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Nezahualcóyotl, and Chilpancingo and draws on key national indicators.   
The findings indicate that decentralization has significantly increased the 
authority and autonomy of Mexican municipalities, but that these changes have not 
necessarily led to local governments that are responsive and accountable to citizens or 
allow for citizens’ active engagement in public affairs.  Further analysis of these findings 
suggests that municipal political institutions create few incentives for public authorities to 
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prohibition on reelection all combine to undermine accountability and responsiveness.   
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Introduction: Democracy Close to Home?   
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, decentralization reforms swept across Latin America and the 
world as almost every country implemented measures to strengthen the authority and 
autonomy of local governments.  Mexico was no exception.  Proponents argued that 
decentralization had the potential to improve democratic governance by making elected 
authorities more responsive, since they would be closer to citizens and better able to 
discern what their preferences were.  In addition, decentralization would bring citizens 
closer to government, allowing them to know what their elected authorities were doing 
and to hold them accountable.  It would also, according to some proponents, allow 
citizens to be more actively engaged in deliberation about public affairs.  
Decentralization would thus create a better quality of representation, greater 
transparency, and more opportunities for citizen participation.   As a result, government 
would be responsive and accountable to citizens, who would, in turn, be actively engaged 
in deliberation about public affairs.  
Most of what we know about the relationship between decentralization and 
democratic governance is from the experience of the developed world.  In most of those 
countries, the construction of democratic institutions and the extension of citizenship 
rights took place during a period of centralization, and decentralization has taken place 
after these rights and institutions have been largely determined.1 In contrast, in Mexico, 
 
1 See T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, London: Pluto, 1987 [1950].  Citizenship rights are, of 
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as in much of the developing world, decentralization has coincided with a period of 
democratic transition.  Therefore, local governments are being empowered at the same 
time that political institutions at all levels of government are being constructed and 
citizenship rights negotiated and expanded.   We know very little about how 
decentralization affects democratic governance in contexts where political institutions are 
still under construction and citizenship rights are often weakly defined and enforced. 
This dissertation examines whether decentralization to municipal governments in 
Mexico has improved democratic governance by enhancing representation, ensuring 
transparency, and creating new opportunities for citizen participation.  In Mexico, 
decentralization began in 1980s and accelerated after 1996, during a period in which 
Mexico was in transition from being a one-party dominant state to a competitive 
multiparty democracy.  Decentralization to municipalities in Mexico has been the result 
not only of transfers of functions, resources, and powers from the federal government, but 
also a result of municipal governments asserting their role vis-à-vis both the federal 
government and state governments.  Decentralization has been both a top-down and a 
bottom-up process through which municipal governments have gained considerable new 
authority and autonomy within the Mexican state. 
Municipalities played an important role in the democratic transition itself, becoming 
the first arenas of political competition in a still authoritarian regime.  By 2004, the vast 
majority of municipalities had undergone at least one change of political party in power.  
They also had a degree of authority and autonomy far greater than they had only a few 
 
course, still being negotiated, extended, and restricted in these countries, and political institutions are 
frequently modified (see, for example, Judith N. Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, on the United States).  However, periods of the greatest 
expansion of citizenship rights have generally coincided with periods of centralization.  Indeed, the struggle 
for inclusive rights has often led to greater central government intervention to ensure equal access to rights. 
4
years earlier.  Given these favorable conditions, this research explores how democratic 
governance in municipalities changed over time as local governments expanded their 
role.  To understand this, I review the existing framework for decentralization and 
municipal governance in Mexico and then conduct three case studies of municipalities 
governed by different political parties and located in different regions of the country: 
Tijuana, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, and Chilpancingo (see Figure 1.1).   
 
Figure 1.1: Figure of Mexico Showing Tijuana, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, and Chilpancingo 
I find that municipalities have, for the most part, become vibrant arenas of political 
competition and generally comply with the requirements of polyarchy: free and fair 
elections accompanied by an almost universal right to vote, organize, express opinions, 
share information, and serve as a candidate for election.2 Moreover, municipalities have 
 
2 Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989, especially 
Chapter 15.  However, there is some debate whether polyarchy is well entrenched in all states and 
municipalities in Mexico.  There are areas where the right to organize is still systematically violated and 
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increasingly sought to strengthen the role of municipal councils, make information on 
finances and policy decisions accessible to the public, and implement participatory 
mechanisms to involve citizens in municipal planning.  These efforts should contribute to 
making municipal governments more responsive and accountable and generate important 
arenas for public deliberation. 
Nonetheless, these advances also show important limitations.  Even with the advent 
of competition, elected officials have few incentives to be responsive or accountable to 
citizens and, instead, have significant incentives to respond to the wishes of authorities at 
other levels of government or within party hierarchies.  Transparency initiatives are only 
weakly institutionalized in most municipalities and frequently undermined by the actual 
behavior of municipal officials.  Participatory mechanisms for planning, though 
frequently attempted, rarely appear to have much impact on public decision-making and 
serve primarily as venues for strategic bargaining among local leaders rather than arenas 
for public deliberation.  Local governments are far more democratic than they once were, 
but decentralization during a period of democratic transition has brought government 
closer to citizens without necessarily bringing citizens closer to government.  
Two legacies of the authoritarian past explain why decentralization has not always 
produced the kind of ongoing vibrant democratic experience at a local level that theory 
suggests.  First, the institutional structure of municipalities creates few incentives for 
elected representatives to be responsive or accountable to their constituents.  Party list 
elections with guaranteed majorities for the largest party and prohibitions on reelection 
and independent candidacies combine to strengthen the influence of party leaderships in 
 
citizens are unsure if their votes have been counted fairly.  However, most Mexican municipalities, 
including the cases studied here, meet the conditions of polyarchy. 
6
the selection of candidates and make elected municipal authorities primarily responsive 
and accountable to those above them in the party hierarchy.  Second, political practices of 
clientelism and control that were common during the period of one party dominant rule 
have survived the change to a regime of competitive democracy.  These practices, which 
create a form of “indirect citizenship” in which individuals can enforce their rights or be 
heard by public authorities only by using political intermediaries, were created during a 
period of one party dominant rule, but have been adapted to a period of multiparty 
competition.  These practices thrive in large part because citizens have few alternatives to 
influence public decisions that affect them and local institutions create few incentives for 
direct government accountability to citizens.  This phenomenon is not merely a case of 
authoritarian leaders surviving at local levels after they are thrust out of power nationally, 
but rather the permeation of authoritarian practices among the range of political actors, 
old and new, that contest power in Mexico.  The deficiencies in the institutional structure 
of municipalities and the weak enforcement of citizenship rights conspire to sustain these 
authoritarian practices even with the advent of political competition.   
Nonetheless, I also find a marked difference in democratic governance across 
municipalities.  These differences appear to depend on a third factor, which is the nature 
of social organizations and their linkages to the political system, prior to decentralization.  
In cases where vibrant social organizations existed and contested power, local 
governments, once empowered, tend to be somewhat more responsive and accountable.  
The existence of multiple sources of political mediation leads to the development of 
competing channels of influence that allow citizens more options for having their voice 
heard and for monitoring public authorities.  Even though these municipal 
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governmentsstill suffer from weak representation and do little to encourage real public 
deliberation, they allow more opportunities for citizen influence and control. 
Surprisingly, I find that in Mexico’s highly party-centric political system, social 
organizations with close links to political parties actually seem to create more 
opportunities for citizen influence in public decision-making than highly autonomous 
social organizations, even if the latter are often more internally democratic.   
These findings contribute to our understanding of the relationship between 
decentralization and democratic governance by suggesting that the practices of political 
actors, the configuration of civil society, and the nature of political institutions together 
help determine the success of decentralization reforms.  Decentralization reforms that fail 
to pay attention to the structure of the relationship of organizations, institutions, and 
practices at a local level are not likely to succeed in producing expected benefits for 
democratic governance.  In a context of weak citizenship rights, making government 
closer to people does not necessarily guarantee responsiveness and accountability, much 
less deliberative decision-making. Moreover, authoritarian political practices that precede 
decentralization may shape the way local governments relate to citizens as they assume 
their new functions, powers, and resources.  Polyarchy alone does not ensure good 
democratic governance if the prevailing institutions and practices that link citizens and 
the state are inherently exclusionary and social organizations are too disparate and 
weakly linked to the political process to provide a channel for citizens to have a voice in 
public decision-making. 
These findings also highlight the importance of understanding local governance 
within debates on democratic transition and consolidation.  Traditionally local 
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governments have been seen as potential laboratories of democratic experimentation 
where citizens can learn practices of public deliberation and government oversight.  If, in 
fact, local democracy is permeated by legacies of the authoritarian past, further efforts at 
all levels of government may be required to address these legacies by redefining 
democratic institutions, strengthening civil society, and transforming political practices.  
Local democracy should not be seen a residual category in democratic debates; rather, it 
is one of the foundations on which the rest of the democratic edifice in a society is 
constructed.  The health of local democracy helps determine the health of a democracy 




The Conceptual Link between Decentralization and Democratic Governance 
 
2.1 Overview  
 
Does decentralization to municipal governments improve democratic governance?  
The literature sheds light on this relationship but falls far short on answering this 
question.   This chapter begins by defining the two key concepts—decentralization and 
democratic governance—and then addresses the literature that discusses the relationship 
between them. 
 
2.2 Defining Decentralization  
Decentralization refers to the redistribution of power within the state between the 
central government and other public authorities.  Most previous works on 
decentralization have focused on decentralization as a transfer of power from the central 
government to other entities.  In an influential work, Dennis Rondinelli and his 
collaborators define decentralization as the “transfer of planning, decision-making, or 
administrative authority from the central government to its field organizations, local 
administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organizations, local governments or 
nongovernmental organizations.”1 Some studies continue to use this broad definition, 
 
1 Dennis A. Rondinelli and Shabbir Cheema, “Implementing Decentralization Policies: an Introduction,” in 
Cheema and Rondinelli, eds., Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing 
Countries, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983, p. 18.  See also Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis, 
and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience, 
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which includes everything from empowering local governments to privatizing state 
functions.  However, in practice, most contemporary discussions of decentralization refer 
principally to the transfer of functions, powers, and resources from the central 
government to subnational governments.2 One World Bank study, for example, refers to 
decentralization as “the process of devolving political, fiscal, and administrative powers 
to subnational units of government.”3 Ribot describes decentralization as “any act by 
which central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels 
 
Washington, DC: The World Bank 1983.  They then separated decentralization further into 
deconcentration, in which national government decentralizes to national government agencies outside the 
capital; delegation, in which decentralization takes place to semi-autonomous governmental agencies (e.g. 
central banks, parastatal companies); devolution, in which decentralization is to subnational governments; 
and privatization, which is to non-governmental organizations, businesses, and other private entities.  
Rondinelli and Cheema, “Implementing Decentralization Policies,” and Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema, 
Decentralization in Developing Countries.  A more recent definition by Rondinelli is “the transfer of 
authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to subordinate or quasi-
independent government organizations or the private sector…”  Dennis A. Rondinelli, “What is 
Decentralization?” in Jennie Litvack and Jessica Seddon, eds. Decentralization Briefing Notes, 
Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 1999. 
2 Most recent studies of decentralization, both by multilateral institutions and scholars, focus their 
discussion of decentralization on devolution (even in cases, such as Litvack and Seddon, cited below, 
where they use a broad definition at the outset). Among World Bank studies, see Shahid Javed Burki, 
Guillermo E. Perry, and William R. Dillinger, Beyond the Center: Decentralizing the State, Washington, 
DC: The World Bank, 1999; Jennie Litvack and Jessica Seddon, eds. Decentralization Briefing Notes, 
Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 1999; Jennie Litvack, Junaid Ahmad, and Richard Bird, Rethinking 
Decentralization in Developing Countries, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998; George E. Peterson, 
Decentralizationin Latin America: Learning through Experience, Washington, DC: The World Bank 1997; 
Anwar Shah, Balance, Accountabilty, and Responsiveness: Lessons about Accountability, Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 2021, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1998; Anwar Shah and Theresa Thompson, 
Implementing Decentralized Local Governance: A Treacherous Road with Potholes, Detours, and Road 
Closures, Policy Research Paper No. 3353, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004; and James Manor, The 
Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999.  Among 
academic studies, see Tulia G. Falleti, “A Sequentinal Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in 
Comparative Perspective,” Americxan Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3, August 2005; Richard C. 
Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, 
Accountability, and Performance, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998;  Philip Oxhorn, Joseph S. 
Tulchin, and Andrew D. Selee, eds., Decentralization, Democratic Governance, and Civil Society in 
Comparative Perspective: Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2003; Joseph S. Tulchin and Andrew D. Selee, eds, Decentralization and Democratic Governance in Latin 
America, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2004; Arun Agrawal and Jesse C. Ribot, 
“Accountability in Decentralization: A Framework with South Asian and West African Cases,” The 
Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 33, Summer 1999, pp. 473-502; and Jesse C. Ribot, Waiting for 
Democracy: The Politics of Choice in Natural Resource Decentralization, Washington, DC: World 
Resources Institute, 2004; as well as many others cited in this chapter. 
3 Burki, Perry, and Dillinger, Beyond the Center, p. 3.   
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in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy.”4 Others have further confined their 
definition to the devolution of powers to democratically elected bodies.  Crook and 
Manor, for example, refer to “democratic decentralization” as the “devolution of power, 
responsibility and sometimes resources on to democratically elected councils at local or 
intermediate levels.”5
Therefore, I argue that transfers from the central state are only one form of 
decentralization.  Decentralization can also be achieved through the strengthening of 
subnational governments vis-à-vis the central government.  Indeed, most contemporary 
scholarship on decentralization, in practice, includes forms of decentralization that are 
not transfers from the central government.6 The kinds of decentralization that do not 
involve direct transfers include measures to clarify the legal framework and 
responsibilities of subnational governments, enhance their fiscal powers, and increase 
their capacities and responsibilities.7 These measures are sometimes the result of central 
government actions, but they are often the outcome of efforts by local governments 
themselves.  Moreover, attempts by local governments to develop their own tax base or 
assume new functions, thus increasing their relative importance vis-à-vis the central 
government, may be profoundly decentralizing without requiring transfers from the 
national government.  Similarly, court decisions that extend the jurisdiction of 
subnational governments may contribute to decentralization without involving transfers.  
 
4 Ribot, Waiting for Democracy, p. 8. 
5 Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa, p. 1.  Cf. Agrawal and 
Ribot, “Accountability in Decentralization.” 
6 The notable exception are initiatives to decentralize the health and education sectors, which tend to be 
focused primarily on transfers of central government responsibilities. 
7 For decentralization scholarship that in practice discusses decentralization not only in terms of transfers 
but also the development of fiscal and physical capacity locally, see Merilee Grindle, Audacious Reforms; 
Peterson, Decentralization in Latin America; Litvak, Junad, and Bird, eds., Rethinking Decentralization, 
and Ribot, Waiting for Democracy. 
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Moreover, in some cases, decentralization reforms actually involve shifting resources 
from intermediate levels of government to municipal governments, rather than between 
national and subnational governments.8
As a result, I propose a somewhat different approach to defining decentralization, one 
which is not based exclusively on the notion of transfers from the national government to 
subnational authorities, but rather emphasizes the increase in the functions, powers, and 
resources of subnational governments vis-à-vis the national government.9 Under this 
definition, decentralization is the increase in the authority of subnational governments 
over functions, powers, and resources and of their autonomy for decision-making over 
these relative to the national government. This shifts the locus of agency from the central 
government alone to that of all the various levels of government which may be involved 
in decentralization.  It also better represents the kinds of decentralization that are included 
in most contemporary research—and most political debates—on the subject. 
Authority 
Local governments are only significant administrative and political entities to the 
extent that they actually do things that matter in citizens’ lives.  This requires that local 
governments have authority, that is, a set of functions, powers, and resources of their 
own.  Functions are the services that governments provide.  On a local level, this may 
include building, maintaining, and operating basic infrastructure (e.g. streets, parks, 
 
8 See Grindle, Audacious Reforms, for example. 
9 Agrawal and Ribot, “Accountability in Decentralization,” combines what I call “authority and autonomy” 
into one concept of “powers” and place a special emphasis on the nature of actors; however, in many ways, 
these two approaches share a similar concern for understand what subnational governments do and what 
margin of discretion they have. Cf. Ribot, Waiting for Democracy. 
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drinking water, sewage) and providing other basic services (e.g. preventive healthcare, 
recreational activities, registration of births, deaths, and marriages).  Powers, on the other 
hand, refer to the policymaking authority that governments have to regulate social, 
economic, and political life.  For local governments, this may range from creating 
regulations for local activities (e.g. markets, transportation) to implementing municipal 
planning or setting criminal codes and electoral legislation.  Finally, resources are the 
funds with which the government carries out its activities.   
Since decentralization is, by definition, a relational term, we are concerned with the 
way authority changes over time, in other words, whether functions, powers, and 
resources of subnational government increase.  Decentralization is often measured in 
terms of the percentage of public resources that subnational governments exercise or the 
increase in their absolute resources.  While these measures are often a useful shorthand 
for quantifying decentralization, a fuller understanding can only be obtained from looking 
at fiscal measures together with the legal framework that defines the functions and 
powers of subnational governments and the actual functions and powers they exercise.  




To be relevant for democracy, subnational governments also need to have a degree of 
discretion to make decisions over how they employ their functions, powers, and 
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resources.10 Autonomy refers to the degree to which subnational governments have 
discretion in decision-making.  The autonomy of subnational governments is often 
limited by formal and informal rules.  In some cases, subnational governments may have 
responsibility for implementing services, but little policymaking authority.11 In other 
cases, responsibilities for certain policy arenas may be concurrent between different 
levels of government, so that higher levels of government have de facto veto power.  In 
still other cases, subnational governments may have decision-making autonomy in some 
policy areas but their decisions are subject to review and modification by other levels of 
government.12 
Subnational government may also find they have limited autonomy if they do not 
have control over their own resources.  When subnational governments raise most of their 
revenues, they can generally ensure their autonomy in fiscal matters.  Similarly, if they 
receive transfers from higher levels of government that are set by formulas, with little 
margin for changes in the amount or method of allocation, they can also generally ensure 
their autonomy.  On the other hand, subnational governments have limited autonomy 
when they depend on discretionary transfers from higher levels of government which 
have the ability to alter the nature, amount, and timing of transfers. 
For this reason, many studies use the percentage of own-source revenue (locally 
raised revenue), known as the “vertical balance,” as shorthand for understanding the 
degree of autonomy that subnational governments have.13 However, this measure, 
 
10 Cf. Ribot, Waiting for Democracy, Agrawal and Ribot, “Accountability in Decentralization.”   
11 Education decentralization in Mexico, for example, initially gave states responsibility for schools but did 
not allow them to set curriculum or teachers’ salaries.  (This has since changed.) 
12 This has been the case for Mexican municipal governments in a number of policy areas, at least until a 
recent Supreme Court decision that will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
13 World Bank, “Fiscal Decentralization Indicators,” published on the web at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm, accessed June 26, 2005. 
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although useful for understanding local revenue capacity, may be misleading as a 
measure of autonomy.14 Transfers that are set by formula may also ensure the autonomy 
of subnational governments and, as we argue in Chapter 5, also play an important role in 
promoting equity among different subnational governments with widely varying 
possibilities for raising their own local revenue.  Indeed, increasing the percentage of 
own-source revenue for subnational governments may increase the autonomy of 
subnational governments (by giving them decision-making control over fiscal matters), 
while undermining the authority many of them have if they have disparate abilities to 
raise local revenue.  Therefore, to measure autonomy, we need to look not only at own-
source revenue but also the security of transfers, and the degree to which subnational 
governments have full decision-making discretion over their own functions, powers, and 
resources. 
 
2.3 Defining Democratic Governance 
As a robust political ideal, democracy is about how citizens in a political 
community engage in public reasoning and make collective decisions through pre-
established rules and institutions in conditions of political equality.15 In practice, 
democratic governance requires that citizens elect their public authorities freely, have 
input into setting the public agenda, and can hold their authorities accountable for their 
 
14 For an economic argument on why transfers are necessary to subnational governments, see  
James M. Buchanan, “Federalism and Fiscal Equity,” American Economic Review, Vol. 40, No. 4, 
September 1950, pp. 583-99.   
15 Amartya Sen, “Why Democratization is Not the Same as Westernization: Democracy and its Global 
Roots,” New Republic, October 6, 2003. 
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decisions.16 It is, therefore, about how governments are responsive and accountable to 
citizens, who in turn are able to be engaged in reasoning about public matters, expressed 
through elections and other forms of participation in public affairs.  Democratic 
governance, in turn, refers to the way the relationship between public authorities and 
citizens takes place in specific contexts in a democratic regime. 
 Democracy as a normative ideal is based on the notion that all members of the 
community are political equals and that they should be the ultimate arbiters of public 
authority.17 In small communities, citizenship was often based on members’ direct 
participation in community affairs; however, in complex modern democracies citizenship 
has become an impersonal legal category that assigns uniform rights and responsibilities 
to all members of the community.18 Citizenship rights and responsibilities are no longer 
functions of a member’s standing in the community or her active participation in 
community affairs, but a category assumed a priori for all members.  Good democratic 
governance presumes that citizens can avail themselves of their rights within the 
community on equal terms with all other members of the community. 
The exigencies of modern democratic societies require that citizens assign 
authority for most major decisions to elected representatives who act on their behalf.  The 
normative ideal of democracy as rule by the people is preserved to the extent that citizens 
 
16 Sartori, for example, notes that “large-scale democracy is a procedure and/or a mechanism that (a) 
generates an open polyarchy whose competitions on the electoral market (b) attributes power to the people 
and (c) specifically enforces the responsiveness of the leaders to the led.”  Giovanni Sartori, A Theory of 
Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debate, Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 
1987, p. 156. 
17 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics; Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature and Limits 
of State Power, translated by Peter Kennealy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 
18 J.G.A. Pocock, “The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times,” in Ronald Beiner, ed., Theorizing 
Citizenship, Albany: State University of New York, 1995; Dahl (Democracy and Its Critics) notes that most 
societies draw some boundaries to this to exclude minors and those who may have limited mental capacity.  
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regularly elect representatives who are responsive and accountable to them.19 Systems of 
representation based on competitive elections, when embedded in a strong system of 
civil and political rights, allow citizens to signal their preferences at the ballot box and 
reward or punish elected officials for their decisions after the fact.20 Elections can 
perform this function only when they are free and fair and are embedded in a strong 
system of civil and political rights that include freedom of expression, broad access to 
information, the right to organize autonomous associations, and universal suffrage with 
the right to be a candidate for election, a set of conditions Dahl has called “polyarchy.”21 
Electoral systems face significant problems under conditions of unequal access to 
information, weak party systems, and the absence of re-election, but even under 
suboptimal conditions elections still give citizens a degree of control over the decision-
making process in a democracy.22 In Dahl’s terms, these systems are polyarchies because 
multiple centers of power exist and compete against each other for influence producing a 
dispersion of power within society.23 
Nonetheless, elections are largely a “blunt instrument”: they allow citizens to 
express their prospective preferences for a candidate and her agenda and to reward or 
punish her after the fact.24 Elections alone provide citizens with little input into the 
 
19 Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds., Democracy, Accountability, and 
Representation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.   
20 Morris Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1981. 
21 Robert Dahl lists seven conditions for polyarchy: elected officials; free and fair elections; inclusive 
suffrage; right to run for office; freedom of expression; alternative information; and associational 
autonomy.  Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989, list and 
discussion in Chapter 15. 
22 Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds., Democracy, Accountability, and 
Representation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.  On the economic benefits of real world 
polyarchies, see Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein, The Democracy 
Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace, New York : Routledge, 2005. 
23 Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. 
24 For the limitation that elections face as mechanisms of accountability, see the editors’ introduction in 
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actions of elected officials between elections and, in and of themselves, give citizens no 
way to know what their representatives are doing on their behalf.  For this reason, it is 
important to have an institutional framework that allows citizens to monitor the decisions 
and actions of their elected authorities and gives them a voice in public affairs between 
elections, that is, systems that allow for the free flow of information between elected 
authorities and citizens between elections and encourage authorities’ responsiveness to 
citizen demands.  Without these mechanisms for transparency and participation to ensure 
an ongoing reciprocal relationship between citizens and representatives, competitive 
democracies become “delegative democracies,” political systems where citizens matter 
only at election time and they lack influence to make their voices heard between elections 
or even sufficient information to make informed decisions at election time.25 
Democracies that lack mechanisms for citizen voice are weakly responsive and end up 
encouraging “exit” strategies; that is, citizens refuse to participate in other aspects of 
public life, such as paying taxes or obeying laws.26 Democracies that have no 
mechanisms for citizens to know what their authorities are doing are only weakly 
accountable. 
Transparency and citizen participation fulfill more than a functional role in 
ensuring responsiveness and accountability.  By establishing an ongoing reciprocal 
 
Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin, eds., Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Among other 
concerns, they note that it is hard for voters both to choose candidates prospectively and reward or punish 
candidates (or their parties) retrospectively.  In this case, the responsiveness and accountability functions of 
elections actually may come into conflict. 
25 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, No. 5, January 2004, pp. 56-69. 
26 The wealthy often “exit” from the public provision of goods by creating their own mechanisms for 
private provision (for example, private security forces and private electrical generation are quite common in 
wealthy communities in Latin America).  In some cases, the poor—or the best educated—may choose to 
“exit” by migrating, as well.  On voice and exit strategies, see Alberto O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty: Responses to Declines in Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1970. 
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relationship between citizens and their elected authorities between elections, they provide 
citizens the opportunity to engage in public reasoning, the normative basis of 
democracy.27 Democracies that provide active opportunities for citizen engagement in 
public affairs, along with extensive access to information, give citizens a stake in public 
decisions and may at times encourage the search for the common good above private 
interests.28 They are “strong democracies” that develop individuals as agents of public 
reasoning rather than as occasional decision-makers at election time.29 They are 
democracies in which citizens and elected authorities have co-responsibility for public 
decisions.  Few—if any—democracies function entirely in this way, but as a strong 
normative ideal, democracy requires more than the delegation of authority (no matter 
how responsive and accountable), but also a constant reciprocal engagement of citizens 
and elected authorities in the process of governance. 
I argue that we need a theory of democratic governance that takes into account 
these three elements described above: a system of representation, government 
transparency, and opportunities for citizen participation.  Taken together, these three 
elements help ensure responsiveness and accountability of elected authorities and create 
opportunities for a rich citizen engagement in the political process.  The research in this 
project examines democratic governance in the light of these three elements. 
 
27 Sen, “Why Democratization is not the Same as Westernization.” 
28 Cf. David A. Crocker, “Sen and Deliberative Democracy,” in Alexander Kafman, ed., Capabilities 
Equality: Basic Issues and Problems, New York: Routledge, 2006; Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 
Democracy and Disagreement, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1996.   
29 Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy, second edition, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, p. 
xxiii; cf. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970; and Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, second edition, Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1978 [1958].  Amartya Sen refers to this as the “intrinsic” benefit of democracy.  Amartya 
Sen, Development as Freedom, New York: Anchor Press, 2000, see chapter 6 for the discussion on the 
intrinsic benefits of democracy. 
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Systems of Representation 
Systems of representation refer to the way that public authorities are elected and 
under what conditions they serve.30 Normatively, systems of representation should 
produce elected authorities who are responsive and accountable to citizens’ wishes, 
claims, and reasons.31 This requires, first and foremost, that they meet the requirements 
of polyarchy discussed above: free and fair elections; inclusive suffrage; right to run for 
office; freedom of expression; alternative information; and associational autonomy.  Even 
when these conditions are met, however, institutional design plays a significant role in 
the way elected officials respond to citizens’ concerns.     
Elections express, in part, citizens prospective preferences for policy (or, at least, 
for candidates), and how systems translate these preferences into seats within 
representatives bodies plays a part in the system’s responsiveness.  Mill refers 
“representation in proportion to numbers” as “the first principle of democracy.”32 
Elections for executives generally are winner-take-all contests; however, in legislative 
 
30 A broader discussion of the concept of representation might encompass all three elements described 
above.  Indeed, representative democracy is about more than the election of representatives; rather, it refers 
to the way that citizens and elected officials interact to ensure an effective combination of delegation with 
ultimately accountability to citizens.  Pitkin, for examples states that, “Political representation is primarily a 
public, institutionalized arrangement involving many people and groups, and operating in the complex 
ways of large-scale social arrangements….It is representation if the people (or a constituency) are present 
in governmental action, even though they do not literally act for themselves.”  In this definition, 
representation thus encompasses the range of reciprocal interactions between citizens and elected 
authorities in the process of governing.  However, for purposes of this project, I use the term “systems of 
representation” to refer to the way public authorities are elected and under what conditions they govern, 
and use “transparency” and “participation” to refer to other aspects of the reciprocal relationship between 
citizens and elected authorities, understanding that all three are part and parcel of representative 
democracy.  Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978 [1967], quote on pp. 221-222.  For a more restricted approach to representative democracy, 
primarily centered on elections, see Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
31 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978 [1967].  Cf. also 
the introduction in Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin, eds., Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. 
32 John Stuart Mill, “On Representative Government,” in Three Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1975, p. 252. 
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elections, electoral design plays a vital role in how preferences are translated into 
electoral results.33 Whether minority preferences are represented proportionally plays a 
significant role in how much these are taken into account by elected officials.34 Systems 
that overrepresent or underrepresent expressed preferences often risk weakening 
responsiveness.35 
Design also influences the extent to which systems create downward 
accountability, that is, accountability to citizens.36 In representative democracies, 
retrospective voting plays an important role in ensuring downward accountability since 
elected officials depend on citizens for their continuation in office.37 However, in many 
systems, elected officials may be more concerned with party officials or authorities at 
other levels of government.  In most contemporary democratic systems, elected 
authorities have some degree of upward accountability to party leaders; however, 
representatives lose their ability to represent if their attention is primarily directed 
upward—individually or collectively—to party leaders or other government officials with 
little concern for constituents’ opinions and preferences.38 The absence of reelection 
coupled with closed party lists may undermine representation by providing few 
 
33 See Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: an Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, 
and Outcomes, New York: New York University Press, 1997; William H. Riker, Liberalism Against 
Populism: a Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice, San 
Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman, 1982; and Arend Lijphart, “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 
1945-85,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 2, June 1990. 
34 The consequences of different electoral systems on patterns of representation—and which citizen views 
are included and excluded—are covered in Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms 
and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999. 
35 Ironically, systems that produce majoritarian outcomes may encourage accountability, by making it clear 
who is making decisions, but they undermine responsiveness ex ante by underrepresenting key 
constituencies.  John Ferejohn, “Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Authority,” in 
Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin, eds., Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. 
36 On downward accountability, see Ribot, Waiting for Democracy. 
37 Fiorina, Retrospective Voting. 
38 We need to concede an intermediate category: one where individual legislators may be primarily loyal to 
party leaders but collectively they are downwardly accountable (worrying about their party not losing the 
next election).  Most parliaments that are democratically accountable function this way. 
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consequences for policymakers who ignore citizens’ preferences and significant 
consequences for those who disobey party leaders.39 Similarly, high barriers to entry into 
politics, such as a small number of political parties that are centrally controlled, may also 
undermine accountability, since it encourages collusion among leaders of the parties with 
a monopoly on political power.40 
Transparency and Monitoring 
High information costs in a democracy undermine the degree to which citizens 
can hold elected officials accountable and limit the quality of deliberation.  Democratic 
governance requires that citizens have ways of knowing what their elected 
representatives are doing on their behalf.  This requirement includes having timely 
information on decisions made by public authorities, who makes these decisions (e.g. 
votes and procedures), and how resources are allocated (e.g. budgets, salaries, contracts).  
Both the kind of information available and the ways that citizens can access it are critical 
for transparency.  Good democratic governance requires that public authorities publish 
information on their actions, decisions, and expenditures frequently and citizens be able 
to get most of this information on demand.  It also requires that this information be 
presented in a form that is accessible to most citizens (i.e., reports are widely distributed, 
figures are clearly understandable) and that rules and procedures for making decisions be 
published ahead of time with citizens having access to real-time information as key 
 
39 Cf. Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, p. 16. 
40 Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan C. Stokes, “Elections and Representation,” in Przeworski, 
Stokes, and Manin, eds., Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, pp. 46-48. 
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decisions are being made. 
 Transparency—understood as citizens’ access to information about what their 
elected authorities are doing on their behalf—is a sine que non of accountability.  
Without it, elected authorities can act with impunity.  Transparency alone is insufficient 
to ensure that citizens can monitor—and hold accountable—their elected officials, but it 
is an essential component.41 In many cases, institutions of horizontal accountability, such 
as courts and ombudsmen, can help encourage transparency and ensure elected officials’ 
compliance with established rules and procedures.  To the extent that these autonomous 
bodies within the government have the power to compel government action, they often 
play a fundamental role in ensuring the prompt disclosure of information and respect for 
established procedures for policymaking.42 
Opportunities for Citizen Participation 
Good democratic governance requires that citizens have clear opportunities to 
make their voice heard to public authorities.  These include both established rules on how 
to bring suggestions, demands, and complaints to the attention of elected authorities (and 
their appointed representatives) and established mechanisms to solve community 
problems or set priorities for public expenditures that encourage public discussion among 
citizens and government authorities.   
The existence of these opportunities can improve responsiveness by providing 
 
41 I am grateful to Jonathan Fox for pointing this out.  
42 Andreas Schedler, “Conceptualizing Accountability. The Self-Restraining State : Power 
and Accountability in New Democracies,” in  Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. 
Plattner, eds., The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999. 
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regular mechanisms for elected authorities to know what citizens want.  Moreover, when 
these institutional channels do not exist, citizens are forced to use either use personal 
connections (particularism) or patronage networks (clientelism) to be heard, or they 
simply have no voice in the policy process between elections.  The creation of 
institutional channels for participation may encourage citizens to have a voice in 
governance and to do so through public, rather than private, channels.   
If these channels for voice and deliberation are well-designed, they can also 
encourage citizens to engage in public deliberation around issues of concern and search 
for collective solutions to shared problems, thus responding to the normative ideal of 
democracy as a process of public reasoning.43 However, considerable disagreement 
exists within the literature on what the role of deliberation should be within governance.  
Deliberative theorists argue that deliberation should help people go beyond their 
particular interests to develop a collective sense of the common good.  In effect, by 
debating priorities, citizens can generate a sense of common purpose that is superior to 
that which emerges from strategic bargaining among them.44 Shapiro, on the other hand, 
warns that deliberation, without attention to equalizing power relationships, may actually 
end up benefiting already privileged groups.45 
Like Shapiro, I take a cautious approach to deliberation in this research.  I 
consider the ability for citizens to engage in public reasoning—that is, an ongoing debate 
about public matters—vital, but have few expectations that this process will, in fact, lead 
 
43 Sen, op. cit.
44 David Crocker, “Deliberative Participation : The Capabilities Approach and Deliberative Democracy," 
chapter 11 in The Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy,
unpublished book manuscript; Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement;
Daniel Yanelovich, Coming to Judgement: Making Democracy Work in a Complex World, Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1991. 
45 Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.  For 
Shapiro, the ideal of “non-domination” may help groups decide when deliberation is to be instituted.  
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to a reasoned search for the common good.  Having the ability to engage in public 
reasoning is an intrinsic basis of democracy, and it may also have particular instrumental 
benefits in democratizing societies where citizens are developing new capacities for 
expressing their views and respecting those of others.  However, producing consensus 
decisions through debate may be less important than simply ensuring citizens’ voice in 
political decisions.  Therefore, when I refer to opportunities for citizen participation as a 
means to public deliberation, I am looking at ways that citizens have an opportunity to 
reason among themselves and with public authorities regardless of whether this involves 
strategic bargaining or a search for common good.  My only requirement for public 
deliberation is that it allow citizens and public authorities to express themselves and 
listen to each other, no matter what the motivation or outcome of this process.  I argue 
that opportunities for citizen participation within governance play a vital role in enabling 
citizens to voice their concerns and express their interests, whether to other citizens or to 
elected authorities.  Deliberation as a means of reaching majority agreement is one way 
this result obtains but it far from the only way. 
The question of citizen participation is not without complications, however.  The 
design of the rules and institutions for participation, and the nature of the society in which 
they are implemented, can lead to significantly different outcomes.  Institutions for 
participation may empower segments of society that were formerly excluded, but they 
may also empower privileged segments of society at the expense of others or just reward 
vocal minorities.  Participatory channels may undercut particularistic or clientelistic 
networks by creating public channels for citizens to have access to being heard, but they 
may also reinforce existing networks.  These mechanisms may enrich the institutions of 
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representation by giving elected authorities better information on what citizens want, or 
they may undercut representation by bypassing elected bodies and establishing direct 
democracy.  Only by examining the nature of participation through existing channels can 
we understand their broader impact on democratic governance.   
 
2.4 The Literature Linking Decentralization and Democratic Governance 
Decentralization has often been linked to values such as efficiency and innovation 
in government.  However, several different theoretical approaches also link it to 
improved democratic governance.  Public choice and institutional economics have been 
particularly interested in the way that decentralization reduces information costs, both for 
citizens and elected officials, thus enhancing the responsiveness of elected authorities to 
citizen preferences and potentially making them more transparent.  Democratic theories 
have emphasized the way that strong local governments may create opportunities for 
citizen participation and deliberation on public matters and encourage the accountability 
of elected officials.  Nonetheless, democratic theorists also worry about uneven power 
relationships within local communities and the potential for decentralization to 
exacerbate these, while institutional economists warn against the distorting effects of 






For scholars of public choice and institutional economics, decentralization can 
help improve the flow of information between principal and agent, ensuring a closer fit 
between citizen preferences and government actions.  Moreover, decentralization reduces 
the scale of activities, which can also help tailor a closer fit between citizens’ preferences 
and government action, something that might otherwise be diluted on a larger scale.  
Eduardo Stein, for example, notes in a recent Inter-American Development Bank paper, 
that: 
With regard to allocation, decentralization can allow a closer match 
between the preferences of the population and the bundle of public goods 
and services chosen by government. If preferences are heterogeneous 
across jurisdictions, the decentralized decision maker can tailor the bundle 
of goods and services, in particular those whose benefits are 
geographically concentrated, to better suit the preferences of the 
population, instead of providing a "one size fits all" bundle for the country 
as a whole.46 
This approach builds on the work by Tiebout and Oates who have argued that 
decentralization helps to internalize externalities of service provision and match 
government services and investments to the preferences of citizens.  It thus provides for 
“allocative efficiency in the face of different local preferences for public goods.”47 
Oates, for example, notes that the fiscal federalism literature: 
…argues that the central government should have basic responsibility for 
the macroeconomic stabilization function, should play a major role in 
income redistribution in terms of financing support for low-income 
households, and should provide national ‘public goods’ whose 
beneficiaries include the residents of all the various jurisdictions in the 
nation.  Subcentral governments have their primary role in the provision of 
goods and services that are consumed ‘locally’.  In this way, outputs of 
 
46 Eduardo Stein, “Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size in Latin America,” Journal of Applied 
Economics, Vol. 2, No. 2, November, 1999, pp. 357-391, quote on p. 362. 
47 Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird, Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries. 
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public services can be tailored to the preferences and circumstances of the 
various geographical constituencies that comprise the nation.48 
Tomassi further argues that decentralization reduces the principal-agent problem.  
With national governments, citizens (principals) are far removed from the agent (elected 
authorities), which makes it difficult to hold them accountable for their actions.  With 
local governments, citizens can more closely reward or punish elected authorities for 
specific decisions related to their local unit.49 This argument suggests both that elected 
authorities on the subnational level have better information than their national 
counterparts about what citizens want and are likely to act on it (responsiveness in 
representation) and that citizens have better information on what elected authorities do 
and can reward or punish them (transparency). 
 However, institutional economics also suggests that the nature of existing 
institutions—both formal and informal—shapes information flows, principal-agent 
relationships, and government performance.50 The institutional structure of 
decentralization is critical to achieving expected effects.  Even if decentralization 
provides a closer match between citizens’ preferences and government decisions, uneven 
capacities to raise revenue and unequal capacities to provide services may undermine 
local government’s ability to be responsive.51 Moreover, weak political institutions may 
 
48 Wallace E. Oates, ed., The Economics of Fiscal Federalism and Local Finance, Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998, p. xiv.  For perhaps the most influential early work on fiscal federalism, 
see Charles M. Tiebout, “A Pure theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 64, 
No. 5, October 1956, pp. 416-24.  Reproduced as chapter 22 in Oates, ed., The Economics of Fiscal 
Federalism. 
49 Mariano Tommasi and Federica Weinschelbaum, “Centralization versus Decentralization: A Principal-
Agent Analysis,” Leitner Program in International and Comparative Political Economy Working Paper 
2003-02, Yale University, 2003. 
50 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, op. cit. 
51 Rémy Prud’homme, “The Dangers of Decentralization,” World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 10, No. 2, 
December 1995, pp. 201-20. 
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not translate citizens’ preferences to government policy.  If local authorities are beholden 
to elites, who have preferential access to political power, principal-agent relationships 
may not function as theory suggests.  Similarly, if local institutions are simply too weak 
to respond to citizen preferences, they will similarly fail to perform as expected.  One 
World Bank report in this vein concludes that “Much of the literature on decentralization, 
normative and empirical, is based on industrial countries and assumes the existence of 
institutions that are usually very weak in developing countries.”52 As a result, 
understanding the institutional structure of decentralization and of local institutions is 
vital to exploring its link to democratic governance. Surprisingly, despite the rich 
literature of institutional design in democracies,53 there is little systematic research on the 




A long-standing debate exists in democratic theory about whether decentralization 
enhances democratic governance.  Many proponents argue that local governments offer 
opportunities for citizens to build on natural units for deliberation where citizenship ties 
are strongest, and to engage with public issues in richer, more active ways. Strengthening 
these will produce positive benefits for citizens’ ability to engage actively in public life, 
both as a deliberator with other citizens and an interlocutor with elected authorities. 
Communitarian theorists, for example, argue that people’s lives are lived in 
 
52 Litvak, Ahmad, and Bird, Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries, p. 2. 
53 For example, Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering; Riker, Liberalism against Populism; 
Lijphart, “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws.” 
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community and that their deepest and densest ties of citizenship can be found in these 
communities.  These ties go beyond the formal rights stated in laws and constitutions and 
include a set of reciprocal norms of conduct defined by people’s ongoing engagement 
with each other.  In other words, there is a denser set of citizenship rights and obligations 
which flow from membership in a smaller political community within the state.  
Following de Toqueville’s insights about American democracy as built essentially 
through close-knit grassroots communities,54 they note that public reasoning is most fluid 
and relevant in people’s lives when it takes place within the context the norms and 
practices of these communities.55 
Similarly, theorists of deliberative democracy generally recognize that local 
communities are an important, though not exclusive, arena for public deliberation, since 
they allow for face-to-face interaction.   Mansbridge’s study of deliberation in New 
England town meetings explored the search for common good that could only take place 
in a community where citizens feel deeply intertwined with each other (1983).56 
Deliberative arenas in small communities also may allow citizens to learn skills and 
values of public deliberation, which they can then apply in larger arenas of public 
 
54 Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America, translated by George Lawrence, New York: HarperCollins 
Perennial Classics, 2000 [1835]. 
55 Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984; Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: The Reinvention of American Society, 
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56 Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy, New York: Basic Books, 1980. 
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reasoning.  Gastil notes that: 
One reason deliberative forums are an effective means of cultural learning 
is that they are, for the most part, small.  Small groups provide people with 
a tangible, visible microcosm of the larger society…Though not always 
consciously, people learn and test social norms, rules, and practices in 
these groups because they are the closest thing to a full society that a 
person can experience.57 
While public reasoning is, by no means, limited to small communities or face-to-
face interactions, deliberative theorists generally agree that local communities and 
small associations form key building blocks for public reasoning.58 
Some democratic theorists also note that local governments can potentially give 
citizens greater opportunities to engage with public agendas.  Young notes that “local 
governance units can best encourage and enable the active participation of citizens in 
raising issues, shaping the policy agenda, making decision and implementing them.”59 
Fung and Wright explore what they call “Empowered Participatory Governance” (EPG), 
systems through which democratic decision-making is devolved to local institutions that 
create joint decision-making between public authorities and citizens.  The institutional 
innovations they explore include participatory budgeting in Brazil, panchayat 
governments in Kerala, India, and school councils in Chicago.  EPG includes “(1) a focus 
 
57 John Gastill, “Cultivating a Deliberative Civic Culture: The Potential Value of Public Deliberation in 
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32
on specific, tangible problems, (2) involvement of ordinary people affected by these 
problems and officials close to them, and (3) the deliberative development of solutions to 
these problems.”60 Decentralization may serve to give citizens and opportunities to 
engage with public issues in more active and more deliberative ways.  This is particularly 
true if participation, which previously took place through informal channels of personal 
influence, is now encouraged through formal channels that allow citizens to deliberate 
and have their voice heard in public, structured fora.61 
These approaches point to exemplary cases where local arenas provide citizens 
with opportunities for a richer democratic experience; however, they tell us little about 
the majority of communities where people live, where conditions for deliberation and 
participation may be far less than ideal.  Skeptics note that small communities are more 
given to “tyranny of the majority” along ethnic, economic, religious, or other grounds, 
while larger political communities tend to dilute this effect by creating ephemeral 
majorities around specific issues rather than permanent majorities.62 Madison, worrying 
about the effect of “factions” over two centuries ago, warned that: 
…a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small 
number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in 
person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.  A common 
passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the 
whole; a communication and concert results from the form of government 
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itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the 
weaker party or an obnoxious individual.63 
Similarly, building on Madison, McConnell observes that local communities tend to 
tyrannize minority opinions and favor elites.   
As Madison observed long ago, the smaller the society, the fewer probably 
are the parties and interests composing it; the fewer these parties and 
interests and the smaller the compass in which they act, the more easily do 
they concert and execute their plans of oppression.  Far from providing 
guarantees of liberty, equality, and concern for the public interest, 
organization of political life by small constituencies tends to enforce 
conformity, to discriminate in favor of elites, and to eliminate public 
values from effective political consideration.  The service of a multitude of 
narrowly constituted political associations is often genuine.  However, this 
service lies in the guarantee of stability and the enforcement of order 
rather than in support for the central values of a liberal society.”64 
Moreover, McConnell notes that the prevalence of personal ties at the local level 
tends to privilege these ongoing interest groups that are well-connected to 
political power and can dominate small communities, whereas “impersonality is 
the guarantee of individual freedom characteristic of the large unit.”65 
Scholars of decentralization have similarly called attention to the dangers 
of “elite capture,” in which local elites are able to use their influence and 
resources to maintain control over local governments and “capture” the benefits 
of decentralization. 66 However, Dahl, in his influential analysis of New Haven, 
argues that even in conditions of economic inequality, political resources tend to 
become diffuse and fragmented, giving citizens considerable influence over 
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competing political elites.  He observes that “minority control by leaders within 
associations [or parties] is not necessarily inconsistent with popular control over 
leaders through electoral processes.”67 According to Dahl, as long as competition 
exists, and the requirements for polyarchy described above are met, a system of 
multiple and overlapping centers of power develop which make citizens the 
ultimate arbiters over who governs. 
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that in decentralized regimes not all local 
governments perform in the same way.  One influential theory, put forth by Putnam, 
argues that different democratic and performance outcomes among localities can best be 
explained in terms of the existing stock of social capital in each.  This stock is a result of 
the social networks and norms of reciprocity that bind citizens together, which are usually 
reflected in the nature of associational life within the community or region.68 In 
Putnam’s view, these stocks of social capital change only slowly over time, and they 
exert a strong influence over the way that local democracies operate.  Localities with 
strong ties are inherently both more democratic and more efficient.  Different democratic 
outcomes can, therefore, be explained in terms of the prevailing political culture, which is 
reflected in the way citizens relate to one another and to public authority.69 
67 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City, New Haven, CT: Yale 
University, 1961, quote on pp. 100-101. 
68 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993.  See also Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000. 
69 Putnam’s theory is an heir to a tradition of theories that emphasize political culture.  Early works that 
influenced this approach include Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, 
Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959; and Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: 
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Palo Alto: Standford University Press, 1963.  A more 
recent application is Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, Princeton: Princeton 




Some theorists have disputed Putnam’s view that social capital is a set stock of 
norms and ties, and urged looking at the way state actors and social actors contest power 
over time as a means to understanding how social capital is shaped.  These scholars argue 
that social capital is not only a static function of the degree of average civic engagement 
within the local political unit, but a result of complex encounters and negotiations over 
time.70 They argue instead that it is far more useful to look at the way existing 
institutions and practices mediate citizens’ insertion in the political process.  They further 
argue that both social movements and political leadership may play a role in reshaping 
institutions and practices,71 although these also have an important inertia built into them 
that may keep changes from taking place as expected.  Migdal, for example, proposes an 
approach he terms “state in society” which looks at how social forces and state actors 
engage in struggles over the terms of domination, thus shaping the contours of both the 
state and society.72 
Dreze and Sen argue that to understand how decentralization shapes democratic 
governance we need to look at the how decentralization reforms empower different 
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people and groups within localities and how these respond to the changes.73 If society is 
structured unequally, different sectors are likely to experience decentralization 
differently.  Armony observes that civil and political rights tend to be distributed 
unevenly in unequal societies.74 Economic inequalities also translate into unequal access 
to the legal system, police protection, and political influence, thus compounding citizens’ 
widely different links to the state.  In cases of severe economic inequality, political 
participation for the poorest segments of society may also serve instrumental purposes 
that belie the democratic purpose of citizenship.  Faced with limited economic security, 
links to individual politicians (particularism), usually in a situation of unequal exchange 
of votes for political favors (clientelism), serve to give poor citizens the only margin of 
influence they have within the political system and ensure personal ties to influential 
people who can help in times of crisis.75 
Mamdani has developed the concept of “indirect citizenship” to describe the way 
citizens in conditions of unequal rights in Africa are linked to political power through 
chains of intermediation.76 This pattern is common in many developing societies and 
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important enclaves within developed ones, where citizens can enforce their rights as 
citizens only by making claims through political brokers. One variation is traditional 
political patronage (clientelism), where citizens vote for a candidate in return for political 
favors.  However, indirect citizenship does not always require an explicit exchange of 
rights for favors.  Rather, it thrives in any system where citizens must appeal to political 
intermediaries to get a hearing with public authorities on a wide range of basic rights and 
demands: access to healthcare, construction of schools, fixing of the local water system, 
police protection, or even avoidance of unjust imprisonment.  In regimes built on indirect 
citizenship, citizens depend on intermediaries for protection and influence.  
Intermediaries may be political officials, neighborhood leaders, union bosses, or any 
number of other locally rooted individuals who have access to political power.  Citizens 
can only make their rights effective either by attaining individual influence (usually by 
getting rich or becoming a broker themselves) or by using the services of these 
intermediaries.   
Indirect citizenship can exist equally within nominally democratic and non-
democratic regimes.  This phenomenon is not necessarily the same as elite capture, which 
suggests the dominance of a single person, group, or family over a locality.  Indeed, 
indirect citizenship can structure social and political relations within a regime that meets 
all of the requirements of polyarchy set forth by Dahl.  Multiple centers of power may 
exist, and compete against each other in free and fair elections, yet each be structured as a 
form of intermediation that keeps citizens from enforcing their rights directly without the 
presence of the intermediaries.  In Mexico, as in much of Latin America, local 
communities were often managed by brokers who served higher level political leaders to 
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maintain order and mobilize votes.  These systems often developed within the context of 
dictatorial, oligarchical, or one-party dominant regimes.  However, it is possible that they 
have survived even with the advent of competitive democracy.   
The possibility thus exists that empowering municipal governments might 
empower these intermediaries instead of average citizens, or a combination of both.   
Examining the impact of decentralization on democratic governance, therefore, requires a 
careful look at how power relations are structured and change over time, that is, which 





Empirical studies of local governance in Mexico and around the world provide 
evidence both of the potential decentralization holds to create more responsive and 
accountable governance and its dangers for fragmenting the public agenda and producing 
unequal local engagement.   
Among the positive signs has been the growth of local government innovation in 
countries around the world.  Three sets of global surveys of decentralization testify to the 
variety and depth of these experiences, although they also caution that many of the 
conditions necessary to produce optimal effects of decentralization on democratic 
governance are absent or only weakly supported in many countries.77 There is no 
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question that decentralization has produced important experiences of “democratic 
innovation” at the local level, generating new ways of linking citizens and their 
governments, at least within the local arena.  At the most basic level, local governments 
have increasingly become elected bodies in many parts of the world, whereas in previous 
decades they were often appointed bodies.78 This is often a direct result of national 
democratic transitions, but in many cases, already democratic (or semi-democratic) 
central governments have instituted elections for local units for the first time.   
Many local governments around the world have experimented with initiatives to 
give citizens a voice in public affairs and allow them to monitor public decisions.  These 
experiences of deepening democracy have included participatory budgeting in Brazil, 
which now takes place in over one hundred municipalities, allowing citizens to 
participate setting priorities for municipal investments.79 Similar experiences of 
participatory budgeting have been carried out in the Philippines, Argentina, and Uruguay 
among other countries.80 In South Africa, local policy initiatives often require extensive 
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citizen consultation, and municipalities in the Philippines and Guatemala have often 
developed similar participatory planning mechanisms.81 In India, decentralization to 
panchayat (local community) units is credited with spawning citizen engagement,82 as it 
has been in Bolivia, with that country’s Popular Participation Law.83 These experiences 
are often credited with forcing elected officials to be more responsive to their 
constituents; giving citizens a more active role in setting municipal priorities; and 
allowing citizens to monitor public investments more closely.  One study of participatory 
budgeting in Brazil by the Inter-American Development Bank found that local 
governments made more efficient and effective investments in infrastructure for poor 
communities when citizens were involved in setting priorities.84 Other studies have noted 
that participatory budgeting empowers new social actors or at least involves old social 
actors in new ways and undercuts traditional forms of clientelism.85 Nonetheless, studies 
also recognize that participatory budgeting has profoundly distinct impacts on state-
society relations in different social contexts and under different designs.86 
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However, these changes also face significant limitations.  Often decentralization 
initiatives, especially in Africa, have not empowered accountable local units but rather 
local governments with little discretionary autonomy or other non-elected authorities, 
such as NGOs, stakeholder groups, or traditional authorities.87 Moreover, local 
governments are often weak in terms of institutional capacity, have uncertain resources, 
and have only short terms in office.  This combination of factors means that citizens do 
not always take local governments seriously as political entities and that municipal 
officials must spend their time in the capital trying to pry loose more resources for local 
initiatives.88 World Bank studies further indicate that there is often a mismatch of 
expectations with institutional design.  Although local governments are expected to 
assume new responsibilities, they often lack the resources, fiscal powers, legal 
framework, and regulatory powers that are needed to carry out their responsibilities.89 
In many cases across regions, elected local governments have political structures 
based on closed party lists.   Party list systems tend to enhance the power of the mayor 
over local legislatures and makes legislators primarily accountable to their political party 
or the mayor rather than to citizens.90 However, despite the extensive literature on 
political institutions in Latin America,91 most of this has focused exclusively on national 
institutions and few systematic studies have been conducted of local and state 
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institutions.92 One notable exception is a study by Acedo which finds that electoral 
systems in Mexican municipalities are highly exclusive because they are based on closed 
party lists with no independent candidacies.93 
Despite their number, few of the participatory initiatives prove sustainable over 
time and relatively few municipalities actually generate participatory innovations.94 
While those experiences that do take place may have long-lasting impacts, even if they 
disappear at some point, the lack of greater innovation and sustainability should be cause 
for reflection.  In some countries, the weakness of local government institutions, 
including few resources and limited technical capacity, appear to work against greater 
innovation and further sustainability.95 In others, the structure of representation, with 
party lists and short terms in office, appears to undermine elected authorities’ interest in 
innovating further.  In many cases, the uneven texture of state-society relations appears to 
produce dissimilar outcomes among municipalities in the same country.  This appears to 
be the case in India, where different political histories among states have led to widely 
varying experiences of decentralized governance,96 and in Brazil, where even the same 
participatory initiatives may produce profoundly different results for democracy.97 
92 Peterson mentions this problem in Decentralization in Latin America but only in passing.  None of the 
major studies of  
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Similarly, in Bolivia and South Africa, decentralization has produced noticeably different 
results for democratic governance among municipalities.98 Finally, there is the danger 
that participatory innovations may sometimes undermine representative structures by 
concentrating power in the executive branch or granting power to unelected civil society 
organizations.  In Brazil, for example, participatory budgeting is carried out under the 
auspices of the mayor, rather than of the city council, and may serve to concentrate 
executive authority at the expense of the legislature.99 In Bolivia, on the other hand, the 
existence of vigilance committees, where civil society organizations are represented, may 
serve to constrain the authority of elected municipal councils.100 
In Mexico, historical studies have pointed out the contested nature of power in 
Mexican municipalities.  Rubin, for example, shows that in Juchitán, Oaxaca, the one-
party dominant system actually involved considerable contestation among different 
political factions, even though these were all contained with the PRI (at least until the 
1970s).101 Even during a period of one-party dominance in Mexico, political power was 
never fully top-down; part of the success of the Mexican political system was that it 
incorporated grassroots demands as well as vertical mandates from above in a highly 
fluid and flexible process for decision-making.  Municipalities were a vital arena where 
this negotiation took place despite the relative weakness of the municipal governments 
themselves in terms of functions, powers, and resources.   
 
98 See Roberto Laserna, “Descentralización, iniciativas locales y ciudadanía: el caso Boliviano,” paper 
presented at the workshop on Local Democratic Innovation in Latin America, Woodrow Wilson Center, 
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As political competition increased in Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s, studies of 
Mexican democracy began to focus on municipalities as a space for counterhegemonic 
power to the one party dominant state, since opposition parties won their first significant 
victories at a municipal level.  They were studied both for their ability to pry open 
Mexico’s one-party dominant system from below102 and to see if opposition parties 
would govern any differently than the PRI had for decades.103 
However, as municipalities increased their authority and autonomy, many studies 
began to focus on the capacity of local governments for democratic innovation.  Early 
studies analyzed experiences of innovative governance and concluded that municipalities 
were potential seats for democratic (and administrative) experimentation.104 In more 
recent years, the Innovations in Municipal Government Project, has documented 
hundreds of municipal governance innovations, many of them related to democratic 
experimentation.105 Bazdresch, analyzing the innovations in participation in the Project, 
finds a positive correlation between institutional innovations in participation and 
government responsiveness.106 However, Cabrero notes that most of the innovations in 
participation and accountability involve only minimal processes of consultation of joint 
action between municipalities and citizens in providing services; only 11% involve 
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citizen engagement in planning and monitoring local government activities.107 
Several other scholars have documented cases of significant democratic 
experimentation.  Ziccardi notes the capacity of municipalities to engage citizens in new 
horizontal relationships between government and society.108 In a four-city study, 
Schteingart and Duhau find that new practices in democratic governance were emerging 
that allowed citizens to have a direct voice on key issues of the public agenda and 
involved virtuous cycles of accountability and participation.109 In this same volume, 
Guillén finds that Tijuana had undergone an ambitious process to give citizens ongoing 
input into key decisions on the municipal agenda through a participatory planning 
council,110 while Duhau and Schteingart argue that Ciudad Nezahualcoyótl had done the 
same through a series of community committees and a citywide development council.111 
Socorro Arzaluz reaches similar conclusions in a study of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl’s 
participatory planning process.112 In a similar vein, Santín argues that Mexico’s 
municipalities have become key arenas for virtuous engagement between civil society 
organizations and government.113 Pineda and Rodríguez document successful 
experiences of popular organizations that were able to create synergies with municipal 
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leaders to generate innovations in accountability and participation.114 
With the de jure granting of self-determination to indigenous communities in 
Oaxaca and the de facto implementation of indigenous rights regimes in Chiapas, several 
authors have addressed the reform of indigenous municipalities from within.  Burguete 
finds that indigenous municipalities in eastern Chiapas are increasingly experimenting 
with new institutional structures to include traditional community roles within the 
municipality.115 Recondo finds extensive experimentation in the implementation of 
Oaxaca’s indigenous rights law, while Santín finds that indigenous municipalities are 
reinventing their traditions and creating new deliberative modes of engagement.116 
Despite this catalogue of important innovations in Mexican municipalities, few of 
these innovations survive over time.  In a forthcoming volume on participation and 
deliberation in Mexico’s municipalities, Tonatiuh Guillén suggests that the weakness of 
Mexico’s municipalities lies in their lack of representative democracy, which in turn 
undermines their potential to serve as more effective arenas of participation and 
deliberation.117 According to Guillén, the dependent structure of the city council, the 
closed list system of elections, the closed nature of political parties, and the monopoly 
that political parties have on political participation combine to limit the representative 
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nature of municipalities and, therefore, limit their responsiveness and accountability to 
citizens.118 Rodríguez, in the same volume, observes that most institutional innovations 
in participation do not last more than one three-year mayoral term because of the 
tendency of mayors to want to make their mark with new reforms rather than continuing 
the existing institutional innovations.119 Merino, in the same volume, argues that the 
fragmented nature of federal transfers to municipalities makes participation difficult since 
each transfer fund requires different institutional structures for decision-making and 
expenditure allocations.120 According to Merino, there is no single public agenda at the 
municipal level that citizens can engage with, since it is constantly shifting and dependent 
on decisions at higher levels of government. 
These institutional factors tell part of the story, but they do not capture the full 
extent of the limitations that municipalities face.  Other factors tied to historical legacies 
and existing political practices appear to play a role as well.  Mexico’s political system 
has historically been considered a “corporatist system,” at least during the period of one 
party-dominant rule, which lasted from the 1930s until the 1990s, in which citizens were 
organized in corporate groups and linked to political power through intermediaries.121 
Cornelius warns that as the corporatist structure of Mexico’s one-party state disintegrates, 
local authoritarian leaders, who had always been subservient to higher level authorities in 
the party/government, gain increased autonomy and are becoming entrenched within 
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“authoritarian enclaves.”  He suggests that: 
 
…the end result of the dispersion of power now under way in Mexico 
could be a fragmentation of the traditional, centralized, presidentialist 
system into a highly variegated mosaic: a ‘crazy quilt’ of increasingly 
competitive, pluralistic political spaces where pro-democracy forces have 
consolidated themselves, juxtaposed with hardened authoritarian enclaves 
in which the surviving ‘dinosaurios’ of the PRI-government apparatus are 
able to resist not only local pressures for democratization but also external 
pressure.122 
Gibson makes a similar argument, suggesting that in both Mexico and Argentina political 
parties that lose power at a national level may choose to reinforce their role at the local 
and regional level and to resist further democratization.123 
This retrenchment of old authoritarian leaderships is undoubtedly taking place in 
some municipalities; however, most municipalities in Mexico are the scene of vibrant 
competition among two or more political parties and most have had at least one change in 
political party, as we will show in chapter 5.  Therefore, they hardly conform to the strict 
notion of “elite capture” where a single dominant individual, family, or group holds sway 
uncontested.  Rather, old forms of clientelism and particularism appear to have survived 
within the context of competitive democracy.  Thus new patterns of competition coexist 
with old patterns of control and mobilization.  Andreas documents that most Mexican 
citizens in rural communities dislike political clientelism and reject norms of trading 
votes for favors.124 Fox describes the process through which numerous Mexican popular 
organizations, previously linked to clientelistic networks, have transitioned out of these 
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by using alliances among civil society organizations and with reformist elements in the 
government.125 However, he also cautions that important enclaves of unequal power 
relationships between political leaders and citizens continue to exist.   Fox and Aranda, 
therefore, stress the need to look at the internal dynamics of municipalities to understand 
decentralization’s democratic potential: 
 
It is often assumed that decentralization necessarily encourages more 
accountable governance…the impact of decentralization on accountability 
depends on how representative local government was before receiving 
additional external resources.  At least in Mexico, there is no evidence that 
increased external funding for municipalities…increases local-level 
accountability.126 
2.5 Towards a Theory of Decentralization and Democratic Governance 
 
In order to understand whether decentralization to municipalities improves 
democratic governance, we need first to see what government structures are empowered 
through decentralization and then see within municipalities which individuals and groups 
specifically are empowered.  I argue for an approach that combines institutional analysis 
of the political system with a detailed understanding of how social actors are linked 
horizontally among each other and vertically to the political system. 
To understand whether this is happening in specific cases, it is necessary to 
examine both the formal rules and institutions that govern decentralized regimes and the 
democratic process and analyze informal political practices that may or may not coincide 
with the formal rules and institutions.  In particular, uneven power relations and 
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clientelistic politics may shape political power in ways that formal rules do not predict.  
The approach used here, therefore, looks first at the formal and informal rules that govern 
the authority and autonomy of municipal governments; then at the formal and informal 
rules that determine political processes within the municipal arena. It explores the 
continuities with old institutions and practices as well as the changes taking place over 
time.  The next chapter develops a methodological approach to doing this, and 
subsequent chapters test it with regards to decentralization and democratic governance in 
Mexico. 
Chapter 3  
Research Design 
 
3.1 Public Policy Method 
 
Public policy as a discipline seeks to understand the real-world causes and 
implications of public policies and contribute to the design of better policies in the future.  
In particular, it seeks to link or contrast the desired outcomes of policies with the actual 
outcomes.  Therefore, the public policy method of study begins with the analysis of a 
concrete policy or set of policies as the independent variable to be analyzed.  It looks at 
the policy (or set of policies) in light of its expected outcome.  It then assesses the effect 
of the policy (or set of policies) on the expected outcome (dependent variable).  If the 
policy does not lead to the expected outcome, it may be that the initial expectations are 
incorrect or that other intervening variables need to be explored.  As a final step, the 
public policy researcher draws conclusions that may inform future policy in the area in 
question. 
I use a comparative politics research method that looks at changes over both time 
and space.  The present study analyzes variation across a set of three cases that show 
political and geographic variation and also analyzes variation within each case study over 
a period of nine to fifteen years in each case. 
 
3.2 Design of the Study 
 
The current study seeks to analyze the effect of decentralization policies in 
Mexico with regards to the quality of democratic governance in Mexico.  As we have 
seen, theoretical insights from institutional economics, public choice, and democratic 
theory suggest that enhancing the authority and autonomy of local government should 
lead to the normatively desired outcome of improved democratic governance by 
enhancing representation, transparency, and citizen participation.   
 
∆ Decentralization (Autonomy + ∆ Authority)
∆ Democratic Governance (=representation + transparency + channels for citizen participation) 
 
Nonetheless, we must allow for the possibility that intervening variables influence this 
relationship.  As noted in the last chapter, both formal political institutions and informal 
political practices may affect the ability of decentralization to improve democratic 
governance.  Therefore, we need both to determine if the relationship holds and, if not, 
what intervening variables might explain the disjuncture. 
To explore the relationship, I examine three case studies of cities in Mexico 
within the context of decentralization reforms.  The first analytical approach, “a view 
from above,” examines the degree of authority and autonomy that local governments 
have achieved overall in Mexico and the general framework for representation, 
transparency, and participation.  The second analytical approach, “a view from below,” 
explores these variables within the three case studies and assesses the possible influence 
of intervening variables (institutions and political practices) in more detail. 
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 The study combines qualitative and quantitative measures.  Although I make 
extensive use of quantitative data both to compare municipal finances (as a measure of 
authority/autonomy) and to explore municipal election patters over time (as a measure of 
competition/representation), much of the exploration of the independent variable 
(decentralization) and most of the exploration of the dependent variable (democratic 
governance) require qualitative measures. 
 
Selection of Variables 
 
As noted, the relationship to be explored is between the change in autonomy and 
authority of municipal governments (independent variables) and the change in 
representation, transparency, and participation (dependent variables).  Below the 
variables are operationalized even further so that the relationship can be tested (see Table 
3.1 for greater detail on variables, indicators, and measurements). 
Decentralization (independent variable) 
As was noted in Chapter 2, decentralization can be defined as the increase in the 
authority of subnational governments over functions, powers, and resources and of their 
autonomy for decision-making over these. It can be measured along two axes, authority 
and autonomy.  Since we are primarily concerned with decentralization to local 
governments, we will operationalize these variables with respect to local governments; 
however, we could as easily do the same for state governments in Mexico (or any other 
intermediate level of government).  It is important to note, however, that decentralization 
to subnational governments in general does not necessarily mean the empowerment of 
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local governments; it is entirely possible that decentralization may empower intermediate 
levels of government (states) without empowering local (municipal) governments.  In this 
research, we are only concerned with decentralization that does empower municipal 
(local) governments.  Below I operationalize the terms authority and autonomy. 
 
Authority refers to the responsibilities, functions, and resources that subnational 
governments have within the aggregate of the public sector.  It can be measured 
quantitatively as the percentage of total public expenditures that municipal 
governments (or state governments) exercise.  This formula helps us visualize the 
relative weight of municipal governments within the public sector.  However, this 
only gives us a partial measure of the authority of municipal governments.  To 
operationalize the concept fully, we need to add the following qualitative 
measures: 
 
• The change in functions that municipal governments perform. 
• Whether municipal governments have exclusive or overlapping 
responsibility for new functions. 
• The change in powers municipalities have for determining regulations and 
other policies within their jurisdiction.  
• Whether new functions and powers are mandated by constitutional 
changes, new laws, or just administrative decrees. 
• Whether municipalities have sufficient resources to carry out their 
functions and powers. 
 
Autonomy refers to the relative independence and self-determination that local 
governments have with respect to their authority, that is, how much autonomy 
they have to make independent decisions with regards to their functions, powers, 
and resources.  One common measure of subnational autonomy is “vertical 
imbalance,” the percentage of subnational revenues raised by the subnational 
unit.1 This is a useful starting point; however, it does not tell us very much on its 
own.  Self-generated revenue may be subject to control by other levels of 
government, as was the case in Mexico prior to 1980, 2 and transfers from other 
levels of government may be unconditional.3 Therefore, autonomy is best thought 
 
1 This is a popular measure in studies by the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. 
2 Before 1980, many taxes were collected by the states but administered by the central government.  The 
fiscal reform of 1980 concentrated most tax collection in the federal government in return for a negotiated 
system of transfers to states. 
3 There is a substantial debate among economists about whether it is best for subnational governments to 
raise most of their own revenue.  The conventional thinking (including that most accepted by the World 
Bank) is that most revenues should be raised and spent locally so that there is a correspondence between 
what people contribute in taxes and what they get back from each level of government..  Nonetheless, 
others dispute this argument suggesting that standardized collection of taxes nationally with clear transfer 
systems allow for targeting resources to alleviate poverty and compensate for regional inequalities.  See the 
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of as a composite of quantitative and qualitative measures including the 
following: 
 
• The percentage of revenue that is locally raised and not subject to control 
by other levels of government. 
• The percentage of transfers that are unconditional and set in formulas with 
clear timing for transfers. 
• Whether municipalities have broad policymaking discretion for deciding 
their expenditures. 
• The degree of borrowing authority that municipal governments have. 
• Whether higher level authorities can remove local authorities or reverse 
their decisions. 
 
Democratic Governance (dependent variable) 
Drawing from the discussion in Chapter 2, we might expect three aspects of 
democratic governance to be enhanced by decentralization: representation, transparency, 
and opportunities for participation.  To evaluate whether these democratic outcomes are 
achieved by decentralization in the cases under study, we need to operationalize these 
three dimensions of democratic governance. 
 
Representation refers to whether elected representatives know what citizens 
priorities are; believe they need to respond to these priorities (rather than to other 
interests in the political system or in society, such as special interests or party 
leadership); and make decisions that reflect this concern.  We measure this 
through a set of three measurable variables: 
 
• Conditions of polyarchy are met: all citizens have equal rights to vote or 
be a candidate for public office, as well as express opinions and organize 
autonomous organizations; and elections are free and fair. 
• An independent, respected electoral institution oversees the elections. 
• Voting preferences are translated into representative bodies in roughly 
proportional amounts. 
• Elected officials have incentives to be responsive to citizen demands. 
 
Transparency refers to whether citizens can have access to basic information 
about decisions pending or already made by their elected representatives, 
 
discussion in Chapter 2.4 of institutional economics and public choice theories.   
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including city council resolutions, planning documents, budgets, investment 
decisions, debt, and contracts.  This can be measured in two ways: 
 
• Municipal documents are published and made available regularly, 
especially city council resolutions, municipal development plans, annual 
budgets, infrastructure investment expenditures, contracted debt amounts, 
the salaries of high level municipal officials, and contracts with private 
parties. 
• Municipal council meetings are generally open, announced ahead of time, 
and their decisions are public record. 
• There is a legal framework that gives citizens access to municipal 
documents on demand. 
 
Participation refers to the opportunities that citizens have to become engaged 
proactively in municipal affairs between elections through giving their opinion on 
municipal decisions and engaging in public reasoning. This can be measured 
through: 
 
• The mayor and city council hold open meetings with citizens to 
receive comment on proposed decisions. 
• Neighborhood councils serve as meaningful conduits for citizen 
concerns. 
• Participatory planning/participatory budgeting processes exist which 
involve a broad cross-section of citizens and have a real impact on 
budgetary decisions. 
• Citizens have clear institutional channels for presenting demands to 
public authorities and for deliberating about and commenting on 
municipal initiatives. 
• These channels are the real channels of participation and influence 
rather than informal networks based on personal relations and 
patronage. 
 
The View From Above: National Framework 
 
Part II addresses the relationship between decentralization and democratic 
governance seen from a national level.  Chapter 4 first constructs a historical framework 
in which to understand centralization and state-society relations in Mexico. Chapter 5 
then analyzes the change in authority and autonomy of Mexico’s municipalities in the 
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period 1980-2004 and the consequent changes in representation, transparency, and 
participation in municipalities.  This chapter relies on national-level fiscal, electoral, and 
legal data, including two databases constructed by the author of all municipal elections in 
the period 1989-2004 and of the finances of all municipalities in the period 1989-2002.  
In addition, I consult a comprehensive survey of mayors by Indesol-Inegi as part of their 
survey of mayors in 2002 and a database of transparency laws created by the Instituto 
Federal de Acceso a Información (IFAI) in 2005. 
 
The View From Below: Case Studies 
 
In Part III, the same variables are explored for three municipalities— 
Chilpancingo (Chapter 6), Tijuana (Chapter 7), and Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl (Chapter 8).  
Below is an explanation of the selection of cases.  In each case, I reviewed all available 
municipal reports and development plans for the period 1996-2005,4 as well as any other 
available documentation from the municipality.  I constructed a detailed history of each 
municipality’s finances using data available from the national statistical institute (INEGI) 
and complemented, when needed, with data from the annual municipal report.5 In 
addition, I conducted interviews with 20 to 40 people in each municipality.  The sample 
included at least: 
• One current or former mayor; 
• Three municipal council members, one from each of the major parties; 
• Two key administration officials involved with citizen demands 
(usually the director/coordinator of public works, planning, or citizen 
participation);  
 
4 See the discussion on the time period below. 
5 The annual municipal report is called different names in different cities.  I have standardized them by 
calling them al the Informe Municipal (municipal report). 
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• Sixteen neighborhood leaders, selected according to specific criteria in 
each city to represent a cross-section of geographic, socio-economic, 
and partisan diversity (the criteria are explained in detail in each 
chapter).6
In all three cities I was able to conduct additional interviews both with people who fit into 
the above mentioned categories and others who represented locally relevant categories: 
business leaders, political party officials, and civic organization leaders.  The formal 
interviews followed a semi-structured interview format built around four to five key 
questions.  The questionnaires used can be found in the appendices.7
In addition to the formal interviews, I had dozens of informal conversations 
around this research with political leaders, scholars, community leaders, and journalists in 
each of the cities and nationally (including two cabinet officials). These conversations are 
not reported in the data, but they helped improve my understanding of the context and 
developments in each city.   
 
6 The specific methodology for choosing community leaders to interview differed from city to city, 
depending on how the municipality is structured.  This methodology is described in each chapter in greater 
detail.  However, in Tijuana, it involved focusing on two of the city’s fourteen subdelegations 
(administrative districts); in Chilpancingo, I focused on six different neighborhoods selected to represent 
different sectors of society; and in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, where neighborhood distinctions are less 
noticeable, I chose a mixture of elected neighborhood council leaders and representatives of other 
important neighborhood organizations in several neighborhoods of the city.  In all cases where partisan 
affiliation mattered, interviews were conducted with people who sympathized with different political 
parties. 
7 I benefited from the research assistance of talented researchers in each city: Lilia León in Tijuana; Jessica 
Hernández in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl; and Osiel González in Chilpancingo.  They conducted many of the 
interviews of neighborhood leadership in the three cities, although I also conducted several with them as 
well (and a few on my own).  All the other interviews were conducted by me. 
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Table 3.1: Variables and Measurements 
Variables Indicators  How Measured 
Decentralization  
(independent variable) 
Authority The change in functions that municipal 
governments perform. 
Whether municipal governments have 
exclusive or overlapping responsibility 
for new functions. 
The change in powers municipalities have 
for determining regulations and other 
policies within their jurisdiction.  
Whether new functions and powers are 
mandated by constitutional changes, 
new laws, or just administrative 
decrees. 
Whether municipalities have sufficient 
resources to carry out their functions 
and powers. 
Review of public expenditure data 
Review of constitution/ legal 
framework/ relevant judicial 
decisions 
Autonomy The percentage of revenue that is locally 
raised and not subject to control by 
other levels of government. 
The percentage of transfers that are non-
discretional and unconditional (set in 
formulas with clear timing for 
transfers). 
The degree of borrowing authority that 
municipal governments have. 
Whether municipalities have broad 
policymaking discretion for deciding 
their expenditures. 
Whether local authorities can be removed 
by higher level authorities or their 
decisions reversed. 
Review of public revenue data 
Review of formulas for transfers 
Review of legislation on debt 
Interviews with municipal leaders on  




Representation All citizens have equal rights to vote or be 
voted for public office, as well as 
express opinions and organize 
autonomous organizations 
Elections are free and fair. 
An independent, respected electoral 
institution oversees the elections. 
Voting preferences are translated into 
representative bodies in roughly 
proportional amounts. 
Elected officials have incentives to be 
responsive to citizen demands. 
Review of Constitutional/Legal 
framework for representation 
Review of electoral data  
Interviews with city council members 
Interviews with community leaders 
Transparency There a legal framework that gives 
citizens access to municipal documents 
on demand. 
Municipal documents are published and 
made available regularly, especially city 
council resolutions, municipal 
development plans, annual budgets, 
infrastructure investment expenditures, 
contracted debt amounts, the salaries of 
high level municipal officials, and 
contracts with private parties. 
Municipal council meetings are generally 
open and their decisions are public 
record. 
Review of existing legislation 
Review of documents published, 
including annual report, municipal 
plan, webpage, council resolutions, 
published budgets, and other 
documents 
Interviews with political and  
community leaders 
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Participation The mayor and city council hold open 
meetings with citizens to discuss 
proposed decisions. 
Neighborhood councils serve as 
meaningful conduits for citizen 
concerns and encourage deliberation. 
Participatory planning/participatory 
budgeting processes exist which involve 
a broad cross-section of citizens and 
have a real impact on deciding and 
monitoring investment decisions. 
Citizens have clear institutional channels 
for presenting demands to public 
authorities, for commenting on 
municipal initiatives, and for 
deliberating with each other and with 
municipal officials. 
These channels are the real channels of 
participation and influence rather than 
informal networks based on personal 
relations and patronage. 
Review of legislation on participation 
Review of national survey of mayors 
Review of election and meeting data   
for participatory planning/budgeting 
Interviews with community leaders,  
neighborhood committees, and  
municipal officials 
Selection of Cases 
 
The case studies examine three medium to large cities in Mexico, each ruled by 
different political party and located in a different geographical region of the country.  
First, I chose three cities which had been dominated each by a different party in recent 
years.  In doing so, it was hoped that this might shed some light on different governing 
styles of the three major parties in Mexico and the way they relate to citizens in the 
process of democratic governance.  There is a considerable literature from the 1980s and 
1990s about the “different” governing styles of the PAN and PRD (as distinct from the 
long-ruling PRI),8 so it seemed important to choose one municipality from each party.  In 
this case, Tijuana has been a bastion of the PAN since 1989 and is the only major city 
 
8 Among many works, see Victoria E. Rodriguez and Peter M. Ward, Opposition Government in Mexico, 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995; Yemile Mizrahi, From Martyrdom to Power: The 
Partido Acción Nacional, South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003; Kathleen Bruhn, Taking 
on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy, University Park, PA: 
Penn State Press, 1997; Marta Schteingart and Emilio Duhau, Transición política y democracia municipal 
en México y Colombia, Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrúa, 2001. 
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where the party has won five consecutive times.  (Ironically, after fifteen years the PAN 
lost control of the city in the 2004 elections, part way into my research.)  Ciudad 
Nezahualcóyotl was the first major city won and held in the next election by the PRD, 
which has now repeated three times in the city government since 1996.  Chilpancingo is 
one of the few remaining cities over 100,000 inhabitants that have never been governed 
by a party other than the PRI.9 Chilpancingo had the advantage of being in one of the 
states which has always been governed by the PRI as well (although, ironically, the PRI 
lost the state government to the PRD in 2005, also in the middle of my research). 
Second, suspecting that regional factors might play a role in the nature of 
democratic governance, I chose cities in three different parts of the country.  Putnam’s 
work, in particular, stresses the role of regional factors in influencing democratic 
outcomes in Italy based on the different histories of each.10 Mexico has long been 
considered to have three distinct regions: north, center, and south (sometimes further 
subdivided).  The northern region is more industrial and the home of much of the 
country’s export agriculture. The northern states tend to have the highest per capita 
income.  The center is based around the dynamism of Mexico City, with industrial 
production and small family and collective farms.  The area around the capital has high 
per capita income but also significant pockets of extreme poverty.  The south is mostly 
dedicated to subsistence and small-scale agriculture, with some large export-oriented 
farms.  It is the poorest and most unequal of the three regions.  For the study, Tijuana 
represents a case in the north (located on the Mexico-U.S. border); Ciudad Nezahualcóytl 
represents the center (within the Mexico City metropolitan area); and Chilpancingo 
 
9 Only 18 of the country’s 152 municipalities over 100,000 inhabitants fall into this category. 
10 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, op. cit. 
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represents the south (in Guerrero, one of the country’s three poorest states and perhaps its 
most violent). 
Finally, I selected cases that were urban. I chose to focus on cities because almost 
60% of Mexicans live in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants (and 91.5% live in urban or 
semi-urban municipalities of over 15,000 inhabitants, see Graph 5.10 in Chapter 5).  The 
selection of only urban municipalities clearly biases the study in favor of cities; as a 
result, some findings may not apply equally to smaller municipalities.  I discuss the 
findings in the final chapter with this cautionary note in mind.  Of the three cities, Tijuana 
and Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl are large cities over one million inhabitants; Chilpancingo is 
a medium-sized city of approximately 200,000 inhabitants.  There are no large cities 
(over one million inhabitants) that have been governed continuously by the PRI; of the 
eighteen other cities over 100,000 inhabitants continuously governed by the PRI, five 
were located in the south, all in states governed by the PRI and with roughly similar 
population sizes (Chilpancingo, El Centro, Campeche, San Andrés Tuxtla, and Othon P. 
Blanco).  I chose Chilpancingo largely because it was a city I already knew well and 
where I had initial contacts that facilitated research. 
 
Table 3.2: Comparison of Municipal Case Studies 
City State Region Size Party 





Center 1,225,972  PRD (1996-present)




I chose to study the cases closely in the period of 1996-2005 because it is the 
period of greatest decentralization.  It also facilitated data collection, since finding 
municipal records over ten years old is often quite difficult.  In the case of Tijuana, I 
extended the period further back—to 1989, since this was the year of election of the first 
opposition government and it provided an interesting look at continuities and 
discontinuities over time—and I stopped the period in December 2004 when the PRI took 
office again. 
In each case study I take a historical look at the development of state-society 
relations in the municipality before taking stock of decentralization and democracy in the 
municipality in the most recent period. 
 
A Note on Data Sources 
Research on local governance in Mexico is not easy.  One of the results of 
decades of centralization has been a paucity of good research sources on local issues and 
a deficit of research institutions outside of Mexico City.  The work of the network of 
local government researchers in Mexico (Investigadores en Gobiernos Locales 
Mexicanos—IGLOM) and the Prize for Innovation in Local Governments, located at 
CIDE, have both put together an impressive body of data and research that proved 
extremely useful.  Similarly, the work of the national statistical bureau, INEGI, to create 
databases of local municipal finances, though imperfect, provided much needed 
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comparative data.  I chose to use INEGI data for all municipal financial information, even 
when I had other sources, because it allowed for comparison across cases.  The database 
of local election data created by CIDAC and the 2002 survey of municipal mayors by 
INDESOL and INEGI also provided very useful comparable data. 
 For the case studies, Tijuana was by far the easiest city in which to find data.  
Several well-researched scholarly studies of the city exist and the municipal government 
keeps excellent records.  Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl was more challenging: there are few 
contemporary academic studies in the social sciences and the municipality keeps less 
careful track of older documents.  However, the city has a Documentation Center which 
proved a treasure trove of information and data: maps, government studies, memoirs of 
politicians, internal party documents, articles by journalists, and unpublished M.A. and 
Ph.D. dissertations.  Chilpancingo presented even more of a challenge: there appear to be 
no previous studies whatsoever on the city in the social sciences and municipal records 
were quite poorly kept.  Fortunately, I could piece together information from several 
historical volumes, studies of state-level politics, and dozens of interviews and private 
conversations.  Perhaps not surprisingly, in all of the cities, the interviews proved to be 
the most interesting and important source of data.   
PART II: 
 
THE VIEW FROM ABOVE 
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Chapter 4 
Centralization and Citizenship in Mexican History 
 
4.1 Centralization, State Building, and Citizenship 
 
Centralization has often been linked in the literature to nation-building and the 
creation of a strong state that can promote development, ensure rule of law, and integrate 
divergent regional cultures and political practices.  The literature on centralization, which 
is mostly based on the experience of the United States and Western Europe, generally 
associates it with the creation of a uniform administrative apparatus that can implement 
public policies throughout the nation-state and regulate market transactions.1
Centralization is thus thought to establish social control by concentrating rule-making 
authority in the state at the expense of other non-state sources of power.2 As a result, 
centralization may also help extend universal citizenship beyond local identities by 
providing a single set of civil and political rights that citizens share across the national 
territory.3 Centralization thus serves as a necessary precondition for democracy, as it 
makes possible universal citizenship, the rule of law, and competing forms of political 
power.  In addition, centralization creates the preconditions for economic development by 
providing a strong state apparatus that can enforce contracts, provide infrastructure and 
basic services, and correct market imbalances.  
 
1 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 
81.  Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European 
Regionalism, London: Sage Publications, 1982.  See also Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of 
Interpretive Sociology, edited by Guerther Roth and Claus Wittig, translation by Ephrain Fischoff, New 
York: Bedminster Press, 1968, Volume III. 
2 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies, Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third 
World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
3 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968, 
p. 135 
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Nonetheless, in Mexico, like in much of Latin America, centralization has meant 
concentrating power in the central government without fully creating a strong state, 
democratic institutions, or inclusive citizenship.  Throughout the period 1857-1980, there 
was a gradual extension of the responsibilities, functions, and resources of the central 
government at the expense of state and municipal governments.  In addition, the central 
government developed a series of formal and informal mechanisms to control subnational 
governments and to intervene in their internal affairs.  This process culminated in 
creating one of the most centralized states in Latin America, in which subnational 
governments had few formal functions, powers, or resources, and even less autonomy to 
use them.  Centralization avoided the fragmentation of the country, achieved several 
decades of economic growth, and created a degree of market regulation, but the state 
remained relatively small and severely limited in its ability to promote development that 
could benefit the majority of citizens.  Indeed, total public expenditures in Mexico 
remained below the average for Latin America and far below that of more developed 
countries, suggesting that centralization did not produce a strong central state as much as 
it did weak subnational governments. 
The reason for this outcome has a great deal to do with the way centralization was 
achieved in Mexico.  National leaders wanted a strong, autonomous central state, but they 
went about it by creating a political system that privileged bargains with local and 
regional powerholders.  What emerged was a state that was highly centralized within its 
institutional hierarchy but weakly institutionalized with regard to other power centers in 
society, represented by an extensive network of local and regional powerholders.   These, 
in turn, retained a significant degree of autonomy and an important role as political 
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intermediaries between citizens and the state.4 The Mexican state would eventually 
develop mechanisms for channeling conflict among these powerholders, especially after 
the 1930s.  However, the price for co-opting these centrifugal forces was the continued 
survival and co-existence of local and regional centers of power outside the state. In 
short, the Mexican state never developed a strong state apparatus for pursuing its declared 
goal of development with equity, but it did succeed in creating a system that channeled 
conflict over power. 
This particular approach, centralization by co-optation, has also shaped the nature 
of citizenship in Mexico.  Most Mexicans, except occasionally the middle class, have 
related to public authority not as individuals but as members of groups within clientelistic 
chains mediated by local and regional intermediaries.  These intermediaries have often 
include community leaders, union bosses, political party leaders and their operatives, and 
a range of elected and appointed officials who function less as public representatives than 
as political brokers.  Citizenship has been, in formal terms, universal, but its exercise has 
taken place indirectly through informal channels of power mediated by a political class of 
professional intermediaries.  The composition of these intermediaries and the way they 
operate within the political system have changed a great deal over time.  However, the 
underlying pattern has remained relatively constant.  Citizenship, in practice, is 
determined less by legal norms than by a constant negotiation of power relationships 
between citizens and an array of intermediaries who link citizens to the state.5 These 
 
4 cf. Migdal, Strong Societies, Weak States.
5 Similarly, Mische has argued for Brazil that “In such a situation in which rights on paper do not translate 
into rights in practice, the question is not who ‘counts’ as a …but rather what kinds of social practices 
between state and societal actors might make citizenship meaningful.  The burden of proof thus shifts from 
the legal definition to the social relationship, which in turn becomes a question of ethics and political 
practice, and not just formal entitlements.”  Ann Mische, “Projecting democracy: the formation of 
citizenship across youth networks in Brazil,” in Charles Tilly, ed., Citizenship, Identity, and Social History, 
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relationships formed the basis of the authoritarian state during the period covered by this 
chapter and they would also shape the nature of the democratic transition covered in the 
next chapter.  The nature of centralization in Mexico has thus shaped the nature of 
decentralization; and the nature of authoritarianism has shaped the contours of 
democratic governance today. 
 
4.2 Colonial Rule and its Legacy 
 
Both centralism and regionalism have been strong currents in Mexican history 
since the colonial period.  The interplay between these two opposing forces, and the way 
they have been negotiated over time, has shaped the nature of citizenship and the 
relationship of state power to citizens.  In colonial times, the desire of the Spanish crown 
to achieve administrative centralization as a means of control and of optimizing the 
extraction of resources conflicted with the reality of colonists who had been granted 
control over large tracts of land and indigenous communities that maintained a degree of 
autonomy over their internal affairs.   As Lorenzo Meyer has observed: 
 
Great distances and abrupt geography played in favor of local interests, as 
did the relative weakness of the crown, which always needed resources 
and had a small army.  The disputes among local groups, classes, and 
races, and the legitimacy of the crown vis-à-vis any other form of 
authority favored the interests of the center.6
Even the formal structure of governance in colonial times expressed this 
 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 135. 
6 Lorenzo Meyer, “Un tema anejo siempre actual: el centro y las regiones en la historia mexicana,” in 
Blanca Torres, ed., Descentralización y Democracia en México, Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1986, 
p. 23. 
70
contradiction.  On the one hand, the Castillian model of governance privileged a strong 
central bureaucracy, centralized in the colonial capital, and maintained a strict approach 
to taxation of local communities.7 On the other hand, Spain bequeathed the concept of 
the Municipio Libre or “Free Municipality” as the basic unit of government, ruled by a 
collegial city council and with a degree of guaranteed autonomy separate from the 
colonial authorities.8 As a result, in practice the colonial governments mediated between 
the crown, which sought centralized control, and regional and local authorities, based 
legally in the municipality and with de facto power because of their distance.  Fiscal 
resources were largely controlled by municipalities and states and, therefore, by local 
powerholders, who often resisted turning these over to the federal authorities, and could 
win elections and raise armies on their own.9 However, the colonial authority, exercised 
by the viceroy of New Spain, was the ultimate arbiter of public authority.  According to 
Fernando Escalante, “The colonial state was, since it was constituted, an apparatus for 
mediation; mediation no only among competing interests, but among bodies with private 
privileges.”10 The intermediaries, who included large landowners, bilingual indigenous 
leaders, military commanders, and even elected municipal authorities, negotiated their 
position between those they represented and the colonial authorities.  
 
7 Claudio Véliz, Centralization in Latin America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 29 
and 45. 
8 Véliz, Centralization, p. 170; Juan Bruno Ubiarco Maldonado, El federalismo en México y los problemas 
sociales del país, Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrúa, 2002, pp. 79-80. 
9 Fernando Escalante, Ciudadanos Imaginarios, Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1992, pp. 102-7 
10 Escalante, Ciudadanos Imaginarios, p. 109. 
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4.3 Independence: Weak Federalism and Indirect Citizenship 
 
Mexico’s independence struggle lasted eleven years, from the declaration of 
independence by a radical priest and his peasant followers in 1810 until the eventual 
victory of the Mexican forces against the Spaniards under the leadership of an aristocratic 
general in 1821.  The independence struggle helped shape national identity.  On the eve 
of independence, most people in New Spain identified primarily with their province, not 
New Spain as a whole.  The independence war helped shape identity in Mexico, as 
elsewhere in Latin America, and created a new sense of belonging to a single country 
based on the shared experience of the independence struggle.11 However, regional 
interests also emerged strongly after independence and would repeatedly challenge the 
central state.  Between 1829 and 1876 Mexico had thirty-six different presidents.  “The 
national state was no more than an embryo, a project, during the half century that 
followed independence,” according to Meyer.12 
Mexico became a federal state soon after independence (following a two-year 
interlude as an empire) in large part to negotiate this tension between an emerging 
national state and strong regional interests and keep the country from falling apart soon 
after being born.  Riker’s classical study of federalism argues that it is about autonomous 
political units coming together in a “federal bargain” to face common threats13; however, 
Mexico, like Brazil and Argentina, followed a different model, what Alfred Stepan has 
 
11 John Charles Chasteen and Sara Castro-Klarén, Beyond Imagined Communities: Reading and Writing the 
Nation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press and Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2003. p. xvii. 
12 Meyer, “Un tema anejo siempre actual,” p. 24. 
13 William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Boston: Little Brown, 1964. 
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called “holding together federalism.”14 Federalism in Mexico had less to do with a 
political ideal for building a great unified country than with creating a solution to the 
centrifugal forces of regional governments that wanted to break free from central control.  
This is not to say that there was no ideological underpinning for the federalist debate after 
independence.  Many intellectual leaders of the independence struggle saw the U.S. 
concept of federalism as an antidote to the centralist tradition of Spain.  Although most 
only vaguely understood federalism, they saw it as a means of protecting local autonomy 
and individual rights.15 At the constituent congress that followed the overthrow of 
Emperor Iturbide, the delegates, after much debate, finally declared Mexico a federal 
republic.  Meacham describes the process: 
 
It is all too true that the normal process of federation was reversed in 
Mexico; that instead of the national state being created by the local states, 
as in the United States, the local states were created by the national 
representative body.  The pretensions of the provinces to independence 
were idle.  It is significant that the convoking of the constituent congress 
was the act of a government representing, or purporting to represent, the 
Mexican Nation as a whole, not the provinces as independent entities.  In 
no sense can the constituent congress be viewed as the legal representative 
of the states which did not exist.  Thus the states enjoyed no original or 
inherent, but delegated powers.  The constituent congress, in the name of 
national sovereignty, created the sovereignty of the states.16 
The provinces—now states after the constituent congress—had certainly existed 
before independence and enjoyed, in some cases, significant authority and 
 
14 Alfred P. Stepan, “Towards a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism, and 
Democracy,” in Edward L. Gibson, Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2004. 
15 J. Lloyd Meacham, “The Origins of Federalism in Mexico,” Hispanic American Historical Review, No. 
18, 1938, pp. 168 and 176.  Meacham argues that federalism was contained “in an embryonic form” in the 
Plan de Casa Mata, the declaration of those involved in overthrowing the Emperor Iturbide and instituting 
the first republic after independence. 
16 Meacham, “The Origins of Federalism,” pp. 179-80. 
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autonomy.17 However, they were not necessarily powerful as public institutions 
except insofar as they were controlled by powerful regional leaders.  The decision 
to imbue them with federal powers did not owe itself to a decision of sovereign 
bodies coming together but primarily to regional leaders trying to ensure their 
base of power through the new constitution. 
The 1824 constitution also preserved the concept of the Free Municipality; however, 
in practice, the nature of the municipality and its functions were left to the state to 
decide.18 In practice, nonetheless, municipalities often enjoyed far-ranging powers, 
steady sources of income, and internally democratic procedures.  Municipalities were 
generally responsible for providing education and basic services, administering the law in 
local disputes, and organizing elections.  Municipalities raised revenues through the 
alcabalas, a form of local tariff on goods passing through a jurisdiction, as well as other 
taxes and fees that they levied.  Generally, municipalities were run by municipal councils, 
elected every year with a prohibition on immediate reelection.  Council members—who 
usually consisted of a sindicate (síndico) and a number of regidores,19 would elect the 
mayor from among their members.  However, municipalities were checked in their 
authority by the prefects—or political chiefs (prefectos or jefes politicos), officials 
appointed by the federal or state government to preside over districts that included 
several municipalities and supervise the way in which they exercised their functions and 
administered their resources.  As often as not, the prefects responded to state governors or 
 
17 Hira de Gortari de Rabiela, “El federalismo en la construcción de los estados,” in Jaime Rodríguez, ed., 
Mexico in the Age of Democratic Revolutions, 1750-1850, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994. 
18 Meyer, “Un tema anejo,” p. 23. 
19 Sindicates were—and are today—responsible for the application of the law and as municipal 
comptrollers.  I will generally refer to both síndicos and regidores together as city council members, except 
when the difference becomes important in some parts of the case studies. 
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to regional powerholders, rather than to the distant and ever-changing federal 
government.  The prefects represented a channel of control over municipalities that could 
be employed by local, regional, or national elites to limit the public authority of 
municipal governments.20 
The tension between the creation of a strong central state and the maintenance of 
strong regional interests also played out in the nature of political rights of citizenship.  
For most of the period after independence, political rights were granted extensively to all 
male citizens, regardless of ethnic origin or property qualifications.21 However, the 
liberal impulse of universal suffrage was checked by the application of indirect elections, 
through which voters selected representatives who would, in turn, elect public authorities.  
For most of the period between 1824 and 1857, elections involved a three-layer process, 
where ever-smaller numbers of elected representatives selected the next set of authorities 
above them.  This meant that political citizenship was largely universal but real decision-
making authority fell on ever small and more elite groups of citizens.  Municipal 
governments organized the first round of national elections and almost any male citizen 
could participate (though rarely more than five percent did).22 However, only those with 
the time and resources to participate in politics and to travel to the capital could afford to 
stand for office.  Similarly, only those with time and resources to become federal deputies 
 
20 Romana Falcón, “Force and the Search for Consent: The Role of the Jefaturas Políticas of Coahuila in 
National State Formation,” in Gilbert Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., Everyday Forms of State Formation: 
Revolution and the Negotiation of Modern Rule in Mexico, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994. 
21 There were attempts to impose wealth qualifications in 1836-42 and 1843-47, but these were short-lived.  
Hilda Sabato, "On Political Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century: Latin America," The American Historical 
Review, October 2001, para 15. Overall, however, suffrage was far more extensive and inclusive in Mexico 
in the 1800s than in the United States.  See Erica Pani, Erika Pani, “La Calidad de ciudadano.  Past and 
Present.  The Nature of Citizenship in Mexico and the United States: 1776-1912.”  Woodrow Wilson 
Center Latin American Program, Working Paper No. 258, July 2002. 
22 Political participation was low, almost always below 5%.  Mexican general election of 1851 had 20% of 
population voting, but this was an exception.  Sabato, “On Political Citizenship,” paragraph 36.. 
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could then stand for that office and be part of the selection of the president.  For 
important periods, there were also property and literacy requirements for being elected to 
the second and third tiers of the political structure.   
Mexico thus succeeded in ensuring both universal political citizenship and elite 
rule at the same time.  One of the important consequences of this system was that 
political citizenship was more extensive in Mexico than in the United States or parts of 
Europe, but it also had less meaning for those included; political rights were widespread 
but not directly correlated with political power.23 Voting gave citizens the right to select 
intermediaries who vote for political leaders, but not the right to participate directly in the 
selection process themselves.  This system increased the universality of the vote, but 
diminished its meaning.  Since voting rarely exceeded five percent of electors, it also 
meant that political leaders were more concerned with mobilizing a small number of 
supporters rather than appealing broadly to citizens as a whole.  The public discussion of 
issues consequently mattered far less than political relationships with a small but 
consistent base of supporters.   
 The limited worth of citizenship as a tool for political empowerment was 
compounded by the instability of the political system during most of the first half century 
of independence.  Although elections for local, state, and national political leaders 
occurred regularly and all of Mexico’s many constitutions in the nineteenth century (save 
one) reaffirmed a commitment to democracy, real power had less to do with elections 
than with ongoing skirmishes—some violent, some political—among competing 
 
23 The United States, for example, had significantly restricted citizenship (women, African-Americans, , 
and many who did not meet economic or literacy tests were excluded), but those included as full citizens 
wielded a great deal of political power.  In Mexico, in contrast, more people were included in full 
citizenship but citizenship had less meaning overall in the political process. 
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politicians.  The country had numerous presidents between 1821 and 1867, many of 
whom came to power with the barrel of a gun (or the threat of it) and others through 
conspiracies and intrigues.  Not only were elections indirect, but they were more often 
than not irrelevant to the actual political process which, in fact, took place outside of 
constitutional channels.  The country’s most significant political cleavage in the 
nineteenth century was between liberals—who believed in a strong federal state, private 
property, and a secular government—and conservatives, who believed in a weaker state 
with strong religious institutions and a mixture of private and collective property rights.  
However, rarely were the disputes among political leaders as much about ideology as 
about personal power and private interests.   
 
4.4 The Liberal State and Centralizing Federalism  
The conflict between liberals and conservatives, simmering during the first three  
decades of independence, exploded in the 1850s.  After a brief three-year interlude of 
liberal government from 1855 to 1858, the country descended into an internecine war that 
lasted until 1867 and included a brief period of monarchical rule with an imported 
emperor from Austria.  The liberals emerged triumphant under Benito Juárez and 
reestablished the liberal Constitution of 1857, which would remain the law of land for 
fifty years.   
The Liberals believed philosophically in a strong federalism, with municipal 
autonomy; at the same time, their desire to spur economic development required 
overcoming the endemic weakness of the central state.  These were by no means 
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incompatible goals, in theory; however, in practice, a state faced by constant challenges 
from regional elites required centralization to create stability and growth.24 The economy 
was stagnant, with GDP ten percent less than at the start of the century,25 and almost half 
of the country’s territory had been lost in a war with the United States in 1846-48.  The 
liberals succeeded in building a stronger central state by suppressing rival military 
leaders, taking over land and functions from the church, and imposing an increasingly 
centralized structure of local prefects. Liberals expropriated church properties and took 
over key functions that the church had previously performed, including the registration of 
births, deaths, and marriage and the provision of education, healthcare, and social 
services.26 In addition, he put down a series of military rebellions in the first years of his 
government, which established the military superiority of the central government with 
regards to the regional centers of power.  As Enrique Krauze has noted, “Under Juárez, 
the various states and regions learned a lesson that would always apply in the future.  No 
regional cacique, no caudillo or general could truly oppose the center. Juárez inaugurated 
an era and an irreversible historical tendency, a fundamental centralism employing 
federal forms.”27 This centralism was strengthened by the appointment of prefects who 
responded, nominally at least, to the central government and were responsible for 
monitoring the activities of municipalities within a given district within states. 
 Nonetheless, the 1857 Constitution also reaffirmed federalism in favor of the 
 
24 Meyer, “Un tema anejo,” pp. 26-27; Mallon observes that “This tension between the decentralization and 
regional articulation of interests, and the need to revindicate the principle of authority and the centralization 
of power, lay at the center of all Liberal debates and practice from the time of the Ayutla Revolution and 
the Constitutional Convention of 1856-1857.  It reemerged during the Restored Republic in the conflict 
between Juarismo and the defenders of communitarian Liberalism.” Florencia Mallon, Peasant and Nation, 
p. 133. 
25 Meyer, “Un tema anejo,” pp. 25-26. 
26 Veliz, Centralization, p. 193. 
27 Enrique Krauze, Biography of Power, New York: Perennial Publishers, 1998, p. 198. 
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states and municipalities, giving them the primary role in raising taxes, recruiting the 
national army, and running elections.28 Equally important, not all regional leaders could 
be suppressed by force.  It was essential to make deals with many of them to ensure 
order.  In many cases, the prefects ended up responding to the interests of the state 
governors rather than the central government, even though they nominally represented 
the president in the district.29 At the same time, peasant organizations shaped the 
contours of the new political order, sometimes allying with the federal government 
against local elites, sometimes with local landowners against an increasingly invasive 
state.30 It was a period of political change and the construction of a stronger central state, 
but the nature of this state building process was in constant tension with other forms of 
power outside the central state.  As Fernando Escalante Gonzalbo has noted, the state 
increased its ability to make rules, but ultimately it “did not impose its rules, it negotiated 
their application” with the range of actors who contested state power from the regions.31 
These changes in the role of the central state necessarily had a profound effect on 
the nature of citizenship as well.  The liberals replaced the onerous three-tiered election 
system with one that had only one tier, so citizens were now only one step removed from 
electing their representatives rather than three steps.  The wars between liberals and 
conservatives had also shaken up the social structure of many towns, creating new 
community leaderships and regional caciques.32 Liberal laws abolishing communal 
property led to a dramatic concentration of landholdings and created new forms of 
 
28 Escalante Gonzalbo, Ciudadanos Imaginarios, 133. 
29 Falcón, “Force and the Search for Consent,”; Escalante Gonzaldbo, Ciudadanos Imaginarios, pp. 101-2. 
30 Florencia Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995, pp. 242-43 
31 Escalante Gonzalbo, Ciudadanos Imaginarios, p. 129. 
32 Mallon, Peasant and Nation, 242-43.  Cacique is a Mexican term for a local strongman (or woman). 
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control by local landowners who bought up newly privatized land from impoverished 
peasants.  At the same time, the expanded state bureaucracy created a new urban middle 
class, tied to government, newspapers, and trade, which in turn constituted new forms of 
civic association in the cities that could be considered an embryonic civil society.33 The 
period following the liberal victory was one of rapid social change and new leadership.  
On one hand, a new urban middle class developed with a more direct relationship to 
political institutions.  On the other hand, most citizens remained connected to political 
power through local and regional intermediaries, though those who served this role 
changed in many cases. 
After a few shorter periods of rule by other liberal leaders (and rebellions by other 
liberal leaders), Porfirio Díaz, one of Juarez’s former lieutenants, was elected president in 
1877.  Except for a brief period from 1880 to 1884 (when he retained de facto power but 
relinquished the title of president), Díaz ruled Mexico until 1910.  He succeeded in the 
liberal project of creating a strong central state that could generate spectacular economic 
growth, but he did so at the expense of equity, federalism, and democracy.  During this 
period, GDP multiplied 3.2 times; roads increased from 893 to 19,205 km, silver 
production soared from 25 million pesos to 85 million, and exports jumped from 60 
million to 270 million.34 Diaz created the Bank of Mexico (Banco de Mexico), which 
along with foreign capital served to finance many of these developments, including the 
country’s infrastructure, mining, and large-scale agriculture. Trade shifted away from 
metals (which dropped from 65% of exports in 1877 to only 50% by 1911, and trade 
 
33 Luis Javier Garrido, El Partido de la Revolución Institucionalizada, Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1982, p. 30; 
Sabato, paragraphs 54-59. 
34 Meyer, “Un tema anejo,” p. 28. 
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became increasingly focused on the United States.35 This growth generated an extensive 
infrastructure that was necessary for modern development, but the economic benefits 
were almost exclusively concentrated in a small group of businesspeople and landowners 
close to the Bank of Mexico, and in U.S. and British investors.  By the end of Diaz’s 
government, three quarters of Mexico’s population was rural and 90 to 95 percent 
landless.36 
The impoverishment of Mexico’s rural population was coupled with a tightening 
of control over local governments and the elimination of any vestiges of democratic rule.  
Díaz abolished the alcabalas, internal tariffs, which were the most important source of 
municipal income, and reinforced the rule of the prefects.37 He co-opted some regional 
caciques by giving them access to the benefits of the growing economy and exercised a 
heavy hand against others.  Although elections continued to take place, he effectively 
ensured that he could win reelection.  Candidates for ocal and state elections were often 
negotiated ahead of time, but when needed, the Díaz regime suppressed dissent 
ruthlessly.  By the early part of the new century, dissent had begun to spread both among 
the burgeoning middle class, which had grown with economic production and the central 
bureaucracy but resented the lack of political space left by Díaz’s authoritarian rule, and 
among the rural poor, who had suffered the loss of land and economic opportunities.  
 
35 These figures based on Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, Post-Revolutionary Mexico, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982, pp. 44-51.  She estimates that the United States accounted 
for 36 percent of Mexican exports and 26 percent of imports in 1872 but 65 to 75 percent of exports and 55 
to 65 percent of imports in 1911.  
36 Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, pp. 48-55.  Peter H. Smith, Labyrinths of Power, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1979, ph. 30, on the role of foreign investors. 
37 The alcabalas were actually eliminated originally by the Ley Lerdo of 1856 and incorporated  into the 
Constitution of 1857, together with the nationalization of much of the property of the Church; however, it is 
unclear how much of an impact this had initially and the law was revoked in 1862, to be reinstated in 1884 
with Díaz.  For more detail on this point, see María del Refugio González, “Debates sobre el regimen del 
municipio en México en el siglo XIX,” in Estudios Municipales, No. 13, January-February, 1987, pp. 145-
63. 
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Regional oligarchs, who had not participated fully in the economic expansion, joined in 
the growing discontent.  By 1910, these disparate factions had taken up arms against Díaz 
and war spread throughout the country.  Díaz fled.  After a brief rule by liberal opposition 
leader Francisco Madero, followed by a coup in which he was killed, the country 
descended into anarchy and internecine warfare until 1920.   
4.5 The Revolution and the Reconstruction of the State 
As North has observed, institutions have an inherent “imbeddedness” that can often 
survive even major regime changes.38 In Mexico, most of the strong central institutions 
built by Díaz collapsed during the ten-year civil war, known as the Mexican Revolution.  
The post-revolutionary government that took power after 1920 faced a country in 
economic ruin, with powerful new generals in control of parts of the countryside and a 
mobilized peasantry.  However, within a few years, they had succeeded in reconstructing 
many of the key institutions that had ensured strong central rule and created new 
institutions to complement these.  
The post-revolutionary governments of Presidents Alvaro Obregón (1920-24) and 
Plutarco Calles (1924-29) reestablished the Bank of Mexico and a professional national 
army; launched the National Irrigation Commission, the National Highway Commission, 
National Electrical Commission, and the national income tax; and created an elaborate 
national labor law to respond to the demands of unionized workers who had participated 
 
38 Douglass North, op. cit., p. 6. 
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in the revolution.39 Despite these new institutions, the central state faced an ongoing 
challenge from regional military leaders who had participated in the Revolution.  
Vaughan notes that in the first years after the Revolution: 
 
…political power was more effectively lodged in the states where civilian 
and military governors and military zone commanders often vied against 
one another and correspondingly against the federal government.  Some 
regional power-holders opposed structural change and allied with 
traditional elites against increasing mass mobilization.  Others sided with 
peasants and workers—sometimes on principle and often as a means of 
building power bases to be reckoned with at the national level.40 
The government benefited from rapid economic growth, influenced partly by the global 
economic boom of the 1920s, which often allowed them to co-opt regional leaders by 
giving them a stake in the country’s growth.41 However, the recreation of strong central 
state institutions competed with the centrifugal forces of the revolutionary elites who 
challenged central control at every turn. 
Two key institutions also played a decisive role in extending the federal 
government’s central control in this period.  The government launched an agrarian reform 
that granted land to thousands of peasant farmers across the country in communal 
landholdings known as ejidos that could not be sold or taxed.  Giving the disastrous 
experience that most poor farmers had faced with the loss of land after the liberal reforms 
that privatized communal properties, the ejidos provided a measure of security that land 
would not be lost.  The federal government maintained iron control over the agrarian 
 
39 The following institutions were created within the first years after the Revolution’s end: The National 
Power commission, 1922; National Electrical Commission, 1926; National Highway Commission; Central 
Bank, 1925; and national income tax, 1924-27.  For an extensive list, see Hamilton, The Limits of State 
Autonomy, pp. 79-82; Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in 
Mexico, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995 , pp. 23-25.. 
40 Mary Kay Vaughan, The State, Education, and Class in Mexico, 1880-1928, Dekalb, IL: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1982, p. 127. 
41 Hamilton , The Limits of State Autonomy, pp. 76-81, Meyer, “Un tema anejo.” 
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reform program, which allowed them a significant presence in rural areas affected by the 
revolution.42 Similarly, the federal government started an ambitious program to extend 
education throughout the country. The Public Education Department (Secretaría de 
Educación Pública), created in 1921, set about to institutionalize education, which until 
then had been largely limited to urban areas and dominated by municipality-run schools.  
The department “had a centralizing capacity greater than that of its predecessor.”  It built 
and staffed schools throughout the country, especially in rural areas, which had lacked 
national education institutions prior to the Revolution.43 
These measures laid the foundation for greater centralization of the state, but this 
process needed a political project to complete it and reign in the constant challenges from 
regional powerholders.  In 1928, the assassination of former President Obregón, recently 
elected to a new term, created the critical moment for President Calles to launch a bold 
proposal: the creation of a single political party that would bring together all of the 
revolutionary elites and “institutionalize” the Revolution.44 This was hardly a new idea, 
but the crisis of Obregón’s assassination provided the critical moment to allow this to 
happen.45 According to Knight, “The crisis of 1928 made possible a successful process 
of settlement, in which elite decisions and conflicts were played out in a situation of flux 
and uncertainty, but such a settlement was, we might say, latent in the revolutionary 
 
42 Vaughan, The State, Education, and Class, pp. 128-129.  
43 Vaughan, The State Education, and Class, p. 271. 
44 Alan Knight “Mexico’s Elite Settlement: Conjuncture and Consequences,” in John Higley and Richard 
Gunther, eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 115. 
45 Knight “Mexico’s Elite Settlement,” pp. 116-18.  According to Knight, the assassination proved critical 
in part because it left only one of the two national leaders (Obregón and Calles) alive and with absolute 
authority; Obregón’s supporters, who distrusted Calles, were happy to have an institutional structure that 
checked Calles’ authority, and Calles’ supporters were willing to support the proposal since Calles would 
lead the new party. 
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legacy…”46 The party, originally called the National Revolutionary Party (PNR, Partido 
Nacional Revolucionario), was formed in 1929 with the participation of key 
revolutionary elites from all over the country, including regional powerholders and 
governors (often the same), union and peasant leaders, and federal government officials.  
It was an elite pact among those who had a claim on the revolutionary legacy and 
specifically excluded the business community and the church.   
Dissent and disagreement, which had been carried out through constant power 
struggles among competing elites (and often through violence), would now be 
institutionalized within one official revolutionary family, headed by the President.  The 
PNR, which would later be renamed the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), “was 
born not to fight for power but to administer it without sharing.”47 Everyone could 
compete for power, as long as they did so within the confines of the party.  The party 
was, at first, almost a “party of parties” with strong local and regional committees that 
received money for campaigns from the central committee.  As such it was “a kind of 
confederation of caciques,” who agreed to play by the same rules in competing among 
each other.48 However, Calles clearly saw the party as a means to centralize authority as 
well as limit conflict.  According to Knight:   
 
In light of this political panorama, the elite settlement of 1928-9, must be 
seen as a key element in the central government’s battle to assert its power 
over divergent political and regional interests.  The institutionalization that 
Calles proclaimed implied a further attenuation of independent political 
movements (of both right and left) in the provinces.  The elite settlement 
thus reflected a clear perception—by Calles and his collaborators—that 
power had to be centralized, to the advantage of the regime and to the 
 
46 Knight, “Mexico’s Elite Settlement,” p. 118. 
47 Meyer, “Un tema anejo,” p. 31. 
48 Garrido, El Partido Revolucionario Institucionalizada, pp. 123-25. 
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detriment of both popular and regional forces.49 
In the years after the party’s founding, violent power-struggles among regional elites and 
between them and the central government dropped dramatically.  Conflict and 
contestation continued, as they would throughout the twentieth century even as the party 
consolidated its grip on power, but these took place increasingly within the revolutionary 
family delineated by the party.  Attempts by outside groups to challenge the official party 
also helped unify party members and solidify the elite pact.  Belonging to the 
revolutionary family meant obligations to respect the formal and informal rules that 
would develop within the party and its hierarchies, atop of which sat the country’s 
President; however, belonging to the family also ensured members the right to participate 
in politics and share in the spoils of government.  
 
4.6 Institutionalizing the Revolution 
One of the important banners of the Revolution had been greater municipal autonomy 
and the abolition of the prefects.  The 1917 constitution—which was approved by the 
main revolutionary factions prior to taking power definitively—banned the prefects by 
forbidding any authority between the states and municipal governments.  However, this 
constitution, which remains in effect today, also granted no specific powers to 
municipalities, leaving the definition of their role and their fiscal powers to the state 
constitutions.50 Article 115 of the constitution, as originally written, simply stated that 
 
49 Knight, “Mexico’s Elite Settlement,” p. 128. 
50 Lorenzo Meyer, “El municipio mexicano al final del siglo XX.  Historia, obstáculos y posibilidades,” in 
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the municipalities had legal jurisdiction, should have an elected government, and could 
administer their own treasury based on rules imposed by the state governments.51 
Similarly, the constitution gave few explicit functions to states that were not also shared 
with the federal government.  Institutionally, therefore, the stage was set for the states to 
dominate the municipalities.  Over time, the federal government would do the same to the 
states and, by extension, to the municipalities.  Indeed, the federal government would 
slowly concentrate most of the fiscal powers of the public sector and eventually close to 
90% of its resources.  Through a series of federal and state fiscal changes, municipalities 
came to comprise only 1.1% of all public expenditures by 1980, while the states 
exercised only 9.4% (Figure 4.1).  Even municipalities’ role in organizing their own 
elections came to an end in 1946.52 













Federal 63.0% 72.6% 68.7% 67.4% 71.4% 75.6% 78.3% 80.8% 78.6% 88.0% 86.4% 90.1% 89.4%
State 24.1% 14.5% 22.9% 25.1% 23.3% 19.0% 18.4% 16.2% 18.6% 10.5% 12.0% 8.6% 9.4%
Municipal 12.9% 12.9% 8.4% 7.4% 5.3% 3.4% 3.3% 2.9% 2.8% 1.5% 1.6% 1.3% 1.1%
1900 1923 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
 
Source: Alberto Díaz Cayeros, Desarrollo Económico e Inequidad Regional: Hacia un Nuevo pacto federal 
en México, Mexico: CIDAC, 1995, p. 65.  Note: State expenditures include the Federal District.   
Mauricio Merino, ed., En busca de la democracia municipal: la Participación ciudadana en el gobierno 
local mexicano, Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1994, pp. 237-39. 
51 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1917 (original text).  Article 115 would remain 
virtually unchanged until 1983.  There were minor constitutional changes to the article in 1933 (prohibiting 
the reelection of mayors and city councilors), 1943 (of little substance), 1947 (allowing women to vote), 
and 1971 (allowing the federal government to remove mayors in territories), but none touched on the 
substance of the municipality’s functions, resource base, or political structure.  Meyer II, pp. 241-2. 
52 I am thankful to Ignacio Marván and Jacqueline Peschard for pointing this out. 
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Most of the reduction of subnational finances in favor of the federation came through 
agreements between the state and federal governments in a series of fiscal pacts signed 
between 1942 and 1980.  The final pact, in 1980, created the sales tax, collected by the 
federation and shared with the states through a distribution formula.53 Both states and 
municipalities continued to gain net income, which made the pacts palatable, even while 
they had to cede fiscal powers to the federal government.  However, the states came out 
far better than the municipalities and both lost strength relative to the federal government 
(see Figure 4.2).54 The willingness of subnational governments to cede their fiscal 
powers can be explained only in part by the fact that they still continued to gain 
resources, since they certainly could have obtained even more resources without the pact. 
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53 Alberto Díaz Cayeros, Desarrollo Económico e Inequidad Regional: Hacia un Nuevo pacto federal en 
México, Mexico: CIDAC, 1995, pp. 65-67. 
54 Luis Aboites Aguilar, Excepciones y Privilegios: Modernización tributaria y centralización en México, 
1922-1972, Mexico: El Colegio de México, 2003, pp. 34-39. 
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It was ultimately the political dimension of centralization, more than the structural 
limitations of the constitution, which permitted the concentration of powers in the central 
state and also facilitated the creation of an authoritarian political system.  The PNR began 
as an elite pact to contain conflict among revolutionary leaders, but under President 
Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40) it would become a true mass party, organized top-down and 
with the ability to mobilize citizens ideologically by incorporating a discourse (and often 
reality) of popular demands.  Though he was Calles’ handpicked successor, Cárdenas 
exiled his mentor and removed most of Calles’ allies from his government and from a 
number of state governorships.55 He then reorganized the party along sectoral lines, 
essentially gutting the regional and local structures in favor of four sectors that 
represented peasants, labor, popular organizations, and the military.  Each of these sectors 
was vertically integrated and responded, at the pinnacle, to presidential leadership.  The 
state and municipal committees remained, but real power negotiations took place now 
among the sectors and their leaders.56 “From being a party which sought to mediate 
among the different factions of the ‘revolutionary’ group, a party ‘of the masses’ was 
being constructed, which would mediate between the state apparatus and the union 
organizations.” Renamed the Mexican Revolutionary Party (PRM, Partido 
Revolucionario Mexicano) in 1938, the party developed a true peasant and labor base and 
appropriated the discourses of these organized social sectors.57 Local and regional 
leaderships continued to exist, but they found a home within the party’s sectors. 
This discourse was backed up by actions.  Cárdenas implemented a far-reaching land 
reform that distributed over 17 million hectares of land, almost two-and-a-half times the 
 
55 Meyer, “Un tema anejo,”  pp. 31-2. 
56 Garrido, El Partido Revolucionario Institucionalizado, 293-95. 
57 Ibid., 295. 
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number of hectares distributed in the first seventeen years of post-revolutionary 
governments.58 This both consolidated federal power at the expense of state and 
municipal leaders—agrarian decisions were the exclusive purview of the federal 
government—and served to put in practice the demands of peasants who had participated 
in the revolutionary conflicts.  In 1938 Cárdenas took on the foreign oil companies that 
dominated Mexico’s petroleum industry, expropriating their holdings.  On the eve of a 
world war, the United States and United Kingdom, whose companies had dominated the 
industry, protested but ultimately accepted Mexico’s proposed compensation to their 
companies.   The expropriation served, ideologically, to cement a strong sense of 
nationalism in the face of years of military and political defeats at the hands of the 
neighbor to the north.  In practical terms, the expropriation also served to bolster the 
national treasury.  Oil would come to provide anywhere from a tenth to a third of federal 
revenues.59 Oil became the motor for national development and spurred a rapid increase 
in the federal government’s strength vis-à-vis state and municipal governments. 
Buoyed by state resources, with official ties to the state, a social base of support, and 
a discourse that appropriated demands from organized social groups, the party dominated 
Mexico’s political life for seven decades.  Renamed the PRI in 1946 (Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional or Institutional Revolutionary Party), the party won every 
election for President, governor, and senator (with one exception) between the late 1930s 
and 1988.  The party resorted to fraud in the presidential elections of 1940 and 1988, and 
 
58 According to Pablo González Casanova, Cárdenas’ administration distributed 17.89 million hectares of 
land versus the 7.66 million that had been distributed during the previous seven administrations starting in 
1917 (La Democracia en México, Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1965, p. 294). 
59 See Thomas Dalsgard, “The Tax System in Mexico: The Need for Strengthening the Revenue-Raising 
Capacity,” Economics Department Working Papers, No. 233, Paris: OECD, 2000.  With rising oil prices, it 
has hovered around a third in 2004-2005. See “Ingresos Presupuestarios del Sector Público,” Mexico: 
Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 2005, published at www.hacienda.gob.mx/eofp.
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almost certainly in many state and local elections as well; however, it remained the 
undisputed party of power.  The PRI lost a handful of municipal elections in these 
decades; however, opposition rule was almost always short-lived.60 The PRI was bound 
tightly to the federal government.  The President was the de facto leader of the party, 
although it had its own nominally separate leadership, and in each state the governor 
served as the de facto party leader as well.   Separate from these state leaderships, the 
party’s sectors (which were reduced to three after the elimination of the military sector in 
194061) held influence within the party structure.  However, the party was created and 
shaped by the country’s presidents and the government ran the party more than the party 
ran the government.62 The Revolution built on Porfirio Díaz’s method “bread or 
bludgeon.”  But while Porfirio’s order was based on being friends with the president, the 
PRI was based on negotiating differences within “the system.”  “The assumption, which 
came to be widely shared, was that all individuals or groups could rise—or at least not 
lose hope of rising—in the social and economic scale, provided they did it amicably 
within the system, not independently outside of it.”63 
The one-party dominant state developed several legal and extralegal mechanisms 
that ensured upward accountability among the ranks of career politicians.  Amendments 
to the constitution in the 1930s outlawed reelection in all elected positions.  This ban of 
 
60 The notable opposition governments were León, Guanajuato in 1945 and San Luis Potosí, San Luis 
Potosí in 1958. However, both opposition victories lasted only one term.  In San Luis Potosí the mayor 
ended up in jail after trying to run for governor; in León, an opposition victory that cost numerous lives, the 
opposition party divided after the federal government starved the municipality for resources and bought off 
party sympathizers.  See Meyer, “El municipio mexicano,”  pp. 245-48.  
61 For a history of civil-military relations in Mexico, inside and outside the PRI, see Raúl Benítez Manaut, 
“Security and Governance: The Urgent Need for State Reform,” in Joseph S. Tulchin and Andrew D. Selee, 
eds., Mexico’s Politics and Society in Transition, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003. 
62 Smith, Labyrinths of Power, p. 57. 
63 Krauze, Biography of Power, p. 551.
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reelection forced politicians to depend continuously on the will of party leaders—and 
influential patrons higher in the party—to promote them to new positions once their term 
had ended.  This provision served to circulate party elites and instilled greater loyalty to 
the party than to building a base of support in any one jurisdiction.    Gradually, this party 
circulation helped undermine local powerholders whose livelihood depended on 
exclusive control over a jurisdiction.  However, it also undermined almost any sense of 
accountability to constituents among elected officials, since their next job depended less 
on performance in their public duties than on party loyalty.  Similarly, federal and state 
constitutions allowed the federal Senate to remove governors, as well as for governors or 
state legislatures to remove mayors.64 These provisions created powerful incentives for 
lower levels of government to obey upper levels.  Although the Senate removed 
governors only occasionally, the dependence of lower level officials on those above them 
for eventual promotion to future political posts meant that higher level officials could 
almost always demand the resignation of officials below them as needed, even without 
pursuing the legal channels.  Dozens of governors were forced to resign by the 
President—as were hundreds of mayors by their governors—during the period of PRI 
dominance.  In time, the PRI developed an institutional culture where politicians knew 
they would be taken care of as long as they stayed within the party and obeyed those 
more powerful than them, even if it meant periods of sacrifice.  
Municipalities thus became small links in the chain of political power.  With few 
defined functions, limited resources, and almost no fiscal powers, they became primarily 
stepping-stones for aspiring local politicians and conduits for higher levels of government 
 
64 Pablo González Casanova reports that in the early 1960s thirteen states had constitutional provisions 
which allowed governors to remove mayors at will (Democracia en México, pp. 37-43.) 
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to maintain control over local affairs.  In some cases, they also served as arenas for 
contesting local political differences and generating demands upward through the party 
and state leadership.  However, a mayor’s hope for moving up in politics depended first 
and foremost on maintaining control over dissent and, second, on obtaining from the state 
or federal government a few funds to carry out projects to benefit his (or, in rare cases, 
her) constituents.  The internal structures of municipalities reflected the profoundly 
authoritarian nature of their design.  The mayoral candidates ran for election with a slate 
of handpicked candidates for city council.  If the PRI candidate won, as he almost always 
did, the entire slate of council candidates would be installed in the council.65 The lack of 
political plurality within city councils and the nature of their election on a party list 
chosen by the mayor meant that city councils had few real functions and most citizens 
knew little about who they were or what they did. 
Municipalities had few mechanisms for transparency—which is hardly surprising 
in an authoritarian system—however, they did generally have mechanisms for some form 
of citizen participation.  These often included neighborhood committees and sometimes 
citywide assemblies for discussing public issues.  It is impossible to generalize about how 
the over two thousand municipalities functioned, but certainly in medium and large cities, 
these mechanisms were generally tied to the PRI and used both as channels to sense 
citizens’ preferences and mobilize them for electoral purposes.  As a result, these 
mechanisms operated through clientelistic channels as did most other aspects of the 
 
65 It is unclear when state constitutions changed to include a single winning slate.  In the early period after 
the Revolution, candidates often ran individually, with or without a party, and the council picked the mayor 
from among their number As will be discussed below, opposition candidates were allowed to win seats on 
some city councils starting in 1977.   Blanca Acedo, “Los sistemas electorales municipales en México: la 
incorporación del principio de representación proporcional,” in Jacqueline Martínez Uriarte and Alberto 
Díaz Cayeros, eds., De la descentralización al federalismo: estudios comparados sobre el gobierno local 
en México, Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrúa and CIDAC, 2003, pp. 281-86. 
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political system.  They contained few opportunities for public deliberation and were, 
rather, means for mobilizing political support. 
4.7 Corporatism, Clientelism, and Contestation 
 
The creation and consolidation of the PRI as the party of power, together with the 
centralization of government functions and resources, successfully substituted the 
centrifugal forces of regional powerholders with a functional structure for negotiating 
differences among political actors.  Whereas the central state in the nineteenth century—
and again immediately after the Revolution—had depended on alliances with regional 
caudillos and caciques for its survival, the PRI/state depended on a complex network of 
political elites who were tied together by their common loyalty to the party.  The 
circulation of elites, promoted by the PRI, partially de-linked political elites from control 
over geographical regions; however, this was only partial and most states continued to 
have important political groups, built often around specific families that dominated 
politics for years.66 As Pablo González Casanova has indicated, “all the processes for 
concentrating presidential power have in their origin, as one of their functions, the control 
of the caciques—of their parties, their followers, their mayors—a phenomenon that does 
not imply, except indirectly, the disappearance of the caciques.”67 The way the party 
related to society remained rooted in the structures of politics of the nineteenth century, 
with greater access perhaps for new voices and more mobility among party leaders.  
 
66 See, for example, the case of the Figueroa family in Guerrero discussed in Chapter 8 or the Grupo 
Atlacomulco discussed in Chapter 7. 
67 González Casanova, Democracia en México, p. 48. 
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Although all citizens could participate in elections, they had little ability to decide who 
was elected.   Candidates were selected from above in the political hierarchy and the PRI 
candidates ensured of victory.  Although indirect elections had been abolished, citizens 
still participated in electoral decisions only indirectly.   
The PRI became a vehicle for a series of patronage networks that mediated between 
citizens and the state.  This helped channel collection action towards ends that were 
localized and fragmented.68 In the nineteenth century, patronage networks had been 
closely tied to individual leaders who maintained a tight grip on local politics within their 
domain.  Under the PRI, the circulation of leaders meant that individual leaders were 
more constrained, but party organizations and networks of politicians became 
increasingly important.  Within the PRI, local organizations—whether municipal party 
committees, neighborhood organizations, or union locals—were linked upward into ever 
larger second- and third-tier organizations that ultimately were part of one of the party’s 
sectors.  Clientelism, the unequal exchange of political support for public benefits, linked 
citizens to particular organizations and to their leaders at the local level.  Corporatism 
within the national and state PRI linked these organizations within vertical party 
hierarchies.  
Political hegemony is never complete, however, and the dominance of the PRI as 
a single national party masked considerable contestation and negotiation taking place in 
Mexico.  Clientelism was a top-down relationship to control dissent, but also a bottom-up 
relationship that gave citizens regular channels to negotiate demands and express 
preferences.  Although municipal governments and PRI-affiliated organizations were 
 
68 Joseph S. Tulchin and Andrew D. Selee, “Introduction,” in Tulchin and Selee, eds., Mexico’s Politics 
and Society in Transition, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003, p. 8. 
95
ultimately controlled from above, they also served as sites for struggle and the constant 
renegotiation of power relationships.69 Political leaders fought against each other for 
control of municipal governments and of PRI-affiliated social organizations.  Citizens 
used party structures to mobilize around key demands and needs.  The PRI succeeded 
largely because it was a party that was capable of responding to and incorporating 
demands and discourses from below.  Citizens and local politicians had to negotiate 
demands in an unequal context, in which state and party hierarchies had the last word; 
however, the party was sufficiently flexible to contain large-scale social discontent for 
decades in large part because it tolerated dissent and contestation within its ranks and was 
able to incorporate—and co-opt—citizen demands and discourses. The hegemony of the 
official party (and of the state) was constantly negotiated at local, regional, and national 
levels.70 
Contestation also took place outside the party, and the PRI/state allowed for a degree 
of non-official opposition.  The National Action Party (PAN), founded in 1946, provided 
a right-of-center alternative to the PRI in many municipalities (and the federal district) 
and had an important support base among the middle class.  The PAN won a number of 
municipalities from its creation through the 1970s, including two state capitals (Mérida, 
Yucatán and Hermosillo, Sonora) in the 1968 elections.71 It provided an ongoing 
challenge to the PRI in several states, especially Baja California, Chihuahua, and 
 
69 On this point, see Mallon, Peasant and State; Mary Kay Vaughan, “Cultural Approaches to Peasant 
Politics in the Mexican Revolution,” Hispanic American Historical Review, Volume 79, No. 2, May 1999, 
pp. 269-305; Rubin, Decentering the Regime; and Gilbert Joseph and Daniel Nugent, Everyday Forms of 
State Formation, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994. 
70 For concrete examples, see the discussion of local contestation in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. 
71 The PAN won one municipality in the 1940s, 14 in the 1950s, 20 in the 1960s, and 32 in the 1970s, out 
of a total of more than 2,000 municipalities throughout this period.  Acedo, “El sistema politico municipal 
en México.”   
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Guanajuato, as well as in the Federal District.72 Two other small “parastatal” parties, the 
Popular Socialist Party (PPS) and the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution 
(PARM), also provided a loyal opposition that gave a façade of democratic competition 
and occasionally provided a real vehicle for dissent.  Mexican leaders were mindful of 
the importance of the appearance of opposition outside the official party, and its utility 
for creating an escape valve for social conflict.  In 1977, following a period of increasing 
social conflict, the federal government recognized the long-outlawed Communist Party 
(PCM).  At the same time, a constitutional change required all municipalities of over 
300,000 inhabitants to include opposition members in their city councils through seats 
assigned to “proportional representation.”  This reform, incorporated into state 
constitutions as the decade closed, greatly expanded the presence of opposition parties in 
the councils of major cities.73 The constitutional change also increased the number of 
seats assigned to opposition parties in the federal congress. 
A great deal of contestation took place outside of the party system as well.  Local 
social movements developed frequently around specific demands that were not met by 
political leaders.74 The official party was often able to co-opt leaders of social 
movements and often the whole movement itself.75 The economy was growing at a 
 
72 Chapter 6 describes the active presence of the PAN in Baja California, where the party almost certainly 
won the 1968 municipal elections in Tijuana and the state capital Mexicali, and consistently presented an 
electoral alternative to the PRI. 
73 I discuss this reform further in Chapter 5. 
74 See the discussions of the Residents’ Restoration Movement (MRC) and several smaller movements in 
Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl in Chapter 8; of CUCUTAC in Tijuana in Chapter 7; and of the Urban Popular 
Movement in Chilpancingo in Chapter 6. 
75 See, for example, the history of the Residents’ Restoration Movement (MRC) in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl 
described in Chapter 8.  Cf. Alan Knight, “Weapons and Arches in the Mexican Revolutionary Landscape,” 
in Gilbert Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., Everyday Forms of State Formation, Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1994. 
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dramatic pace,76 which allowed government leaders a certain margin to incorporate 
strongly pressed demands.  Larger social movements, that defied government co-
optation, developed from time-to-time.  On a national level, these included the teachers’ 
strike of 1956 and the railroad strike of 1958, the doctors’ strike of 1965, and the student 
movement of 1968.77 Each of these larger social movements was ultimately repressed 
violently as it began to challenge state policy and include demands for democratic 
opening.  However, other smaller movements maintained a degree of autonomy by not 
fully challenging the authority of the state and making more modest claims for 
democracy.  Several smaller left-wing political movements particularly developed along 
these lines, working quietly but assiduously around local and regional demands while 
avoiding full-scale confrontation with the state.  In chapters 6-8 several of these 
movements are discussed, including a broad-based social movement in Ciudad 
Nezahualcóyotl over the fair price for land; a statewide civic movement against the 
governor of Guerrero in 1960, which detonated a series of local struggles throughout the 
state; and various struggles around land and fair elections in Baja California.   
In the 1970s, with the dramatic explosion of major cities, an Urban Popular 
Movement (MUP) developed in cities throughout Mexico (as elsewhere in Latin 
America).  The MUP was made up of organizations in cities throughout Mexico that 
would come together to form national umbrella organizations at the end of the 1970s and 
beginning of the 1980s.  These organizations mixed concrete demands for land titles and 
 
76 The economy grew 7.0% annually in the 1950s, 8.6% annually in the 1960s, and 7.2% annually between 
1970-75.  Nora Lustig, Mexico: Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy, Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1998, p. 15. 
77 As will be discussed in Chapter 8, there were also significant regional armed movements in Mexico, 
especially in the state of Guerrero.  There was one significant armed rebellion in the state of Morelos in the 
1950s, under Rubén Jaramillo, but the most important guerrilla movements would emerge in Guerrero at 
the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s. 
98
basic services (electricity, water, sewage) with political demands for democracy.  Though 
sometimes co-opted and occasionally repressed, the movement became one of the most 
sustained challenges to the hegemony of the PRI outside the party in the 1970s and 
1980s, but it avoided full-scale repression in large part because it was willing to negotiate 
with the government around its concrete demands 
The Mexican state and the PRI preferred to co-opt when they could and adapt when 
necessary.  They tolerated considerable contestation on specific decisions related to 
resource allocation, but they did not tolerate challenges to their overall power, the basic 
outlines of the political system, or major national policy questions considered of vital 
national importance.78 As Stevens has noted: 
Some groups have been permitted to express dissent from the choices of 
national goals, but this dissent is quarantined so that the disagreement is 
prevented from spreading. This behavior provides the elite with 
information concerning the effect of its policies while at the same time it 
places that kind of information beyond the reach of the bulk of the 
citizenry.79 
Similarly, the press was allowed to report widely on events in the country as long as it 
did not challenge the basic contours of national policy or the interests of key political 
leaders.  Only one television station existed nationally and it had a close alliance with the 
governing PRI.  Newspapers and radio stations, both those with a national coverage and 
more local media organizations, depended almost invariably on government advertising 
for their economic survival.80 There were a handful of exceptions in large markets where 
media could be self-sustaining without government advertising, but these were extremely 
 
78 Tulchin and Selee, “Introduction,” p. 9. 
79 Evelyn P. Stevens, Protest and Response in Mexico, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1974, p. 12. 
80 Chappell Lawson, Building the Fourth Estate: Democratization and the Rise of a Free Press in Mexico, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.  
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few and far between.81 Almost all media—and especially those outside of Mexico City—
maintained a cautious approach to criticizing the government and prominent officials of 
the governing party.  The press had to constantly balance their desire to write attractive, 
cutting-edge stories that exposed the workings of politics with their financial dependence 
on government resources.  This control largely limited their ability to pursue independent 
journalism. 
The PRI was able to periodically expand the contours of the political system to 
incorporate new demands, new groups, and new kinds of press coverage, and it even to 
allow a loyal opposition to exist as long as it played by the overall rules of the system.  
For a country with a recent memory of war, this system provided stability and an 
institutional means for resolving conflict peacefully.  For a country going through rapid 
growth, it provided mechanisms for sharing the benefits of economic expansion among 
those involved in politics.  For the poor, it provided a small measure of security and even 
influence in politics, although it was mediated by clientelistic channels.  For those 
inspired by the discourse of the Revolution, it provided an embodiment of the principles 
of the period’s major heroes, if not necessarily the substance of their aspirations.  What 
Mexico’s political system could not provide was a more democratic relationship between 
citizens and the state or an equitable process for national growth and development. 
 
81 Notable exceptions were Excelsior, in the mid-1970s, which the government was eventually able to 
control; Unomasuno in Mexico City; and El Norte in the industrial capital of Monterrey.  In the early 1980s 
the former editor of Excelsior would start an independent weekly, Proceso; another journalist would launch 
a daily La Jornada; and two journalists in Tijuana would start a northern border weekly, Zeta. 
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4.8 Centralized State, Weak State 
 
The Mexican state by 1980 was extremely centralized, even in comparison to 
other countries in the western hemisphere and Europe (see Figure 4.3).  Not only were 
fiscal powers and resources concentrated at the federal level, but the federal government 
had the ability to intervene directly to remove governors, and state governments could do 
the same with municipal mayors.  The federal government also had developed an 
impressive arsenal of tools to direct and control private enterprise, although the country 
maintained an important number of strong private sectors enterprises (especially in the 
north of the country) that were never completely subject to government control.  
Nonetheless, at the close of the 1970s, nine of the largest ten businesses, thirteen of the 
largest twenty-five, and sixteen of the largest fifty were partially or completely run by the 
federal government.82 Through the Bank of Mexico and other smaller banks, the federal 
government ensured the dependence of most small and medium-sized businesses on 
government loans. 
 
82 Smith, Labyrinths of Power, p. 59. 
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Figure 4.3: Subnational Expenditures as a Percentage of Total Public Expenditures, 
Selected Countries, 1980 













Note: The World Bank data do not include parastatal companies.  If these were included, the figure for 
Mexico’s subnational expenditures in 1980 would be around 10.5% (see Figure 4.1), given the weight that 
Pemex, the national oil company, had within the federal public sector. 
Source: World Bank, Subnational Fiscal Indicators, available at: 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm 
These formal measures of centralization were only part of the story, however.  
The most important means for central control had come from the creation of the PRI as 
vertically integrated official party.  The PRI had become the most important vehicle for 
ensuring central control over political decision-making and for creating hierarchical 
channels to resolve disputes among competing political elites.  However, the creation of 
the PRI also required the central government to cede power to informal arrangements 
among political powerholders.  The formal centralization of the state thus contrasted 
sharply with the continued existence of multiple centers of informal power built on 
interpersonal bargains and clientelistic networks.   Political elites had to swear ultimate 
allegiance to the party (and, therefore, the hierarchy of the state), but in return they 
received a certain degree of discretion to manage their own networks of power 
relationships as they saw fit. 
 The result of this apparent paradox—an omnipresent centralized government and 
a pervasive system of informal power—was a state that could channel major conflicts but 
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was constantly undermined in its efforts to regulate economic activity, provide services, 
and ensure the rule of law.83 Central government revenue as a percentage of GDP grew 
only slowly (Figure 4.4) and noticeably more slowly in Mexico than in a number of other 
countries in the Western Hemisphere and Europe, so that by 1980 Mexico lagged behind 
much of Latin America in central government revenue and expenditures as a percentage 
of GDP (Figures 4.5 and 4.6) despite the ongoing perception of the Mexican state as one 
of the strongest in Latin America.84 Moreover, the nature of the bargains within the party 
necessarily meant a deficient state capacity to enforce the rule of law or create genuinely 
democratic institutions.  As a result, civil and political citizenship, which had been 
formally universal since independence, was exercised and constantly renegotiated 
through informal practices of intermediation and clientelism.  Even in 1980, as in 1880 
and in 1780, citizenship remained somewhat indirect, legally extended to all, yet 
constantly renegotiated in the interactions between citizens and a range of intermediaries 
who could mediate between citizens’ demands and limited state resources. 
 
83 Cf. Migdal, Strong Society, Weak State. 
84 Indeed, if we were to factor in the weight of subnational governments in other countries (they had 
noticeably more revenue capacity in Brazil and the United States by 1980, for example), the gap in public 
sector revenue would be even more noticeable.  According to World Bank statistics, for example, 
subnational governments accounted for a quarter (25%) of Brazil’s public revenues in 1980 and over a third 
(34%) of the United States’ revenues.  It is worth noting that Mexico and the United States had roughly the 
same size government’s (compared to GDP) in both 1910 and 1940, but that the U.S. public sector grew 
rapidly after World War II while Mexico’s grew only modestly.  For the subnational revenue shares, see 
World Bank, “Fiscal Decentralization Indicators,” available on the WB decentralization website: 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization. 
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Source: Aboites, Excepciones y Privilegios, pp. 396-99, for 1910-1970; for 1980, International 
Monetary Fund, “International Financial Statistics,” dataset available at www.ifs.apdi.net/imf. 
 
Figure 4.5: Central Government Tax Revenues as a Percentage of GDP, 











Mexico 3.10% 4.20% 5.00% 5.70% 6.90% 8.30% 15.08%
Brazil 8.90% 9.80% 15.70% 22.28%
Argentina 7.20% 9.00% 18.10%
United States 1.70% 3.60% 5.70% 13.60% 19.80% 19.11%
Spain 8.30% 5.70% 9.80% 9.30% 7.80% 11.50% 13.74%
Italy 12.10% 16.60% 17.70% 18.50% 20.30% 23.02%
France 10.70% 13.70% 17.80% 17.40% 25.50% 29.20% 38.61%
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1970 1980
Source: Aboites, Excepciones y Privilegios, p. 397, for 1910-1970; for 1980, International Monetary Fund, 
“International Financial Statistics,” dataset available at www.ifs.apdi.net/imf. 
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Figure 4.6: Central Government Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP, Selected Countries, 1980 
















Note: These figures refer only to central government expenditures independent of publicly held 
corporations.  If we were to add in Pemex, the government-owned oil company, the figure for Mexico 
would increase dramatically for 1980. 




In the terms that we used in Chapter 2 and 3 to lay out the theoretical framework 
of this project, the Mexican state was highly centralized by 1980, that is, municipal 
governments (and states too) had limited authority and even less autonomy. Individual 
political leaders, who were influential within the PRI, might succeed in obtaining 
resources for local needs and even creating a margin of maneuver for making decisions, 
but these were isolated cases.  The institutional framework afforded municipalities few 
functions, powers, or resources of their own, and the political system ensured that mayors 
were loyal to higher authorities within the state and the party.  The country was officially 
a federation but in practice functions, powers, and resources were concentrated 
overwhelmingly in the federal government at the expense of states and especially 
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municipalities. 
 Similarly, the structure of municipalities was designed to ensure the dominance of 
the official party and the frequent circulation of politicians through different public posts.  
Therefore, terms for mayor and city council were short with no reelection allowed; the 
winning party (almost always the PRI) won all seats in the city council and the occupants 
of these seats were chosen by party list, which gave control over the council to the party 
bureaucracy or the incoming mayor.  No independent candidates could run.  This 
institutional design did little to ensure representation, but it served the ends of a one-
party dominant state well.  Given single party dominance, transparency was limited—
largely dependent on what the mayor chose to tell his or her constituents.  Political 
institutions were thus formally democratic, but they were designed to ensure the 
accountability of local officials upwards to higher-level officials in the party or the 
government. 
Similarly, citizen participation in municipal affairs, though frequent, was 
mediated through clientelistic channels and permitted little citizen engagement in 
deliberation about public affairs.    In fact, the entire political system was predicated on a 
series of patronage networks that mediated between citizens and their elected authorities.  
The intermediaries at the center of these patronage networks—union leaders, community 
representatives, and local party officials—served both as agents of political mobilization 
for those above them in the party hierarchy and as brokers for the demands and needs of 
their constituents below them.  Independent political parties and social organizations 
fought for demands of specific sectors of society—often workers, farmers, or 
neighborhoods—but they had to walk a fine line to avoid repression.  Similarly, the 
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media, though nominally independent, depended on their relationship with government 
officials, who provided most of the advertising revenue as well as direct subsidies, so 
reporters had to tread cautiously to avoid anything that might be deemed offensive to 
those in power.  Overall, few spaces of truly autonomous organization existed outside the 
official party though considerable contestation took place within it.  The dominant 
structure of power was built around a vertically integrated system of political 
intermediaries who belonged to a single political party and owed their loyalty upward to 
party leaders.   Within this system, political rights were nominally extensive, but the 
effectiveness of their exercise was sharply restricted.  Everyone could vote, but true 
power was not exercised at the ballot box but through the chain of political brokers who 
linked citizens with the government and its decision-makers.
Chapter 5 
Decentralization and Democratic Transition (1980-2005) 
5.1 Authoritarian Legacies and Political Change 
 
In the late 1970s Mexico’s central government lived through its most glorious period.  
High world oil prices coupled with the discovery of new oil reserves in the Gulf of 
Mexico created an influx of revenue into government coffers, supplemented by extensive 
loans from foreign banks.  During this period the federal government negotiated a fiscal 
pact with the states in which they ceded most of their fiscal powers in 1980 to the federal 
government in return for increased revenue transfers.  In 1977, the federal congress had 
passed a law, at the insistence of the President, which expanded proportional 
representation in congress (to a quarter of all seats) and created, for the first time, 
proportional representation seats in municipal city councils in all municipalities over 
300,000.1 A successful government awash in dollars could afford to be generous with the 
opposition and, in passing, shore up its own legitimacy in the eyes of the public.  
However, this period of abundance proved short-lived.  In 1982, a worldwide recession, 
declining oil prices, and soaring interest rates sent the Mexican economy into a tailspin.2
Debt spiraled out of control, growth stagnated, inflation climbed, and President José 
López Portillo was forced to devalue the peso in his final days in office.  The Mexican 
 
1 This initiative was the brainchild of legendary PRI politician and intellectual Jesús Reyes Heroles, who at 
the time was serving as Secretary of the Interior (Gobernación).  The idea was to ensure the legitimacy of 
the political system at a time when political competition had diminished.  The reform also legalized new 
political parties, including the long-restricted Communist Party.  See Enrique Ochoa Reza, “Multiple 
Arenas of Struggle: Federalism and Mexico’s Transition to Democracy,” in Edward L Gibson, ed., 
Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. 
2 Nora Lustig, Mexico: Remaking of an Economy, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998. 
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economy continued in crisis for most of the next fifteen years (until 1997), with only a 
brief period of growth from 1990 to 1994.   
The federal government faced a loss of public confidence.  Throughout the 1980s and 
1990s it would gradually devolve powers, functions, and resources to municipal and state 
governments.  Initially it did this in order to divert political conflict from the national 
stage to the local arena.  However, as opposition political parties gained a foothold in 
subnational governments, they bargained for further decentralization reforms to shore up 
their own base of support.  Decentralization became one of the many reforms that 
opposition parties pushed in driving for democratic reform over the ensuing years.   
Decentralization thus served both to open up political space in Mexico’s authoritarian 
regime and was a product of that opening.   
Despite the mutually reinforcing relationship between decentralization and 
democratization in Mexico, neither opposition parties nor the federal government paid 
attention to reforms that would democratize local governments themselves.  Both saw 
local governments in instrumental terms.  For opposition parties, local governments were 
the bastion from which they could pry open the authoritarian system and ultimately take 
over national power.  For the federal government, local governments presented an 
opportunity to redirect political dissent away from the national capital.  While some local 
mayors took individual initiatives to democratize municipal institutions, elected leaders 
as a whole paid little attention to this possibility.  Once opposition parties achieved their 
ultimate goal—creating a competitive electoral system and eventually ousting the PRI 
from power—they similarly neglected reforms to democratize the local arena.  As a 
consequence, Mexico’s municipal governments continue to live with an institutional 
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structure that was created to serve largely authoritarian purposes.  The structure of 
Mexican municipalities was developed to privilege single-party rule with limited public 
oversight; however, with only minor adjustments, all of the major political parties have 
learned how to benefit from the status quo even in a competitive political environment.   
 
5.2 Mexico’s Democratic Transition 
In many countries of Latin America, democratic transitions came about through 
the collapse of a military order (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia, and Brazil3) or
negotiated peace processes (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua).  In a few cases, 
“limited democracies,” which had elections but largely restricted competition to two 
political parties, were liberalized by sudden crises of legitimacy (Venezuela and 
Colombia).4 Mexico, however, underwent a protracted democratic transition that 
involved a series of iterative negotiations among key political parties driven by periods of 
social mobilization and periodic crises of legitimacy.  The negotiations set the electoral 
rules and institutions in ways increasingly favorable to competition, and they determined 
the powers, function, and resources of subnational governments in ways that gradually 
broadened the impact of political plurality at a subnational level.  The gradual, negotiated 
nature of the transition helped ensure stability, created a strong party system, and 
 
3 The Brazilian and Chilean militaries were able to negotiate the end of their rule, however. 
4 On democratic transitions, see the landmark study by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and 
Lawrence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; and a more recent compilation which reviews the literature on 
transitions in Latin America, Felipe Aguero and Jeffrey Stark, eds., Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-
Transition Latin America, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 
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generated a degree of legitimacy for the changes.  However, this same process also meant 
that non-party actors, though influential in pushing for democratic changes, had little 
impact in the final decision-making.   The bargains that created Mexico’s democratic 
system were agreements among party elites who sought to preserve a monopoly on 
political influence for themselves within the new political regime. 
Even in the times of greatest single-party dominance, considerable political 
contestation did take place in Mexico.  Much of it took place within the official party, but 
there were also always political parties and civic organizations that operated outside the 
official party (see Chapter 4).  For the most part, however, the PRI enjoyed a certain 
degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the Mexican public and in an expanding economy it 
had powerful tools to reward its followers and punish those few opponents who presented 
a serious challenge.  With the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, the PRI lost much 
of its legitimacy in the eyes of important segments of the Mexican public.  It also found it 
hard to “share the wealth” with its followers, as it had traditionally done, at a time when 
federal government revenues were contracting.5 Moreover, the PRI was forced to turn to 
technocratic members of the party, generally economists trained abroad, to pull the 
country out of the economic crisis, alienating many of the career politicians who had 
dominated party leadership in the past, including most elected offices and the cabinet.6
The dominant party began to show fissures and the public became more skeptical about 
its performance.7
5 Government spending fell 6.9% between 1983 to 1988, then remained constant as a percentage of GDP 
until 1996. Lustig, Mexico: Remaking of an Economy, p. 80-81, 211. 
6 See Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy Within Reason: Mexico’s Technocratic Revolution, second 
edition, University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1997. 
7 For a more extensive analysis of Mexico’s democratic transition, see Joseph S. Tulchin and Andrew D. 
Selee, “Introduction,” in Tulchin and Selee, eds., Mexico’s Politics and Society in Transition, Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2003 and Roderic Ai. Camp, Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Transformation, fourth 
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 The PAN was the first beneficiary of the shift in public opinion.  In the elections 
of 1983, the PAN won around thirty cities, including the state capitals of Chihuahua, 
Durango, Sonora, and San Luis Potosí, plus the major border city Ciudad Juárez.8 The 
party went on to compete actively in the state election in Chihuahua in 1986, although the 
PAN’s apparent victory in the gubernatorial race was not recognized.  In 1989, the PAN 
had its first major breakthrough, winning the city of Tijuana, with nearly a million 
inhabitants, and the governorship of the state of Baja California, where Tijuana is located.  
The PAN would win Tijuana four more times in the 1990s and consolidate its hold on the 
state governorship as well.  In 1992, the PAN won its second governorship, in 
Chihuahua, and by 1997 the PAN controlled a majority of large cities in the country.9
The PAN consciously followed a “municipalist” strategy, identifying cities as their 
strongest bastion of support and building slowly towards national influence.  The party 
was also willing to bargain with the PRI at key times, giving it some ability to negotiate 
demands for strengthened local government in return for supporting the PRI’s national 
policies.10 
The Mexican left followed a different path.  Traditionally divided among several 
smaller political organizations, the left began a process of unification after 1985, creating 
first the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico and then the Mexican Socialist Party.  The left 
had some success at winning small municipalities starting with Juchitán, Oaxaca in 
 
edition,  Oxford: Oxford Unversity Press, 2003. 
8 For an analysis of the 1983 elections see Carlos Martínez Assad, ed., Municipios en Conflicto, Mexico: 
UNAM, 1985. 
9 Author’s calculations based on the data cited in Figure 5.5.  By 1997, the PAN governed 18 of the 
country’s 26 large cities (those that had over 500,000 inhabitants in the 2000 census). 
10 On the PAN, see Yemile Mizrahi, From Martyrdom to Power, South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University, 
Press, 2003. 
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1981.11 However, its great opportunity came in 1987-88, when Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, 
son of Mexico’s most revered post-revolutionary president, decided to leave the PRI after 
failing to get the party to democratize its own internal selection process.  Cárdenas 
launched a campaign for president with the backing of the left and a few other small 
parties, and many PRI leaders throughout the country supported his campaign.  Cárdenas 
may well have won the vote, but he was officially credited with 31% of the vote against 
51% for the PRI’s candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari.  Cárdenas’ followers and the 
Mexican Socialist Party together formed a new party, the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD), in 1989, but the party struggled for several years winning no more 
than a few smaller towns.12 The party’s major breakthroughs finally came with a victory 
in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, a large city on the outskirts of Mexico City, in 1996, and then 
in Mexico City itself in 1997 (with Cárdenas as mayoral candidate).  In congressional 
elections that year, the PRD also narrowly edged out the PAN to become the largest 
opposition party in Congress. 
Civil society organizations grew steadily in this period as well.  Traditionally 
Mexico had had few independent social organizations that were not linked to the PRI, 
and the few exceptions almost invariably were tied to the Catholic Church or to one of 
the small left political parties, who could provide a measure of protection.13 However, 
 
11 This was a victory for an alliance between the Communist Party (PCM) and a local social movement, the 
COCEI.  However, the COCEI/PCM government was suspended in 1984 before it could finish its term.  
The COCEI would win Juchitán again in 1990, in alliance with the PRD, and repeat several times after that.  
See Jeffrey Rubin, Decentering the Regime.   
12 The difficulties arose both from the challenges of creating party unity in a new organization that brought 
together different political cultures (both the historical left and PRI dissidents) and from the resistance of 
the government, which went out of its way to harass the party at every turn.  See Kathleen Bruhn, Taking 
on Goliath : the emergence of a new left party and the struggle for democracy in Mexico, University Park : 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. 
13 Miguel Concha Malo, La Participación de los cristianos en el proceso popular de liberación en México, 
1968-1983, Mexico City: Editorial Siglo XXI, 1986. 
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the crises of the 1980s generated a growth of independent social organizations, many of 
them dedicated to development concerns.  Of particular importance was the growth of the 
Urban Popular Movement (MUP, for the initials in Spanish), which brought together 
coalitions of neighborhood organizations representing poor communities throughout the 
country.  The MUP had different national structures over the years, but within cities the 
urban organizations representing the poor often became quite combative around issues of 
land tenure and basic services and helped shape municipal policies.14 In the early 1990s, 
a series of organizations pushing for more democracy emerged.  The most important of 
these, Alianza Cívica (Civic Alliance), brought together hundreds of smaller associations 
throughout the country to lobby for free and fair elections.  With considerable support 
from the international community, Alianza Cívica succeeded in mobilizing over 30,000 
people to monitor the 1994 presidential elections to prevent fraud.15 An armed 
movement that emerged publicly in the same year, the Zapatista National Liberation 
Army, also played a role in the struggle for political liberalization.  The emergence of the 
Zapatistas, a mostly indigenous rebel army in the southern state of Chiapas, galvanized 
civic mobilization around their demands for democracy and indigenous rights, and forced 
the government to move quickly on planned electoral reforms in that year.16 Quite 
significantly, the national press, which had largely been beholden to the federal 
government for advertising dollars and “supplemental income” under the table, gradually 
 
14 José Manuel Valenzuela Arce, Empapados de Sereno: El Movimiento Urbano Popular en Baja 
California, Tijuana: Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 1991. 
15 Tulchin and Selee, “Introduction.” 
16 It should be noted that the Zapatistas are not necessarily a very democratic movement internally, and they 
have generally asked their members to abstain in local and national elections; but their demand for 
democracy found an important echo in other sectors of Mexican society.  On the conflict in Chiapas, see 
Neil Harvey, The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy, Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1998; and Cynthia J. Arnson, Raúl Benítez Manaut, and Andrew Selee, eds., Chiapas: los 
desafíos de la paz y la negociación, Mexico City: UNAM, 2003; and Arnson, Benítez, and Selee, “Frozen 
Negotiations: The Peace Process in Chiapas,” Mexican Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, forthcoming February 2006. 
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broke free of this dependence and developed a more independent posture.17 
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17 Not all media did this at the same speed or to the same extent, of course.  But important independent 
media voices, especially in print media, developed during the 1980s.  These included La Jornada and 
Proceso in Mexico City and El Norte, which had begun even earlier, in Monterrey.  El Norte later gave 
birth to Reforma in Mexico City in the 1994.  On these changes, see Lawson, Building the Fourth Estate.
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Note for all three graphs: PRD/left is PRD in 1994 and 2000; Frente Democrático Nacional (FDN) 
in 1988; Partido Socialista Unificado de México (PSUM) in 1985; and the Mexican Communist 
Party (PCM) in 1982.  In some years the three major parties entered elections in coalitions with 
small parties; however, the results reported here reflect all votes as in favor of the major parties.  
Percentages do not add to 100% because data presented on electoral results exclude smaller parties 
and blank votes. 
Source for all three graphs: CIDAC, “Base de Datos de Elecciones Federales,” available at 
www.cidac.org, and Instituto Federal Electoral, “Estadísticas de las Elecciones Federales de 
México 2003,” available at www.ife.org.mx, both consulted June 17, 2005 
 
Throughout the period after 1982 opposition political parties grew in electoral 
strength (see Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3) and increasingly conquered municipal and state 
elections (see Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6).  The pressure of both the opposition parties and 
civil society organizations forced the federal government to pass increasingly more 
effective electoral laws as well.  In 1990, the Federal Electoral Institute was created as an 
autonomous body to run elections.  Though still largely controlled by the Ministry of the 
Interior, it was no longer located within the ministry itself.  In 1994 it incorporated 
citizen counselors for the first time, and in 1996 became a fully autonomous institution 
run by seven citizen counselors selected by a two-thirds majority in the congress.  The 
conditions were now set for clean and fair elections.  Most states followed suit, setting up 
autonomous electoral institutions with differing degrees of credibility.18 By the mid-
 
18 See Jacqueline Peschard, “Instituciones electorales estatales,” unpublished manuscript presented at the 
Woodrow Wilson Center, March 2005. 
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1990s, the country reached a “tipping point,” where citizens voted as often for opposition 
parties as for the PRI in municipal elections.19 Indeed by 1997, almost half (49.9%) of 
citizens lived in municipalities ruled by opposition governments.20 Also in 1997 the PRI 
lost the federal congress for the first time.21 Opposition parties maintained their strong 
foothold in municipal elections thereafter, and in 2000, a charismatic PAN candidate, 
Vicente Fox, swept the PRI out of office for the first time in 71 years, winning 42.5-
36.1% over the PRI’s candidate. 









PRD 1 3 4 6
PAN 1 1 2 3 3 3 4 4 6 6 7 9
PRI 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 30 30 29 28 28 28 27 27 25 23 21 17
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Note: Mexico City is counted as a state beginning in 1997 when elections for its “Chief of Government” 
were first allowed.  Coalitions of the PAN and PRD are added to one party or the other: The governors of 
Nayarit (1999- ) and Yucatan (2000- ) are registered as PAN governors; the governor of Chiapas (2000- ) is 
registered as a PRD governor.  In several other cases, governors were elected as parts of coalitions that 
included smaller parties, but the candidates were members of the PRI, PAN, or PRD and are noted as such. 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data in Enrique Ochoa-Reza, “Multiple Arenas of Struggle: 
Federalism and Mexico’s Transition to Democracy,” p. 272. 
19 Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, Beatriz Magaloni, and Barry Weingast argue that the mid-1990s constitute the 
“tipping point” where a critical mass of opposition municipalities was reached and citizens stopped fearing 
fiscal retaliation from the federal government if they voted for an opposition government in local elections.  
(“Mexico: Before the Fall,” in Hoover Digest, No. 1, 2001.) 
20 Author’s calculations based on the dataset cited in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. 
21 It remained the largest party, however, and only a few seats shy of the majority.  The PRI was often able 
to hobble together majority coalitions with small parties, but it also had to negotiate with the PAN and the 
PRD on major legislation. 
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Note and Source: See Figure 5.6. 
 





































































Note: These numbers exclude municipalities that are governed by customary law (usos y costumbres) in 
Oaxaca and the Federal District of Mexico City.  In the case of coalitions, the municipality was assigned to 
the larger party.  In the case of the rare PAN-PRD coalitions, a judgment was made on which party to 
assign the municipality in the data. 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on a database assembled with data from CIDAC, “Elecciones 
municipales, 1980-2004,” available at www.cidac.org.   Data for the 1996 elections in Hidalgo were taken 
from La Jornada, and missing data for the Oaxaca elections of 2001 from Gobierno de Oaxaca, “Distritos y 
Municipios de Oaxaca,” available at www.oaxaca.gob.mx/distmun/munidis.html, and checked against 
election returns reported by La Jornada and El Universal.
Mexico’s gradual democratic transition has much to recommend it.  It avoided 
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violence, preserved stability, and privileged consensus among key political actors.  
Mexico went into the new millennium with a strong party structure while many countries 
in Latin America lacked stable political parties.  At the same time, the exclusive reliance 
on pacts among political elites meant that their interests were largely preserved in the 
political system that emerged, and this happened at the expense of changes that might 
have opened the democratic process.22 The electoral changes, for example, kept the 
prohibition on immediate reelection to any public office, which means that elected 
officials owe their future possibilities for candidacy to party bosses rather than 
constituents.  Independent candidacies were prohibited at any level of government.  Few 
attempts were made to create clear rules and procedures for policymaking in the federal 
congress or most state congresses, leaving legislation subject to informal rules and back-
room procedures that are difficult for citizens to monitor.23 As we will see later in this 
chapter, these changes also kept intact the old municipal structure, which creates 
incentives for elected municipal authorities to be responsive and accountable primarily to 
higher level party and government officials rather than to citizens. 
 
5.3 Mexico’s Decentralization Reforms 
Decentralization took place in many countries in Latin America as quickly and 
 
22 I am grateful to Tonatiuh Guillén for pointing this out.  For a related argument, see Mauricio Merino, La 
transición votada: Crítica a la interpretación del cambio político en México, Mexico: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 2003. 
23 See Alejandra Vallejo, “Transparency in Budgeting Processes in Latin America,” Ph.D. dissertation 
manuscript in process. 
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dramatically as their democratic transitions.24 In Venezuela and Bolivia, major 
decentralization reforms were practically decreed overnight by national leaders seeking to 
shore up their support in the midst of extreme crises of political legitimacy.25 In 
Colombia and Brazil, major decentralization reforms emerged from constitutional 
conventions that marked important road markers in the countries’ democratic transition.26 
In Guatemala and El Salvador, decentralization emerged out of negotiations to end the 
countries’ civil wars.27 In Mexico, on the other hand, decentralization took place at much 
the same pace as democratization, through iterative negotiations over a period of two 
decades.  Indeed, the constant renegotiations over Mexico’s democratic future spurred 
decentralization reforms and set its rhythm.  This process helped ensure an orderly and 
gradual transfer of powers, functions, and resources to subnational governments.  
However, it also meant that decentralization reforms were seen in the light of a political 
 
24 For arguments about the reasons for decentralization in Latin America during this period, see Alfred P. 
Montero and David J. Samuels, eds., Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America, South Bend, IN: 
Notre Dame Press, 2004; Eliza Willis, Christopher Garman, and Stephan Haggard, “The Politics of 
Decentralization in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1999, pp. 7-56; and 
Andrew Selee, “Introduction: Decentralization and Democratic Governance,” in Joseph S. Tulchin and 
Andrew Selee, eds., Decentralization and Democratic Governance in Latin America, Washington, DC: 
Woodrow Wilson Center, 2004. 
25 Merilee Grindle, Audacious Reforms. See also Rosa Amelia González and Carlos Mascareno, 
“Decentralization and the Restructuring of Politics in Venezuela, in Tulchin and Selee, eds., 
Decentralization and Democratic Governance in Latin America, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 
Center, 2004. 
26 On Brazil see Marcus Melo and Flavio Rezende, “Decentralization and Governance in Brazil” in Joseph 
S. Tulchin and Andrew Selee, eds., Decentralization and Democratic Governance in Latin America, 
Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2004; on Colombia, see María Antonieta Huerta 
Malbrán, Carlos Gabián Pressacco Chávez, Consuelo 
Ahumada Beltrán, Marcela Velasco Jaramillo, Jesús Puente Alcaraz, and Juan 
Fernando Molina Meza, eds., Descentralización, municipio y participación ciudadana: 
Chile, Colombia y Guatemala, Bogotá: CEJA, 2000.  One significant exception is Argentina, which went 
through a significant decentralization process, geared primarily toward the provinces, in the 1990s.  See 
Tulia Falleti, “Federalism and Decentralization in Argentina: Historical Background and New 
Intergovernmental Relations,”, in Tulchin and Selee, eds, Decentralization and Democratic Governance in 
Latin America. 
27 See Victor Gálvez, Carlos Hoffman, and Luis Mack, Poder local y participación democrática, 
Guatemala: FLACSO, 1998.  See also Luis Linares and Jesús Puente, “A General View of the Institutional 
State of Decentralization in Guatemala,” in Tulchin and Selee, eds., Decentralization and Democratic 
Governance. For a overview of major experiences with decentralization in Latin America, see Andrew 
Selee, “Introduction,” in Tulchin and Selee, Decentralization and Democratic Governance. 
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chess game, where each side sought to use the reforms to ensure its own political 
advantage in the protracted democratization process rather than to improve democratic 
governance.  Decentralization reforms had less to do with subnational governments and 
their role in the state as they did with their potential to influence partisan outcomes in the 
electoral process. 
 
Decentralization in an Authoritarian Regime (1983-88) 
 
After years of gradual centralization of power, functions, and resources in the 
central state, President Miguel de la Madrid (1983-88) set in motion a gradual 
decentralization process with his proposal to reform the constitution to strengthen 
municipalities.  He had made the proposal initially during the campaign and within five 
days of his inauguration formally proposed the constitutional changes to the Congress.  
The changes to the constitution’s article 115, which regulates municipalities, were passed 
in 1983 and took effect on January 1, 1984.  These changes altered the legal framework 
of municipalities significantly.  Municipalities, rather than the states, could now levy 
property taxes, and they had full ownership over their own property, which had 
previously been property of state governments. Municipalities were given the right to 
determine their own internal processes for governance, including municipal planning, 
budgeting, and the passing of regulations on matters within their territory.  Municipalities 
were also granted the right to provide basic municipal services, including water, street 
lighting, street cleaning, markets, cemeteries, slaughterhouses, local street building and 
maintenance, parks and gardens, public security, and local transportation, and to sign 
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agreements with other municipalities or with the state to coordinate efforts.28 Finally, the 
reform clarified the procedure through which the state governments could remove mayors 
and councils, limiting the governor’s discretion to do this.29 
President de la Madrid seems to have been largely motivated by the need to 
reclaim legitimacy for the Mexican state in the light of the economic crisis and serious 
mismanagement by his predecessor.30 The reforms made a significant difference to large 
municipalities, which could raise new revenues through property taxes and effectively 
implement their new set of constitutionally protected functions.  However, many smaller 
municipalities saw little difference in their status.  This was especially true in mostly 
rural municipalities where tax-exempt communal properties were the predominant form 
of landowning.  Moreover, this period coincided with the most difficult moments of the 
economic crisis, so that municipal revenue-raising capacity suffered overall (and rampant 
inflation undermined the value of existing revenues).  Overall, municipal revenues 
increased only a modest 15% in real terms in the 1983-88 period.   
The federal government pursued a second approach to decentralization by 
creating a new system for federal government investments in states.  For the first time, 
the federal government agreed to sign agreements, known as Single Development 
Agreements (CUD, Convenios Únicos de Desarrollo) with all states to set the purpose 
and nature of federal investments each year from the various ministries.  Since the federal 
government still managed most public investments, states, and indirectly municipalities, 
 
28 According to de la Madrid, the changes were “aimed at strengthening the municipality’s finances, its 
political autonomy, and all the faculties that somehow have constantly been absorbed by the states.”  Cited 
in Victoria Rodriguez, Decentralization in Mexico: From Reforma Municipal to Solidaridad to Nuevo 
Federalismo, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, p. 74.  For an analysis of the reforms, see p. 119; and 
Enrique Cabrero, Las Políticas Descentralizadaras en México (1983-1993), Logros y Desencantos, 
Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrúa, 1998, pp. 108-9. 
29 Mauricio Merino, Fuera de Centro, Xalapa, Veracruz: Universidad Veracruzana, 1992, pp. 113-17. 
30 Rodriguez, Decentralization in Mexico, pp. 1 and 109; Cabrero, Las políticas descentralizadoras, p. 17. 
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would now have a say in how those investments were determined.  Each state was to 
have a State Planning Council (Coplade) which would bring together all three levels of 
government, and each municipality a Municipal Planning Council (Copladem or 
Coplademun), which would bring together key social groups, municipal government 
officials, and key state and federal officials.31 According to one study, however, only 11-
15% of federal investment in the states actually went through the CUDs and the Coplades 
had little influence in determining even these investments.  Moreover, only 10% of 
municipalities reported even creating a Copladem and most of these were dominated by 
the municipal mayor.32 Nonetheless, the requirement to create Coplades and Copladems, 
set a precedent that would become important in the future.33 
This period also saw some important changes politically.  Opposition parties won 
fewer municipal victories after 1983—or at least fewer victories were recognized—, but 
opposition parties continued to make inroads in municipal elections.  Significantly, the 
1983 reforms for the first time allowed municipalities under 300,000 inhabitants to have 
city council members of minority parties.  In 1986, the federal electoral law was changed 
to require representation of minority parties in all municipal councils, which greatly 
expanded the presence of these parties in local politics for the first time.34 Opposition 
parties thus gained a foothold in local governments, and this presence greatly expanded 
 
31 Rodriguez, Decentralization in Mexico, p. 73.  Coplades were actually created in 1981 under the previous 
president, José López Portillo, but given expanded functions under de la Madrid.  See John Bailey, 
“Centralism and Political Change in Mexico: The Case of National Solidarity,” in Wayne A. Cornelius, 
Ann L. Craig, and Jonathan Fox, Transforming State Society Relations: The National Solidarity Strategy,” 
La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1994. 
32 Cabrero, Las Políticas Descentralizadoras, pp. 153-61. 
33 The de la Madrid administration also began a gradual decentralization of healthcare from the federal to 
state governments.  This decentralization of healthcare services was done on a state-by-state basis, but it 
would greatly expand state budgets over the coming years.  See Mizrahi, “Twenty Years of 
Decentralization in Mexico: A Top-Down Process,” in Oxhorn, Tulchin, and Selee, eds., Decentralization, 
Democratic Governance, and Civil Society in Comparative Perspective for a synopsis of this process and 
Kaufman and Nelson, Crucial Needs, Weak Incentives, for a full analysis. 
34 Ochoa Reza, “Multiple Arenas of Struggle.” 
123
their influence and desire to compete.   
 
An Ambiguous Decentralization: Solidarity (1988-1994) 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari reached the presidency in an election marked by public 
discontent and massive fraud.35 Bent on rebuilding citizens’ faith in government, 
solidifying his political base, and recreating the social pact that had existed between the 
government and the Mexican poor before the crisis, Salinas initiated an ambitious new 
social program known as Solidarity.36 It was to be a participatory, demand-based 
program in which the government would provide funds to civic organizations to carry out 
major public works and productive projects in coordination with the government.  
Solidarity grew from 1989 to 1994 to involve over 6% of the programmable budget and 
around 13% of social spending.37 The program included over a dozen separate funds 
which were managed in different ways and for different purposes.  Among these, were 
the Solidarity Municipal Funds, which provided funds directly to municipalities for 
community-driven, small-scale infrastructure projects.  Municipal Funds constituted 
around 14% of the total Solidarity budget.38 These funds noticeably increased the 
resources available to municipalities for public investment.  Other Solidarity funds, 
though not given directly to municipalities, often required their involvement with state 
 
35 The governing PRI had suffered a major split, and the election computers “crashed” on election night as 
initial results showed an opposition candidate leading the presidential poll.  
36 Officially “Programa Nacional de Solidaridad” (Pronasol) or “National Solidarity Program.” 
37 Since most of social spending is in education and healthcare, this is actually a very large number.  It 
represented around 1.08% of GDP in 1992.  Nora Lustig, “Solidarity as a Strategy for Poverty Alleviation,” 
in Wayne A. Cornelius, Ann L. Craig, and Jonathan Fox, Transforming State Society Relations: The 
National Solidarity Strategy,” La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1994. 
38 This figure covers 1989-1992.  Jonathan Fox and Josefina Aranda, Decentralization and Rural 
Development in Mexico: Community Participation in Oaxaca’s Municipal Funds Program, La Jolla, CA: 
Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1996, p. 5fn. 
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and federal governments for implementation. 
 Solidarity produced contradictory effects for both decentralization and democratic 
governance.  On one hand, the funds created new synergies among levels of government 
in the implementation of projects and provided municipalities with funds for investment 
that did not depend on the discretion of state governors.39 Solidarity’s demand-driven 
approach also created new synergies between state and society, at least in some regions 
where authoritarian control was already weak.40 On the other hand, Solidarity was also 
highly centralized and managed discretionally by the federal office of the president, 
where the program was located for most of its existence.41 Critics have noted that 
although Solidarity had decentralizing elements, it was far from a decentralization 
initiative.  In fact, its real intention was to recentralize power in the presidency and to 
reestablish the legitimacy of the president.42 Although it provided funds to 
municipalities, these were discretional transfers that were not institutionalized or ensured 
in future years.43 On balance we might conclude that the intention of Solidarity was to 
 
39 Rodriguez, Decentralization in Mexico. 
40 Fox and Aranda, Decentralization and Rural Development in Mexico, pp. 45-50; see also Kerianne 
Piester, “Targeting the Poor: The Politics of Social Policy Reforms in Mexico,” in Douglass A. Chalmers, 
Carlos M. Vilas, Katherine Hite, Scott B. Martin, Piester, and Monique Segarra, eds., The New Politics of 
Inequality in Latin America: Rethinking Participation and Representation, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997.  Solidarity is believed to have created over 150,000 local committees related to projects.  
While many of these were of limited permanence, some did achieve a life beyond the individual projects 
they set out to implement.  See Wayne A. Cornelius, Ann L. Craig, and Jonathan Fox, Transforming State 
Society Relations: The National Solidarity Strategy,” La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1994, 
pp. 20-21. 
41 Starting in 1992, the federal government created the Ministry of Social Development (Secretaría de 
Desarrollo Social) to run the program; however, it remained closely tied to the presidency.  On the 
discretional nature, see Juan Molinar Horcasitas and Jeffrey A. Weldon, “Electoral Determinants and 
Consequences of National Solidarity,” in Cornelius, Craig, and Fox, Transforming State-Society Relations. 
42 Bailey, “Centralism,” and Denise Dresser, “Bringing the Poor Back In: National Solidarity as a Strategy 
of Regime Legitimation,” in Cornelius, Craig, and Fox, Transforming State-Society Relations. 
43 Cabrero, Las políticas descentralizadoras, pp. 38.  Cabrero finds that most Solidarity decisions, even for 
Municipal Funds, continued to be top-down, with final decisions on projects made by the federal 
government rather than municipalities (pp. 169-81).  Fox and Aranda (Decentralization and Rural 
Development in Mexico) found a more participatory approach in Oaxaca’s Municipal Funds program, 
however. 
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recentralize power in the federal executive and it created few sustainable institutional 
structures for decentralization or for society-driven development; however, the program 
did generate new practices in the relationship among levels of government and between 
government and society, which would later prove important when institutional changes 
were made.44 
New Federalism, New Funds, New Laws, New Competition (1994-2000) 
 
The presidency of Ernesto Zedillo in the presidency marks a turning point in 
Mexican federalism and the role of municipalities within it.  The changes were partially a 
result of a national strategy to decentralize, but also of increased political competition and 
the growing bargaining power of opposition parties.  Zedillo formulated an approach 
known as “New Federalism” to redefine the role of all three levels of government.45 
Within this framework, the government converted most of the budget line for Solidarity, 
Ramo 26 (Ramo is the Spanish word for a budget line), into block grant transfers to state 
and municipal governments.  Instead of administering social programs from Mexico City, 
they would now be administered in subnational governments.46 Thus federal transfers 
 
44 The Salinas administration also began a decentralization process in education to state governments.  
Most day-to-day responsibilities for schools were passed from the federal government to the states in this 
period, although the federal government maintained tight control over key policy decisions, including 
curriculum and wage levels.  The transfer of education to the states would dramatically increase their share 
of total public expenditures, and education would come to be one of the central activities of most state 
governments and one of the most significant components of their annual budget..  See Mizrahi, “Twenty 
Years of Decentralization in Mexico,” and Robert R. Kaufman and Joan M. Nelson, eds., Crucial Needs, 
Weak Incentives: Social Sector Reform, Democratization, and Globalization in Latin America. 
Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004. 
45 Peter Ward and Victoria Rodriguez with Enrique Cabrero, New Federalism and State Government, U.S.-
Mexico Policy Report No. 9, Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1999. 
46 Part of the Solidarity funds were transferred into other budget lines to be spent on federal social 
programs, but the bulk of the funds were converted into the bloc grants under Ramo 33. 
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showed a noticeable rise in 1995-1997 after many years of steady but very gradual 
growth.  The immediate impact of these new transfers was lessened somewhat by the 
effects of rampant inflation, in the wake of the 1994-95 “tequila crisis,” which reduced 
the real value of these transfers.  However, it began a period of accelerated growth in 
federal transfers to municipalities (see Figure 5.7).   
 
Figure 5.7: Total Federal Transfers to Municipalities (in Billions of Pesos), 1989-2002 











Transfers (nominal value)  2.55  3.58  4.83  6.11  6.95  8.52  9.89  14.16  19.02  31.44  46.45  58.55  69.60  83.00 
Transfers (real value=2002)  13.03  13.57  14.96  14.88  14.36  15.82  17.07  22.60  28.09  42.95  58.69  68.43  75.25  83.00 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in INEGI, Sistema Nacional de Base de Datos. 
 
After 1998 federal transfers to municipalities (and to states to a lesser extent) 
would rise even more dramatically.  In the 1997 elections, the PRI had, for the first time 
in history, lost its majority in the lower house of Congress, and an opposition coalition 
led by the PRD and the PAN took control of the chamber.47 In the negotiations over the 
federal budget in 1998, the PAN managed to win approval for the conversion of Ramo 26 
into Ramo 33, an automatic transfer to states and municipalities.  Ramo 33 would be 
 
47 The PRD and PAN could only control the chamber with the support of smaller parties, however, and the 
PRI was often able to win these small parties over on specific votes.  Nonetheless, on major issues like the 
budget, the opposition coalition often held—and it was always a force to be reckoned with. 
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composed of several funds, of which two were specifically for municipalities: the Fund 
for the Support of Municipal Social Infrastructure (FAISM, Fondo de Aportaciones para 
la Infraestructura Social Municipal) and the Fund for Strengthening Municipalities and 
the Federal District (FORTAMUNDF, Fondo para el Fortalecimiento de los Municipios 
y las Demarcaciones Territoriales del Distrito Federal).  FAISM was designed to 
provide municipalities with funds for small infrastructure projects in low-income 
communities.  Decisions on spending FAISM funds were to be made by the Municipal 
Planning Council (Copladem) or a Municipal Development Council (Codemun), which 
would include key government officials and citizen representatives who would jointly set 
priorities.  FORTAMUNDF would provide unrestricted funds for improving the 
infrastructure and performance of the municipality itself.  Since 1998 Ramo 33 funds 
have almost tripled in real terms (Figure 5.8) and come to constitute one of the most 
important sources of revenue for municipal governments.   











FORTUMUNDF  6,733  13,097  15,030  19,536  22,327  22,888  24,096 
FAISM  9,140  12,245  14,054  16,753  19,144  19,625  20,661 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Note: Calculated in 2004 pesos. 
Source: INAFED, “Finanzas Públicas Locales y Federalismo,” based on data from the Secretaría de 
Hacienda y Crédito Público, www.inafed.gob.mx, consulted June 4, 2005. 
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 In 1999, Congress took up the constitutional framework of municipal 
governments and ultimately passed an amendment to article 115 of the Constitution, 
which would have far-reaching consequences.  Under the 1983 constitutional reform, 
municipalities had been given responsibilities for the provision of services, internal 
governance, and levying income taxes; the 1999 reform specifically designated 
municipalities as political entities, which, like states and the federal government, could 
set policy for local affairs within their jurisdiction.  The reform also gave them the faculty 
to assume new powers and functions through agreements with state governments, thus 
moving beyond the initial list of eight functions reserved for municipalities.  The 1999 
constitutional changes also produced reforms in all of the state constitutions (as required), 
and a very small number of states actually incorporated additional reforms in their 
constitutions to give municipalities even greater powers.48 
This period also saw a very important expansion of political plurality in Mexican 
municipalities.  Opposition parties had made inroads in municipalities since the early 
1980s, but by the mid-1990s, they controlled a significant number of municipal 
governments, and in 1997 already governed almost half of all Mexicans at the municipal 
level (see Figure 5.6).  By 1996, a majority of Mexicans (52.7%) had previous or ongoing 
experience with an opposition party governing their municipality.49 The PAN’s interest 
in creating Ramo 33 and reforming the constitution was closely linked to these political 
changes.  The PAN saw municipal (and also state) victories as a path to prying open 
 
48 Baja California, Colima, Tlaxcala, Oaxaca, and Coahuila, for example, included local innovations in the 
constitutional changes.  Tonatiuh Guillén and Alicia Ziccardi, eds., Innovación y continuidad del municipio 
mexicano: análisis de la reforma municipal de 13 estados de la república, Mexico City: Miguel Angel 
Porrúa, 2004.  See especially the introduction by the editors. 
49 Author’s calculations based on the dataset cited in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. 
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Mexico’s political system and eventually winning the national presidency.50 
Decentralization through Political Change (2000-2005) 
The 2000 elections shifted the political calculus of decentralization dramatically.  
With the victory of the PAN’s Vicente Fox, the majority of municipalities (57.6%) were 
now ruled by political parties different from that of the national government.  Indeed, the 
country’s political institutions lived through a period of impressive political plurality: the 
President was from the PAN; the Senate had a PRI majority; the lower house of Congress 
was divided among the PRI, PAN, and PRD, without a majority for any party; the 
majority of governors were from the PRI; the mayor of Mexico City from the PRD; and 
at the municipal level (excluding Mexico City), 42.4%% of the population lived under 
PAN administrations, 43.4% under PRI administrations, and 11.5% under PRD 
administrations.  After years of one-party rule—and a brief interlude of greater openness 
after 1998—the country had truly entered a period of competitive democracy. 
 At the same time, the PAN, which had fought so hard for decentralization in past 
years, suddenly became increasingly skeptical of it.  The Fox administration espoused a 
commitment to “authentic federalism,” but in practice this largely entailed helping 
municipal governments work better with the resources and legal framework they already 
had.51 The PAN-affiliated federal government became increasingly reluctant to pursue 
major new initiatives given the strength of the PRI at the state and municipal level.   
 
50 Yemile Mizrahi, From Martyrdom to Power, South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2003. 
51 Presentation by Carlos Gadsden, director of the National Institute for Federalism, Ministry of the Interior, 
at the meeting by of the meeting of the High-Level Inter-American Network for Decentralization, (RIAD) 
of the Organization of American States, Cancún, Mexico, September 2003. 
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One notable exception was the Habitat program to reduce urban poverty and restore 
historical downtown areas.  In 2004, this program injected 2.07 billion pesos into urban 
areas throughout the country.52 While this paled in comparison to the over 44 billion 
pesos invested in Ramo 33 transfers to municipalities, it provided additional targeted 
funds to urban municipalities to address the challenges of growing urbanization and the 
restoration of center cities. 
During the Fox administration, the PRI and PRD, which remained strong at the 
state and municipal level, saw an opportunity in reinforcing subnational governments.  
PRI and PRD governors formed the National Conference of Governors’ Association 
(CONAGO, Conferencia Nacional de Gobernadores) in July 2002.  The PAN governors 
refused at first refused to join, but by December 2002 had become part of the 
organization.53 The CONAGO pushed for a National Fiscal Convention in which the 
rules of fiscal federalism could be reevaluated and recalculated.  The federal government 
conceded, eventually, and the Convention was held from February to August of 2004.  
The three municipal mayors’ associations (one for each party) nominally joined together 
to present a common set of proposals at this convention.  However, in reality, partisan 
logics dominated all three associations and these had little force in the debates.  The 
municipal associations thought that the federal government might find common cause 
with them to stave off the challenge from the governors; however, this collaboration 
never emerged.54 In the end, the convention reached agreements on a few broad 
 
52 Detailed data on Habitat is available in SEDESOL, Habitat: Reglas de Operación, Mexico City: 
Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, 2004, available at www.sedesol.gov.mx/ subsecretarias/ 
desarrollourbano/reglas_operacion_habitat_2004.pdf. 
53 For a history of the formation of the CONAGO from one of the governors, see Miguel Alemán Velazco, 
La Revolución Federalista, Mexico: Editorial Diana, 2004.  
54 Interview, Ruben Fernández, President, Association of Municipalities of Mexico (AMMAC), March 4, 
2005. 
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proposals, but these had little momentum behind them and never even came up for 
serious debate in the Mexican congress.55 
The logic of federalism had changed: the PAN now wanted a stronger central 
government while the PRI pushed for greater federalism.  As one scholar who served as 
an advisor to the federal government, observed before the Convention started: 
 
The greatest paradox of the 2004 national convention will be that the 
PAN, which nowadays controls the national executive, and for many years 
has fought for a greater decentralization of resources as an opposition 
party, will have to behave as a conservative agent in charge of keeping in 
the hands of the federation enough power and resources to build a national 
project.  In contrast the PRI, a party that developed its political hegemony 
through the centralization of all sorts of resources, will seek to shift the 
balance of power and resources to the entities [states].56 
However, while the Fox administration and opposition parties remained stuck at 
an impasse over decentralization, the Supreme Court reached a decision with far-reaching 
implications.  In a May 31, 2005 decision, the court found that municipal governments 
had exclusive authority for policymaking in functions under their control.57 
Traditionally, despite the 1999 constitutional amendments, state governments had 
reserved the right to supersede municipalities in policymaking and regulation when they 
saw fit.  The court’s ruling, however, established that the intent of the 1999 reform had 
been to give municipalities equal standing with states and the federal government as 
decision-making bodies, each with separate jurisdiction.  It is as yet unclear what 
practical impact this ruling would have on municipal powers, but it removed—at least in 
 
55 At least as of this writing.  This seemed unlikely to change before the July 2006 presidential and 
congressional elections. 
56 Alain de Remes, “Democratization and Dispersion of Power: New Scenarios in Mexican Federalism,” 
Paper presented at the Conference on Challenges to Mexico’s Demoratic Consolidation, American 
University, November 13-14, 2003.  De Remes served as an advisor to the Secretary of the Interior while 
on leave from teaching at CIDE.   
57 Jesus Aranda, “Confirma la Suprema Corte potestades jurídicas de los municipios del país,” La Jornada, 
June 1, 2005; see also the Editorial “Responsabilidad Municipal,” El Universal, June 1, 2005. 
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theory—the concept that municipalities were administrative bodies subservient to states 
rather than a third order of government with separate policymaking jurisdiction. 
 
5.4 The Impact of Decentralization  
 
Municipalities in Mexico were largely irrelevant at the beginning of the 1980s, 
except as a stepping stone for political advancement and a mediating institution between 
citizens and the more powerful state and federal governments.  Municipalities comprised 
only a little over 1% of the total public expenditures and had few functions, powers, or 
sources of revenue of their own.  Two decades later, this had changed dramatically.  
Municipalities comprised almost 7% of public expenditures (see Figure 5.8) and had 
specific functions, powers, and sources of revenue.  Moreover, decentralization did not 
appear to constitute a slimming down of the state itself.  Total federal programmable 
expenditures in Mexico actually maintained themselves around 15-16% of GDP (and  
around13-14%, excluding Pemex, the national oil company) from the early 1990s to 2004 
even while subnational expenditures expanded (see Figure 5.9).58 How did these changes 
affect the authority and autonomy of municipal governments? 
 
58 Programmable expenditures exclude payment of the debt and transfers to subnational governments. 
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Federal Government 87.4% 84.6% 85.4% 91.0% 90.2% 90.6% 83.1% 83.0% 78.7% 75.1% 71.4%70.1% 72.4% 72.2% 76.2% 70.4% 70.1% 68.7% 68.5% 67.4% 65.8%
State Governments 10.8% 12.9% 12.1% 7.4% 8.2% 7.7% 13.8% 13.2% 16.5% 20.0% 23.3%22.1% 20.8% 20.6% 16.0% 20.7% 20.8% 21.8% 21.9% 22.3% 23.8%
Federal District 3.6% 3.2% 3.6% 4.0% 4.0% 3.6% 3.8% 3.6% 3.7% 3.5%
Municipalities 1.8% 2.6% 2.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.7% 3.0% 3.8% 4.9% 4.9% 5.4% 4.2% 3.6% 3.6% 3.8% 4.8% 5.5% 5.7% 5.9% 6.6% 6.9%
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Note: Federal District expenses are calculated as part of the federal budget until 1994. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in INEGI, Finanzas Estatales y Municipales, 1989-97, 1998-
2003, and 2000-2003; and INEGI, Ingreso y Gasto Público en México, 1985, 1999, 2004. 
 












1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total Federal Programable Expenditures Federal Programmable Expenditures without Pemex
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data presented in Vicente Fox, Cuarto Informe de Gobierno, 





The 1983 constitutional reform provided municipalities with clear functions that 
they were authorized to carry out, primarily in the provision of basic services.  The 1999 
constitutional reform gave municipalities separate powers, with the right to make policy 
decisions around functions they perform within their territory.  The 2005 Supreme Court 
resolution clarified the 1999 reforms by determining that municipalities were a separate 
order of government with exclusive domain over certain policy areas, which were not 
subject to state intervention.    
 









M unicipal Revenue (abso lute terms)  5,005  7,442  10,250  12,742  15,665  17,996  20,131  26,565  34,125  50,527  70,045  85,179  100,674  121,940 
M unicipal Revenue (real terms) 25,545  28,226  31,742  31,045  32,357  33,393  34,747  42,413  50,397  69,021  88,506  99,555  108,839  121,940 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Note: Figures in millions of pesos.  Real pesos calculated with control for inflation in 2002 pesos. 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data in INEGI, Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos, consulted 
June 3, 2005. 
 
The increase in functions and powers were accompanied by an increase in 
resources. Total municipal revenues almost doubled between 1989 and 1997 and then 
more than doubled from 1997 to 2002 (Figure 5.11).  Not all Mexican municipalities are 
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created equally, however.  Twenty-seven large municipalities with over 500,000 
inhabitants, plus the federal district of Mexico City, make up 32.1% of the population.59 
Another 27.4% of the population lives in 127 medium-sized cities of 100,000 to 500,000 
inhabitants, and 32.1% lives in 864 small urban municipalities of 15,000-100,000 
inhabitants.  The remaining 8.5% of the population lives in 1,399 small rural 
municipalities of under 15,000 inhabitants (see Figure 5.12).60 In 1989, small urban and 
rural municipalities had revenues per inhabitant almost half that of large urban 
municipalities.  Medium urban municipalities fared only slightly better.  By 2002, 
however, all size categories of municipalities had similar levels of revenue per inhabitant, 
with small rural municipalities actually outpacing others, with large urban municipalities 
in second place (Figure 5.13).  As we will see in the next section, federal transfers appear 
to be responsible for this shift.61 
59 We do not include the Federal District in calculations of municipal finances, since it is technically a part 
of the federal government with its own legal framework quite distinct from that of a municipality.  Since 
1994, the federal district has increasingly gained autonomy from the federal government, and in 1997 
elected its own “mayor” (called the Chief of Government) for the first time.  
60 The distinction between small urban and small rural municipalities is entirely based on size.  In practice, 
a municipality of 20,000 may be entirely rural and one of 14,000 might be a suburb of a city; but on 
balance, the division by size provides a good way of understanding different institutional challenges for 
municipalities. 
61 The similarity among sizes of municipalities masks important differences within each category, however.  
Most municipalities have annual municipal revenue in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 pesos per inhabitant, but 
a few municipalities register as little as 100 pesos per inhabitant or as much as 5,000 pesos per inhabitant.  
Author’s calculations, based on author’s database put together on statistics in INEGI, Sistema Nacional de 
Base de Datos. 
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Figure 5.12: Number of Municipalities by Size and Total Population 
Federal District (1) 
8,605,239
Small Rural, 
15,000> (1,399)  
8,227,103 
Small Urban, 
15-99,999 (864)  
31,073,958 
Large Urban, 
500,000< (26)  
22,858,332 
Medium Urban, 
100-499,999 (127)  
26,527,685 
Note: Number of municipalities in each category in parentheses followed by total population in category. 
Source: INEGI, Encuesta Nacional de Población y Vivienda, 2000. 
 











Large Urban  410.2  452.9  504.3  489.0  503.8  496.6  518.3  565.6  679.6  902.9  1,151.3 1,254.8 1,325.2 1,427.7 
Medium Urban  293.0  328.0  377.4  373.9  389.3  402.8  418.1  497.4  586.8  798.8  1,021.9 1,178.2 1,310.5 1,366.8 
Small Urban  206.2  225.8  250.3  243.5  257.6  272.7  286.6  392.3  464.8  662.9  864.0  978.9 1,055.0 1,282.5 
Small Rural  242.0  261.9  294.8  289.4  305.1  350.6  353.1  498.3  589.8  801.1  1,000.6 1,118.2 1,337.1 1,603.5 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Note: In 2002 Pesos; Population is held constant at 2000 figures. 
Source: Source: Author’s calculations, based on data in INEGI, Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos, 
consulted June 3, 2005. 
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Despite these impressive gains in municipal authority over a relatively short 
period of time, municipalities still remained relatively weak compared to federal and state 
governments.  In 2002, municipal investment income was approximately 26.0% of all 
municipal expenditures, approximately 32.0 billion pesos.  In contrast, federal and 
aggregate state investment expenditures were approximately 149.4 billion and 36.4 
billion pesos, respectively.62 This is not wholly surprising.  Many federal and state 
investments (interstate and intrastate highways, educational infrastructure, targeted social 
programs, agricultural credits, and the like) are comparatively more expensive than the 
small-scale investments that municipalities tend to do.  Nonetheless, as the case studies in 
chapters 6 through 8 indicate, federal and state governments still do invest directly in 
municipal infrastructure, though far less extensively than a decade ago.  If we add in 
other operating expenses, total state expenditures are over three times total municipal 
expenditures, and federal government expenditures almost three times those of the states.  
In short, municipalities are more relevant as governance structures than ever before, but 




Municipal autonomy appears to have increased as well.  Before, municipal 
governments spent their time chasing down federal agencies to carry out investments in 
municipal projects.  Now municipalities have a much clearer legal framework and, when 
 
62 Author’s calculations.  Based on INEGI, Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales de México, 1999-
2002, and INEGI, Ingreso y Gasto Público en México 2004. For states and municipalities, the investment 
figure is that of “obras públicas y acciones sociales,” while for the federal government it is “gastos de 
capital.”  These are rough measures of investment expenditure in both cases, but give an approximation for 
comparison purposes. 
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they have sufficient funds, they can carry out separate functions that do not overlap with 
other levels of government.  They also have their own sources of revenues, both local 
sources, through property and other revenue sources, and federal sources, through 
transfers.  Since 1996, transfers have come to represent over half of all municipal 
revenues, and by 2002 it was over two-thirds.  There is a significant difference among 
municipalities by size, however.  Large municipalities receive only slightly over half their 
revenues from transfers, while all other groups of municipalities average 63-83% 
dependence on transfers (Figure 5.14).  This new dependence on transfers had both 
positive and negative effects on autonomy.  On one hand, these transfers have provided 
municipalities with a steady flow of resources to turn their constitutionally assigned 
powers and functions into reality.  They also appear to have equalized the revenue of 
municipalities of different sizes.  Moreover, throughout the 1990s, the formulas for 
assigning transfers became more transparent and less discretional, so that there was 
greater regularity in the amounts assigned to subnational governments.  Unlike Solidarity, 
which was largely decided on a case-by-case basis, Ramo 33 transfers (and Habitat 
transfers) are based on published formulas.   
 











Large Urban 38% 36% 36% 37% 32% 35% 38% 42% 44% 50% 54% 59% 59% 54%
Medium Urban 51% 47% 47% 46% 42% 44% 47% 51% 53% 60% 63% 64% 66% 63%
Small Urban 63% 60% 58% 60% 58% 61% 60% 61% 65% 72% 77% 78% 78% 79%
Small Rural 72% 71% 66% 69% 66% 70% 71% 71% 75% 78% 84% 85% 80% 83%
All 51% 48% 47% 48% 44% 47% 49% 53% 56% 62% 66% 69% 69% 68%
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data in INEGI, Sistema Nacional de Base de Datos. 
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On the other hand, the dependency on transfer has produced other contradictory 
results that reduce municipal autonomy.  Although Ramo 33 is assigned to states based 
on published formulas, each state is able to create its own formula for assigning the funds 
to the municipalities.  State formulas vary widely from one state to the next and are often 
determined by political criteria.  Municipalities thus have little certainty on what transfers 
they will receive year to year.  Per capita transfers to municipalities in 2002 varied widely 
from around 600 pesos per inhabitant to over 5,000 per inhabitant, for example, though 
most fell between 800-2,000 pesos per inhabitant.63 Equally troubling is that state 
governments can alter the timing of transfers.  As noted in the case studies of Tijuana 
(chapter 7) and Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl (chapter 8), state governments often delay 
transfers either for bureaucratic or overtly political reasons, making it difficult for 
municipal governments to plan expenditures.  Moreover, some evidence exists that 
increased transfers are correlated with decreased own-source revenues.64 Indeed, own-
source revenues for municipalities have increased much slower in real terms than 
transfers (Figure 5.15).  However, this may also indicate real limitations in some 
municipalities’ ability to raise own source revenues. 
 
63 Author’s calculations, from a database constructed out of data in INEGI, Sistema Nacional de Base de 
Datos. 
64 See, for example, Enrique Cabrero Mendoza and Isela Orihuela Jurado, “Finanzas en municipios urbanos 
de México. Un análisis de los nuevos retos en la genstión de haciendas locales (1978-1998), Estudios 
Demográficos y Urbanos, Vol 17, No. 1, January-April 2002, pp. 175-209.  Uri Raich, “Impacts of 
Expenditures Decentralization on Mexican Local Governments,” Working Paper 102, Programa de 
Presupuesta y Gasto, CIDE, 2002.  This is also a concern frequently raised by the World Bank and other 
multilateral institutions that fear that transfers will undermine subnational governments’ interest in seeking 
own-source revenue.  This fear, however, needs to balanced against the need for equity, which national 
transfers can help address. 
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Figure 5.15: Real Growth of Local Revenue and Federal Transfers as a Source of Municipal Income 











1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Local Revenue Federal Transfers
Source: Author’s calculations, with data from INEGI, Sistema Nacional de Dase de Datos. 
On balance, municipalities now have much greater autonomy than at any other 
time in recent decades.  However, they still face serious constraints for ensuring a steady 
revenue flow, solid own-source revenues, and the ability to make effective all of their 
constitutionally mandated functions and powers. 
 
5.5 The Impact on Democratic Governance 
 
Democratic governance has improved noticeably with the end of one-party rule.  
However, key structural constraints remain for deepening democracy at the municipal 
level, since these structures have not been thoroughly updated since the change to a 
multiparty system.  Moreover, many key social institutions that could play a role in 




Systems of Representation 
 Municipalities have become, for the most part, vibrant arenas of electoral 
competition.  Since 1983, three-quarters of all municipalities, where 85% of citizens live, 
have had at least one change of political party in power.  Competition is most prevalent in 
large municipalities—all but one city over 500,000 inhabitants has had a change of party 
at least once65—but even small rural municipalities are surprisingly competitive (see 
Figure 5.16).  Fully 70% of small rural municipalities (and 73.4% of citizens who live in 
these municipalities) have seen at least one change in power between parties.  Clearly 
there is a correlation between the size and urban/rural condition of the municipality and 
the likelihood that it has been governed by more than one party; however, competition is 
now prevalent in municipalities of all sizes.  Even in those municipalities where the PRI 
remains dominant, other political parties almost always do compete and often win a 
significant share of the vote.66 
65 The one exception is El Centro, Tabasco, where the capital of the state, Villahermosa, is located.  
Villahermosa has had some close elections, however.  It is also the smallest of the large municipalities, 
with just over 500,000 inhabitants. 
66 Author’s calculations, based on data in Table 5.1.   
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% of All Municipalities 3.80% 13.40% 21.20% 30.00% 24.90%









Total for all 
Municipalities
Note: These numbers exclude municipalities that are governed by customary law (usos y costumbres) in 
Oaxaca and the Federal District of Mexico City. 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on a database assembled with data from CIDAC, “Elecciones 
municipales, 1980-2004,” available at www.cidac.org.   Data for the 1996 elections in Hidalgo were taken 
from La Jornada, and missing data for the Oaxaca elections of 2001 from Gobierno de Oaxaca, “Distritos y 
Municipios de Oaxaca,” available at www.oaxaca.gob.mx/distmun/munidis.html, and checked against 
election returns reported by La Jornada and El Universal. 
The introduction of autonomous state electoral institutes and electoral tribunals in 
the 1990s played an important role in ensuring free and fair elections.  Although the 
autonomy and credibility of the state electoral institutes and tribunals varies from state to 
state, overall they seem to have achieved a significant degree of credibility in most states.  
Moreover, the ultimate arbiter of electoral disputes in all elections (including municipal 
and state elections) is the Federal Electoral Tribunal, which has achieved very substantial 
credibility as an impartial judicial institution. 
 Despite these important gains for free and fair elections, the institutions of 
representation in municipalities have barely been updated to respond to the demands of a 
democratic society.  Unlike state and federal legislatures, which are chosen through a 
mixture of direct district elections and proportional representation, municipal councils are 
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selected via party lists on slates headed by the party’s mayoral candidate.  The result of 
this process is that political parties—or sometimes mayoral candidates—control the 
selection of candidates for the entire list and citizens rarely know who the council 
candidates are.  Rather, they vote for the mayoral candidate they prefer and the winning 
candidate brings his or her whole slate to the council with him.67 The losing candidates 
get part of their slate of candidates in the council in accordance with complex formulas 
for proportional representation.68 Mayoral candidates dominate municipal campaigns and 
citizens know little about the proposals or profile of council candidates.69 
Moreover, the mayor is guaranteed a majority on the council regardless of the 
percentage of votes for the winning party.  Therefore, despite the diversity of voting in 
Mexico, parties that win pluralities in municipal elections are consistently 
overrepresented in the municipal council, often quite significantly.  Figure 5.17 shows the 
aggregate vote by state for each major political party in the most recent municipal 
elections.  In only four states (Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas) does 
any party have a majority of the votes in municipal elections.  Moreover, a more detailed 
analysis of all municipalities shows that only 37.8% have a majority party; in the 
remaining 62.2%, the mayor is elected with only a plurality of the votes.  Yet in all cases 
 
67 Or very occasionally her: 96% of mayors were men in the period 2002-2004; only 4% women.  Among 
city council members (regidores and síndicos combined), around 16.7% were women.  INEGI, Presidentes 
municipales por entidad federative según sexo, 2002-2004, available at www.inegi.gob.mx; and 
INDESOL-INEGI, Encuesta Nacional a Presidentes Municipales sobre Desarrollo Institucional Municipal 
2002, Mexico City and Aguascalientes: Secretaría de Desarrollo Social and INEGI, 2003, p. 59. 
68 On the problems inherent in party list systems, see Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation 
in South Asia and West Africa:, Ribot, Waiting for Democracy..
69 For a thorough analysis of this, see Tonatiuh Guillén, “”Democracia representativa y participative en los 
municipios de México: procesos en tensión,” in Andrew Selee and Leticia Santín, eds., Participación 
Ciudadana y Democracia Municipal, Washington, DC and Mexico City: Woodrow Wilson Center and 
Agora, forthcoming. 
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the mayor’s party wins an automatic majority of the city council.70 A study of this 
system, in 1997-1998, showed that the winning party was guaranteed from 58.33% to 
87.5% of city council seats, depending on the state.71 In many states, as we will see in 
the coming chapters, the second largest party is highly underrepresented while small 
parties are guaranteed seats.  When the PRI was the hegemonic party, this arrangement 
ensured that councils appeared to be plural, with multiple parties involved, while the 
main opposition party was effectively stifled.72 Independent candidacies are barred, since 
election is by party lists only.  Hence, a system that was built to ensure the dominance of 
a hegemonic party continues to function even after the advent of competitive democracy 
and a multiparty political system. 
 
70 Author’s calculations, based on a database assembled using data from CIDAC; see Table 5.1 for full 
citation. 
71 Blanca Acedo, “Los sistemas electorales municipales en México: la incorporación del principio de 
representación proporcional,” in Jacqueline Martínez Uriarte and Alberto Díaz Cayeros, eds., De la 
descentralización al federalismo: estudios comparados sobre el gobierno local en México, Mexico City: 
Miguel Angel Porrúa, 2003.  The proportion used to be even more lopsided, however.  In 1988, the 
majority party won 75% to 95% of city council seats, depending on the state.  Sergio Elías Gutiérrez 
Salazar, “Autonomía política municipal y el principio de representación proporcional,” Estudios 
Municipales, No. 19, January-February 1988. 
72 From the 1940s to the 1990s, there were several small parties loosely affiliated with the PRI (often called 
“satellite parties”), which received economic benefits from the dominant party in return for their loyalty.  
These parties could often win seats in the municipal council with only a small percentage of the vote, and 
then vote with the PRI on key issues, providing an appearance of democratic plurality.  At the same time, 
the main opposition party in a municipality, usually the PAN or one of the left parties (or later the PRD), 
would be systematically underrepresented and unable to participate effectively in shaping legislation. 
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Figure 5.17: Average Vote by State for Each Major Political Party in the 
 Most Recent Municipal Elections (2001-2004)  
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PRI PRD PAN PAN/PRD Others
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data in CIDAC, “Base de datos de elecciones locales, 1980-2004.” 
The deficiencies of the electoral system are compounded by the prohibition on 
reelection of mayors and council members.  This prohibition is a long-standing tradition, 
which is codified in the constitution and embedded in the ideological legacy of the 
Mexican Revolution and its rejection of Porfirio Diaz’s repeated reelections as President.  
Nonetheless, the absence of reelection undermines the accountability of representatives to 
citizens since the former have few incentives to fear punishment at the ballot box (or 
hope for reward).  In fact, in a system with no reelection for any elected position (as is the 
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case in Mexico), politicians tend to be beholden to party leaders, who determine which 
elected and appointed positions the party’s cadres can aspire to next.  The system thus 
creates upwards accountability to party leaders rather than downward accountability to 
citizens. 
 
Transparency and Monitoring 
Most incoming mayors of Mexican municipalities create a three-year plan at the 
outset of their administration, and then provide an annual report to the council and 
citizens.  They often accompany the verbal report with a written report, the Informe 
Municipal,73 which provides a list of accomplishments during the year and priorities for 
the future.  In some cases, municipal reports and development plans can be quite 
revealing, giving detailed financial information, lists of public works projects with 
investment figures, and details on the activities of the mayor city council.  In other cases, 
these documents provide little but rhetoric and a list of good intentions for the future.  
However, aside from these documents, whose content is usually discretional, municipal 
administrations have few obligations to reveal to citizens what they do during the year, 
collect in revenues, or spend on behalf of those who elected them.  Nonetheless, many 
municipalities do share information about their activities and finances.  Many large and 
medium municipalities—and even some smaller ones—have even made use of the 
internet to disseminate information.  Some municipal websites give detailed information 
on everything from government salaries to public works investments; others seem more 
 
73 89% of municipalities produce a written report according to INDESOL-INEGI, Encuesta Nacional a 
Presidentes Municipales 2002, Mexico City: INDESOL, 2003.  This report is sometimes called the Informe 
de Gobierno or by other names.  We use Informe Municipal to designate the annual municipal reports in the 
three cities studied for this research. 
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geared towards public relations.74 
In a recent study of 32 Mexican municipalities, the NGO Centro de Servicios 
Municipales “Heriberto Jara” found that 80% of municipalities publish (in print or on the 
internet) a list of public works projects over the past three years, 64% publish their own 
income and 72% the amount of federal transfers they receive.75 Only 20% of 
municipalities surveyed publish their list of contractors and suppliers, and while just over 
half (52%) made available salaries of top municipal officials, only 20% showed base 
salaries, bonuses, and other financial benefits.76 In only 8% of cases were the sessions of 
the municipal council’s budget committee open to the public. 
In 2002, the federal congress passed a law granting citizens widespread access to 
executive branch documents and creating an autonomous institute to oversee this process.  
Many states—at least twenty-two out of thirty-two (including Mexico City)—had created 
similar state laws as of April 2005, most with some form of autonomous or semi-
autonomous agency to oversee implementation (Table 5.2). These laws have been passed 
by state governments led by all three major political parties.  All of the existing 
transparency laws apply equally to states and municipalities and some have specific 
provisions requiring municipalities to publish their development plan.  However, state 
laws are uneven in the degree of access they grant, the degree of privacy they grant the 
 
74 I conducted a non-representative review of twenty websites of municipal governments, including ten 
each of large and medium-sized municipalities.  The best sites give extensive information on salaries, 
public investments, city council resolutions, government contract, and updated budget figures.  Others 
provide little information at all outside of contact numbers and municipal activities. 
75 Ricardo Jiménez, “Reflexiones sobre el derecho al acceso a la información y la transparencia en los 
gobiernos locales en México: la experiencia del Programa ‘Ciudadanos por Municipios Transparentes, 
CIMTRA,’” paper presented at the LogoLink International Workshop on Resources, Citizen Engagement 
and Democratic Local Governance, Porto Alegre, Brazil, December 6-9, 2004. 
76 As several municipal council members and one member of Congress indicated to me, off-the-record, 
mayors often “reward” high-level officials and council members with bonuses that are never reported in 
official publications.  These are sometimes used to “buy loyalty” from council members or to put money 
into the coffers of the political party or mayor’s election committee for his/her next office (in these cases, 
the bonuses are given on condition that a percentage be donated). 
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requestor, and the autonomy and authority of the institution that oversees the law.77 In all 
cases, these are new laws that have been passed since 2002 (and most more recently), and 
in most cases they have a long lead-time (usually six months to eighteen months) before 
they take effect fully, so that a description and comparison of their actual functioning is 
still difficult.  Few municipalities appear to have separate transparency laws of their 
own.78 
Table 5.1: State Transparency Laws by Date Published and Governor’s Party  
(as of April 2005) 
State Date Law Published Governor's Party
Sinaloa April 26, 2002 PRI 
Michoacán August 28, 2002 PRD 
Querétaro September 27, 2002 PAN 
Jalisco January 6, 2003 PAN 
Nuevo León February 21, 2003 PRI 
Durango February 25, 2003 PRI 
Colima March 1, 2003 PRI 
San Luis Potosí March 20, 2003 PAN 
Federal District  May 8, 2003 PRD 
Guanajuato July 29, 2003 PAN 
Aguascalientes July 30, 2003 PAN 
Morelos August 27, 2003 PAN 
Coahuila November 4, 2003 PRI 
Mexico State April 30, 2004 PRI 
Quintana Roo May 31, 2004 PRI 
Yucatán May 31, 2004 PAN 
Veracruz June 8, 2004 PRI 
Nayarit June 16, 2004 PRI 
Zacatecas July 14, 2004 PRD 
Tlaxcala August 13, 2004 PAN* 
Puebla August 16, 2004 PRI 
Tamaulipas November 25, 2004 PRI 
Sonora February 25, 2005 PRI 
Baja California No Law PAN 
77 The state laws in both Coahuila and Nuevo León, for example, apply to both state and municipal 
governments.  For a full comparison of these laws, with great detail, see Instituto Federal de Acceso a la 
Información, “Estudios Comparativos de Leyes de Acceso a la Información Pública,” April 2005 (available 
from IFAI).   
78 Two notable exceptions are cities covered in this study: Tijuana (chapter 7), whose city council passed a 
transparency law in December 2004 shortly after a PRI-affiliated government took over after fifteen years 
of PAN-affiliated governments; and Ciudad Nezahualcoyótl (chapter 8), which passed a law in late 2004 
and implemented it in summer 2005. 
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Baja California Sur No Law PRD 
Campeche No Law PRI 
Chiapas No Law Coalition 
Chihuahua No Law PRI 
Guerrero No Law PRD** 
Hidalgo No Law PRI 
Oaxaca No Law PRI 
Tabasco No Law PRI 
Note: All state transparency laws currently in effect are binding on municipalities in that state.  *In 
Tlaxcala, a PAN governor took over from a PRD governor in 2005; ** In Guerrero a PRD governor took 
over from a PRI governor in 2005. 
Source: Based on information in Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información, “Estudios Comparativos de 
Leyes de Acceso a la Información Pública,” April 2005.  Available from IFAI. 
 
One reason for the difference between the push for transparency at the national 
level and its near absence at the municipal level has to do with the weakness of both the 
media and civil society organizations in local arenas.  At a national level, the media and 
civil society organizations have played an important role both in securing passage of the 
access to information law and in monitoring federal government finances and decisions.  
For example, a group of media representatives, academics, and NGO activists, known as 
the Oaxaca Group (Grupo Oaxaca) played a pivotal role in crafting the federal access to 
information law and lobbying for its passage.   However, while major national media 
have transited from being largely dependent on government resources to greater 
independence, local media often continue to depend on the goodwill of a few key 
political or government leaders.79 Major national media still often depend on public 
advertising for an import part of their revenue; however, they can diversify among 
different levels of government (often run by different political parties), diverse public 
agencies (including several autonomous agencies, such as the Federal Electoral Institute 
and the Central Bank), and between public and private sector advertising.  Local media 
 
79 Lawson, Building the Fourth Estate.
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often depend almost entirely on a few state government departments, the dominant 
political parties, and major urban municipalities.  This dependency often reduces their 
margin of autonomy considerably. 
Civil society organizations face a similar problem in the municipal arena.  While 
Mexico has hundreds of non-governmental organizations, most that deal with policy are 
located in the national capital.  While most states (and many municipalities) have thriving 
third sectors and a dense web of social organizations, most are related to social service 
provision.80 The organizations that work on monitoring government decisions and 
expenditures—organizations dedicated to transparency, human rights, and the 
environment, among others—tend to be overwhelmingly concentrated in Mexico City 
and a few major urban areas.  Popular organizations tend to be locally rooted, but rarely 
have the technical capacity to conduct detailed monitoring of public documents or 
activities. 
 
Opportunities for Participation 
 The discourse of participation in municipal affairs has a long tradition in Mexico.  
For decades municipalities have recognized official neighborhood committees and 
various forms of public works committees that help carry out infrastructure projects.  In 
some cases, these organizations were related to the PRI’s seccionales (neighborhood get-
out-the-vote committees) or incorporated in other ways into the structure of the local 
party itself.  Though these relationships were generally clientelistic in nature and 
involved unequal exchanges between municipal officials and citizens, mediated by local 
 
80 See Gustavo Verduzgo, Organizaciones no lucraticas: vision de su trayectoria en México, Mexico: 
Colegio de México and Centro Mexicano para la Filantropía, 2003. 
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intermediaries (often block chairs, neighborhood council presidents, or local officials of 
the PRI), they, nonetheless, constituted informal channels of communication between 
citizens and municipal governments.  Citizens used these channels to make demands on 
government officials, who in turn used them to mobilize votes.  Citizen organizations 
independent from the PRI also existed and often engaged in demand-making on political 
authorities and in efforts at self-help within communities.  In the late 1970s and 1980s, 
the Urban Popular Movement, a loose collection of poor people’s organizations outside 
the PRI, gained strength in Mexico as an alternative to the traditional clientelistic 
organizations.   
In the early 1980s, practices of municipal participation were, in theory, 
standardized, first  through an executive decree (1981) and then through  a revision of the 
federal Law on Planning (1983).  The latter required all states to have a State Planning 
Council and suggested that municipalities create a Municipal Planning Council (Consejo 
Municipal de Planeación), know as Copladem or Coplademun, which would bring 
together citizens and government officials to create the three-year Municipal 
Development Plan at the start of each administration.  With the implementation of 
Solidarity in 1989, municipalities that received Solidarity’s Municipal Funds were 
required to create a separate Municipal Development Council (Codemun) to approve the 
list of projects to receive funding.  With the creation of Ramo 33, all municipalities were 
required to have either a Coplademun or Codemun in order to receive the Social 
Infrastructure Fund (FAIS) within Ramo 33.  In theory, municipalities would have to 
bring together citizens and government leaders to set priorities for financing with FAIS 
funds each year, in addition to the requirement for participatory planning at the outset of 
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each three-year administration.  Several states have state laws that incorporate these 
structures as part of participatory planning processes as well.81 
The available evidence suggests that many municipalities have Copladem or 
Coplademun, but few use this body to incorporate citizen voices into planning and 
decision-making.  When these structures exist, they tend to be mere formalities, often an 
ad hoc group of government officials and program beneficiaries.82 Nonetheless, 
according to a major study of almost all municipal mayors,83 58.0% of municipalities 
report having a Coplademun (Figure 5.18).  Among municipalities, 40.8% report that 
they allow citizens to present proposals for the use of Ramo 33 funds and 43.4% report 
having meetings with citizens on setting priorities for their expenditure.  However, only 
8.9% involve citizens in actual decision-making on these funds and 4.1% in evaluating 
the investments (Figure 5.19).  The structure of the Coplademun appears to be relatively 
widespread, but it rarely lives up to its stated purpose of engaging citizens in decisions 
about investment decisions and the monitoring of these.   
 
81 These are sometimes laws on citizen participation (as in Baja California); other times, they are part of the 
state’s municipal code (as in Mexico State).  However, many states have no legal framework for Copladem 
or Codemun at all.  Alison Rowland, “Population as a Determinant of Local Outcomes in Decentralization: 
Illustrations from Small Municipalities in Bolivia and Mexico,” World Development, Vol. 29, No. 8, pp. 
1373-89, 2001. 
82 Allison Rowland and Edgar Ramírez, La descentralización y los gobiernos subnacionales en Méixco: 
una introducción, Working Paper no. 93, Division of Public Administration, CIDE, n.d. 
83 INDESOL-INEGI, Encuesta Nacional a Presidentes Municipales, pp. 141-47. 
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Figure 5.18: Institutions of Citizen Participation, by Size of the Municipal Seat 
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Note: See note in Figure 5.19. 
Source: INDESOL/INEGI, Encuesta Nacional a Presidentes Municipales sobre Desarrollo Social 2002, 
Mexico: Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, 2003, p. 142. 












No participation 2.6% 0.7% 4.8% 0.0% 2.3%
Other 0.7% 0.4% 0.0% 3.1% 0.7%
Meetings to evaluate municpality's
actions
4.4% 3.6% 0.0% 3.1% 4.1%
Participate in decision-making 9.2% 6.1% 4.8% 11.5% 8.9%
Meetings to set prioritites 44.1% 43.0% 39.7% 31.3% 43.4%




Note: Percents are of municipalities that responded to the questionnaire.  N=2,429.  These data are 
compiled according to the size of the municipal seat, that is, the community where the municipality’s 
offices are located, rather than the total size of the municipality.  These tend to coincide in larger 
municipalities, which correspond to cities, but not always in smaller ones that include several rural 
communities.  All other data reported in this research uses municipality size, but this particular survey only 
lists municipal seat size. 
Source: INDESOL/INEGI, Encuesta Nacional a Presidentes Municipales sobre Desarrollo Social 2002, 
Mexico: Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, 2003, p. 145. 
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Despite these limitations, a few Mexican municipalities have used the figures of 
Coplademun and Codemun in creative ways to create channels for more robust citizen 
participation in planning and public policy decisions.84 These experiences have generally 
taken place in municipalities where opposition parties have won for the first time.  Such 
was the case of Cuquío en Jalisco, a small municipality which implemented a 12-year 
experiment in participatory planning using an expanded Coplademun, under a PRD 
government.85 Berriozábal in Chiapas followed a similar pattern during two PRD 
administrations.86 Two small municipalities in Veracruz, Ciudad Mendoz and 
Tatahuilcapán, also experimented with far-reaching participatory mechanisms under left 
governments.87 Several large cities have also established extensive participatory 
planning mechanisms.  These have included Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, under a PRD 
government, and Tijuana, Baja California; León, Guanajuato; Hermosillo, Sonora; and 
Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua under PAN governments.88 Nonetheless, the evidence 
indicates that most of these institutional innovations usually do not survive beyond one or 
two—or, when very successful, three—periods of government. 
One study suggests that most institutional mechanisms for participation tend to be 
focused on specific projects rather than policy decisions.  In his analysis of successful 
 
84 See Andrew Selee and Leticia Santín, eds., Democracia y Participación en Municipios Mexicanos, 
Washington, DC and Mexico City: Woodrow Wilson Center and Agora, forthcoming; Miguel Bazdresch, 
“Cambio Municipal y Participación Social,” in Enrique Cabrero, ed., Políticas Públicas Municipales: una 
agenda en construcción, Mexico City: Miguel Angel Porrúa, 2003; and Alicia Ziccardi and Rolando 
Cordera, eds., Participación Ciudadana en las Políticas Sociales, Mexico City: UNAM, 2004. 
85 Miguel Bazdresch, “Consejo democrático en Cuquío, Jalisco”, in Enrique Cabrero, ed., Innovación en 
gobiernos locales: un panorama de experiencias municipales en México, México: CIDE, 2002. 
86 Leticia Santín and Victoria Motte, “Participación Ciudadana en Berriozábal, Chiapas, in Enrique Cabrero 
ed., Innovación en gobiernos locales: un panorama de experiencias municipales en México: CIDE, 2002. 
87 Carlos Rodríguez, Experiencia municipales de participación y deliberación en México; hacia la 
construcción de una democracia territorial de proximidad,” in Selee and Santín, eds. Particpación 
Ciudadana y Democracia. 
88 Tijuana and Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl are the subject of chapter 7 and 8, respectively.  On Hermosillo, see 
Leticia Santín, “Planeación Urbana en México,” paper presented at the conference on Local Innovation and 
Democracy at the Woodrow Wilson Center on September 2, 2005. 
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municipal experiences submitted for consideration of the annual prize in Innovations in 
Municipal Government, coordinated by CIDE, Cabrero notes that most of these 
innovations involve forms of citizen consultation (38%) or cooperation for project 
implementation (32%), while relatively few involve monitoring of government programs 
18%) or citizen engagement in municipal decisions (12%; see Figure 5.20).  Of these 
innovations, Cabrero argues that only14% can be considered “high intensity” 
participation, where citizens can both influence decisions and monitor outcomes.  These 
are the kind of participation that engages citizens as deliberators in public affairs in 
conjunction with public authorities.  Another 41% of the democratic innovations are 
“medium-intensity” experiences, where citizens have a consultative say in some aspect of 
government projects, 45% are “low-intensity” experiences where citizens were primarily 
recipients of government services.89 His findings suggest that Mexico’s municipalities 
are indeed becoming sources of democratic experimentation, but few of the institutional 
mechanisms truly allow for ongoing citizen participation and deliberation in public 
matters.  Cabrero similarly notes that most of the innovations in citizen participation are 
weakly institutionalized.  They tend to emerge with great “spontaneity and voluntarism” 
but rarely survive beyond this period of collective social energy.90 
89 He also finds that over half of the democratic innovations are in PAN-affiliated governments.  There is 
no way of knowing whether the submissions to the Innovations in Municipal Government prize, a private, 
Ford Foundation-funded project, are representative of other municipalities in the country.  However, since 
these are self-selected “innovations,” it seems likely that they are on the cutting-edge of municipal 
experimentation in democratic governance.  Enrique Cabrero, “Participación y deliberación en la acción 
pública local: La experiencia municipal,” in Selee and Santín, eds. Democracia y Ciudadanos. 
90 Cabrero, “Participación y deliberación en la acción pública local.” 
156
Figure 5.20: Types of Citizen Participation in Municipal Initiatives Submitted to  
the Innovations in Government Prize (2000-2004) 







Source: Enrique Cabrero Mendoza, “Participación y deliberación en la acción pública local: La 
experiencia municipal,” in Andrew Selee and Leticia Santín, eds., Democracia y Ciudadanía: 
Experiencias de Participación y Deliberación en Gobiernos Locales Mexicanos, Washington, DC: 
Woodrow Wilson Center and Agora, forthcoming. 
The limited scope and durability of participatory mechanisms in Mexico is 
perhaps not surprising.  The poor quality of representative institutions hardly creates 
incentives for municipal leaders to reach out to citizens.  However, the weakness of 
participatory channels might also suggest a significant disjuncture between the 
emergence of a more active citizenry, on one hand and the structure of the municipality 
on the other.  In other words, if an autonomous civil society is developing in Mexico as 
old clientelistic channels within the PRI lose some of their importance, then participation 
would have to take place at the margin of public institutions since municipal governments 
have created few durable channels for citizen engagement.  Another possibility, however, 
is that there are few participatory institutions largely because traditional forms of 
clientelism remain the dominate means of linking citizens and the state.  If this is the 
case, the absence of participatory institutions might reflect the permanence of old 
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practices based on political intermediaries.  This question will be explored with greater 
detail in the three case studies that follow. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
Decentralization has given municipalities greater authority and autonomy than 
they had in previous decades.  They now have functions, powers, and resources that were 
unimaginable in 1980, and the end of one-party rule has freed them from some of the 
unwritten rules that kept them subservient to higher levels of government.  Nonetheless, 
the actual legal scope of decision-making power of municipalities is still being 
negotiated, and their dependence on discretional transfers from other levels of 
government undermines their ability to be completely autonomous in setting policy and 
planning investments.  Contrary to standard definitions of decentralization that see it as a 
question of transfers from the national government to subnational authorities, 
decentralization to municipalities in Mexico has involved both a devolution of functions, 
powers, and resources top-down from the federal government and the bottom-up 
development of municipal capacities for revenue collection and service provision along 
with the clarification of municipal jurisdiction for decision-making.  Decentralization is 
thus a multifaceted process that has involved all levels of government in constant 
negotiation with both top-down devolution and bottom-up construction of municipal 
authority and autonomy. 
Municipalities served as tool for democratization in Mexico’s long period of 
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political opening, but there have been surprisingly few efforts to democratize local 
governments since then.  As a result, municipalities have structures for representation that 
are artifices of an older authoritarian era and have few durable institutions for 
transparency and citizen participation.  Political parties have little interest in changing 
this situation because they have adapted their political practices so well to it.  The 
structure of Mexican municipalities was developed to privilege single-party rule with 
limited public oversight or engagement.  However, with only minor adjustments, all of 
the major political parties have learned how to benefit from the status quo even in a 
competitive political environment.  Although an increasingly independent civil society 
and media are emerging, they often remain too weak (and, in the case of the media, too 
dependent on government resources) to demand reforms that could transform local 
governance from below.  Mexican municipalities thus remain condemned to a structure 
that undermines their responsiveness and accountability and limits their effectiveness as 








Chilpancingo: The Continuation of Corporatism? 
 
6.1 A Change in the Air 
In late January 2005, three weeks before statewide elections, three young men in 
suits had set up a stand in the central plaza of Chilpancingo, the state capital of Guerrero, 
to promote the campaign of Hector Astudillo, the PRI’s candidate for governor.  A giant 
television screen broadcast the image of the candidate speaking about progress and 
development for Guerrero. Astudillo was Chilpancingo’s favorite son, and he had done 
everything a native of the capital could do to prepare himself for the governorship.  He 
had served as a city council member and then mayor of the city before going on to be 
chair of the state PRI and a Senator.  Groomed for leadership within his party, he was 
confident of his victory in a state that had seen no other party in power for well over 
seventy years. 
The PRI has long maintained its power in Guerrero through alliances with local 
caciques, who maintained control in their municipalities and helped the state government 
ensure order and get out the vote at election time.1 Guerrero is one of Mexico’s poorest 
states, representing only 1.68% of Mexico’s GDP although it has 3.16% of the 
population.  Almost two thirds of the population earns two minimum wages or less, and 
fully 36% earns one minimum wage or less.  On average, students complete 6.6 years of 
schooling, the third lowest in the country, and well under the national average of 7.8. 
 
1 See Armando Bartra, Guerrero Bronco: Campesinos, ciudadanos y guerrilleros en la Costa Grande, 
second edition, Mexico: Era, 2000; Carlos Illades, Breve historia de Guerrero, Mexico: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 2000; Jorge Rendón Alarcón, Sociedad y conflicto en el estado de Guerrero, 1911-1995, 
Mexico: Plaza y Valdés, 2003.  
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Periodically social movements have arisen to challenge the existing political and social 
order, but these have generally been put down with force.  Starting in the 1960s, several 
social leaders gave up on peaceful protest and created guerrilla organizations to fight 
against the state and federal governments.  Even today these rebellions still simmer in the 
mountains and the coast, the poorest regions of the state.  Guerrero has been, without 
doubt, one of Mexico’s most destitute and most openly conflicted states.  
 In the midst of all this, Chilpancingo has been the center of the PRI’s political 
machine in Guerrero.  As the capital, it has been the home of the state bureaucracy and 
the companies that depend on it for their business.  Despite a growing opposition party 
presence in the late 1990s, the PRI had never been seriously challenged here.  
Chilpancingo was, by all appearances, a town where very little had changed even as the 
rest of the country and state lived through decades of political turmoil. 
Figure 6.1: Map of the State of Guerrero 
Note: Chilpancingo in yellow in the center of the state. 
162
In fact, the city had something of a reputation for being a place where everything 
and yet nothing ever happened.  Many of the tumultuous events taking place elsewhere in 
the state and the country passed through Chilpancingo, yet rarely seemed to disturb its 
peace.2 Rebel commanders, army generals, social leaders, union bosses, landowners, 
peasant organizers, human rights advocates, and political leaders of all stripes passed 
through here.  The city was witness to political negotiations and public debates, to 
protests and the planning of assassinations.  However, the city itself seemed largely 
untouched by the dramatic events going on around it and by the decisions outsiders made 
within its limits. 
Every three years the city returned the PRI to power in seemingly uncomplicated 
elections marked by little real competition.  Local contestation seemed muted and easily 
channeled.  Part of the story was city residents’ dependence on state government 
employment and contracts.  The other part was that city residents had benefited from the 
PRI’s continued rule; not equitably, of course, but sufficiently so that political dissent 
could be channeled and contained.  The state frequently invested in the city’s 
development, supplementing meager municipal budgets by providing funds for extending 
basic services and building roads, markets, and parks.  In return, the state governor and 
the state’s principal political leaders generally influenced the selection of the city’s mayor 
and intervened periodically in municipal decisions.  The municipal government helped 
 
2 Tomás Bustamante states that “Chilpancingo is one of those places which, from an early age, has not had 
much of a local history of its own, rather it has received the influence of transitive cultures….In each stage 
of its history, we find it to be the scene of social processes that have to do with other regions and social 
groups which determine the life of the inhabitants of the place.” (Tomás Bustamante, Cruz, “Revolución e 
Inmigración, 1910-1940, in Historia de Chilpancingo, Chilpancingo: Universidad Autónoma de Guerrero, 
1999, pp. 253-4).  I largely agree with Bustamante but with a slight difference in emphasis: Like any city, 
Chilpancingo very much has its own social and political processes that follow local dynamics, but these are 
also implicated with the processes taking place elsewhere in the state and cannot be understood without 
reference to these. 
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maintain peace by creating a loose network of intermediaries in each neighborhood who 
had ties to the ruling party and helped generate party support at election time.  These 
intermediaries provided a channel for community demands and provided a conduit to 
assign resources for services and infrastructure.  They also helped get out the votes at 
election time for the PRI.   
Something was wrong on this January day, however.  No one was stopping to 
look at the giant screen portraying  Hector Astudillo or listen to his campaign promises.  
Instead, there was a large gathering part-way across the plaza around a small black-and-
white television set broadcasting the image of Zeferino Torreblanca, a charismatic 
businessman and former mayor of nearby Acapulco, who was the gubernatorial candidate 
of the left-of-center PRD.  Two poorly dressed older men, who seemed surprised by the 
crowd, answered questions and pointed to newspaper articles about the candidate 
haphazardly taped to the wall behind the television screen.  Clearly something was 
happening in this city where nothing ever seemed to happen.   
Three weeks later, in the state elections, Zeferino Torreblanca of the PRD 
overwhelmed Hector Astudillo, 55%-42%, to end the PRI’s rule in the state.  It was a 
stunning defeat for the party that had kept power for over seven decades.  To add insult to 
injury, Hector Astudillo lost his hometown as well.  Chilpancingo voted overwhelmingly 
for Torreblanca over its own favorite son and former mayor.  Indeed, the PRI managed to 
hold on to only a few of the poorest neighborhoods around the edges of the city and some 
of the rural areas further away.3 Almost the entire city—the bureaucrats, the 
 
3This judgment is based on my analysis of the election results by polling station.  Detailed election data is 
available from the state electoral council at www.ceegro.org.mx. The electoral map of Chilpancingo, with 
polling stations marked, was made available by the Federal Electoral Institute.  Torreblanca (PRD) defeated 
Astudillo (PRI) in Chilpancingo 50.8% to 47.0% according to the state electoral council’s figures.  The 
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businesspeople, and even the majority of the poor, all who had benefited from the PRI’s 
largesse—voted for the PRD candidate.  The old mechanisms for control seemed to have 
lost their ability to turn out votes for the official party.   
Figure 6.2: Photograph of Chilpancingo along the Mexico City-Acapulco Highway 
The election appeared to suggest that the city had never been quite as tranquil and 
uncomplicated as it had seemed.  Underneath the semblance of unity around the dominant 
political party, dissent and dissatisfaction had been building and new cleavages 
developing among citizens in the city.  As the municipality had undergone a process of 
significant growth in its authority and autonomy, it had also become more plural and 
contested.  The increase in the municipality’s responsibilities, though still contained 
somewhat by the state government, had given citizens something to fight over in 
municipal elections.  Finally, in the 2005 elections, the old mechanisms of control had 
failed after years of silent erosion.  However, it was unclear what the new forms of 
political mediation were.4 What implications did these changes have for democratic 
 
margin was notably higher in the center city that makes up three-quarters or more of the municipality. 
4 For an excellent analysis of the failure , at a state level, of the old mechanisms for mediation and its 
impact on the 2005 elections, see Raúl Fernández Gómez, Elecciones y Alternancia Guerrero, Mexico: 
Nuevo Horizonte Editors, 2004.  The book was written slightly before the elections, but shows in great  
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governance in a city like Chilpancingo, where one party had ruled unchallenged for over 
seven decades along with a state government of the same party?  As the municipality had 
become increasingly relevant to citizens’ lives, what quality of democratic governance 
was emerging?  
 
6.2 Deep Historical Roots, Recent Growth 
Chilpancingo was first registered as a municipality in 1693.5 For most of its 
existence it remained a sleepy, mostly rural municipality, on the highway connecting 
Acapulco and Mexico City.  The town emerged from its slumber, however, periodically 
in the nineteenth century to take a significant place on the national stage.  In 1813, 
Mexico’s independence leader José María Morelos y Pavón called for a constituent 
congress in Chilpancingo, in an area the rebel forces controlled, to declare Mexico’s 
independence.  The Congress of Anáhuac, as it was called, proclaimed Mexico’s 
independence, and Morelos issued his “Sentiments of the Nation,” a statement of 
principles for the cause of independence.  One of Mexico’s leading independence 
advocates, Nicolás Bravo, and his two brothers, were also natives of the town.  Bravo 
would go on to become Mexico’s first Vice President after independence and would 
serve twice as President and two more times as Vice President in the first two decades 
 
detail how the PRD had built a coalition out of historical social movements, dissidents from the PRI, and 
those citizens in the growing urban areas who were no longer connected to the PRI through old clientelistic 
networks. 
5 There are references to Chilpancingo’s legal status as early as 1591, but it appears to have been a ranch 
rather than a town at the time.  Jaime Salazar Adame, “Introducción,” in Historia de Chilpancingo, 
Chilpancingo: Universidad Autónoma de Guerrero, 1999, pp. 14-15; see also Angélica Gutiérrez y Salgado 
and Hector Rodríguez Morales, Chilpancingo Ayer y Hoy, Chilpancingo: Instituto Guerrerense de Cultura, 
1987, p. 30. 
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after independence.  In the 1850s Chilpancingo reemerged as an important military 
garrison in the midst of the civil war between liberals and conservatives.  In 1855, as the 
conservatives faced defeat, Chilpancingo was the site of the negotiations to install Juan 
Alvarez as Mexico’s first liberal president and end the civil war.  Benito Juárez, 
Alvarez’s personal secretary at the time, carried out the negotiations.6
Chilpancingo remained a small, mostly rural municipality (see Figure 6.3).  It was 
perhaps best known for being the site of an annual Christmas fair, which attracted 
regional and national attention, and for serving as a center of commerce along the 
Acapulco-Mexico City highway.7 In religious matters, it depended on the neighboring 
municipality of Zumpango, which was the parish seat; in political matters, it depended on 
the municipality of Tixtla, which was the district capital and later the state capital.  In 
1868, however, Chilpancingo became its own parish.8 An 1870 rebellion led by the 
leaders of Tixtla against the state governor convinced him to move the state capital from 
Tixtla to Chilpancingo on an emergency basis.  In 1871, the state congress formally 
decreed that Chilpancingo would become the new state capital.9
6 See Gutiérrez y Salgado, Chilpancingo Ayer y Hoy, chapter 2. 
7 Teresa Pavía, “Centro de Poder, 1821-1870,” in Historia de Chilpancingo, Chilpancingo: Universidad 
Autónoma de Guerrero, 1999, p. 178.  Starting in 1825, Chilpancingo was the first city in modern-day 
Guerrero authorized to have an annual fair without the participants paying state and federal taxes; in 1857 it 
was still one of only 15 annual fairs in the country, and it still operates today. 
8 Pavia, “Centro de Poder,” p. 186; Gutiérrez y Salgado and Rodríguez, Chilpancingo Ayer y Hoy, p. 37.   
9 The governor cited two reasons for this: the rebellion in Tixtla (which he had successfully contained) and 
Chilpancingo’s advantageous location on the Acapulco-Mexico City highway.  Pavía, “Centro de Poder.” 
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Source: Angélica Gutiérrez y Salgado and Héctor Rodríguez Morales, Chilpancingo Ayer y Hoy 
Chilpancingo: Instituto Guerrerense de la Cultura, 1987, pp. 38, 41; Tomás Bustamante Alvarez, 
“Revolución e inmigración, 1910-1940,” in Jaime Salazar Adame, ed., Historia de Chilpancingo,
Chilpancingo: Asociación de Historiadores de Guerrero, A.C., 1999, p. 277. 
 
With its new political status, the city attracted a new elite of landowners from 
elsewhere in the state who moved to the city to take part in politics.10 According to 
Bustamante: 
In Chilpancingo several families emerged that began to create the new 
social power tied to the institutions of government; they continued to be 
the owners of land, ranchers, farmers, traders, etc., but increasingly were 
integrated with the institutions of government.11 
The emergence of Chilpancingo as a state capital coincided with the era of Porfirio Díaz, 
an era that was marked by rapid economic growth.  The city would have to survive two 
major earthquakes in 1902 and 1907, however, and the ravages of the Mexican 
Revolution.  
 
10 “The majority of members of the new political class who came to power in the different levels of the 
state government came from the class of landowners formed in the shadows of the policies of the Porfiriato 
[administration of President Porfirio Díaz, 1877-1910].” (Bustamante, “Revolución e Inmigración,” p. 
255). 
11 Bustamante, “Revolución e Inmigración,” p. 288. 
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Figure 6.4: Photograph of a Festival in Chilpancingo 
Source: Website of the State of Guerrero, www.guerrero.gob.mx. 
 
The city was centered on four barrios, traditional neighborhoods, each with its 
own church and annual religious festival.12 However, after 1950s, the city’s growth 
accelerated.  The expansion of the state bureaucracy and the growth of the state’s 
autonomous university served as a magnet to attract new residents.  At the same time the 
endemic poverty in the rest of the state pushed people out of their own localities in search 
of new opportunities, generally to one of the larger cities in the state (Acapulco, 
Chilpancingo, Iguala, and Taxco).  After 1960, a majority of inhabitants of the 
municipality lived in the city  and this increased in size dramatically from just over 50% 
in 1960 to 74% in 2000, and the population more than quintupled from 35,838 to 192,947 
(and to over 200,000 by 2004) (see Figure 6.5).13 The city’s first map, which covered 
 
12 For a description of city life in the four barrios—San Mateo, San Antonio, Santa Cruz y San Francisco—
and the city’s gradual urbanization, see Wences, Chilpancingo ayer y hoy, los personajes, etc. 
13 The municipality is probably much more urban than the 74% figure suggests if we include many of the 
small villages around the city that have been effectively absorbed by it.  Less than 10% of the population of 
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the four barrios and twenty-nine colonias (low-income neighborhoods), was not 
developed until the late 1960s.14 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the number of 
colonias exploded, reaching over 400 by 2004 (see Table 6.1).  Many of these were 
initially irregular colonias, that is, they were the product of “land invasions” that political 
leaders, community organizers, or the migrants themselves, who lacked land titles.  By 
2004, approximately four-fifths of the colonias had land titles according to official 
figures.15 







Municipal Population  18,448  17,958  16,120  19,663  22,729  30,721  35,838  59,087  98,266 136,164 192,947 
Urban Population  7,497  7,994  5,955  8,315  8,834  12,673  18,022  36,193  67,498  97,165 142,746 
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Source: Raul Velez Calvo and Rafael Rubí Alarcón, “El Paisaje,” in Historia de Chilpancingo,
Chilpancingo: Universidad Autónoma de Guerrero, 1999, p. 19; INEGI, Censo General de Población y 
Vivienda, 2000.
the municipality is involved in agriculture (see Table 7.3). 
14 The first map of the city, made in the late 1960s, is available as an attachment in the book by Zaida 
Falcón de Gyves, Chilpancingo: Ciudad en Crecimiento, Mexico City: UNAM, 1969.  The map’s 
development is discussed on p. 7. 
15 Informe Municipal 2004, p. 66.  However, the director of the city office for Colonias and Barrios 
(Procurador de Barrios y Colonias) noted that there were over 100 irregular colonias. Interview with José 
Luis Lozena, director of Colonias and Barrios, April 20, 2005. 
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Table 6.1: Growth of Colonias in Chilpancingo, Guerrero (1960-2004) 
Year Colonias (total) Regular Colonias Irregular Colonias 
1960 2 2 0 
1969 23 n/d n/d 
1980 120 (approx.) n/d n/d 
1999 368 292 76 
2004 409 330 79 
Note: Regular colonias are those where most residents have land titles; irregular colonias lack land titles. 
Source: Data taken from several sources: 1960 and 1969, de Gyves, p. 31; 1980, Wences Román, p. 156; 
1999, Plan Municipal de Desarrollo 1999-2002, and 2004, Informe Municipal 2004, p. 66.  The 1987 
Informe Municipal (p. 8) notes that over half of the colonias are regular, while a third are irregular and the 
rest are in the process of regularization. 
As it grew, the city remained largely dependent for employment on the 
government and services related to it.  A significant secondary source of employment was 
in commerce and business, often tied to the commercialization of agricultural products 
from other municipalities in Guerrero.  A study in the 1960s suggested that around 45% 
of the workforce was either in the city and state governments or in services directly tied 
to them.16 By 2000, a full 29.4% of the population worked in government (including 
teaching and medical services), and another 15.2% worked in commercial enterprises.  
Less than a twelfth of the workforce in the municipality was in agriculture (7.9%) and 
manufacturing (7.8%) each, while most other workers were in service occupations that 
depended directly or indirectly on government and business: construction (10.3%), 
transportation (4.8%), hotels and restaurants (5.0%), professional services and service to 
business (3.1%) (see Figure 6.6).17 There was little local industry.18 The city had 
achieved higher income levels than the average for the state (and close to national 
averages), but it had more low-wage workers than most medium-sized cities (see Figure 
 
16 De Gyves, Chilpancingo, pp. 37-39. 
17 The remaining occupations are all in the service sector as well.  Data are taken from INEGI Cuaderno 
Estadístico Municipal: Chilpancingo de los Bravo, Guerrero, Aguascalientes: INEGI, 2002, based on data 
from the Censo de Población y Vivienda 2000. 
18 The city’s Municipal Development Plan for 1999-2002 notes that “Manufacturing has not managed to 
develop as an industry; the activity is limited to small economic units, usually family-based, even though 
there is a large demand for products of this type.”  (Plan de Desarrollo Municipal 1999-2002, p. 8). 
171
6.7).  There were significant educational opportunities available, however, and these 
showed dramatic improvement in the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 6.8). 
Figure 6.6: Employment by Sector in Chilpancingo, Guerrero (in Percent of Workforce), 2000 











Note: The remaining occupations are all in the service sector as well. 
Source: INEGI, Cuaderno Estadístico Municipal: Chilpancingo de los Bravo, Guerrero, Aguascalientes: 
INEGI, 2002, based on data from the Censo de Población y Vivienda 2000. 
 
Figure 6.7: Distribution of Income in Chilpancingo by Multiples of the Minimum Wage 







Chilpancingo  21.1  26.8  17.4  18.8  11.2  4.7 
State  35.9  30.2  12.7  10.5  5.8  4.9 
National  20.7  30.3  17.6  14.1  11.8  5.4 
Medium Cities  14.3  31.2  19.5  15.8  13.8  5.4 
<1 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 5 5 or more No data
Source: INEGI, Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda, 2000. 
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% Adult illiteracy  20  15  11 
% Adults w /o primary
education
 21  17  14 
% Children (6-14) not
in school
 26  13  9 
1980 1990 2000
Note: Adults are those 15 years old or older. 
Source: INEGI, Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda, 1980, 1990, 2000. 
 
6.3 Strategies of Control, Moments of Rebellion (1960-1995) 
 
Among Chilpancingo’s first inhabitants in colonial times were people with the 
family names of Adame, Leyva, and Alarcón.19 Three hundred years later, those family 
names still resonated: between 1986 and 2005 there were mayors of the city named 
Florencio Salazar Adame, Efraín Leyva Acevedo, and Saúl Alarcón Abarca. This fact 
highlights one of the central truths of politics in the city: family names, apellidos, matter.  
The elite of the city has hardly been static over the centuries; it has grown and changed 
with migration and especially with the movement of elites from the rest of the state to 
Chilpancingo after it became the state capital.  However, there is little doubt that the 
city’s elite has been composed almost exclusively of a small set of families with 
 
19 Gutiérrez y Salgado and Rodríguez, Chilpancingo Ayer y Hoy, p. 30. 
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recognizable apellidos.20 These families live in the city, generally in one of the four 
traditional barrios, and often have ties to other elites throughout the state.  There have 
been times when the popular sectors have risen to prominence—notably after the 
Revolution, when the popular Greens and the elite Reds faced off in election after 
election—but over time and until recent times, the apellidos have dominated politics..  
The selection for municipal office has often required a negotiation among these families, 
mediated by powerful state-level political leaders. 
In the nineteenth century, Chilpancingo was ruled by a cabildo (city council) 
elected for one-year terms, with the mayor chosen from the collegial body.21 The 
municipal government was responsible for organizing elections, resolving disputes other 
than major crimes, maintaining elementary schools, taking care of public buildings and 
the cemetery, maintaining roads, and carrying out basic improvements to municipal 
infrastructure.  The municipality had funds from fines and taxes on public spectacles, 
sales, common property, and the transport of goods through the jurisdiction.22 The city 
was subject to vigilance by a prefect who served the district of Tixtla and reported 
directly to the governor.  The prefect had the ability to review the finances of the 
municipality and intervene on behalf of the governor in local decisions.   
The post-Revolutionary governments cancelled the figure of the prefect, but the 
tradition of a rotating city council with one year terms continued until the 1940s.  In 
1936, Aurora Meza Andraca became the first woman to serve as mayor in Mexico’s 
 
20 The key family names include: Adame, Memije, Calvo, Alarcón, Acevedo, Tapia, and Leyva.  Time after 
time in interviews, political leaders noted the importance of apellidos in the political process, although they 
often recognized that this was now changing (as we will discuss later). 
21 For a detailed description of the number of city council members over time, see Jaime Salazar Adame, 
“De Ciudad a Capital,” in Historia de Chilpancingo, Chilpancingo: Universidad Autónoma de Guerrero, 
1999.  At several points throughout the nineteenth century, Chilpancingo, like most of Mexico, had 
auxiliary mayors who served in localities outside the main city. 
22 Pavia, “Centro de Poder”, p. 165-66. 
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history, ten years before women’s suffrage for local elections was enshrined in the 
Constitution.  Eventually the terms were extended to three years with no reelection 
allowed, and the members of the city council were elected on a joint slate with the mayor.  
The number of council members varied over the years; however, one constant, until 1989, 
was that all members were part of the mayor’s slate, ensuring mayoral dominance over 
the council and single-party rule.  Indeed, the PRI won all elections in Chilpancingo with 
little effort from the 1940s until the 1990s (see Figure 6.9).   
The state government—and key state political leaders—also maintained tight 
control over municipal elections.  At least by the 1950s, it was common for the state 
government, in consultation with key local caciques, to name the candidates for mayor 
and city council in most of the state’s municipalities. The state frequently removed 
mayors as well, either through decree or through unofficial pressure.  Even though the 
prefects had been eliminated and the Mexican Constitution forbade any intermediate 
authority between the state and municipality, the state constitution allowed the governor 
to appoint inspectors to “examine accounting, verify entrance and exit of funds, oversee 
public services, and inform on the labors of the municipal government.”23 Mayors were 
thus elected at the will of the state governor and had to serve at his pleasure as well.24 
In the case of Chilpancingo, the tutelage of the state government was even more 
 
23 Moisés Ochoa Campo, Guerrero: Análisis de un estado en  problema, Mexico City: Editorial Trillas, 
1964, pp. 35-41, quote from the state constitution in effect in 1960 on p. 35. 
24 See also Armando Bartra, “Donde los sismos nacen,” in Tomás Bustamante Álvarez and Sergio 
Sarmiento Silva, eds., El Sur en Movimiento: La reinvención de Guerrero del siglo XXI, Mexico: Editora 
Laguna, 2001, p. 45.   State leaders were not immune to federal interference either, however.  From 1925 
until 2005 only seven governors served their entire term in office.  In other words, in eighty years, there 
was elected governor serving for only forty-two years.  The federal governor had formal and informal 
mechanisms for forcing governors to resign in the same way that the state governor could do to 
municipalities (see Chapter 4).  In Guerrero, where conflict often spiraled out of control, the federal 
government frequently saw that it was in their interest to remove elected governors.  See Carlos Illades, 
Breve Historia de Guerrero, p. 120. 
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direct than in most municipalities.  The city had little own-source revenue and few 
possibilities for investment in infrastructure.  As one study in 1960 noted, “Chilpancingo, 
despite being a capital, remains in the worst state of abandonment….the lack of resources 
and help is translated into a lack of drinking water, sewage, pavement, and schools.”25 
Soon the state government began playing a conspicuous role in upgrading the city’s 
infrastructure.  In the period 1981-87, for example, Governor Alejandro Cervantes 
Delgado undertook a major investment strategy for the capital primarily in roads, water, 
and sewage infrastructure.26 When Florencio Salazar Adame took over as mayor in 1987, 
he recognized that many of the functions that the municipal government should be 
performing were actually being done by the state government.  He noted in his first 
yearly report: 
 
We received a  public administration…with modest public functions, 
without decision-making authority in the execution of public works, 
constrained to provide insufficient services, and always leaning on the 
support of the State Government, which substituted, in large part, the 
responsibilities of the municipality…We would greatly appreciate the 
respectful decision of the Governor not to interfere in municipal 
responsibilities…we have proposed to overcome the inertia that made our 
citizens see in the State Governor also the Mayor.  For that reason, we 
have assumed all of our functions, which has meant...setting about the 
performance of our tasks with our resources. The inhabitants of 
Chilpancingo now know that municipal matters are dealt with and 
resolved in the Municipality.27 
Despite this bold declaration, municipal finances remained fragile and over 78% of 
Salazar’s municipal budget the following year was still composed of federal and state 
 
25 Ochoa Campo, Guerrero, p. 122. 
26 This initiative, known as “Plan Chilpancingo,” transformed the physical appearance of the city (Gutiérez 
y Salgado and Rodríguez, Chilpancingo Ayer y Hoy, pp. 72-75). 
27 Informe Municipal 1987, p. 3 and p. 26.  It should be noted that Florencia Salazar would go on to be a 
prominent PRI politician in Guerrero before, in a surprise move, throwing his support to Vicente Fox in the 
2000 presidential elections.  He was rewarded with several high-level government appointments in Fox’s 
administration including Secretary of Agrarian Reform. 
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transfers.28 In the mid-1990s, the state government continued to carry out major 
investments in Chilpancingo, even producing a small report to boast of the state 
government’s investment in the city.29 The dependence of the municipal administration 
on the mayor was, therefore, compounded by the mayor’s almost total dependence on the 
state government and on the state governor in particular. 
 The control of the state government and the state political elites over municipal 
politics was never complete, however, and a great deal of controversy and contestation 
did take place within municipalities, including Chilpancingo.  In the case of the capital, 
the most visible moment in which the dominant system was challenged was in 1960, 
when a popular protest spun out of control of the government and set off a series of 
events that transformed life in the city and in the state.  A confluence of factors, including 
a rise in taxes and increasing repression, led to protests throughout Guerrero in 1960.  
Students and faculty of the Autonomous University of Guerrero, based in Chilpancingo, 
soon joined the protests and added to them a demand for full autonomy of the university.  
The state government cracked down on the protests, killing eighteen people.30 The 
federal Congress quickly forced the governor to resign, and the new state government 
granted autonomy to the university.  The events of 1960 have remained a powerful 
symbol in the collective consciousness of Chilpancingo, as well as “a turning point in the 
history of Guerrero…, a symbolic reference of popular mobilization, and a point from 
 
28 Informe Municipal 1988. 
29 The report notes that “From the beginning of this [state government] administration, it has been a priority 
objective to improve the image of the city of Chilpancingo.”  The report only mentions the municipal 
government in passing.  Construyendo un nuevo Chilpancingo, Chilpancingo: Gobierno del Estado de 
Guerrero, 1995, quote on p. 12.  
30 Alba Teresa Estrada, Castañon. El movimiento anticaballerosta: Guerrero 1960: Crónica de un 
conflicto. Chilpancingo: Editorial Universidad Autónoma de Guerrero, 2001, pp.  49-90. 
Castaños Alba Teresa. El movimiento anticaballerista: Guerrero 1960. “Crónica de un conflicto”. 
Editorial,  UAG. Guerrero, México. 2001, Pág.  49-90. 
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which some of the central actors in the conflicts to come emerged.”31 These events also 
produced divergent responses from protest leaders.  The most visible leader of the 
protests, Genaro Vásquez, tried for some time to lead a political struggle outside the PRI 
but, after considerable repression, ended up towards the end of the 1960s founding a 
guerrilla organization in the mountains of.Guerrero.  Vásquez’s efforts would also spawn 
a second guerrilla organization, the Party of the Poor, which began in the late 1960s and 
continues indirectly today (through a new organization, the EPR, which sees itself as a 
continuation).  Other leaders, like Jesús Araujo Hernández and Josefat Acevedo, 
remained with the official party and went on to serve in positions in the public 
administration in the following decades.32 
The PRI managed to reassert control over most dissent in the state—leading some 
opposition leaders like Vásquez to take up arms—but the illusion of harmony had been 
broken.  Over the years, several other forms of protest and contestation outside of the 
official party would emerge.  In the mountains and coast of Guerrero, rural unions 
became especially influential, and the 1990s saw the emergence of human rights 
organizations to defend rural activists who were often threatened, jailed, or killed.33 In 
Chilpancingo, as the number of colonias grew, so too did organizations that represented 
the urban poor in the city.  Some of the strongest organizations, such as the Unión de 
Colonias Populares de Chilpancingo, were affiliated with the PRI.34 Others like the 
 
31 Illades, Breve Historia de Guerrero, p. 131. 
32 Araujo would go on to be chief justice of the Superior Court and Acevedo an interim mayor of 
Chilpancingo.  See Illades, Breve Historia, p. 136 on Araujo; and on Acevedo, see Felix J. López Romero 
Del mundo chilpancingueño, Chilpancingo: Ayuntamiento de Chilpancingo, 1995.. 
33 See Armando Bartra, Guerrero Bronco, for a more detailed discussion of these movements. 
34 Union of Popular Neighborhoods of Chilpancingo.  It later changed its name to Movimiento Territorial 
de Chilpancingo (Territorial Movement of Chilpancingo).  Interview with Clementino Navarrete, one of the 
former leaders of the Union and former president of the Development Committee of the Tatagildo 
neighborhood, April 10, 2005.   
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Consejo Popular de Colonias, were close to the Trotskyite PRT and to other left-wing 
parties.35 The Urban Popular Movement (MUP), as the non-PRI organizations were 
called, created concern among PRI leaders and forced them to invest in regularizing land 
titles and providing services to undercut the strength of the organizations.36 At the same 
time, a dissident teachers’ movement within the official National Union of Education 
Workers (SNTE), Mexico’s largest union, caught on in Guerrero and won adherents 
among teachers in Chilpancingo.  Although the dissidents never broke openly with the 
national union, they openly challenged the state and federal government on teacher pay 
and education investments.  In the process they both received ongoing support from the 
PRD and provided one of its most consistent bases of support.37 
In Guerrero left-wing political parties and the right-of-center PAN developed 
small but loyal followings and competed in state and municipal elections starting in 1980 
(see Figures 6.9, 6.10).  The candidacy of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas awoke the population in 
1988 and he officially won 36% of the state vote in the presidential elections of that year, 
though his actual totals might have been much more (Figure 6.11).  From that point on, 
the left became particularly successful in challenging the PRI in local elections in 
Guerrero and gaining a foothold in the state congress.  However, in Chilpancingo, the 
opposition parties lagged behind their performance elsewhere in the state, and through 
most of the 1980s and 1990s the PRI seemed immune to the winds of change blowing 
 
35 Popular Council of Neighborhoods.  This was the major alliance of non-PRI neighborhood organizations 
begun in 1988; in 1989 it became the Frente de Lucha de las Colonias Populares (Front for the Struggle of 
the Popular Neighborhoods) in a merger with other organizations.  Interview with Daniel Acatitlán Ramón, 
April 10, 2005, and “Se Integró el Consejo Popular de Colonias,” Expresión Popular, January 11, 1988; 
“Colonos acusan a funcionario municipal,” El Sol de Chilpancingo, May 26, 1989; “Constituyen aquí el 
Frente de Lucha de las Colonias Populares,” El Sol de Chilpancingo, September 12, 1989. 
36 The Informe Municipal 1990 of Mayor Efraín Leyva Acevedo is particularly clear in this regard.   
37 On dissidence in the SNTE, see Joe Foweraker, Popular Mobilization in Mexico: The Teachers' 
Movement 1977-87, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
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elsewhere in Guerrero (see Figure 6.10). 












PRI 87.6% 86.7% 85.3% 58.3% 58.3% 50.2%
Left* 6.8% 7.7% 7.7% 25.3% 29.6% 35.8%
1980 1983 1986 1989 1993 1996
* Left is a composite of left parties from 1980-1986; after 1989 vote is for the PRD only. 
Note: The PAN has generally registered 1 - 4% of the vote, except in 1996 when it reached 8.5%. 
Source: Alba Teresa Estrada Castanon, "Guerrero en los 90s: Realineamiento Electoral y Movimiento 
Social," in David Cienfuegos Salgado and Humberto Santos Bautista, eds, Guerrero: Los Retos del Nuevo 
Siglo, Chilpancingo: Fundacion Academica Guerrerense, 2000. 
 







PRI 99.4% 86.1% 86.5% 88.9% 58.8% 71.5% 60.6%
PRD/Left* 0.0% 8.6% 6.2% 5.2% 24.6% 16.5% 24.9%
PAN 0.4% 2.0% 1.4% 0.8% 1.7% 1.8% 5.4%
Others 0.2% 1.8% 3.8% 4.1% 9.0% 10.3% 11.0%
1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1993 1996
Note: * = PCM in 1980; PSUM in 1983 and 1986; PRD after 1989 
Source: Consejo Estatal Electoral de Guerrero 
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Carlos Salinas de Gortari (PRI) 60%
Cuahtemoc Cardenas (FDN) 36%
Manuel Clouthier (PAN) 2%
Percent of Vote
Source: Alba Teresa Estrada Castanon, "Guerrero en los 90s,” p. 44; Bartra, Guerrero Bronco, pp. 141-42. 
Note: Vote for Cárdenas was probably much higher than reflected in the official total. 
 
6.4 How Much Decentralization (1996-2005)? 
Authority 
 
Chilpancingo, like all other municipalities in Guerrero, has long struggled to raise 
local revenues to finance local government expenditures.  Chilpancingo lacks industry 
and, as noted earlier, is largely dependent on the state government.  This dependency, in 
turn, reduces the city’s potential tax base.  On the other hand, the proliferation of 
commercial enterprises, the services related to government, and the annual fair, which is 
heavily attended from all over the state, do provide some opportunities for taxation.  
Overall Chilpancingo fares better than many other municipalities in Guerrero by 
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diversifying its revenue sources and has for several decades.38 However, Chilpancingo 
fares poorly when compared to other municipalities of the same size in Mexico.  
Chilpancingo has historically depended on revenue transfers from the federal and state 
governments, complemented, especially in the mid-1990s, by loans for major projects 
(see Figure 6.12, 6.13), and this dependency has increased over time.  The creation of 
Ramo 33 and later Habitat have bolstered the city’s revenues and its capacity for 
investment; nonetheless, even with the growth in federal transfers, Chilpancingo 
remained a poor city in per capita municipal revenue compared to other cities of the same 
size (Figure 6.14). 
 
Figure 6.12: Real Municipal Revenue, Chilpancingo, Guerrero, 1989-2004 







Millions of 2002 Pesos
Unspent Funds 0 0.19 0 0 0.87 0 0 0 0 1.36 2.86 0.1 0 0
Other 0.56 24.4 39.6 0 0 1.3 0 0 10.7 29.5 76 8.83 1.54 0.92
Debt 3.01 7.65 8.13 3.03 21.4 44 45.2 78.9 0 1.64 0 0 6.49 0
Local income 22.8 20.3 32.7 43.5 24 19.3 19.7 21.2 24.6 25 30.7 35.2 39.9 35.9
Federal transfers 29.9 19 18.3 26 13.6 13.9 15.8 18.4 21.8 77.9 23.2 103 156 136
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: INEGI, Finanzas Estatales y Municipales, 1989-97 and 1998-2002. 
38 This was true in 1960 and is still so today based on a review of financial statistics in the nacional 
municipal financial database (INEGI, Sistema Nacional de Base de Datos).  For 1960 see Moisés Ochoa 
Campo (Guerrero: Análisis de un estado en  problema, Mexico City: Editorial Trillas, 1964. 
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Figure 6.13: Growth of Transfers through Ramo 33 and 20, Chilpancingo, 1998-2004 









FORTAMUNDF  12.6  27.0  31.0  38.9  44.5  45.6  47.1 
FAISM  19.9  29.8  37.8  45.1  51.1  51.6  54.7 
Habitat  10.0  5.7 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: For Ramo 33, INAFED, “Finanzas Públicas Locales,” available at www.inafed.gob.mx; for 
Habitat, Informe Municipal 2003, 2004. 
Figure 6.14: Comparison of Municipal Revenue per capita between Chilpancingo and the Average 











Average for Medium Cities 57.4 86.5 122 153 188 217 242 312 397 585 809 1008 1212 1367
Chilpancingo 57.2 97.9 165 154 150 219 243 385 200 513 545 654 976 895
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002






The city’s weak finances are partially compensated by the state’s direct 
investment in Chilpancingo.  As noted previously, the state government has taken a 
particular interest in improving the city’s infrastructure, particularly because it is the state 
capital, but this investment has come at a price to the municipal government’s autonomy.  
Mayors, like Florencio Salazar Adame (see section 6.3 below) have tried to separate the 
municipal administration from the overbearing presence of the governor, but this strategy 
has never been fully possible.  The governor and key state political leaders of the PRI 
have traditionally paid close attention to the selection of the PRI’s candidate for mayor, 
and the governor lives and works within the city.39 Moreover, the city depends on 
occasional injections of state resources to complement its meager investment budget.  
This was particularly noticeable during the early 1990s under the Solidarity Program.  
Despite being one of the three least poor municipalities in the state, Chilpancingo 
received more Solidarity funds than any other municipality except Acapulco and more 
funds per capita in the period 1990-1992 than all but two small municipalities. Indeed, 
Chilpancingo concentrated 10.09% of all Solidarity investments in this period, despite 
comprising only 5.2% of the population.40 Nonetheless, the arbitrariness of transfers has 
been reduced over time with the implementation of Ramo 33 and Habitat, which are 
formula-based (see Chapter 5).  Although the state government continues to provide 
 
39 It should be noted that the state administration has gradually moved most of its functions to the city’s 
southernmost side, creating a greater physical distance than once existed when both municipal and state 
offices were concentrated around the central plaza. 
40 See Isabel Osorio Salgado, Eradicación o Radicación de la Pobreza? Pronasol y Territorio en el Estado 
de Guerrero, Chilpancingo: Universidad Autónoma de Guerrero, 1995, especially charts on pp. 126 and 
185. 
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occasional investments out of the state budget,41 transfers appear to be far more equitable 
than before.  Indeed, Chilpancingo received around 6.0% of all federal and state transfers 
in 2002 and makes up just under 6.3% of the state population.42 
The lack of municipal autonomy is confirmed by interviews with major political 
leaders.  Mayor Saúl Alarcón (2002-2005), for example, recognized that he occasionally 
had to negotiate with the governor around priorities.43 Opposition council members were 
more direct. One council member observed that “Since it is the capital of the state, there 
is a total interference of the governor.”44 Another stated that “Who governs in 
Chilpancingo is the governor.”45 The truth probably lies in between the two positions.  
On most issues the municipal government sets priorities and conducts business without 
the governor paying much attention.  Nonetheless, the governor is able to influence 
priorities when he wants to.  This influence is based both on the control over resources 
the city needs and on the metaconstitutional powers that governor has through his 
political connection to the mayor.  With the victory of the PRD in the state elections in 
2005, the influence of the governor in municipal decision may thus be sharply reduced. 
 
41 City council member Rigoberto Ramos (PAN), for example, noted the state government’s investment in 
the reconstruction of a major city market in 2004 with funds that came directly from the state budget. 
42 Author’s calculations, based on figures from INEGI, Censo de Población y Vivienda 2000 and INEGI, 
Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales de México, 1999-2002. This figure includes participaciones, 
Ramo 33, and Habitat.   The fact that the city received slightly less than its population share in transfers is 
to be expected, since the Ramo 33 formula includes calculations based on poverty indicators, which are 
relatively low in Chilpancingo compared to other municipalities in the state. 
43 Interview with Mayor Saúl Alarcón Abarca (PRI), March 11, 2005. 
44 Interview with Rigoberto Ramos Romero (PAN), March 11, 2005. 
45 Interview with Julio Cesar Aguirre (PRD), March 11, 2005. 
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6.5 Changes in Democratic Governance (1996-2005) 
 
Historically Chilpancingo was run not only by the PRI, but, as mentioned earlier, 
by a small number of traditional families that were the city’s economic elite and also the 
dominant groups within the PRI.  Every three years, state political elites, who had a direct 
interest in the capital, and city elites would negotiate over who would become the 
candidates for mayor and city council and draw the names from the ranks of the 
privileged families.  Even a cursory look at the names in the city council and high-level 
municipal officials gives a sense of some of the leading political families: Memije, 
Abarca, Calvo, Tapia, Adame, Acevedo, and Leyva.  The poor were not excluded 
entirely, however.  Grouped into corporate organizations of the official party, they turned 
out the vote every three years and influenced decisions between elections through the 
party structure and their links to individual politicians.  Nonetheless, by the beginning of 
the new millennium, the political rules had begun to change, albeit slowly. 
 
System of Representation 
 
State and municipal elections became increasingly competitive in the state of 
Guerrero in the 1990s, especially after 1996 (see Figure 6.15).  The PRD even won more 
votes than the PRI in the 2002 municipal elections (though the PRI won slightly more 
votes in the congressional races).  Indeed, of the state’s five large cities, the opposition 
has won four of them—Acapulco, Iguala, Taxco, and José Azueta (Zihuatenejo)—at least 
once since 1996. The fifth city, Chilpancingo, remained the only major city in the state 
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solidly in the hands of the PRI (see Figure 6.16).   
 








PAN 8.5% 1.7% 8.7%
PRI 50.2% 49.7% 39.4%
PRD 35.8% 47.8% 41.2%
1996 1999 2002
Source: Estrada Castañon, “Guerrero en los 90s”; Consejo Estatal Electoral de Guerrero, Memoria: 
Proceso Ordinario de Diputados y Ayuntamientos 2002, Chilpancingo: CEEGRO, 2002.









PRI 61% 55% 47%
PAN 5% 3% 9%
PRD 25% 38% 36%
Other parties 11% 3% 5%
1996 1999 2002
Source: Consejo Estatal Electoral de Guerrero. 
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Even in Chilpancingo, however, the electoral climate began to change after 1997.  
In that year, one of the PRI’s leading figures in the city, Píoquinto Damián Huato, broke 
away from the party after not being selected as the party’s candidate for congress.  The 
historical leader of the store owners in the city, a former secretary general of the state 
PRI, and then the state’s Secretary of Education, he bolted to the PRD and ran as that 
party’s candidate for congress in the 1997 federal elections.46 He won election, defeating 
a former city mayor, 44.6% to 40.7%, the first defeat ever for the PRI in the city.47 The 
PRI’s municipal structure remained largely intact after these events, and the PRI would 
continue to win every other election afterwards (including the 1999 mayoral race against 
Damián).48 Nonetheless, his departure from the official party gave the PRD a boost, 
adding dissident teachers and some neighborhood leaders to the PRD’s base of support.  
Even though the party failed to repeat its success in subsequent years, it came to be seen 
as a major alternative to the PRI in the city for the first time.49 
As the state moved gradually away from single-party dominance, the state created 
an autonomous electoral council and passed an improved electoral code.  In 1996, the 
State Electoral Council of Guerrero (CEEGRO) was created as an autonomous body with 
citizen counselors to oversee elections.50 Although opposition parties often questioned its 
credibility, it effectively removed the organization of elections from the governor’s direct 
 
46 For news coverage, see Hector Gutiérez, “Pioquinto Damián Huato ‘candidato popular,’” Vértice, March 
20, 1997; Daniel Genchi Palma, “Pioquinto Damián renunció al PRI y se fue al PRD,” Vértice, March 20, 
1997. 
47 Election results for the seventh district of Guerrero, available from the Instituto Federal Electoral 
(www.ife.org.mx). 
48 Interviews, Pío Quinto Damián, April 13, 2005 and April 20, 2005, and Miguel Angel Mercado Durán, 
Director of the PRI’s Training Institute, April 15, 2005. 
49 Interviews with City Council members Julio Cesar Aguirre (PRD), March 11 and April 19, 2005; 
Rigoberto Ramos (PAN), March 11, 2005; and Bertín Cabañas (PRI), March 11, 2005. 
50 See history on the webpage of the Council, www.ceegro.org.mx.
188
control and opposition parties began to win municipal elections and gain a significant 
presence in the state congress.  . 
Similarly, the state allowed opposition parties to have increasing representation 
within the city council.  Until 1989 opposition parties had no representation at all within 
the city council.51 After 1996 this representation grew substantially, although the 
winning party continued to have an overwhelming majority of council seats and the 
second largest party always was heavily underrepresented in the council (see Table 6.2).  
Moreover, the PRI, faced with challenges from the opposition, was forced to look for 
candidates outside the traditional families, candidates who could appeal to the growing 
number of low-income communities around the city.  Whereas the party had been 
traditionally dominated by candidates of “a certain last name and barrio,” the rising star 
in the municipal PRI in 2004-2005, in fact, was Mario Moreno, a charismatic federal 
congressman who had come from one of the low-income communities himself.52 
Table 6.2: City Council Composition, Chilpancingo, Guerrero, 1996-2005  
(with Over/Underrepresentation of Top Three Political Parties) 
Election Year Party Vote Council Seats* % Council Over/under- 
representation 
1996 PRI 61% 11 65% +4% 
PRD 25% 3 18% -7% 
PAN 6% 3 18% +12% 
1999 PRI 55% 10 62% +7% 
PRD 38% 4 25% -13% 
PAN 3% 1 6% +3% 
PVEM  1 6%  
2002 PRI 47% 9 53% +6% 
PRD 36% 4 24% -12% 
PAN 9% 2 12% +3% 
PVEM  1   
Convergencia  1   
Note: Electoral law was changed to alter the number of city council members and the assignation of 
síndicos.  There were 17 members in 1996-99, 16 in 1999-2002, and 17 in 2002-2005, including the mayor. 
Source: Data courtesy of the Municipal Secretary’s office (Ayuntamiento de Chilpancingo 2002-2005, 
Secretaría de Gobierno), checked against records of the PRI, PRD, and PAN municipal party offices. 
 
51 See Informe Municipal 1990, pp. 41-42. 
52 Interview, Aguirre. 
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Despite their minority position, council members of the PRD and the PAN began 
having increasing influence in municipal decisions due to their political strength in the 
state and country as a whole.  Council members noted that they were able to use their 
influence with the state congress and federal government agencies to influence key 
decisions, playing a sort of two or three-level game where their influence in municipal 
political derived from their influence in other spheres of government.  This was the case 
with the municipal revenue budget for 2004, which the PRD and PAN joined together to 
block by going to their party delegations in the state congress.  The PRI had only a 
minority in the state congress after 2002 (21 out of 46 seats53) and together with smaller 
parties the two major opposition parties were able to get the congress to deny approval of 
the municipality’s revenue budget until technical errors were corrected, giving them some 
limited negotiating room on the budget.54 The two leading opposition parties also played 
a role in stopping the state congress from privatizing the water system in Chilpancingo by 
appealing to their party colleagues in the Congress.55 In this case, the PAN and PRD 
turned out to be key allies of the mayor, who was also opposed to the privatization.  And 
the two PAN members of the city council found they could play an important role as a 
liaison with the federal Department of Social Development (Sedesol) in helping get funds 
for local development projects and following up when these funds were not adequately 
accounted for.56 
53 See Consejo Estatal Electoral de Guerrero, Memoria, p. 129. 
54 Interviews with Aguirre (PRD) and Ramos (PAN).  The decision of the Congress is available as 
Congreso del Estado de Guerrero, “Ley No. 119 para los Ingresos de los Municipios del Estado para el 
Ejercicio Fiscal 2004,” December 19, 2004, especially pp. 3-4, available on the website of the Guerrero 
State Congress, http://www.conggro.gob.mx/consulta/leyes/119.pdf. 
55 Interview, Ramos (PAN). 
56 Interview, Ramos (PAN).  The PAN had only two seats in the city council, but one of the two was later 
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Nonetheless, in most decision-making matters, the Chilpancingo government 
continued to be strikingly centralized in the figure of the mayor, as it had always been, 
with occasional influence of the governor.  In questions of municipal investment in public 
works, the mayor seems to have the final say despite the legal requirement that city 
council members decide these matters.  “There is a deep-seated presidentialism…” one 
PRD council member alleged, “Public works are negotiated with the mayor, not even 
with the council.”  He and a colleague from the PAN each noted that they had been 
promised funding for certain public works in 2004 but that this pledge had not been 
honored.  In 2005 they were reduced to negotiating instead for tons of cement for 
projects.57 This comment was supported by PRI council members and officials of the 
municipal administration, who noted that public works requests from communities were 
generally made directly to the mayor himself and occasionally copied to council 
members.58 One PRI city council member, who chairs the public works committee, noted 
that “The mayor is in charge of the relationship with the neighborhoods, but I help as a 
council member.”59 Even the current mayor saw this way of proceeding as the natural 
order of things.  When asked how citizens make requests for public works, he answered 
“They come to me as mayor with requests” (“me gestionan a mi como presidente 
municipal”).  He added that once the proposal for public works was ready, the council 
could comment on it, but it was basically his responsibility to decide these matters.60 
expelled from the party after he supported the PRD candidate for governor in 2005. 
57 Interview, Aguirre (PRD). 
58 Interviews with José Arroyo, Chief of Planning, March 11, 2005; Lozena, Chief of Barrios and 
Neighborhoods, April 20, 2005; Cabañas (PRI council member). 
59 Interview, Jaime González González, city council member (PRI), April 20, 2005.   
60 Interview, Saul Alarcón, Mayor 2002-2005 (PRI). 
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Transparency and Monitoring 
 
A few advances have occurred in transparency and monitoring of municipal 
decisions, but these changes are few and far between.  Different administrations have 
produced bulletins and newsletters to advertise their activities.61 The current 
administration has listed the municipal budget on the website and recently added the base 
salaries of employees by category.  However, the salary table does not list bonuses or 
other forms of compensation.  The annual municipal report generally lists the budget, 
although the level of details varies considerably from year to year.  The 2004 report noted 
investments through Ramo 33, a significant advance in transparency.  At the same time, 
there are few formal structures to allow citizens to monitor whether what is reported is 
accurate.  As of this writing, an ongoing dispute is taking place between the federal and 
municipal governments over the use of funds from Habitat (Ramo 20): the federal 
government claims the funds were used for purposes other than areas of high poverty 
concentration.62 No regulations seem to govern the disclosure of information to the 
public. Hence, efforts to increase transparency appear to be entirely discretionary.   
 Moreover, city council meetings are rarely open.  Table 6.3 shows, for selected 
years for which data could be obtained, the number of council meetings and those 
meetings that are open.  Overall, it appears that no more than 12% of meetings are public 
(and usually fewer) and most of the council’s business is conducted behind closed doors.  
One PRD council member, who publishes his own annual report, stated that he “proposed 
 
61 The current administration uses bulletins, which are posted on their website, though these seem to be 
quite infrequent and not readily available in print form at the municipal offices.  The Informe Municipal 
1988 lists an ongoing newsletter, while the Informe Municipal 1999 lists a municipal bulletin. 
62 Interviews, Ramos (council member PAN) and Arroyo (Chief of Planning, Municipality). 
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that the sessions of the council be held openly, with the purpose of making the work and 
actions of the municipality transparent, something which was achieved on only one 
occasion during the year.”63 There appears to be little serious discussion in the council 
about changing its closed-door policy, however. 
 Chilpancingo has several newspapers and radio stations, and local affiliates of the 
national television networks, yet there appears to be little critical coverage of the 
municipal government.  Indeed, the seemingly passive role they have played in pushing 
for greater transparency may be because of the dependence of the newspapers and radio 
stations (though less of the television stations) on city and state government advertising 
revenues.  However, further research would be necessary to establish if this is correct. 
 
Table 6.3: City Council Meetings and Percent Public, Chilpancingo, Guerrero, selected years 
Year 1988 1999 2003 2004 
Total council meetings 41 65 23 17 
Regular meetings 13 55 6 10 
Extraordinary meetings 22 3 15 5 
Solemn public meetings 2 5 0 0 
Public working sessions 4 2 2 2 
% Working sessions public 10.3% 3.3% 8.7% 11.8% 
Note: Percent of working sessions public is the percent of all regular and extraordinary meetings that are 
open to the public (i.e., it excludes the solemn public meetings, which are meeting commemorating events).  
We have used figures from the mayor’s own annual report, but note that the coordinator of the PRD in the 
council cites only one open meeting in 2004. 
Source: Informes Municipales 1988, 1999, 2003, 2004.  Aguirre, Informe de Actividades 2002-2003. 
63 Julio Cesar Aguirre, Informe de Actividades 2002-2003, Chilpancingo: Regiduría de Educación, Cultural, 
Recreatción y Espectáculos, 2003, p. 7. 
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Opportunities for Participation 
 
Citizen participation has long been a central term used in PRI-run municipal 
administrations in Chilpancingo, so much so that in 1991 the city published a book on 
“participatory municipal democracy.”64 Indeed, this was one of two central thrusts for 
the municipal government of the period 1989-92.65 It has been echoed, in one form or 
another, as a major thrust of every recent municipal administration.  The most recent 
municipal development plan notes that the city’s first priority is to “promote citizen 
participation as a fundamental key to consolidate the plans and programs of 
government.”66 Mayor Saúl Alarcón observed that his priority was to “do more with 
less” by “getting the society to participate” (“metiendo a la sociedad que participe”).67 
However, what PRI leaders have generally meant by participation is that citizens be 
active in authorized political channels, carefully controlled by the PRI, and contribute 
their effort in order to lower the cost of providing public services. 
The primary means for citizen participation in municipal affairs has officially 
been through the development committees (comités de desarrollo), which are supposed to 
exist in each neighborhood; an array of ad hoc public works committees convened 
around specific projects; and the Planning Council for Municipal Development 
(Coplademun).  The development committees have a particularly long history in 
 
64 This book, Democracia Participativa Municipal, by José Gilberto Garza Grimaldo does not deal with the 
city specifically.  See the review by Beatriz Parra in Crítica Jurídica, No. 10, pp. 217-18, 1992. 
65 According to the Informe Municipal 1990, corresponding to the first full year of the administration of 
Efraín Leyva Acevedo.  The two axes were “consolidation of municipal autonomy and reduction of the 
social need in marginal zones” and “strengthening participatory democracy through solidarity and co-
responsibility between people and government,” a clear echo of the federal Solidarity program.  The cites 
are on page 2. 
66 Ayuntamiento de Chilipancingo, Plan Municipal de Desarrollo 2002-2005, p. 38.  See also the previous 
plan, Ayuntamiento de Chilpancingo, Plan Municipal de Desarrollo 1999-2002, especially pp. 3 and 24. 
67 Interview, Alarcón. 
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Chilpancingo, possibly going back several decades, and in the early 1980s the first law 
was published to regulate their election and activity.  A revision of this law was published 
in 1999.68 According to the law, the committees should be elected in every neighborhood 
every two years in a non-partisan election, in the presence of the responsible municipal 
authority, and serve to “motivate citizens to unity, to achieve the social development in 
benefit of the population.”  The actual functions are not terribly specific, however, 
despite considerable detail on the structure and form of election of the committees.69 
Various municipal documents make reference to the development committees, 
though not all neighborhoods have them.70 In detailed interviews with sixteen 
community in six different neighborhoods (see Table 6.4), it became clear that at least in 
these neighborhoods, the committees were active.  All had been elected in public 
assemblies witnessed by the Chief of Barrios and Neighborhoods (Procurador de Barrios 
y Colonias), as the law requires.  However, they varied a great deal in their degree of 
support, level of activity, ways of functioning, and length of service.  Some seemed to 
have minimal activity, while others had several ongoing projects.  Some committees 
served for the full two-year term; others for up to seven years.  Some assemblies to elect 
the committees had generated a large turnout; others did not even meet the legal quorum 
to elect the committee.  Most committees seemed to be primarily concerned with basic 
services (where these were lacking) or secondary infrastructure (pavement, access roads).  
Several of the committees were involved in issues around public security and 
 
68 Interview, José Luis Lozena, Municipal Chief of Barrios and Colonias, April 20, 2005. 
69 Author’s analysis of the law.  The regulation was passed on April 23, 1999 as “Reglamento para la 
organización de barrios, colonias, fraccionamientos y unidades habitacionales del municipio de 
Chilpancingo de los Bravo, Guerrero,” and published in the Gaceta Muncipal in May 1999. 
70 The Informe Municipal 2003 refers to having contact with 74 development committees during the year 
(of the more than 400 neighborhoods in the city).  The Informe Municipal 2004 notes that 42 committees 
were “renewed” during the year.  Further back, the Informe Municipal 1999 refers to the election of 115 
development committees. 
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transportation.  For the most part, they seemed to operate in almost complete isolation 
from each other, except in rare cases where there was a demand for better transportation 
services or a common access road or bridge.  This style was in sharp contrast to the late 
1980s and early 1990s when large organizations linked neighborhood committees. 
 
6.4: Neighborhood Interviews Conducted 
Neighborhood Year founded Number 
of families 




1978 139-40 Low-income 2 
Colonia Plan de 
Ayala 
1983  700+ Low-income 2 
Colonia Tatagildo 1983 336-37 Low-income/working class 4 
Colonia del PRI Late 1950s 
(oldest in city) 
Several 
thousand 
Working class (some low-income 









Early 1980s 200+ Middle class bureaucrats 2 
Note: Interviews were conducted with at least one PRI member and one opposition supporter in each 
neighborhood.  In all cases, the president or vice president of the neighborhood was interviewed in addition 
to other current or previously elected officials. Where there were splits in the neighborhood, interviews 
were conducted with the opposition committee.  Interviews conducted March 28-30 and April 3-5, 8, 10, 
12-13, 20, 2005. 
Note: Colonia and Fraccionamiento mean neighborhood (usually colonia is a popular neighborhood and a 
fraccionamiento a planned wealthier one, but these distinctions are not always kept in practice). 
 
The Coplademun, on the other hand, does not really exist for any practical 
purpose.  The Coplademun is convened each year to approve the proposal for public 
works under Ramo 33, as required by law.  Indeed, in 2004, the meeting included 245 
people.71 However, the municipal government only invites the presidents of those 
neighborhoods that have been selected by the mayor to receive.72 Development 
committee leaders confirmed that the only times committee leaders were invited to the 
Coplademun was when they had already negotiated a public works project from the 
 
71 Ayuntamiento de Chilpancingo, Boletín No. 56, April 2, 2004. 
72 Interviews with council members Cabañas (PRI), Aguirre (PRD), and Ramos (PAN). 
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municipality.73 The body thus serves not as an institutional framework to discuss and 
negotiate demands let alone deliberate and decide on a policy, but rather as a ceremonial 
occasion to bring together beneficiaries of public works projects and representatives of 
the three levels of government responsible for funding and executing those projects.   
 Indeed the only institutional channel that exists to bring demands to the attention 
of municipal authorities is through a written letter followed up by informal political 
negotiations.74 Most of the development committee leaders interviewed indicated they 
maintained close relationships with city council members or municipal officials as 
necessary elements in getting their petitions heard.  In several cases they cited direct 
communication with the mayor himself, but they also noted the role played by several of 
the PRI city council members, the secretary of the municipality (the mayor’s second-in-
command), the director of public works, and even the federal congressman Mario 
Moreno.  They reported different levels of responsiveness from the municipality, 
however.  One committee president noted with frustration that “The people from the 
municipality only show up in the neighborhood when they want us to support some 
candidate.”  Others seemed to have a much more fluid relationship with the municipality, 
but these leaders were largely the same ones whom opposition supporters accused of 
campaigning for the PRI during the 2005 state election.  In fact, there seemed to be a 
direct relationship between those leaders who reported a close relationship to the 
municipality and those who were signaled by their opponents as partisan.  Being 
politically connected helped get demands met, but it also meant using the development 
committee for partisan purposes.   
 
73 Based on three interviews in which leaders noted they had been invited to Coplademun meetings. 
74 Interview, Lozena. 
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 All of the committees in the six neighborhoods studied were run by members of 
the PRI, as are most committees in the city.75 It was particularly evident, however, that 
competition had increased a great deal in recent years.  Although committee presidents 
had been historically imposed by municipal officials, elections are now increasingly 
competitive between the PRI and the PRD.76 In all of the neighborhoods studied, the 
PRD (and in some cases dissident PRI factions) had competed actively and, in at least 
two neighborhoods, won in past elections. Even the Colonia del PRI, the largest and 
oldest neighborhood in the city (outside of the four traditional Barrios), had elected a 
PRD development committee at one point.  However, the municipal official in charge of 
development committees explained that the PRI leaders tended to be “better at getting 
results” than PRD leaders, which explained that party’s dominance.  He pointed out that 
when the PRI lost a neighborhood, it would form an alternate committee using the section 
structure of the PRI (the party’s grassroots neighborhood unit) and compete with the 
official committee for funds and projects.77 Of course, the fact that the PRI controlled the 
resources for community investments through the mayor’s office helps explain the PRI’s 
continued dominance of the committees. 
 Opposition sympathizers (and dissident PRI members) often claimed that the 
official committees had been put together by the municipal government as structures of 
 
75 Lozena and council members Cabañas (PRI) and Aguirre (PRD) noted in interviews that most official 
development committees were run by PRI leaders. 
76 The PAN has little neighborhood level organization.  PAN council member Rigoberto 
Ramos noted that “We do not have a social base [but rather] the image of a 
serious party…there are no PANista neighborhoods.”  Instead, he noted, the PAN 
has often drawn support from the city’s professionals.  PRI council member 
Bertín Cabañas simply stated that “The PAN is a club of friends.”  Interviews, 
Ramos and Cabañas. 
77 Interview, Lozena. 
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control and partisan promotion.  One former committee president (and local PRI official) 
noted that his neighborhood’s committee was put together “through the imposition of the 
municipality.”  They noted that the PRI would often come through with handouts for 
residents (food, cardboard, and cement) before elections took place.  In four of the six 
neighborhoods, citizens sympathetic to the PRD had formed their own organizations, 
which usually brought together several families in different neighborhoods.  Each of 
these organizations was linked to a PRD leader (city council member or leading political 
figure), except for one which seemed to be a product of the 2005 governor’s election 
(which included PRD, PAN, and dissident PRI members).  Since these organizations had 
little influence within the municipality, they tended to find high-profile issues (lack of 
transportation services in one case; an access road in another) around which they could 
protest and pressure the authorities.  In the new climate of plurality, these organizations 




The municipality of Chilpancingo was once a mere caretaker of day-to-day local 
issues with major decisions taken care of by the state government.  Decentralization has 
changed this relation of subordination.  The municipality still lives in the shadow of the 
state government (and the state governor in particular), but increasingly the municipality 
has its own functions, powers, and resources and sufficient discretion to decide what to 
do with these.  With the election of an opposition party to the state governorship in 2005, 
it is likely that the municipality will break away from many of the remaining informal 
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constraints on its autonomy. 
 However, decentralization clearly has not produced the kind of democratic 
governance that theory might suggest.  The form of governance that still dominates in 
Chilpancingo is, on the face of it, the same that was set up during the period of one-party 
hegemonic rule. The mayor is largely all-powerful and he largely controls the agenda of 
the city council.  The council members, in turn, serve primarily as an occasional conduit 
for petitions from community organizations to the mayor’s office.   Council meetings are 
closed and citizens have few ways of knowing what their municipal government does 
between elections.  The PRI controls most spaces of social organization, including a 
broad array of neighborhood organizations that belong almost entirely to the same party 
and serve as tools for partisan mobilization as much as conduits for citizen demands.  The 
prevailing opportunities for citizen participation are extremely thin and more like 
lobbying than deliberative rule by the people or their elected representatives.  Indeed, 
they almost always involve citizens approaching their authorities through intermediaries, 
either neighborhood leaders tied to the PRI or city council members of the same party 
who can serve as conduits with the mayor.   In a state where political competition has 
become normal, Chilpancingo still seems on the surface like a relic from the past.  
 However, under the surface, a great deal of contestation has developed and 
alternate forms of conducting politics are beginning to take place.  Opposition city 
council members have found new strength in allying with representatives of their own 
parties in the state congress and in federal agencies.  Municipal leaders have felt pushed 
to publish at least some information about official finances and activities.  At a 
community level, considerable competition takes place for some neighborhood 
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committees, and opposition groups are building broad (though not yet deep) coalitions 
across neighborhoods. 
 Nonetheless, all of the new ways of doing politics share one key element of the 
old ways of doing politics: they rely on informal institutions.  They are more means for 
partisan lobbying than for collective problem-solving.  The underlying structure of 
politics has changed, but the institutional channels for processing these changes remains 
the same.  Opposition parties need to rely on two-level games—playing off other federal 
and state institutions against municipal institutions—to make their voices heard within 
the elected city council.  Citizens must rely on well-placed political intermediaries or 
pressure through numbers to make their demands known to authorities or to obtain 
information about their activities. In a city where poverty is widespread, public services 
limited, and the application of justice often arbitrary, political brokers serve a vital 
purpose for people’s everyday survival.  Little, if any, public debate takes place, and 
those spaces of citizen participation that do exist serve only to mask the top-down nature 
of political decision-making. The city lacks independent organizations, a strongly 
autonomous media, or even consistently competitive opposition parties.  Much is 
changing in Chilpancingo, but bringing government closer to people alone has done little 
to make it more representative, transparent, and participatory.  The permanence of old 
political institutions that create upward accountability with the weakness of civil society 
and the press that could push for further democratic opening have conspired to undermine 






On October 2, 2005 the inhabitants of Guerrero went to the polls to elect their 
municipal authorities and state Congress.  As in the gubernatorial election in February, 
the PRD emerged triumphant, winning 40 of the state’s 73 municipalities and seventeen 
of the 28 congressional districts.  Of the five largest cities, only one went to the PRI—
Chilpancingo, where the PRI trounced the PRD by an almost two-to-one margin.78 Once 
again, the traditional party of the city had reasserted its power to win the local elections 
decisively even while the rest of the state was turning against the once dominant PRI. 
 The PRI won, in large part, because it remains the only political party with a 
broad base in the city.  Its leaders have skillfully prevented the emergence of other 
political options and controlled most of the existing social organizations.  At the same 
time, the PRI also won because it was willing to adapt in order to survive.  For the first 
time, the party put forth a candidate who did not come from one of the city’s elite 
families.  The winning candidate, Mario Moreno, is a PRI leader who came out of the 
party’s popular organizations and has his own political base in the poorer communities in 
the city.  Faced with pressures from the PRD, the PRI turned to its most popular 
candidate, even though it meant that the city’s elite families had to give up their historical 
monopoly on mayoral candidacies.   
 Everything in Chilpancingo remains the same, yet it is changing at the same 
time... 
 
78 The final vote was 61.11% for the PRI, 32.33% for the PRD, with the PAN and smaller parties winning a 
handful of votes.   Statistics available from the State Electoral Council, www.ceegro.org.mx.
Chapter 7 
Tijuana: Citizen Democracy? 
 
7.1 The End of an Experiment 
 
Shortly before midnight on August 1, 2004, Jorge Hank Rhon, millionaire casino 
owner, accused smuggler, and suspected assassin, came out on stage in front of his 
supporters to declare victory in the mayoral race in Tijuana, Baja California.1 His claim 
was supported by the official electoral results, which gave him a slim lead of one 
percentage point over his opponent of the ruling National Action Party (PAN).  Hank’s 
followers went wild.  After fifteen years in the opposition, the PRI was finally returning 
to power in Tijuana, Mexico’s largest and most modern city on the northern border.   
To many observers, Hank’s victory seemed startling.  Tijuana had been the 
greatest urban bastion of the center-right PAN for the past decade and a half.  In 1989, it 
had become the first city of its size—soon to surpass a million inhabitants—to throw out 
the long-ruling PRI and hold onto power in subsequent elections.  In the same election, 
Tijuana had led the way in electing a PAN governor, the first opposition governor in 
Mexico since 1929.  National politics certainly influenced the outcome of the election: 
then-President Carlos Salinas de Gortari was looking to boost his country’s image 
internationally and recognizing an opposition victory in a distant border state seemed like 
good politics.2 However, there is no question that Tijuana’s particular characteristics also 
 
1 It should be noted that Hank has never been convicted of any crime and was only charged once with 
smuggling rare animal skins across the border (but later cleared when it was “proved” that they were not 
real).  However, accusations against him have been legion in the city, and two of his bodyguards were 
convicted of killing the city’s most popular journalist, Hector Gato Felix, co-editor of Zeta newspaper.  The 
paper has run a weekly statement since 1988 asking Hank to clarify whether he ordered the assassination. 
2 A few months later Salinas would pursue a free trade agreement with the United States.  At the time of the 
election he was already looking at his options for expanding Mexico’s commercial relationships—hoping 
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played a role in creating a margin of victory for the PAN that President Salinas felt 
obligated to respect. 
 
Figure 7.1: State of Baja California showing Tijuana 
Tijuana’s motto is “the fatherland begins here,” and city residents are proud of 
being the entry point to the nation.  For many in Mexico, however, including the 
country’s political leaders, Tijuana was always been seen as a distant city and one of the 
hardest to control.  Political control was further complicated by rapid demographic and 
economic growth.   Tijuana’s population increased seven times in four decades, leaping 
from 165,000 inhabitants in 1960 to over 1.2 million by 2000.  Although this rapid 
growth led to a dramatic deficit in urban infrastructure, it was fueled by economic 
opportunities in tourism, trade, and the foreign-owned factories, known as maquiladoras,
originally for a trade agreement with Europe. 
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as well as in the construction boom that these activities generated.  As a result, a chronic 
shortage of basic urban services co-existed with a comparatively well-off population that 
felt they had real opportunities to get ahead economically.   
The right-of-center PAN, which advocated individual rights, efficient 
government, and free markets, seemed ideally suited to this individualistic, dynamic city.  
The party consistently won a quarter to a third of the votes in municipal and state 
elections starting in the late 1950s—while it barely registered elsewhere in the country—
and almost certainly won a majority in the municipal elections of 1968 (although these 
were annulled).  So it was hardly surprising that as Mexico took its first steps on the path 
of democratic opening, Tijuana, in 1989, would become the first major city to elect a 
PAN government.   
The new PAN governments set about to destroy the legacy of corporatism 
implanted by the PRI and to create a new model of democratic governance based on 
individual citizenship, civic participation, and transparency.  Carlos Montejo, the first 
PAN Mayor of Tijuana, summed up his party’s commitment to these values in his 
inaugural address: 
 
I understand that true politics should be directly oriented towards 
organizing social activity, but never absorbing it.  Political realities should 
always be at the service of society.  That is why every citizen has the right 
to have his voice heard by the authorities, to express his opinions freely, to 
monitor the actions that the government engages in, and know the real 
results of the government’s performance.3
This was a bold declaration of principles long cherished by PAN leaders: to create an 
administration that was transparent, responsive to citizen concerns, and created clear 
 
3 From the inauguration speech of Mayor Carlos Montejo, 1989.  Cited in the Plan Municipal de 
Desarrollo, 1990-92, Tijuana: Ayuntamiento de Tijuana, 1989, p. 5. 
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channels for their voices to be heard.   
During the fifteen years they governed, the PAN would be given an 
unprecedented opportunity to implement these principles.  This period coincided with the 
country’s gradual process of decentralization.  The municipality slowly gained authority 
and autonomy, using the functions, powers, and resources that were devolved to it and 
increasing its own local resource base though aggressive application of its new fiscal 
powers. Moreover, the PAN governments in Tijuana played an important role in 
accelerating Mexico’s decentralization process: the municipality started the first mayors’ 
association in the country, filed the first municipal lawsuit against the federal government 
over jurisdictional issues, and created the first project for private bank financing of public 
investments.  One of the municipality’s former leaders even sponsored the legislation in 
Congress that created the Ramo 33 transfers to municipal governments.   
 How, then, could the PAN lose an election fifteen years later to one of the city’s 
most controversial and polarizing figures?4 Part of the answer lies in the way the party 
governed during its five terms, a style that earned it great success administratively but 
also failed to build a durable base of support.  The first PAN governments tried to 
implement the lofty principles, which Mayor Montejo had articulated, by building a more 
responsive and transparent local government with institutional channels for citizen’s 
deliberative engagement with policy decisions.  But subsequent municipal governments 
ultimately lacked the will and the incentives to sustain these initiatives and returned to a 
style of democratic governance that showed little consistency with these commitments.  
 
4 Hank, the renegade son of a famous PRI leader and former mayor of Mexico City, was so controversial 
that most of the business leaders, who had traditionally supported the PRI, refused to endorse him.   
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Figure 7.2 Downtown Tijuana 
Source: Government of Baja California, www.bajacalifornia.gob.mx
7.2 Location, Mobility, and Dynamism 
Tijuana began as a small settlement around 1889, in what was then the Northern 
District of the Territory of Baja California. It grew into a major city in the period after 
World War II, when it experienced a sustained period of explosive growth that has made 
it one of Mexico’s ten largest cities today.5 Three processes characterize Tijuana and 
have conditioned its particular political dynamics: location, mobility, and dynamism.  
Tijuana is the city in Mexico most distant from the national capital.  This fact has 
shaped patterns of political control and people’s feelings towards centralization. The state 
 
5 In the 2000 census, it was the sixth largest municipality in the country.  Adding in Mexico City, it would 
be the seventh largest city in the country.  In reality, municipalities four through six (Ciudad 
Nezahualcóytol, Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana) have just over 1.2 millions inhabitants each.  Since all are 
cities with large migrant populations, it is hard to know for certain which is largest. 
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of Baja California was originally part of the Mexican territory of California, but after the 
1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which concluded a war between Mexico and the 
United States, the northern region of California was ceded to the United States and Baja 
California (divided into northern and southern districts) became Mexico’s northern 
territory, under direct tutelage of the federal government, until it achieved independence 
as a sovereign state within the federation in 1953.6 This distance from Mexico City 
shaped political attitudes towards centralization and generated a sense of self-reliance.  
Until the late 1930s, the territory was poorly connected to the center of the country and 
developed something akin to a frontier mentality at the extremity of the country.   
Distance also weakened the ability of federal authorities—and the PRI—to 
establish the kinds of political arrangements that made control possible in other states in 
Mexico.  Although the same corporatist organizations affiliated with the PRI existed in 
Baja California as elsewhere in Mexico, they were often weakly linked to the national 
organizations and maintained a greater degree of autonomy than similar organizations 
elsewhere.  As a territory, Baja California also had no territory-wide elections until it 
became a state, and only briefly had municipal elections from 1915 to 1927.
Consequently, in the crucial period after the Revolution, the PRI did not need to mobilize 
voters regularly, which had become the underlying logic of the party elsewhere.  The PRI 
thus existed and dominated local politics as elsewhere, but its structures were less closely 
tied to the national structures, and its capacity for political mobilization was less tested by 
electoral demands. 
Distance from Mexico City has been complemented by proximity to the United 
 
6 The southern district of Baja California, which remained a federal territory for most of the twentieth 
century, became a separate state, Baja California Sur, in 1975. 
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States, which has produced considerable economic interdependence and allowed for a 
cross-border flow of ideas between the two countries.  The nature of that interdependence 
has changed over time: during Prohibition in the United States, bars and casinos in 
Tijuana became a major attraction; when gambling was outlawed (1935), the city (and 
state) became a free zone exempt from the tariffs imposed elsewhere in Mexico; and 
during World War II, Tijuana became an industrial city that helped supply the allied war 
effort.  In 1965 the Mexican and U.S. governments negotiated an agreement to create 
maquiladoras, foreign-owned industrial plants that would process goods for tariff-free 
export to the United States.7 By 2000, employment in the maquiladora sector in Tijuana 
accounted for approximately 8 percent of all workers in the city; however, many more 
were in related manufacturing.8 In addition, another 8 percent of the economically active 
population of Tijuana works in the United States.  Moreover, many city residents have 
family members on both sides of the border, and the media treat the two sides of the 
border as a single market in many cases.9
Population mobility has also shaped Tijuana, making it one of the fastest growing 
 
7 These companies,  principally U.S.-owned,  wanted to produce goods for the U.S. market using lower 
wage labor in Mexico. However, by the 1990s, many companies from other countries, especially Japan, 
South Korea, and Sweden, also had set up maquiladoras in Baja California in order to produce goods for 
the U.S. market. In principle, this program was designed to create jobs in Mexico to absorb excess labor 
after the termination of the bracero program, a guest-worker program that had brought hundreds of 
thousands of Mexicans to the United States as seasonal workers starting after World War II.  The 
maquiladoras, however, would become an importance source of employment in the city and a magnet for 
migration to the city.  Maquiladoras almost always maintain operations in both Tijuana and San Diego. 
8 Plan Estratégico Tijuana, 2003-2025. 
9 Television stations and most radio stations serve both Tijuana and Spanish-speaking communities in San 
Diego.  Tijuana newspapers cover San Diego as part of local news; and the San Diego Union-Tribune 
covers Tijuana as local news for San Diego residents as well.  Both the Union-Tribune and Los Angeles’ 
two major papers, the Times and La Opinión, are commonly sold at Tijuana newsstands (and far easier and 
less expensive to acquire than Mexico City papers).  When the federal and state governments began to 
harass one of Tijuana’s leading newspapers, Zeta, in the 1980s, the publisher began printing the paper in 
San Diego and importing it to avoid censorship.  See Andrew Selee and Heidy Servin-Baez, “Writing 
Beyond Boundaries,” in Rossana Fuentes-Beraín, Andrew Selee, and Heidy Servin-Baez, eds., Writing 
Beyond Boundaries: Journalism Across the U.S.-Mexico Border, Washington, DC and Mexico City: 
Woodrow Wilson Center and Foreign Affairs en Espanol, 2005.  See also the chapter in the same volume 
by Sandra Dibble, reporter for the San Diego Union-Tribune, “The Stories that Whisper.” 
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cities in the western hemisphere and a “cultural mosaic” of people from all over Mexico 
(as well as other countries).10 The population exploded from 1960 to 2000 (see Figure 
7.3).  Migration has been driven employment opportunities and sometimes the desire to 
cross the border into the United States.  In 2003 slightly over half of Tijuana’s population 
was born outside of the state, and growth continues at a rate of around 4.9 percent 
annually.11 








Tijuana population 1,028 11,271 21,997 65,364 165,690 340,583 461,257 747,381 1,210,820
State population 23,523 48,327 78,907 226,965 520,165 870,421 1,177,886 1,660,855 2,487,367
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Source: Data for 1950-2000 from INEGI, Tijuana, Aguascalientes: INEGI, 2000, based on census 
data from the Population Surveys of the various years.  The data for 1920-1940 are drawn from 
Monografía Tijuana, Tijuana: XVI Ayuntamiento de Tijuana, 2000, based on INEGI census data. 
 
Finally, Tijuana represents a pattern of dynamic economic expansion coupled 
with a deficient provision of basic services to meet the needs of the growing population.  
The city remains primarily dependent on the service sector (52.5%), but with a sizable 
percentage of employment in manufacturing (32.5%) and construction (7.9%) (see Figure 
7.4).  Income has increased noticeably over time, with over half of residents earning three 
times the minimum wage or more (compared to 27% nationally; see Figure 7.5) and 
almost full employment. Few residents of the city are illiterate (2.9% versus 9.5% 
 
10 I borrow the  term “cultural mosaic” from Tonatiuh Guillén, “Presentación,” in Tonatiuh Guillén with 
José Negrete, eds., Baja California, Mexico City: UNAM, 2002, p. 16. 
11 Plan Estratégico Tijuana, 2003-2025, p. 43. 
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nationally).12 
Figure 7.4: Major Economic Activities in Tijuana, 2000 




















Source: INEGI, Censo General de Población y Vivienda, 2000. 
 
Figure 7.5: Income of Workers in Tijuana and Nationally as a Multiple of the Minimum Wage, 2000 
















Source: INEGI, Censo de Población, 1990 and 2000. 
12 Educational statistics from the 2000 census (INEGI, Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda, 2000,
available in INEGI, Sistema Nacional de Base de Datos). 
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However, these figures mask considerable needs in the city.  Although incomes 
are significantly higher than the national average, the cost of living is also significantly 
higher, with most goods imported from the United States.  Moreover, rapid growth has 
generated an important deficit in basic services, including electricity, water, and sewage.  
Federal government statistics show that the coverage of services is in the 80-95 percent 
range (Figure 7.6); however, these statistics often fail take into account many of the 
newest neighborhoods in the city.  There are over 300 neighborhoods in Tijuana without 
legal land titles, most (but not all) of recent creation.  The city’s long-term strategic plan 
lists the coverage of sewage services as only 60 percent, compared to the federal statistic 
of over 80 percent.13 Relatively high opportunities for employment co-exist with high 
living costs and important deficits of residential infrastructure. 
















Note: These figures are the oficial census figures; however, the Tijuana city government’s statistics show a 
much coger coverage of services.  Census figures traditionally undercount neighborhoods where residents 
do not have legal title to the land; and these are precisely the neighborhoods that most often lack services. 
Source: Cuaderno Estadístico Municipal: Tijuana, Aguascalientes: INEGI, 2003.   
 
13 Plan Estratégico Tijuana, 2003-2025, p. 40. 
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7.3 Weak Control, Strong Resistance (1930s-1989) 
 
The state of Baja California was born out of a long-term struggle for autonomy.   
A local movement first developed in 1917, during the national constitutional convention, 
to demand that the territory have a civilian governor who would be a native of the 
territory.14 This movement gained strength in 1931 with the founding of the Committee 
for a Free and Sovereign State of Baja California (Comité Pro-Estado Libre y Soberano 
de Baja California), which also demanded statehood for the territory.  As the population 
and electoral importance of the state grew, the federal government gradually warmed to 
the idea of statehood and in 1952 created the state of Baja California.  In the first state-
wide elections in 1953, Braulio Maldonado, one of the founders of the Committee, was 
elected the first governor of the state of Baja California.  His election set off an 
uninterrupted period of PRI rule that would last until the 1980s.  However, in Baja 
California, the PRI would face its greatest sustained challenge anywhere in the country 
from an opposition and, at times, the party’s grip on power seemed on the verge of 
slipping away. 
The PAN elsewhere in Mexico was a small opposition party, designed to do little 
more than express disagreement with the ruling party; however, in Baja California it 
acquired a real electoral capacity and a relentless desire to win elections.  In 1945, the 
PAN included only 65 people, but it soon spread to all of the major cities of the state, 
including Tijuana.  While the PRI-affiliated Committee fought for statehood, the PAN 
argued for the restoration of municipal autonomy, which had existed starting in 1915 but 
 
14 This paragraph draws on the account of Baja California’s independence struggle in Lawrence Douglas 
Taylor Hansen, “La evolución de las instituciones políticas de Baja California,” in Tonatiuh Guillén with 
José Negrete, Baja California, Mexico City: UNAM, 2002. 
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then been suppressed in 1927.15 Although the PAN barely presented any resistance in the 
first state elections in 1953, the party made strong showings in the 1958 presidential and 
1959 gubernatorial elections, winning over a third of the vote in 1959.16 In 1968, the 
PAN made another strong showing, almost certainly winning the municipal elections in 
both Tijuana and the state capital Mexicali.  In this case, the state congress annulled the 
elections without releasing the results and changed the state constitution so that it could 
appoint a caretaker government.  The PAN entered a difficult period as many of its 
supporters lost faith in the possibilities of change through elections.17 Nonetheless, the 
PAN continued to command an average of a quarter to a third of all votes in city and state 
elections between 1971 and 1986 (Figures 7.7, 7.8).  In 1986, the PAN won its first 
recognized municipal election in the small municipality of Ensenada, just south of 
Tijuana, with a charismatic candidate named Ernesto Ruffo, although the party fared 
poorly in the Tijuana mayor’s race that year.  Ruffo would go on to play an important 
role in state politics three years later. 
 
15 José Negrete Mata, “Historia política y alternancia en Baja California, 1952-1989,” in Guillén with Mata, 
eds., op. cit., p. 58-59 and 59f. 
16 PAN leaders claim they won both elections, including a clean sweep of all Tijuana polling stations in the 
1958 presidential elections (Negrete Mata, “Historia política y alternancia,” pp. 62-3). 
17 Negrete Mata, “Historia política y alternancia,” pp. 64-65. 
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PRI 99.0% 99.0% 58.7% 74.2% 75.5% 65.5% 64.2% 57.2% 61.0% 64.1% 60.7% 32.0%
PAN 41.3% 25.8% 24.5% 32.9% 31.9% 40.3% 25.6% 28.2% 24.1% 45.3%
1954 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989
Source: Compiled from data sources available from the Instituto Estatal Electoral de Baja California, 
www.ieebc.org.mx, consulted March 2005.  Percentage for PRI and PAN only. 
 







PRI 90% 66% 74% 63% 65% 65% 42%
PAN 7% 34% 26% 35% 32% 30% 52%
1953 1959 1965 1971 1997 1983 1989
Source: Compiled from electoral data available from the Instituto Estatal Electoral de Baja California, 
available on the website www.ieebc.org.mx, consulted March 2005.  Percentage for PRI and PAN only. 
 
At the same time, through a variety of social organizations and political parties, 
the Mexican left developed a presence in Tijuana.  In addition to an early role in student 
organizations, the left came to play a decisive role in the 1970s and 1980s in the struggle 
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for land and services for urban migrants.  Many of these migrants had established 
shantytowns throughout the city, especially along the banks of the city’s river.  These 
neighborhoods became particularly politicized as the result of two acts of repression 
against the urban poor that have become an indelible part of the collective memory of the 
city.18 As the city grew in the 1970s, the government and business leaders wanted to 
reclaim much of the land along the river near the downtown area and convert it into a 
zone of tourist and financial services.  In 1973 these plans led to the forced removal of a 
community known as Cartolandia (“land of cardboard”), an area of precarious homes 
made from cardboard boxes and scraps of wood and metal.  In order to pave the way for 
the development of downtown, the state government removed residents of the area at 
gunpoint and relocated them to a distant area.19 The forced removals would continue 
sporadically in other precarious neighborhoods along the river throughout the 1970s. As a 
justification, the government often cited the danger posed by flooding.  In January 1980, 
during an especially strong period of rains, the governor, without warning to city 
residents, gave the order to open the gates of Tijuana’s dam, flooding the remaining 
settlements along the river.  Several people died, and hundreds lost their homes in the 
flood, and whole communities had to move to other areas of the city.20 
The flooding of 1980 galvanized a nascent organization among the city’s poor, 
 
18 During the five years  I lived in Tijuana (1992-97), I frequently heard  references among the city’s poor 
and working class residents to these two incidents. These events have resonance even among some city 
residents who had arrived in the city after the 1970s, since they remain important reference points for what 
the government might do even today to those who live in precarious circumstances in the city. 
19 Officials relocated residents to a newly built neighborhood called Centro Urbano 70-76 where the city 
sold them homes.  In an especially shocking statement, one business leader involved in the project stated to 
the press that “if they do not wish or cannot pay for the houses that the federal government has given them, 
the residents of Centro Urbano 70-76 will have to go live in the hills; we will not allow any more zones of 
misery (cinturones de miseria).”  Cited in José Manuel Valenzuela Arce, Empapados de Sereno: El 
Movimiento Urbano Popular en Baja California (1928-1988), Tijuana: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 
1991, p. 104.   This book also contains an account of the removal of Cartolandia, pp. 99-115. 
20 Valenzuela, Empapados de Sereno., 136-42. 
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CUCUTAC,21 which residents who lived in the communities along the river had started 
in 1978 as a means of defending their homes.  Once forced out, some were relocated by 
the government and others began a series of land invasions around the city to establish 
new communities where residents could begin their lives anew.  The organization would 
come to have a significant presence throughout the city, especially in the neighborhoods 
known as Sánchez Taboada, El Tecolote (in La Gloria), and Florido-Mariano Matamoros. 
After 1989, the leaders of CUCUTAC would become significant political figures as city 
council members and state legislators.  However, throughout the 1980s, the groups fought 
primarily for land titles and the provision of basic services (electricity, water, and 
sewage) for the communities that emerged from the floods, and for new communities that 
sprang up all over the city to accommodate poor migrants from the south.   
Figure 7.9: Low-Income Community in Tijuana 
Source: Photo by Julio Sevla Saavedra, Primer Taller Fotodocumental Tijuana,  
available at http://www.f8.com/FP/TIJUANA/PROJECTS/Julio1.htm. 
 
21 CUCUTAC stands for Comité Unión de Colonos Urbanos de Tijuana, A.C. (Committee Union of Urban 
Residents of Tijuana, Civil Association). 
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As migration to Tijuana continued unabated in the 1980s, the PRI developed an 
army of brokers who helped landless residents invade areas and set up new communities.  
The largest community developed by the PRI, Grupo México (now known as Camino 
Verde), became one of the largest blocs of votes for the party in the city and at one point, 
when the municipal PRI leadership ignored them, negotiated successfully with the 
national party to remove the PRI’s municipal leader.22 The PRI similarly led land 
invasions in Florido-Mariano Matamoros and throughout many other parts of the city.  In 
1984, under a new governor, the state government, in hopes of staunching the wave of 
land invasions, opened a program to grant land to residents who needed it,.  This program 
initially increased the pace of land invasions, as the organizations involved sought to 
strengthen their bargaining position with the government. In the long-term, however, the 
program reduced the demand for land and undercut the growing strength of the 
organizations that sponsored land invasions (including both CUCUTAC and the various 
PRI-affiliated organizations).23 
Tijuana entered the late 1980s with considerable competition among diverse 
approaches to organizing political power.  The PRI remained dominant and ensured its 
continuation in power, although it occasionally had to resort to fraud to win. The official 
party had a strong presence in many of the urban settlements, where their leaders served 
as brokers for regularizing land titles and getting services. PRI also had affiliated unions 
among transportation workers, hotel and restaurant employees, and public sector 
workers.24 However, these organizations only covered a small percentage of the city’s 
 
22 Valenzuela, Empapados de Sereno, p. 163. 
23 Valenzuela, Empapados de Sereno, pp. 83-97, and 203-4. 
24 For a description of the PRI’s corporatist organization in Baja California, see Victor Alejandro Espinoza 
Valle, Alternancia política y gestión pública, Tijuana: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 2000. 
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residents.  Many other city residents were not involved in any form of social or political 
organization.  Unless they lived in a party-organized community, owners of small 
businesses, maquiladora workers, construction workers, and those who worked in the 
United States were outside the PRI’s corporatist system. The PAN had built a base of 
sympathy among these unaffiliated citizens, but the party membership itself was 
relatively small.  CUCUTAC and other smaller organizations on the left were involved in 
organizing the migrant poor.  At the margin of these more politically active 
organizations, the city had also seen the rise of non-governmental organizations, 
primarily devoted to education and social assistance, and often affiliated with the 
Catholic Church or small Protestant churches.25 Tijuana had a large number of citizens 
whose vote was up for grabs for any party that could offer a convincing platform. 
In 1988, the campaign of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the presidential candidate of a 
left-leaning coalition, found echo among these unaffiliated voters as well as among the 
left and disaffected sectors of the PRI.  His organizers in the state included the state’s 
first governor, Braulio Maldonado, who had split from the PRI, Catalino Zavala, the 
leader of CUCUTAC, and many other local political leaders.  Cárdenas won the state 
outright, with 165,497 votes to 157,190 for the PRI’s Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Baja 
California was the only northern state that Cárdenas officially won.  The PAN ended up a 
disappointing third with 101,164 votes (see Figure 7.10).  Within a year, however, the left 
had divided in Baja California, as elsewhere in Mexico, and could not capitalize on the 
 
25 The number of NGOs would grow dramatically in the 1990s to around 186 in 1999.  Many of these 
organizations had links to the Catholic Church, Protestant churches, or U.S.-based NGOs.  A study by 
Benedicto Ruíz in 1999 indicates that 22% of the 186 NGOs in existence at that time had started in the 
1980s or before.  Unlike in other cities in Mexico, however, few of these NGOs were engaged in political 
or policy-oriented activities.  Several policy-oriented NGOs would emerge in the 1990s, including 
organizations (and coalitions) dedicated to human rights, women’s issues, and advocacy around AIDS.  
Benedicto Ruíz, “Las ONGs en Tijuana: Un perfil general,” El Bordo, No. 4, 1999. 
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growing discontent in the state.  With the charismatic mayor of Ensenada, Ernesto Ruffo, 
as their candidate, the PAN trounced the PRI in the state governor’s election.  A largely 
unkown businessman named Carlos Montejo became the first opposition mayor of 
Tijuana, riding Ruffo’s coattails to victory.   






Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (FDN) 39%
Carlos Salinas (PRI) 37%
Manuel Clouthier (PAN) 24%
Percentage of votes
Source: Negrete Mata, “Historia política y alternancia,” p. 83.  Note: Percentage is the percentage of votes 
among the three main candidates; it does not include other candidates or blank votes.  Cárdenas’ total 
includes all votes for him distributed among the political parties that were part of the coalition. 
The PAN was a party that had attracted the votes of unaffiliated citizens, who had 
individually expressed their rejection of the PRI’s corporate style of governance.  It was, 
moreover, a truly liberal party that believed that government should establish a direct 
relationship between individual citizens and the state rather than one mediated by 
corporate organizations.   A perfect match seemed to exist between the city—distant from 
the center of power, mobile, and dynamic— and the party—federalist, liberal, and 
capitalist—that voters had chosen to entrust with their future.  How would the PAN go 
about implementing its new style of democratic governance?  Could it create new 
channels to mediate between citizens and the government and to replace the PRI’s old 
corporatist channels?  And if so, would the municipal government have sufficient 
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authority and autonomy for any innovations to be meaningful? 
 
7.4 How Much Decentralization (1989-2004)? 
The victory of the PAN in Tijuana in 1989 coincided with a period of expansion 
of municipal authority and autonomy in Mexico.  Under five successive mayors elected 
from the PAN (see Table 7.1), The Tijuana government both benefited from this 
expansion and, in the 1990s, led the way in promoting it.   Municipal finances more than 
tripled in real terms times between 1989 and 2004 (Figure 7.11).   
Table 7.1: Mayors of Tijuana, 1989-2004 
Mayor Term Party Margin of victory 
Carlos Montejo Favela 1989-1992 PAN 13.3% 
Hector Osuna Jaime 1992-1995 PAN 2.4% 
Guadalupe Osuna Millán 1995-1998 PAN 12.4% 
Francisco Vega de Lamadrid 1998-2001 PAN 6.9% 
Jesús González Reyes 2001-2004 PAN 9.2% 
Figure 7.11: Real Growth of Tijuana Municipal Finances by Income Source, 1989-2002 







1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Local Revenue Transfers Other Income Financing Unspent Balance
Source: for 1989-2002, INEGI, Sistema Nacional de Base de Datos; for 2003-2004, Ayuntamiento de 
Tijuana, Presupuesto de Ingresos, 2003, 2004, available on the municipal website, www.tijuana.gob.mx,
and INEGI, Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales 2000-2003, Aguascalientes: INEGI, 2004. 
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Increased federal transfers accounted for much of this increase; however, the city 
government took great pains to exercise its agency and expanded its locally-generated 
revenue (Figure 7.12).  The first PAN administration, under Carlos Montejo, updated the 
registry of properties and increased property tax rates;26 the second administration, under 
Hector Osuna Jaime, took out a loan from Banobras, the federal government’s bank for 
subnational governments, to create a comprehensive new system for tracking property 
taxes.27 The third administration, under Guadalupe Osuna Millán, created the first 
detailed city map, which allowed the government to determine property that had not been 
included in the registry.28 Overall, compliance with property taxes significantly 
increased from 47.9% in 1989 to 71.3% by 2003, and property tax revenue skyrocketed 
from under 7 million pesos to over 100 million pesos (see Table 7.2).  At the same time, 
the city found new sources of locally-generated revenue, largely tied to taxation of 
business in the city, so that even while revenue from property taxes increased, other 
forms of locally generated revenue expanded even faster (Figure 7.8). 
 
26 Property tax rates are the exclusive province of the state legislature.  In this case, Montejo used a 
calculation from an autonomous government commission to determine the rates and then took the proposal 
to the state legislature. See Tonatiuh Guillén López and José Negrete Mata, “Tijuana” in Guillén, ed., 
Municipios en transición: actors sociales y nuevas políticas de gobierno, Mexico: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
1995..   
27 For more information on this topic, see Tim Campbell and Travis Katz, “The Politics of Participation in 
Tijuana, Mexico: Inventing a New Style of Governance,” in Harald Fuhr and Campbell, Leadership and 
Innovation in Subnational Government : Case Studies from Latin America, Washington, DC: The World 
Bank, 2004.  Campbell and Katz argue that municipal governments in Mexico had used loans from 
Banobras primarily for public works projects, and this fact may have been the first time a municipal 
government used a Banobras loan to increase its own tax-generation capacity. 
28 Interview, Martín de la Rosa, May 3, 2005. 
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Figure 7.12: Real Growth in Locally Generated Revenue, including Taxes, 1989-2002 




















Local Revenue Total Tax Revenue Property Taxes
Source: Calculations for Property Tax based on data in Table 7.2; for Total Taxes and Locally Generated 
Revenue: for 1989-2002, INEGI, Sistema Nacional de Base de Datos; for 2003-2004, Ayuntamiento de 
Tijuana, Presupuesto de Ingresos, 2003, 2004, available on the municipal website, www.tijuana.gob.mx,
and INEGI, Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales 2000-2003, Aguascalientes: INEGI, 2004. 
Table 7.2: Increase in Property Tax Compliance, 1989-2003 
 Properties 
Properties 




1989 143,285 68,642 47.9 6,778 
1990 172,901 105,558 61.05 19,536 
1991 180,925 114,063 63.04 24,524 
1992 196,378 115,965 59.05 25,381 
1993 206,714 126,714 61.3 31,813 
1994 217,080 134,310 61.87 37,053 
1995 220,561 143,469 65.05 37,776 
1996 228,851 149,938 65.52 44,499 
1997 285,247 157,456 55.13 51,646 
1998 310,000 209,456 67.57 72,533 
1999 n.d. n.d. n.d. 70,220 
2000 n.d n.d. n.d 79,450 
2001 315,291 207,109 65.7 89,449 
2002 324,094 219,945 67.9 99,802 
2003 336,598 240,000 71.3 112,000 
Source: Informe Municipal, 1998, 2000, 2003.  
* In thousands of pesos.  Some years (1998, 2000, 2003) are approximations.   
No data on properties taxed were available for 1999 and 2000. 
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The city also experimented with new approaches to municipal debt.  In addition to 
the Banobras loan to improve tax collection infrastructure, the second PAN 
administration, under Osuna Jaime, created a plan, known as the Plan de Activación 
Urbana (Urban Activation Plan) or PAU, that would have allowed for private financing 
of a comprehensive strategy for major infrastructure development.  It was the first 
attempt in Mexico to combine private loans, state and city funds, contributions from 
business, and a betterment levy to create a major package for modernizing the city’s 
infrastructure.29 The idea of the PAU emerged out of a major flood that devastated the 
city, took over 60 lives, and left whole communities cut off from the city for days.30 It 
also responded to a clear political logic: the PAN government wanted to urbanize the city 
without being dependent on federal government loans that could lead to greater federal 
control over city decisions.31 Ultimately, however, the city was forced to scrap plans for 
the PAU.  The 1994-95 economic crisis had led to a 50% devaluation of the peso against 
the dollar and had sent interest rates skyrocketing. The innovative idea of the PAU set the 
precedent for later, more modest loan packages from private sources.   
Mayor Osuna Jaime also took a step towards ensuring greater municipal 
autonomy when he created a national conference of PAN mayors.  The organization, 
which would eventually become the Asociación de Municipios de México (Mexican 
Association of Municipalities, AMMAC), met for the first time in Tijuana, and Osuna 
 
29 The package included 40 major infrastructure investments, 70% of which were roads with drainage 
systems and 10% of which were flood control.  20% of the payment on the loan for the US$170 million 
project would have come from a betterment levy on residents who lived near the new infrastructure; 40% 
from residents who lived further away; 15% from business taxes; and 25% from state and municipal funds.  
For a detailed description of the project, see Campbell and Katz, “The Politics of Participation in Tijuana, 
Mexico.” 
30 Interview, Hector Osuna Jaime (Mayor, 1992-1995), February 25, 2005; Campbell and Katz, “The 
Politics of Participation.” 
31 Guillén and Negrete, “Tijuana.” 
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became its first president.32 Under Osuna Jaime, the city of Tijuana, alleging that the 
federal Solidarity Program was being used for political purposes in the city, would also 
file the first municipal lawsuit against the federal government.  The Supreme Court 
ultimately found in favor of the federal government, but not before Tijuana had set a 
precedent of municipal autonomy that dozens of other municipalities would copy in 
subsequent years. 
 By the late 1990s, municipal authority and autonomy expanded even further.  The 
creation first of Ramo 26 (1997) and then Ramo 33 (1998- ) led to an dramatic rise of city 
finances under increasingly clear rules.  Political and bureaucratic conflicts between the 
state and city governments sometimes led to financial transfers being delayed, which in 
turn generated problems for the planning and implementation of programs.  Such was the 
case, for example, with public security funds in 2003 and 2004, which were delayed by 
bureaucratic infighting and political disagreements between the PAN-run state 
government and PAN-run city government.33 Nonetheless, the city largely had a 
guaranteed source of external revenues in addition to its own-source income.   
The fact that the city comprised almost half of the state population and over half 
of its economic activity also meant that the city had a certain degree of leverage within 
political and policy debates in the state.  As a result, the Baja California state government 
 
32 Although at first a relatively small association, the AMMAC would grow to become the most influential 
municipal association in Mexico. Gradually weakening its relationship to the PAN and expanding its reach 
to include municipalities governed by other parties, by 2004 AMMAC  would reach over 250 members, 
including mayors of most of the country’s largest cities.  Based on author’s review of current AMMAC 
director Ruben Fernández, March 4, 2005.  The AMMAC’s current membership, available on the 
association’s website at www.ammac.org.mx, accessed March 2005. 
33 In an interview, city council member Arnulfo Guerrero (PAN, 2001-2004), February 24, 2005, for 
example, noted that state funds for public security were transferred in October, which made it impossible 
for the city to deploy these funds fully.  Sometimes delays represent bureaucratic difficulties between the 
state and city governments; in other occasions, they appear to have been the result of political infighting 
between state and municipal officials. 
225
recognized its five municipalities as political interlocutors in major policy decisions and 
created, after 1996, a series of mechanisms to gather formal input from municipalities in 
decisions that effected them. A major reform of the state law on municipalities in 2001, 
which emerged from negotiations among the municipalities and state government, 
explicitly recognized the regulatory authority of municipalities in a range of areas where 
the law was previously unclear. The new law transferred full authority for property 
registry and taxes to the municipalities and allowed for concurrent responsibility in 
regulating transportation and alcoholic beverage sales.34 
7.5 Changes in Democratic Governance (1989-2004) 
 
System of Representation 
 
Competitive Elections 
After the PAN won both the city and state government, Baja California began to 
innovate in electoral reforms.  In 1991, the state created its own registry of voters; in 
1992, its own secure election credential with a photograph; and in 1994, an autonomous 
state electoral institute with citizen counselors elected by the state congress.  These 
measures, designed to eliminate vote fraud, preceded similar actions by the federal 
government, which did not create an updated registry of voters and a voting credential 
 
34 For further discussion of this, see Tonatiuh Guillén López, “Una reforma municipal en dos tiempos: Baja 
California,” in Tonatiuh Guillén and Alicia Ziccardi, eds., Innovación y continuidad del municipio 
mexicano: análisis de la reforma municipal de 13 estados de la República, Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrúa, 
2004. 
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with photograph until 1994 and an autonomous electoral council until 1996.   
Although the PAN won every Tijuana municipal election and Baja California 
state election from 1989 to 2004 (see Figures 7.13, 7.14), the PRI and other parties 
competed actively.  In fact, the PRI won the federal elections of 1994 outright, winning 
every congressional district in the state, and frequently won the other municipal 
governments in the state (though never Tijuana).  In addition, the PAN failed to win a 
majority in the state legislature from 1989 through 1995 and again from 1998 to 2001, so 
the PRI and PRD shared considerable influence in the state legislature.  Electoral reforms 
in 1994 and 1996 actually expanded the representation of minority parties in the state 
legislature and city councils.35 








PAN 52.3% 49.6% 48.7%
PRI 41.7% 41.2% 36.7%
PRD 2.1% 3.2% 4.2%
1989 1995 2001
Source: Elections Results available from the Instituto Estatal Electoral de Baja California, 
www.ieebc.org.mx/estadistica. 
 
35 See Espinoza Valle, La Transición Dificil and Alternancia Política y Gestión Pública for extensive data 
on state congressional elections and seats and an analysis of the major issues dealt with in each period. 
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PRI 32.0% 45.4% 39.4% 38.6% 37.6% 47.5%
PAN 45.3% 47.8% 51.8% 45.5% 46.8% 46.4%
PRD 2.4% 3.9% 3.5% 9.8% 6.0% 3.3%
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
Source: Instituto Estatal Electoral de Baja California, electoral data available on website, 
www.ieebc.org.mx, consulted March 2005. 
 
The Mayor and the Municipal Administration 
 The PAN had long practiced internal democracy and regularly held conventions 
to determine its candidates for election.  The party’s success after 1989 only served to 
strengthen this process.  When Carlos Montejo ran for mayor in 1989, he was unopposed 
at the party’s municipal convention, which barely attracted 200 PAN members.36 
However, once the party was in power, and candidates had a reasonable expectation of 
winning the general election, subsequent internal elections drew considerably more 
interest within the party.  In both 1992 and 1998 the internal elections proved particularly 
competitive.37 
However, the democratic potential of the PAN’s internal selection process was 
 
36 Tania Hernández Vicencio, De la Oposición al Poder: El PAN en Baja California, 1986-2000, Tijuana: 
El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 2001, p. 103. 
37 David A. Shirk, “El PAN, un partido en construcción: lecciones desde Tijuana,” in Tania Hernández 
Vicencio and José Negrete Mata, eds., La Experiencia del PAN: Diez anos de gobierno en Baja California, 
Tijuana: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 2001. 
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severely limited by the small number of citizens who could actually be engaged in the 
selection process.  The PAN has maintained a small membership both in Baja California 
as well as nationally.  Unlike the PRI, which has always conceived of itself as a mass 
party, the PAN has preferred a limited base of members and sympathizers.  During the 
period of PRI dominance, this size difference prevented PRI’s infiltration and cooptation 
of PAN, and it helped maintain a relatively clear set of principles that differentiated the 
PAN from other parties.38 Although PAN membership grew in Tijuana from under 500 
in 1990 to 1,581 in 1999 and finally to around 2,400 in 2004, this number was still less 
than 3 percent of those voters who voted for the PAN in the 2004 municipal elections 
(and a little over 1 percent of all voters).39 The PAN has become increasingly divided 
into party factions, which formed coalitions around particular candidates.40 According to 
Senator and former mayor Hector Osuna Jaime, the PAN’s relatively small size means 
that a successful municipal candidate only needs to convince “around twenty people” in 
order to win an internal election, as long as those twenty are the key leaders of the 
different factions.41 Internal democratic processes within the PAN were an important 
innovation that contributed to a more accountable mayoral administration, but this 
innovation evolved little as the party itself grew and began to win elections. 
When Carlos Montejo became mayor in 1989, he created a cabinet that included 
members of the PRI and the PAN, as well as a number of non-partisan professionals.  
 
38 See Yemile Mizrahi, From Martyrdom to Power: The Partido Acción Nacional in Mexico, South Bend, 
Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 2003. 
39 Data on party membership from: for 1990, Shirk, “El PAN, un partido en construcción”; for 1999, 
Hernández Vicencio, De la Oposición al Poder, p. 113; for 2004, the article “Estiman depurar a 960 
panistas,” Frontera, February 1, 2005, p. 1.  Ironically, the PAN was planning to reduce its membership up 
to 40% as a response to losing the municipal election in 2004. 
40 See Hernández Vicencio, De la Oposición al Poder. 
41 Interview, Hector Osuna Jaime, February 25, 2005. 
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This plural composition of the cabinet was repeated at the state level as well.42 This 
pluralism reflected both the PAN’s need to incorporate PRI members with administrative 
experience and the willingness of many sectors of the left to embrace an opposition 
government run by the PAN.43 Although the second PAN administration, of Hector 
Osuna Jaime (1992-95), was more partisan, it largely drew on young PAN members and 
sympathizers who were chosen for their work ethic and commitment.44 The third 
administration, of Guadalupe Osuna Millán (1995-98), was especially plural.  Osuna 
Millán himself had been a state employee, who only joined the PAN in 1994 when he ran 
for election as a federal congressman; as a result, he turned to both PAN members and 
leading professionals outside the party to create his team.45 The plural composition of 
municipal administrations had a parallel in the state administrations under Governors 
Ernesto Ruffo (1989-1995) and Hector Terán (1995-98).  However, under the final two 
PAN administrations of Francisco de la Vega (1998-2001) and Jesús González Reyes 
(2001-2004), PAN loyalty dominated over professional qualifications as party members 
demanded greater presence in the municipal administration.  After 1998, both the state 
and municipal governments gradually excluded from the upper ranks of government 
those who were not members of the party.46 
42 Interview, Antonio Cano, February 23, 2005. 
43 As former CUCUTAC leader Catalino Zavala noted, “The anti-Priism of the PAN combined well with 
the left’s struggle.” Interview, Catalino Zavala, April 23, 2005. 
44 Interviews, Hector Osuna Jaime, February 25, 2005 and Zeferino Sánchez, February 24, 2005. 
45 Among the most noted non-PANistas were Martín de la Rosa, a scholar and former Jesuit priest, who 
was hired in a competitive selection process as director of the Municipal Planning Council (Copladem), and 
Leonardo Saravia, a former left-wing organizer, hired to run the Municipal Institute of Culture, both high-
profile positions within the administration. Interviews with Guadalupe Osuna Millán, April 21, 2005, and 
Martín de la Rosa, May 3, 2005. 
46 Hernández Vicencio, De la Oposición al Poder, pp. 134-44. 
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City Council  
After 1989, the City Council gained a much higher profile than it had had 
previously.  The first PAN-dominated council passed a law that regulated the council’s 
operations, which for the first time brought a degree of transparency to its operations.  
Since 1993 (when data became available) the council has met regularly for 15 to 31 times 
a year and, from 1996 to 2004, passed an average of 132 resolutions per year (see Table 
7.3).  The commissions of the council generally have three to five members and several 
of them are quite active.  This activity is particularly true of the Committee on 
Governance, which handled 70% of all resolutions during the last PAN government 
(2001-2004), and the Budget Committee (Hacienda), which handled all issues regarding 
finances.47 Meetings were generally not open, although rules required them to be, nor 
were they announced ahead of time.  Nonetheless, the city council started filming most of 
its sessions and putting these on the city’s website so that citizens could watch them after 
the fact.48 In a 2002 reform, the council also approved a process for “citizen initiatives,” 
which allowed citizens to present resolutions directly to the city council for their 
consideration,49 
Table 7.3: City Council Meetings and Resolutions, 1993-2004 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Council meetings 30 27 15 26 21 23 22 17 15 31 25 25
Resolutions    103 176 147 84 95 63 197 165 165
% not unanimous     12% 12% 7% 14% 3% 3% 6% 9% 9%
Note: No data on number of council resolutions for 1992-1995.  The percentage reflects the percentage of 
resolutions that were passed by majority vote rather than by consensus. 
Source: Own compilation, based on data in the annual Mayor’s reports (Informe Municipal, 1993-2004). 
47 Interviews with former city council members Arnulfo Guerrero (PAN, 2001-2004), February 24, 2005; 
Juanita Pérez (PRI, 1999-2001), February 25, 2005; and José Roberto Dávalos (PRD, 2001-2004), April 1, 
as well as Arnulfo Guerrero, “El Cabildo,” unpublished manuscript. 
48 Interview, Arnulfo Guerrero (PAN, 2001-2004); Guerrero, “El Cabildo”; and Reglamento de Cabildo.
49 Reglamento de Participación Ciudadana; Interview, Arnulfo Guerero. 
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A split within the PAN’s council members during the first PAN administration 
(1989-1992) heightened the visibility of the council.50 Although the mayor eventually 
succeeded in governing by reaching a deal with members of a third party, the dispute 
gave new life—and considerable publicity—to what had been a previously irrelevant 
body.  A similar split among PAN council members during the fourth administration 
allowed opposition parties to form alliances with dissident PAN members.  “We stopped 
a lot of things of the PAN government,” noted PRI council member Juanita Pérez.  
However, the ability to block the mayor’s proposals did not necessarily translate into the 
ability for the opposition to create successful resolutions without the mayor’s support.51 
Despite these splits, a review of council resolutions from 1996 on (Table 7.3, 
above) suggests that most resolutions were passed by consensus, with slightly less 
unanimity in 1996-1997 and 1999.  In the case of two of the major political initiatives of 
PAN, the city council hardly played a role at all.  In raising property taxes in 1990, 
Montejo took his case directly to the state congress.  In launching the PAU in 1994, 
Osuna Jaime got the council to approve the initiative with little debate; only one PRI 
representative was a member of the council at the time.  To generate legitimacy for the 
PAU initiative and to compensate for the lack of space for real debate in the council the 
mayor scheduled a referendum on the proposal.52 
The city council structure inherited from the PRI in 1989 allowed for only three 
council members of minority parties with eleven members of the majority party including 
 
50 A faction of six PAN council members (out of thirteen) disagreed on most major policy issues with the 
mayor.  This faction, drawn from more traditionally members of the party, felt that the mayor was not 
following the party’s principles sufficiently.  Guillén and Negrete trace this development in detail in 
“Tijuana.”  See also Shirk, “El PAN, un partido en construcción.” 
51 Interview, Juanita Pérez, former city council member (PRI 1999-2002). 
52 The PAU was approved in a referendum in late 1994; however, only 7% of registered voters participated.  
On both the PAU and the process for raising the property tax, see Tonatiuh Guillén and José Negrete Mata, 
“Tijuana.” 
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the mayor.  Since the PAN had won the election with only 45.3% of the vote, this meant 
an overrepresentation of the PAN by 33.2% and an underrepresentation of the PRI by 
34.9%.  However, in 1994 the state government passed a major electoral reform which 
expanded the number of city council seats to 17, assigning ten to the largest party 
(including the only síndico) and seven to minority parties.  This change helped minimize 
the degree of under/overrepresentation of different parties within the council, although it 
continued to ensure a majority for the mayor regardless of the extent of the winning 
party’s support (Table 7.4).  Candidates for city council were still elected on party lists as 
well, so that citizens did not vote directly for them.  A state reform to allow almost half of 
city council members to be elected directly in district elections was negotiated between 
the state and municipal governments in 2000-2001, but eventually discarded because of 
opposition from the mayors.53 Starting in 1995, the PAN began to elect its list of city 
council members through internal elections (as noted above), which ensured a greater 
degree of inclusion of different party factions.54 However, since the party members who 
could participate in these decisions represented little more than 1% of those who voted in 
the general elections, this arrangement only ensured the inclusion of different party 
factions rather than creating a mechanism for citizens to choose council members, let 
alone deliberate regularly with them. 
 
53 The reform was scrapped in part because the mayors saw little reason to give up on party control over the 
selection process for council members.  Guillén, Una reforma municipal en dos tiempos.” 
54 Guillén, “Gobernabilidad y gestión local en México,” p. 80. 
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1989-92 11 1 PRI 
2 PARM 
45.3%-32.0% +33.2% -34.9% 
1992-95 10 1 PRI 
1 PRD 
47.8%-45.4% +35.5% -37.1% 
1995-98 10 6 PRI 
1 PRD 
51.8%-39.4% +7.0% -4.1% 
1998-2001 10 5 PRI 
1 PRD 
45.5%-38.6% +17.0 -6.35% 
2001-04 10 5 PRI 
1 PRD 
1 PT 
46.8%-37.6% +12.0% -8.2% 
Source: Own calculations with data based on Guillén, “Gobernabilidad y gestión local en México,” p. 78, 
for 1989-1998; for 1998-2001, email communication with Tonatiuh Guillén, Professor at El Colegio de la 
Frontera Norte, December 19, 2005; and webpage of the municipality (www.tijuana.gob.mx) for 2001-4. 
* Including the Sindicate, but excluding the mayor, who has a vote in city council meetings and was a 
member of the PAN in each administration. 
 
Overall, after 1989 the city council became far more inclusive and achieved a 
much higher profile and scope of action.  However, on balance, the council remained 
trapped in the structural constraint of the party list which reduced significantly the degree 
to which citizens had any real connection to their elected representatives.  Citizens 
continued voting for the mayoral candidate they preferred, and this vote determined the 
number of council members each party would be assigned.  While city council 
compositions more closely resembled voters’ partisan preferences, it still 
underrepresented the second largest party significantly, and city council members 




The advent of the PAN government led to a new openness on the part of the city 
administration.  The mayor’s annual report (Informe Municipal) became a genuine 
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reporting of key municipal data.  After 1992, these reports actually became quite detailed 
with extensive budgetary data, investment figures, and lists of activities.  During the third 
administration, under Osuna Millán (1996-98), the mayor’s final report even had a 
scorecard that compared the goals set out in the Municipal Development Plan against the 
administration’s actual accomplishments, including—in great detail—both successes and 
failures.  This administration also published a series of bulletins, Tijuana Hoy, which 
dealt with a range of municipal services and current events, and distributed them widely 
throughout the city.55 
The city council continued to meet behind closed doors, with no prior 
announcement of meetings, which sharply limited citizens’ ability to monitor their local 
legislature and contribute to public deliberation.  However, the council eventually began 
videotaping its sessions and now posts these on the municipal website so that citizens 
could follow council proceedings.  This innovation was an imperfect compromise, since 
not all citizens had ready access to the internet, especially the poorest, but it was a step in 
the direction of greater transparency.  However, the structure of the council contained a 
flaw that made it particularly hard to pursue malfeasance by public officials.  The síndico,
a member of the council who is empowered to investigate acts of corruption by municipal 
officials, is, by state law, a member of the majority party.56 
One of the most important innovations that the PAN-affiliated governments 
carried out was the creation in 1991 of a state ombudsman, known as the Ombudsman for 
Human Rights and Citizen Protection (Procurador de Derechos Humanos y Protección 
 
55 Informe Municipal, 1998; Tijuana Hoy, issues 1 through 7. 
56 The Síndico is a member of the city council empowered to monitor government expenditures and pursue 
legal actions.  Former City Council Member Juanita Pérez (PRI, 1999-2001) emphasized this point in an 
interview, February 25, 2005,   
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Ciudadana, PDH).  Although this reform was on the state level, it had a significant 
impact in the municipal arena since the ombudsman was empowered to denounce acts of 
corruption by both state and municipal officials.57 Moreover, the PDH had its main 
office in Tijuana.  Baja California was only the second state in the country, after 
Aguascalientes, to create an autonomous human rights office, and the reform preceded 
the creation of a federal ombudsman a year later.58 The first three ombudsmen selected 
(who covered the period 1991-2001) were all noted human rights advocates who were 
members of the PRD, the state’s third party, and they established a reputation for 
weeding out corruption and malfeasance.59 The fourth ombudsman selected (2001-2004) 
was a PAN member, however, and the office appears to have lost public credibility  and 
moral authority as a result of the perceived association with the governing party.60 
Despite impressive gains in transparency under the first PAN administrations, 
several troubling signs began to emerge in the new millennium.  While Baja California 
had led the country in creating a human rights office, the state trailed the rest of the 
country in passing a law that would give citizens access to government documents on 
demand.  Although a federal transparency law had taken effect in 2002 and a majority of 
 
57 The law, approved in 1991, declares that the ombudsman is empowered “to look out for the legality of 
actions by the public administration, promote justice, and ensure the respect for human rights…”  He/she 
would not be able to prosecute corruption, but any denouncements by the ombudsman had to be answered 
in writing by the accused authority and could be channeled to the attorney general’s office.  Ley sobre la 
Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos y Protección Ciudadana de Baja California, approved March 10, 
1991, available on the website of the Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas of UNAM, 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/leg/, consulted March 19, 2005. 
58 Interview, José Luis Pérez Canchola, March 4, 2005. 
59 The most notable among the three was, without doubt, the first, José Luis Pérez Canchola, who would go 
on to be vice president of the National Academy of Human Rights.   
60 Under existing law, the governor sends a trio of candidates to the state legislature, which designates the 
ombudsman.  According to Catalino Zavala, who was a state legislator (PRD) at the time of the decision, 
the governor had sought to impose a close associate who had been rector of the state  university system  as 
the ombudsman in 2001.  The PRI, PRD, and dissident PAN legislators were afraid that this candidate 
would use the office to protect the governor, so they chose a different candidate, who was a member of the 
PAN but from a party faction opposed to the governor.  Interview, Catalino Zavala, February 24, 2005.   
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states had done the same by 2004, Baja California had no such provisions.  The state 
congress passed a transparency bill in 2004, but the governor refused to sign it.61 
Political leaders interviewed noted that the governor was opposed to the law because it 
would limit his margin of discretion over the budget.  They also observed that the press in 
the state was unwilling to take a more vocal stance on this issue because the media 
companies depended on the PAN-affiliated state and municipal governments for 
advertising revenues.  
The municipal government made some steps towards reporting information on its 
website, including major contracts, salaries of top officials, and annual budgets.  
Nonetheless, the salaries did not include bonuses (which are often the major form of 
compensation of top level employees), and the annual budgets lacked detail (though some 
detail appeared in the annual mayor’s report).  Indeed, there were rampant rumors of 
corruption in the municipal government, largely due to a lack of controls and reporting on 
construction contracts.  It is hard to know to what extent these rumors were true, but as 
one analyst noted, “even if the stories are only true in part, it’s bad.”62 One former PRD 
council member noted that much of the alleged corruption in the municipal 
administration was tied to the granting of permits for the construction of condominium 
complexes for lower and middle income families.  He noted that few controls exist to 
ensure the approval of developments and the licensing processes involved are carried out 
transparently, a concern echoed by an independent civic organization.63 In a symbolic 
 
61 “Revisarán la Ley de Acceso,” Frontera, October 13, 2004, p. 1; and interviews with political leaders 
Catalina Zavala, February 24, 2005; Gastón Luken, February 25, 2005; and Askan Lutheroth, February 23, 
2005. 
62 Interview, Gaston Luken, former president of the State Electoral Institute and member of Tijuana 
Trabaja. 
63 Interviews with José Roberto Davalos, city council member (PRD, 2001-2004), and Hector Lutheroth, 
president of Consejo Ciudadano para la Transparencia. 
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act, one that underscored the degree to which the public came to perceive the PAN 
governments in Tijuana as corrupt, the new PRI-dominated city council in December 
2004 made its first action the approval of a municipal transparency law.64 
Opportunities for Participation 
 
After 1989, PAN state and municipal officials held high hopes for reconstructing 
the channels of communication with citizens so as to treat them as individual citizens 
rather than as clients of corporate organizations.  Government officials actively sought to 
break down the traditional channels of mediation, which had privileged PRI-affiliated 
unions and community associations.  The result of this effort was mixed, however.  As 
former Governor Ernesto Ruffo Appel observes: 
When we arrived in the state government in 1989, we expected that a 
repressed society would take control of its destiny, that it would take the 
initiative, propose actions, use its new government.  We felt the obligation 
to make the government function, attending to the needs; the responsibility 
of living up to our promise.  But we also felt despair at not seeing an 
active citizenry who would fight for their rights.  Citizen participation was 
more a slogan than a reality.65 
The government had a partial success with the taxi unions, which had always 
monopolized the right to ask for permits on behalf of their members. The PAN state 
government changed the regulations to require drivers to apply individually for their 
permits instead of through their union representative.  Similarly, the governor largely 
refused to deal with organizations—especially those affiliated with the PRI—
 
64 Reglamento Municipal de Transparencia, approved December 2004, available on the city’s website, 
www.tijuana.gob.mx.
65 Ernesto Ruffo Appel, “EL PAN en Baja California: su relación con la sociedad,” in Vicencio and 
Negrete, eds., La Experiencia del PAN. 
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representing residents who wanted land titles.66 The state government accelerated the 
granting of land titles at modest prices to families who needed it and jailed leaders who 
promoted land invasions.67 These actions largely succeeded in undercutting the strength 
of both the PRI-affiliated community organizations and independent groups like 
CUCUTAC. 
The city government followed in the footsteps of the state government in these 
efforts, refusing to deal, whenever possible, with the corporate organizations.  In 
addition, the city sought to reconstruct its relationship with citizens by creating new 
channels for communication, dialogue, and influence that were more democratic and 
eliminated the influence of intermediaries.  These efforts included elected committees in 
each neighborhood of the city. In addition, the city created a participatory planning 
process that included elected citizen committees in thirteen sectors of the city and several 
issue-oriented citizen committees, which would help city officials set priorities for public 
action.  Finally, the city government created a joint business-government roundtable to 
address major public/private investment opportunities.  Let us consider each in turn.   
 
Neighborhood Committees  
The first PAN administration, under Montejo (1989-1992), created a system for 
recognizing electing neighborhood committees.  Martín de la Rosa, who served as deputy 
director of the municipality’s social participation department at the time, notes that the 
 
66 The notable exception, especially in the early years, was CUCUTAC, since its leader, Catalino Zavala, 
had become a PRD state legislator and had formed a tacit coalition with the PAN to give the governor a 
majority in Congress.  3248410… 
67 On the PAN-government’s attempts to end corporatist intermediation, see Victor Alejandro Espinoza 
Valle, Alternanacia Política y Gestión Pública: El Partido Acción Nacional en el Gobierno de Baja 
California, Mexico City and Tijuana: Plaza y Valdés and El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 2000, especially 
chapters 6 and 7; and Victor Alejandro Espinoza, La Transición Dificil: Baja California 1995-2001, 
Tijuana: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 2003. 
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city government decided to recognize these committees “with general criteria but no legal 
framework.”  Whenever people from a neighborhood brought a demand to the city, they 
would go to the neighborhood, hold an election for a neighborhood committee in the 
presence of city authorities, and then began working with them around the demand.  The 
only requirements were that the members of the committee be residents in the 
neighborhood and that they be elected in a public assembly that had been announced 
ahead of time throughout the neighborhood.  According to de la Rosa, a former Jesuit 
priest who had created a self-help movement in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl in the 1970s and 
a housing cooperative in Tijuana in the 1980s, this method was based on the concept of 
autogestión, self-determination. The approach served to undercut the power of 
intermediaries from political parties who had served as brokers for neighborhood 
demands and to establish a direct relationship to citizens who lived in the neighborhood.68 
During the first administration, 157 neighborhood committees were created and the city 
held the first congress of social organizations to bring these groups together.69 
The recognition of neighborhood committees—and the requirement that 
neighborhood demands be channeled through a publicly elected committee—became a 
hallmark of the PAN governments.  The efforts intensified under the succeeding 
administrations and by 2004 the city had registered an impressive total of more than 350 
committees.70 It was not until the fifth PAN administration that the city council would 
finally pass a law establishing the legal framework for neighborhood committees, but the 
 
68 Interview, Martín de la Rosa Medellín. 
69 Informe Municipal, 1992, and Interview, Martin de la Rosa. 
70 This estimate is based on my review of the committees in the database of Comités de Vecinos as of 
November 2004. 
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procedure became well-established long before them.71 Interviews with twelve leaders of 
neighborhood committees in two districts of the city (Table 7.4) and with municipal 
officials indicated that the practice of recognizing neighborhood committees had, in fact, 
become standard practice.72 Many of the committees had formed when neighborhood 
leaders went to the city asking for resolution of specific demands and the city had 
requested that a neighborhood election be held before proceeding.  In other cases, already 
existing community groups had applied to be recognized as neighborhood committees to 
comply with the government’s requirements.73 In contrast to Chilpancingo, where the 
PRI designated its leaders in the community, I found no cases where the municipal 
government actually created its own committees or designated the leaders.  . 
 








La Gloria 6 3/2/1 2 1 
Florido-Mariano 
Matamoros 
6 3/2/1 3 1 
Note: Interviews conducted February 12 through March 20, 2005.  In addition, interviews on citizen 
participation were conducted with three former Copladem counselors (two from the 1999-2002 period, one 
from the 1996-98 period); the municipal Coordinator of Citizen Participation (2001-2004); the Technical 
Secretary of Copladem (1999-2004) and a former Director of Copladem (1996-98); and with three city 
council members.  Among the current Copladem citizen councilors, three of the interviewees were close to 
the PAN, two to the PRD/Convergencia, and one to the PRI. 
 
71 Ayuntamiento de Tijuana, Reglamento de Participación Ciudadana. 
72 Tijuana has traditionally been divided into six administrative divisions, known as delegations, each with 
a representative, known as the delegado, who represents the municipal government.  Since several of these 
divisions have grown considerably, they have been further divided into districts, known as 
subdelegaciones, each with a subdelegado who reports to the delegation.  As of 2004, there were 14 
districts in the city.  We conducted interviews in two districts, El Florido and La Gloria, as well as with two 
former Subdelegados of these districts, the municipal Coordinator of Citizen Participation, and the 
Technical Secretary of the Municipal Planning Council (Copladem, see below), who had served in the last 
PAN administration (2001-2004).  It should be noted that these interviews were conducted shortly after the 
last PAN administration had left power and the PRI administration had begun.  Technically the 
neighborhood committees were still functioning, but their future remained uncertain.  The interviews 
focused only on the period of the PAN governments. 
73Four committees had existed prior to 1989 and decided to become official neighborhood committees to 
facilitate their dealings with the municipality.  Eight others were formed when citizens approached the 
municipality asking for services (usually the subdelegado, but occasionally other government agencies) and 
were asked to first form a committee. Based on the interviews. 
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Many of the committees were established during the second PAN administration 
of Hector Osuna Jaime (1992-1995), who instituted an ambitious community investments 
program called “Manos a la Obra” (“Hands to Work”).  Manos a la Obra provided funds 
to organized citizen groups to make improvements to their neighborhoods in return for a 
community contribution, usually in labor. This project was not a novel idea; in fact, it 
was similar to the federal Solidarity Program discussed in Chapter 5.  Nonetheless, the 
program substantially redefined the municipality’s relationship to citizens by creating a 
sense of co-responsibility for public investments.74 The program also created a powerful 
incentive for citizens to form neighborhood committees so that they could apply for 
program funds.  The program only lasted two years (1994-95), but it set an important 
precedent of government-citizen collaboration.  Indeed, the government would create a 
separate program for community infrastructure after 1995 which it then channeled 
through a participatory planning structure (see next section).  Many of the committees 
formed to apply for Manos a la Obra funds disappeared once funding ended; however, 
many others survived and became ongoing community institutions.  
By 2004, neighborhood committees appeared to be primarily involved in 
obtaining land titles and basic services for their neighborhoods (pavement, electricity, 
water, sewage) and neighborhood improvements (schools, parks, community centers). A 
recent development has been the emergence of neighborhood committees in housing 
developments, particularly oriented towards dealing with problems with development 
 
74 Mayor Osuna Jaime developed the program to regain citizens confidence following the 1994 federal 
elections, in which the PAN lost all three federal congressional districts in the city.  According to Mayor 
Osuna Jaime, he realized that he had to do something to win people’s confidence again.  The goal, he 
believed, was to ensure “that people are satisfied with us,” since the elections seemed to suggest that they 
were not.  Interview, former mayor Hector Osuna Jaime (1992-95), February 25, 2005. 
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companies that did not complete the housing as promised.75 Some committees had long 
histories and solid organizational structures (especially those that began by getting land 
titles or basic services in the 1970s and 1980s); others were created recently to deal with 
a specific set of demands.  Almost all had significant leadership turnover (all but one of 
the leaders had started their term after 2001).  A few committees seemed to be internally 
democratic and based on broad-based dialogue within the community about priorities; 
many were based around a single leader who occasionally called a meeting to get support 
his or her initiatives.76 There appeared to be little other form of organization in the 
neighborhoods besides the committees, although some reported having had party 
organizations involved in the neighborhood in the past.77 In neighborhood committee 
elections, a fifth to a third of the families in each neighborhood turned out to vote, which 
suggests that the committees enjoyed a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of community 
residents, but did not generate massive enthusiasm.78 
Unlike Chilpancingo, there appeared to be little partisan involvement in the 
neighborhood committees in Tijuana.  Several committees reported having had party 
involvement in the past—with the PRI, PAN, or PRD—but only four of twelve appeared 
 
75 Interviews with neighborhood committee leaders.  We interviewed two leaders of committees in housing 
developments, who had demands around incomplete housing (and the need for a school in one case); María 
de los Angeles Castillo, Coordinator of Neighborhood Committees for the municipality (2001-2004), also 
observed the emergence of new committees in housing developments.  Interview, Castillo, February 24, 
2005. 
76 I have limited information on the internal workings of the committees, since the data are based on 
interviews with committee leaders.  However, in interviews, most of the leaders gave important clues as to 
whether they saw themselves as part of a community effort or were the ones who got things done in the 
neighborhood. 
77 The exceptions were the existence of a PAN committee in Florido; the presence of a PRI leader helping 
the neighborhood get land titles in another neighborhood (though the residents had later expelled him and 
started their own independent committee); and the resurgence of PRI committees in two neighborhoods 
after the victory of the PRI in the August 2004 municipal elections. 
78 One larger community reported only 5% turnout; another smaller neighborhood reported that almost 
every family participated.  It should be noted that these numbers are approximations based on the memory 
of the leader of the organizations; however, they appear to represent a significant, though not 
overwhelming, interest in the committees. 
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to have ongoing links to party leaders and these links were mostly tenuous.79 Similarly, 
no political or municipal officials interviewed saw the committees as an important source 
of political mobilization. 
The non-partisanship of the neighborhood committees would seem to be a 
positive sign of the construction of true citizen institutions at the margin of partisan 
politics.  However, the absence of partisan involvement also contributed to municipal 
leaders’ general indifference towards the committees.  There were no organic channels 
for committees to get a hearing with public officials.  Those who were most successful 
observed that they often achieved things through “sympathy, relationships, or friendship” 
with particular officials or through stubborn determination.  As one committee president 
noted, “I can say that they paid attention to us, but because of exhaustion, because 
sometimes we lasted three or four hours waiting.”80 Other leaders reported that they felt 
the municipality always wanted something in return from the neighborhood committees, 
usually small favors like attending public events sponsored by the government.  As one 
neighborhood committee leader noted, “The Delegation [city administrative office] gives 
support, but it also asks for our support…We respect the government’s decisions since 
we always have to go ask them for things.”81 In one unusual case a municipal official 
asked a committee to help him conduct an electoral poll prior to an election in exchange 
for help on a project; however, most government requests to neighborhood groups 
 
79 Two of twelve leaders expressed that they were personally close to the PAN and had some involvement 
in party politics, as did one former leader who is a PAN member (but no longer president of the 
committee); one past leader had gone on to become a municipal official (Subdelegada); another committee 
had been close to the PRI, then switched to the PAN, then felt abandoned by both. Yet another was led by a 
leader of CUCUTAC who had once served briefly as a PRD city council member (though CUCUTAC was 
now moving from PRD to Convergencia, a small party, due to disputes within the PRD). The rest seemed 
to lack close ties to any party. 
80 Interview with committee president, La Gloria, February 19, 2005. 
81 Interview with a committee member, El Florido, February 14, 2005. 
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seemed to be less politically charged. 
 Overall, the municipality succeeded, it appears, in undercutting the influence of 
intermediaries and corporate organizations in representing community residents and 
succeeded in creating a more democratic form of neighborhood organization.  However, 
it failed, over time, to create the mechanisms to allow these organizations to relate to the 
municipality through clear, consistent, institutional channels.  In the absence of these 
channels, the lack of partisan influence in the committees may have been a mixed 
blessing.  On one hand, the committees were largely saved from insertion into partisan 
politics and were not directly part of clientelistic networks as other organizations in 
Tijuana in the past.  However, the lack of interest that the political parties showed in 
these committees also translated into a lack of interest by municipal authorities in their 
demands.  The committees were institutional, democratic, and mostly transparent, but 
they were also largely abandoned by municipal authorities and the parties.  Despite the 
glowing assertion of one municipal official that “The neighborhood committee is strength 
for the city government, for everything,”82 the committees seemed to have a fairly low 
profile within the political calculations of most municipal officials and city council 
members.  
The committees suffered from one more serious deficiency that made it even 
harder to overcome their lack of political influence.  No mechanisms existed, inside or 
outside the government, to link the various committees among themselves.  The large 
citywide organizations like CUCUTAC had once played this role by bringing together 
different neighborhoods to discuss common challenges and scale up their demands.  By 
the early 1990s, no such overarching organizations existed and the municipal government 
 
82 Interview, Ofelia Panda, Subdelegada of La Gloria (2003-2004), February 26, 2005.   
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provided no consistent forum that allowed contact among neighborhood committees.83 
The committees thus remained isolated not only from the political system but also from 
each other. On balance, the creation of the neighborhood committees appears to have 
been a step towards a more democratic relationship between citizens and the government, 
but a step that lacked the necessary complementary steps for it to be fully functional. 
 
The Municipal Planning Council (Compladem) 
 Under the 1983 national planning law reform, municipalities were asked to create 
a Municipal Planning Council (Copladem or Coplademun) that would bring together 
organized social sectors and government officials to design the municipal development 
plan every three years.  Under the PRI administrations of 1983-86 and 1986-89, the 
Copladem in Tijuana appears to have been a mere formality without any substantive 
existence.84 Under the first PAN administration of Montejo (1989-92), the Copladem 
office actually existed, with two staff, and was responsible for holding a series of public 
forums to get citizen input into the municipal development plan.  However, the office did 
little else during this administration.85 The second mayor of the PAN, Hector Osuna 
Jaime (1992-95), expanded role of the Copladem considerably, however, so that it would 
serve as a space for dialogue among organized social sectors and the municipal 
government, as well as design the municipal development plan.86 
This newly redesigned Copladem, with a staff of thirteen, included thirty 
 
83 The municipality did hold occasional fora of neighborhood committees, starting in 1992, but these were 
rare and ad hoc.  There was no ongoing forum for contact among committees. 
84 Tonatiuh Guillén, “Gobernabilidad y Gestión Local en México: El Caso de Tijuana, B.C., 1989-1997,” in 
Martha Schteingart and Emilio Duhau, eds., Transición política y democracia municipal en México y 
Colombia, Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrúa, 2001, pp. 86-7. 
85 Tonatiuh Guillén, “Gobernabilidad y Gestión Local en México,” pp. 89-92. 
86 This was the first council resolution passed under the new administration.  Plan Municipal de Desarrollo, 
1993-1995. 
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members drawn from municipal, state, and federal officials, business organizations, 
professional associations, universities, and other organized groups.  The council had 
twelve subcommittees based around key issues areas that brought together representatives 
of social organizations.87 The Copladem became a highly visible body during Osuna 
Jaime’s administration because it was the center of a number of disputes between social 
organizations and the city government.  In many cases, these disputes responded to a 
logic of political confrontation between the PRI and the PAN.  Locked out of power in 
the city council, where the PRI only had one council member, this party used its 
sympathizers within the Copladem to attack the municipal administration.  However, not 
all of the confrontations responded to partisan differences; in many cases, there were 
legitimate disagreements between citizen members and the administration around 
priorities for the public administration.88 The Copladem had no decision-making 
authority at this time, but it became an important—and highly visible—forum for public 
debate of municipal policy and a meeting space between the city government, civic 
organizations, and opposition political parties.89 
Under the third PAN administration of Guadalupe Osuna Millán (1995-98), the 
Copladem’s structure and functions were greatly expanded and it became a even more 
vital space for dialogue among citizens, the city council, and municipal officials.  
Redesigned under a resolution approved by the city council in 1995, the Copladem was 
designed to have both a set of citizen counselors, elected in the city’s districts, and a 
 
87 Ayuntamiento de Tijuana, Informe del Presidente Municipal 1993.
88 Tonatiuh Guillén, “Gobernabilidad y Gestión Local en México,” pp. 90-2; Interview, Martín de la Rosa 
Medellín, advisor to Mayor Hector Osuna Jaime, February 25, 2005. 
89 A delegational subcommittee member interviewed had also served in the Copladem under Osuna Jaime 
and noted that she was one of the few members of the body during that period from a low-income 
community. Interview, February 29, 2005. 
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series of thematic subcommittees that brought together major civil society organizations 
and government officials.  The two basic elements of this structure were: 
1. Delegation Subcommittees, which included thirteen citizen counselors elected in 
each of the city’s thirteen administrative districts (subdelegaciones) plus three 
government officials (the local Subdelegado, a city council member, and a 
staffperson of Copladem).  These Subcommittees would be responsible for 
deciding investment expenditure in small and medium-sized projects in their 
district. 
2. Sectoral Subcommittees on each of fifteen different issues (e.g. migration, health, 
public security, ecology), which included up to thirteen citizen members, drawn 
from relevant non-governmental organizations, plus three government officials (a 
council member, the director of the related municipal government agency, and a 
member of the Copladem staff).  These Subcommittees were responsible for 
advising the city on key priorities in the related subject.90 
In addition, the Copladem had two overarching citywide bodies that brought together 
members of the different subcommittees: the Municipal Development Council, which 
brought together the Delegation Subcommittees to decide on overarching municipal 
investment priorities; and the General Assembly, which brought together all citizens and 
public officials involved in the Copladem process.91 Each of the bodies was composed 
by a majority of citizens,92 although government officials were present in each body and 
the city council had ultimate decision-making authority over any decisions made.   
The Sectoral and Delegation Subcommittees came to play a significant role in the 
development of municipal affairs.  Mayor Osuna Millán stated that “all projects had to be 
validated by Copladem” and a published study of the period suggests that the Copladem 
achieved immense influence as a space for dialogue and decision-making on public 
 
90 There were also a sectoral committee and a municipal committee, composed of mostly city officials, to 
which the subcommittees had to respond.  The city council resolution creating the new structure of the 
Copladem is published in full in Informe Municipal 1996. 
91 In theory, there was also  a Governing Council (Junta de Gobierno) comprised of the mayor and city 
council, as the top decision-making organ.  However, this was a formality that simply reasserted the council 
and mayor’s final jurisdiction over all decisions. 
92 The General Assembly had 74% citizen members; the Delegation Subcommittees had 81% citizen 
members. 
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priorities.93 According to the director the Copladem at the time, the process was designed 
to achieve “equilibrium among the executive, city council, and citizens,” and serve as a 
meeting place among all three, creating “permanent dialogue [of the executive and 
legislative] with citizens—NGOs and community residents…[and] institutional 
mechanisms for dialogue.”94 The Copladem system had several important design 
features.  First, it allowed citizens to elect representatives within the area of the city they 
lived in to represent them in public investment decisions and it largely empowered them 
to make these decisions.  This process encouraged deliberation among citizen counselors 
from different neighborhoods and between these and government officials from the 
executive and legislative branch.  Second, the system created opportunities for citizens to 
deliberate at a citywide level about major municipal priorities.  It created ongoing 
discussion among citizen representatives and non-governmental organizations from 
different parts of the city and forced government officials to sit down with them regularly 
to discuss priorities.  Third, the system recognized the importance of both elected citizen 
members, who were the majority on the Delegation Subcommittees, and organized civic 
associations, who had a majority on the Sectoral Subcommittees.  And finally, the system 
created broad-based mechanisms for public dialogue while not bypassing the central 
functions of the city council.  Although the Copladem carried great moral weight in 
decision-making, the elected city council had the final say in public decisions and council 
members were represented at all levels of the Copladem.     
 The Delegation Subcommittees received the most attention and were probably the 
most successful part of the Copladem system, largely because they had authority over 
 
93 The quote is from the author’s interview with former mayor Guadalupe Osuna Millán (1995-99), April 
21, 2005; the study is Tonatiuh Guillén, “Gobernabilidad y gestión local en México.” 
94 Interview, Martín de la Rosa Medellín, former coordinator of Copladem (1995-98), May 3, 2005. 
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real investment decisions. The first election of Delegation Subcommittees in 1996 
involved 7,314 people in the thirteen districts, electing 169 citizen counselors from 336 
candidates.95 This represented barely 2.5 percent of the number of voters who had 
participated in the 1995 elections, but was still a significant number for a first-time 
experience.96 The subcommittees appeared to be quite plural in their composition, with 
counselors that were close to all political parties and many who had no partisan affiliation 
at all.97 These subcommittees had responsibility for deciding on 28 to 55 million pesos 
worth of public works per year (Figure 7.15).  While this represented only 5-8% of the 
municipal budget, it was 18-23% of the city’s investment in infrastructure (Figure 7.16) 
and an even more substantial amount of what was spent in low-income communities.   
The Delegation Subcommittees became responsible for the funds that had been 
previously channeled to neighborhood committees through Manos a la Obra, and the 
municipality increased these funds available for community infrastructure.  There are no 
studies on the internal workings of the Subcommittees themselves, but those interviewed 
who had participated in the process remembered it as highly deliberative and a real space 
of encounter between government officials and citizens.98 
95 Plan Municipal de Desarrollo, 1996-98. 
96 The registration for the election of counselors was held with only three days-notice, which benefited the 
PAN and administration officials, who knew of the plans and could recruit candidates for citizen counselors 
ahead of time.  However, many candidates sympathetic to other parties, or without any party affiliation, 
won seats.  Tonatiuh Guillén, “Gobernabilidad y Gestión Local en México,” p. 95. 
97 Tonatiuh Guillén, “Gobernabilidad y Gestión Local en México,” pp. 95-6; and Interview, Maria de los 
Angeles Castillo, February 24, 2005, former member, Delegation Subcommittee in La Mesa, 1996-98. 
98 Based on interviews with one former citizen counselor of a Delegation Subcommittee, Ramon López, 
February 26, 2005; Oscar Escalada, President of the Network for the Defense of Migrants, February 23, 
2004; and Gabriel Preciado, former deputy director of social development for the municipality during this 
period, April 19, 2005. 
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Source: For 1992-95, Martín de la Rosa Medellín, “La participación social en la obra social comunitaria (el 
caso Tijuana, B.C.)” in Alicia Ziccardi, ed., Ciudadanía y políticas sociales en el ámbito local. México: 
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The Sectoral Subcommittees appear to have met with a more uneven fate.  
Several, including the Subcommittees on Migration, Public Security, Health, Urban 
Development, and Ecology, were quite active, according to one study, while others rarely 
met or had little incidence on the municipal agenda.99 Surprisingly, opposition council 
members showed little interest in the Sectoral Subcommittees.100 Unlike the Delegation 
Subcommittees, which had responsibility for actual investment decisions, the Sectoral 
Subcommittees were primarily advisory bodies around different issues areas.  This 
difference likely explains the lesser attention given to the sectoral bodies. 
 The Copladem maintained its official role after 1998, but over time it lost its 
capacity to serve as an arena for decision-making and deliberative interaction among 
citizens and government officials.  The municipality reduced the percentage of the budget 
devoted to community investments, thus limiting the scope of the delegation 
subcommittees’ work (Figure 7.16, above).  Moreover, in 1998, the municipality lowered 
the number of citizens counselors on the delegation subcommittees from thirteen to five 
so as to control them more easily.  The fourth and fifth PAN governments (1998-2001 
and 2001-2004) placed far less emphasis on the Copladem structure overall and hardly 
highlighted it at all in their development plans.101 Interviews with several citizen 
counselors who had participated in the subcommittees in the 2001-2004 period (Table 
7.4, above) revealed how much the municipal government had managed to control these 
bodies.  During this period, slates of candidates affiliated with the PAN had won all seats 
 
99 I atended the Migration Subcomitee on several occasions in 1996-97 and was impressed by the serious 
level of discussion that it allowed between the municipal authorities and NGOs working on migration 
issues. 
100 Tonatiuh Guillén, “Gobernabilidad y Gestión Local en México,” p. 98. 
101 Based on the Author’s comparison of the content of the annual reports and municipal development plans 
for the period 1989-2004. 
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of ten of the fourteen delegation subcommittees.102 In two other subcommittees there 
was one non-PAN affiliated citizen counselor; in the two smaller districts, opposition 
slates had won all seats.103 In one district where the PAN won, for example, the local 
district official of the municipality (subdelegate) called a meeting of fifteen leaders of 
neighborhood committees close to him a few days before the registration of candidates to 
see who would be the most attractive candidates, and five were selected to run as 
candidates for the subcommittee as the PAN-affiliated slate.104 This pattern of top-down 
decision-making by the municipality was repeated in most or all other districts in the city.  
Candidates were independent citizens in name, but selected by the government or by 
opposition political parties in practice. 
Figure 7.17: Community Meeting in Florido-Mariano Matamoros 
Source: Photo by Luz Aida Ruíz Martínez, photographer, Primer Taller Fotodocumental  
Tijuana, available at http://www.f8.com/FP/TIJUANA/English/indice.htm.
102 Originally there were thirteen subdelegations and one more had been created in the late 1990s. 
103 A PRI member won one seat in Florido-Mariano Matamoros and a PRD member in Los Pinos, both in 
PRI/PRD/PT coalitions.  In La Gloria a slate of candidates affiliated with CUCUTAC won all seats and in 
Salvatierra a PRI-supported slate won most seats.  Based on interviews with Victor Alvarez, Technical 
Secretary, Copladem; city council members José Roberto Davalos, (PRD, 2001-2004), Arnulfo Guerrero 
(PAN, 2001-2004), and Juanita Pérez (PR, 1998-2001); CUCUTAC leaders Ramona López, Francisco de 
Paula, and Catalino Zavala; two members of the Delegation Subcommittee in La Gloria and three members 
of the Delegation Subcommittee in Florido-Mariano Matamoros. 
104 Interview, Subcommittee member, El Florido, affiliated with PAN, February 26, 2005.  The 
Subdelegate, Román González, acknowledged that he was close to the four counselors from the PAN slate, 
noting that they were “of my confidence” [“de mi confianza”].  Interview, Román González, Subdelegate 
of Florido-Mariano Matamoros (2001-2004), interview, February 26, 2005.  Ironically, Román himself is 
the former leader of CUCUTAC in Florido-Mariano Matamoros, who later left CUCUTAC after a split in 
the organization to co-found CERCO, another left-leaning social organization, before joining the PAN. 
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Moreover, it appears that in contrast to the 1996-98 period the Delegation 
Subcommittees had come to have little discretionary power for decisions on investments,.  
As one municipal official noted, in confidence, the subcommittees committed most of the 
public works in return for votes before the election, so there was little left to give to 
others once they are elected.  Equally important, the municipal officials appeared to 
maintain considerable control over the information needed to make decisions.  In the case 
of Florido-Mariano Matamoros, for example, the subdelegate called meetings 
infrequently and rarely took the Subcommittee out on trips to meet with neighborhood 
committees, which limited their ability to make reasoned decisions.  In general, citizen 
counselors ended up following the proposals of municipal officials for lack of other 
information.105 All three counselors interviewed in that district agreed that the 
subdelegate gave counselors little voice in decision-making.106 One councilor noted that 
when they met with citizen counselors from three other districts, they found that the 
others faced the same problems.  Another counselor, who had served on a previous 
subcommittee, noted that they had much less margin to make decisions in this period than 
previously.  “It [the delegation subcommittee] lost its purpose; the council ceased to be 
necessary,” he observed, since the government really made the decisions before the 
meetings ever happened.   
In contrast, in the two districts where opposition slates won the delegation 
 
105 Florido-Mariano Matamoros is the second largest subdelegation and has the largest number of low-
income communities.  As a result, council members of all four parties with representation in the city 
council took turns participating in the Subcommittee in Florido. Two Copladem citizen counselors 
highlighted the role of the PRD council member, José Roberto Davalos, who took pains to teach the citizen 
counselors how to evaluate projects during his time on the subcommittee.   
106 Based on three interviews with Delegation Subcommittee members in Florido, one affiliated with the 
PRI and two with the PAN, March 16, 17, and 26, 2005. 
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subcommittees had consider decision-making authority.  For example, in La Gloria 
citizen counselors, who all belonged to CUCUTAC, reported that they often met ahead of 
time to decide on a common position before the meeting with the government officials.107 
However, in the case of La Gloria, the municipal government cut the investment funds 
available for the subcommittee’s decision-making by two-thirds, from over 7 million 
pesos in 2002 to under 2.4 million pesos in 2003.108 It is unclear the reasons for this 
shift, but residents in La Gloria involved with the delegation subcommittee clearly saw it 
as a retaliation for electing an independent slate of candidates.109 It seems likely that 
subcommittees that tried to exercise autonomy from the municipal government saw their 
scope of authority reduced dramatically. 
 Not only did the Subcommittees end up lacking decision-making power owing to 
a paucity of funds with which to work—or see their funds reduced even more if the 
Subcommittee were not aligned with the municipality—but they also appeared to lack 
presence in the community.  In the elections in La Gloria and Florido approximately 
1,000 people voted in each area.  Assuming this number was repeated in other areas, only 
14,000 or so citizens participated in the election, double the number in 1996 but still only 
a fraction of potential voters six years after the first election (around 6% of those who 
voted in 2001).  In interviews with the leaders of neighborhood committees, not one 
 
107 Based on interviews with two citizen counselors, February 27 and 29, 2005; and the former Subdelegate 
Ofelia Panda, February 26, 2005; Also interview with Ramona López, the CUCUTAC leader who put 
together the slate and served as an advisor to the citizen counselors, February 12 and 26, 2005. 
108 Based on data reported in the mayor’s annual reports for 2002 and 2003 (Informe Municipal 2002, 
2003). 
109 Based on interviews with two citizen counselors (see footnote 107), the community leader who had 
organized the slate, Ramona López, and an outside CUCUTAC advisor, Francisco de Paula, February 26, 
2005.  However, it should be noted that La Gloria is a relatively small area of the city, so there may be 
other explanations.  However, the official proposal of Copladem for the distribution of Ramo 33 funds, 
which balances population size with marginality, does little to explain the variation year to year of funds 
for La Gloria (Copladem, Propuesta de Distribución de Recursos, Fondo III, Ramo XXXIII, 2003.). 
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indicated a close working relationship with their Delegation Subcommittee.  “I don’t 
know the counselors; I’ve never heard anyone speak about Copladem,” noted one 
neighborhood committee president.  “They never sought us out, and we never sought 
them out,” stated another.  Of the twelve leaders interviewed, eight had no direct 
knowledge of their Delegation Subcommittee; three knew them but had no ongoing 
communication with them; and only one was actually in touch with the members.  Of 
those who knew their Subcommittee, one leader stated that he had not been allowed to 
attend the meetings; another stated that “The counselors have the function of fighting 
over public works projects…The political parties get together their slates of candidates 
with their most scandalous people, get their friends and acquaintances involved, register 
the slate, and whoever gets the most votes wins.”  Whatever channels might have existed 
between the neighborhood committees and the Copladem subcommittees in the past 
appeared to have fallen apart or into disuse by the last administration. 
 One of the most important innovations of the Copladem had been the creation of 
the Municipal Development Council, which allowed citizens to meet each other from 
different districts throughout the city and to dialogue on citywide priorities with 
municipal, state, and federal officials and city council members.  This council was 
responsible for deciding, among other things, the use of funds for major infrastructure 
projects that might affect several communities at the same time.  Although the Municipal 
Development Council continued to meet until 2004, counselors reported that it had few 
real functions and often barely could muster a quorum.  Municipal officials appeared to 
have made decisions ahead of time and since most citizen counselors were PAN-
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affiliated, there was little debate around any matters brought up for discussion.110 
Everything became confused; who were the members, what were the decisions…” noted 
one counselor with a previous more positive experience on the council in earlier years, 
“Almost everyone was with the PAN, so all that remained was to vote ‘yes’…just to 
legalize and legitimize the decisions.”111 Without the Municipal Development Council as 
an inclusive space for real dialogue and debate, the delegation subcommittees remained 
disconnected and easily manipulated.   
The Sectoral Subcommittees appear to have met a similar fate to the Delegation 
Subcommittees.  A few met regularly, and municipal statistics suggest that attendance 
had increased over time (Table 7.5).  However, others virtually disappeared or had little 
impact on municipal decisions.  One PAN city council member, who chaired the Ecology 
Subcommittee, stated that he had simply stopped calling meetings of the Subcommittee.  
He complained that the members, representatives of environmental NGOs, only showed 
up to complain and attack the government.  “They have no sense of responsibility at all... 
[just] attacking for the sake of attacking…”112 A PRI city council member stopped 
holding her Subcommittee meetings because she said that the municipal officials in 
charge of the area would not show up.113 A PRD city council member, however, 
observed that his two sectoral subcommittees met frequently and appeared to have 
 
110 According to one PAN-affiliated counselor from Florido and two CUCUTAC-affiliated counselors from 
La Gloria (cited previously). 
111 Most decisions passed without debate, but on one occasion, the council members were asked to vote to 
divert a substantial amount of the Copladem funds for the year to major road projects.  This was technically 
outside the purview of the program, which was supposed to be focused on  small and medium-sized 
community projects, but it was an election year (2004) and major public works projects had greater 
visibility.  The opposition-supported counselors and city council members voted against the proposal in 
bloc but were outnumbered overwhelmingly.  Interviews with three members of the Municipal Council 
(two from La Gloria, one from Florido, cited previously),. 
112 Interview, former city council member Arnulfo Guerrero (PAN, 2001-2004), February 24, 2005. 
113 Interview, former city council member Juanita Pérez (PRI, 1999-2001), February 25, 2005. 
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produced some results.114 Interviews with leaders of NGOs who were citizen counselors 
on the migration subcommittee noted that this subcommittee had been quite active and 
useful in the past but had lost steam in the last two administrations.115 
Table 7.5: Meetings and Attendance at Copladem Subcommittees 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Sectoral  Subcommittees  
Number 15 n.d. 14 20 20 21 21 21 
Sessions 84 90 84 103 87 299 146 143 
Attendance 1608 1340 1496 2127 1853 7526 3557 2940 
Delegational Subcommittees  
Number 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Sessions 94 83 64 n.d. 69 n.d. 54 69 
Attendance 1199  574 n.d. 525 n.d. 563 552 
Source: Based on data in Informe Municipal, all years 1996-2003. 
 
Overall, the Copladem structure provided an innovative approach to engaging 
citizens in decision-making about public affairs and creating dialogue between citizens 
and government officials.  It included several design elements that were critical to 
generating broad based citizen engagement and public deliberation: district-based 
elections for citizen counselors who would meet regularly with government officials to 
make community investment decisions; thematic bodies that brought together non-
 
114 The successes included a US$125,000 donation of prosthetics for low-income city residents as a 
resolution of the subcommittee on disability.  Interview, José Roberto Davalos (PRD, 2001-2004), 
interview, April 1, 2005.  The data on sectoral subcommittee meetings support his assertion that these were 
active groups (Informe Municipal, 2002, 2003).  A PAN official confided that this council member was the 
most professional on the city council, despite being the only member of his party, a view echoed by the two 
citizen counselors in Florido of the PAN and PRI.  This professionalism may also have had something to do 
with the success of his subcommittees.   
115 In 2004, the state secretariat of social development, now headed by a former Tijuana city council 
member, had taken the leadership in bringing together federal, state, and municipal officials with migration 
NGOs to resolve problems, effectively displacing the Copladem subcommittee on migration as the arena 
for dialogue between NGOs and government officials.  Interview, Oscar Escalada Hernández, President, 
Network in Defense of Migrants of Baja California, February 23, 2005; and Cristina Franco Abundis, 
director of the Human Rights Program at the Ibero-American University, February 23, 2005,.  This 
conclusion was echoed by Gabriel Preciado, deputy coordinator of the Tijuana office of the social 
development ministry, who had helped start the Copladem process in the mid-1990s, interview, April 19, 
2005.  The municipal data on sectoral subcommittee meetings confirm that the migration subcommittee met 
only once in 2003 (Informe Municipal, 2003). 
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governmental organizations and the government around a range of issues of substance for 
municipal governance; a broad overarching municipal council where citywide issues 
could be discussed publicly among citizens of different districts and organizations and a 
range of public officials; and the direct involvement of the city council in all of these 
processes.  However, after a brief period of effervescence, the municipality lost interest in 
the Copladem system.  Although municipal officials never eliminated it, they simply gave 
it less importance and learned to control the elections for citizen counselors and the 
information that counselors received once elected so as to minimize their influence.  
What had begun as a promising innovation in citizen participation and deliberation ended 
up devoid of real meaning or purpose. 
 
The Economic Development Council of Tijuana (CDT) 
 
The final innovation of the PAN governments to build new participatory channels 
was the creation of the Economic Development Council of Tijuana (Consejo de 
Desarrollo Económico de Tijuana, CDT), a business/government roundtable designed to 
spur dialogue and encourage planning between government and the private sector.  Set up 
during the second PAN administration of Osuna Jaime, the CDT receives equal funding 
from the state government, municipality, and the largest business organization, the 
Business Coordinating Council (Consejo Coordinador Empresarial, CCE).  The CDT’s 
most visible function has been the development of two long-term strategic plans, one in 
1994 and the other in 2003.116 Based on a model borrowed from Seville, Spain, the plans 
(each known as “Strategic Plan Tijuana”) lay out major priorities for economic 
 
116 Plan Estratégico Tijuana, 2002-2025, Tijuana: Ayuntamiento de Tijuana, 2003; and Plan Estratégico 
Tijuana, Tijuana: Ayuntamiento de Tijuana, 1995. 
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development over a twenty-five year period and prescribe responsibilities to the different 
levels of government and to the private sector.117 These plans were designed to create a 
more long-term strategic vision than that contained in the three-year municipal 
development plans, and to generate dialogue between government and the private sector 
about shared responsibilities for development. 
 Business leaders interviewed suggested that the CDT performed relatively well as 
a space for dialogue between the private sector and municipal and state governments.  
Overall, they acknowledged that the business community in Tijuana is highly fragmented 
and has little capacity to influence public policy.  This is partially a result of the mixture 
of locally-owned and foreign businesses, but also reflects the fragmented nature of 
Tijuana society in general.118 Several business-supported associations have emerged in 
recent years to address public policy issues in the city, including Tijuana Trabaja 
(“Tijuana Works”), Tijuana Renacimiento (“Tijuana Rebirth”), and Imagen Tijuana 
(“Tijuana Image”); however, those interviewed agreed that these were primarily groups 
of friends who had good ideas but had not yet been able to have an influence in policy 
debates.  The multiplication of disconnected private sector-supported groups mirrored the 
multiplication of largely disconnected NGOs, which have a limited ability to influence 
policy or develop common proposals for joint action.  In this context, the CDT performed 
an important but limited function in getting business leaders together with public 
officials.   
 
117 Interview, Hector Osuna Jaime. See also the analysis by Cesar M. Fuentes and Noé Arón Fuentes, 
“Desarrollo Económico en la Frontera Norte de México: de las políticas nacionales de fomento económico 
a las estrategias de desarrollo económico local,” Aracauria (Universidad de Sevilla), Vol. 5, No. 11, 2004; 
and the website of the CDT: http://www.cdt-tijuana.com/noticias/news.asp.
118 Interviews, Antonio Cano, February 23, 2005; Zeferino Sánchez, February 24; Gastón Luken, February 
25, 2005; and Askan Luteroth, February 23, 2005. 
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However, not all those interviewed were equally enthusiastic about the CDT and 
its long-range development plan.  One opposition city council member and a former 
government official both noted that in the absence of a strong Copladem with a real 
participatory planning process, the CDT-supported long-range plan had come supplant 
the municipal development plan as the municipality’s real blueprint for policy 
priorities.119 This in turn might mean that the business community was beginning to 
supplant citizens as the true interlocutor for developing municipal priorities. 
7.6 Conclusions 
 
The municipality of Tijuana grew significantly in authority and autonomy over 
the period of PAN governance.   Favorable circumstances certainly contributed to this 
change: the federal government increased transfers to municipalities during this period, 
and the city had a significant tax base that it could exploit once municipalities were 
allowed to innovate in tax collection.  The city’s size and importance within its state also 
gave it a margin of negotiation, which few municipalities have with their state 
government, in order to ensure greater autonomy.  However, the city government also 
took matters into its own hands by strengthening its functions, powers, and resources.  It 
sought out new forms of local revenue, leveraged private investment, sued the federal 
government, and created a national mayors’ association as part of its efforts to expand its 
authority and autonomy. 
 
119 Interviews, Juanita Pérez, former City Council member (PRI, 1998-2001), February 25, 2005; and 
Martín de la Rosa, former Coordinator of Copladem, 1996-98, May 3, 2005. 
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Within this context of extensive decentralization, the PAN-affiliated governments 
of Tijuana—in the first years after winning the municipal elections in 1989—also created 
some innovative institutions to improve democratic governance.  Fearing the PRI would 
recover the city, they sought to break the control of PRI’s corporatist organizations and 
their political intermediaries.  As a party supported mostly by unaffiliated citizens, they 
hoped that they could create a new relationship with their constituents as individual 
citizens who would have institutional channels to make demands, participate in public 
affairs, and monitor their government. Towards this end, they improved the 
representative structure of the city council; pursued policies that encouraged greater 
government transparency; and created a series of institutions for citizen participation that 
included non-partisan neighborhood committees, a participatory planning structure, and a 
business/government roundtable.  As a result of citizen demands, the PAN governments 
vastly increased the resources devoted to community infrastructure investments and 
pursued joint public/private ventures for urban development.   
In many ways, these initiatives stand as models of what decentralization might 
and should accomplish: the unleashing of creative democratic energy at the grassroots.   
Citizens had access to more information than before on their government and clearer 
institutional channels for participating in public deliberations.  The Copladem system 
implemented under the second and third PAN administrations successfully bypassed 
political intermediaries to give citizens a voice in public affairs, created linkages among 
citizens in different neighborhoods, and generated ongoing processes for public 
deliberation.  Similarly, the Tijuana Development Council successfully brought together 
business leaders and municipal officials to think through long-term opportunities and 
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challenges for the region.   
Tijuana seemed ideally suited to this kind of transparent and participatory 
governance.  It was perhaps the city in Mexico where the PRI’s corporatist structure had 
sunk the shallowest roots.  Most citizens did not belong to organizations tied to any party 
and were thus relatively independent voters.  The city enjoyed an extensive, though 
fragmented civil society, based on small neighborhood organizations, church groups, and 
non-governmental organizations dedicated to social assistance.  In this environment, PAN 
mayors initially realized that they had to build a support base for their party by 
mobilizing individual citizens through institutional channels rather than constituting 
clientelistic or corporatist organizations.  The improvements in the council, initial steps at 
transparency, and the participatory innovations all served to build this relationship. 
 However, this dense web of citizen-government interaction gradually weakened 
as the PAN repeatedly won elections and its leaders lost their fear of being thrown out of 
office.  The PAN’s historical practices contributed to this: as a party built to resist 
cooption by the PRI, it had maintained a small, loyal membership.  As a result, the party 
was ideally suited to serve as an incorruptible opposition movement, but less so to govern 
a major city.  PAN leaders knew they needed to bring new voices into the policy process, 
but they also distrusted mass democracy and its potential for corruption. 
Political institutions reinforced these limitations.  Supermajorities in the city 
council and party list elections meant that aspiring PAN politicians needed to spend more 
time negotiating backroom deals with potential supporters within the small party base 
than attending to citizen concerns.  The leaders lost interest in transparency and stalled 
efforts at providing citizens access to information on demand.  They undermined the very 
263
channels they had created for citizens to deliberate on policy with government officials 
and to be partners in public efforts.  While the kind of autonomous, diversified civil 
society that existed in the city was ideal to respond to the participatory initiatives of the 
first PAN governments, the absence of links among organizations and between these and 
the political parties meant that there was no one to defend the advances once the 
government lost interest.  The lack of media that could maintain sufficient distance from 
the party in power further compounded this problem. 
In the end, PAN officials destroyed most of the influence of the PRI’s corporatist 
organizations, but they created no lasting alterative to link citizens to the government 
outside of the party system.  Indeed, they created a form of “weak control” where they 
generated their own “intermediaries”—the Copladem councilors and a few successful 
neighborhood committee leaders—who were willing to do small favors for the 
government in return for obtaining occasional benefits.  These intermediaries, however, 
had neither an organic relationship to the party nor did government officials take them 
very seriously.  It was a very weak form of clientelism that operated at the margins of the 
real decision-making processes of the municipal government.   
Under the PRI, citizens had strong ties to the government through the party, 
though under non-institutional and highly unfair rules that privileged party leaders and 
community brokers.  Under the PAN, citizens had clearer institutional channels for 
making demands on the government, but government officials paid less and less attention 
to these demands.  The rules of the game were more democratic, but citizens were also 
more disconnected and isolated from their government than ever before. A highly 
mobilized and participatory society became increasingly disillusioned with a government 
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that gave only lip-service to their concerns and did little to ensure their rights.  Citizens, 
finding the PAN governments increasingly unresponsive, would ultimately choose two 
different options.  Most citizens stopped voting.  Abstention rates in Tijuana soon became 
among the highest in the country.120 And among those who continued to be politically 
involved, they finally tired of the PAN and opted to return to the PRI and its old style of 
corporatist government with a leader who promised to listen and take them into account, 
even if he might bring back the old style of patronage politics they had left behind. 
 
120 The abstention rate in the 2004 elections was 63.7%.  José Negrete Mata argues that abstention rates 
rose dramatically not only because the city is highly mobile (so some registered voters were not around to 
vote), but also because citizens became disillusioned with their options and disconnected from politics 
given the PAN’s technocratic governance style and the perceived corruption of the PRI.  Negrete Mata, “En 
busca del votante (tijuanense) perdido : cultura política, participación y abstencionismo,” Ph.D. 




8.1 Winning Respect  
 
In August 2004, Belem Guerrero won the Olympic silver medal in women’s 
cycling, the second medal for Mexico in the 2004 Olympics.  The inhabitants of Ciudad 
Nezahualcóyotl, known usually by the city’s nickname “Neza,” were ecstatic.  “That’s 
where she lives,” one man pointed in the direction of the neighborhood where Belem had 
grown up.  “She always cycles by this way in the morning,” said another man as he 
pointed to one of the main boulevards. 
Belem’s victory was highly symbolic for Ciudad Nezahualcóytol.  A large city on 
the outskirts of Mexico’s capital, Neza has always struggled to have an identity of its 
own.  Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Neza was known as an extremely poor bedroom 
community on the fringes of Mexico City.  It was a large shantytown where people from 
the countryside came to live when they could not afford an apartment in the capital and 
where the capital’s poor went to live when rent became too expensive.  Most residents in 
Neza did not have land titles, and in many neighborhoods there was no electricity, water, 
or sewage.  Frequent flooding meant that the city’s dirt roads turned constantly into 
muddy pools. A book written about Neza in 1977 called it “a neighborhood on its way to 
absorption by Mexico City,”1 despite the fact that the city already had almost a million 
 
1 The book notes that Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl is principally a neighborhood on the outskirts of Mexico City 
defined by its social and cultural marginalization (Roberto Ferras, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl: un barrio en 
vías de absorción por la Ciudad de México, Mexico City: Centro de Estudios Sociológicos, Colegio de 
México, 1977).  Other works of the 1970s and 1980s similarly aproached Neza as a marginalized 
community of the Mexico City metropolitan area (see, for example, Marta Schteingart, Los productores del 
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inhabitants.  Another book, written by a Jesuit priest active in the city in the early 1970s, 
noted that “Netzahualcóytol [sic] has no inner life; strictly speaking it is not a city 
because it lacks relative autonomy; it is an appendix of a megalopolis.”2
By the 1990s, however, things had changed.  Citizens had begun to organize in 
the 1970s to demand land titles and basic services and within two decades they achieved 
significant successes.  Another book written about the city in 1992 chronicled these 
changes under the title “Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl: From Marginalized Neighborhoods to a 
Great City.”3 By 2000, almost all properties had land titles; 99.4% of homes had 
electricity, 98.2% water, and 98.9% sewage; and 88.5% of the streets were paved.4 The 
average income was well above the national average (though still less than that of Mexico 
City and some neighboring towns).  This fact meant that Neza’s inhabitants had gone in a 
generation from desperately poor to respectably working class. The city had an 
increasingly strong municipal government and an identity separate from the federal 
capital next door.  As one university professor who grew up in Neza told me, “our fight 
in the 1970s was for services; we were proud of being marginal; today our fight is for 
respect.”5 As part of the struggle for respect, the city government had pitched in to buy 
Belem her racing bike for the Olympics after the country’s notoriously elitist Olympic 
 
espacio habitable: Estado, empresa y sociedad en la ciudad de México, Mexico: El Colegio de México, 
1989). 
2 Martín de la Rosa, Netzahualcóyotl: un fenómeno, Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1974, p. 4.  
Note that even the name of the city was spelled two different ways by different authors in the 1960 and 70s. 
3 Margarita García Luna, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl: de colonias marginadas a gran ciudad,” Toluca, 
Mexico: Pliego, 1992. 
4 According to the city’s Municipal Development Plan, two neighborhoods of the city, Canales de Sal and a 
part of Colonia El Sol, did not have regularized land titles in 1997, but both have since achieved land titles 
(Ayuntamiento de Nezahualcóyotl, Plan Municipal de Desarrollo 1997-2000, Ciudad Nezahualcóytol: 
Ayuntamiento, 1997).  For the data on electricity, water, and sewage, see the 2000 Census (Censo General 
de Población y Vivienda 2000, Aguascalientes: INEGI, 2001); for the data on pavement, see María del 
Socorro Arzaluz Solano, “Participación ciudadana en la gestión urbana de Ecatepec, Tlalnepantla y 
Nezahualcóyotl (1997-2000),” Ph.D. dissertation, Centro de Estudios Sociológicos, El Colegio de México, 
December 2001, p. 290. 
5 Ramón Rivera, March 4, 2005. 
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Committee had refused to support her.  Her victory was more than an individual 
achievement; it was a shared effort by the city to win both respectability and the 
recognition of its existence.   
 
Figure 8.1: Map of Mexico State showing Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl 
Note: Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl is in blue on the right side of Mexico City (in yellow). 
 
Eight years before Belem’s great race, the inhabitants had taken another step 
toward winning respect by throwing out the long-ruling PRI.  Like most poor and 
working-class cities, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl had been dominated by the PRI through a 
web of clientelistic networks that organized people – in a top-down manner -- by blocks, 
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neighborhoods, and occupations.  The grip of the ruling party began to slip slightly in the 
1980s, as a series of strong social movements independent from the PRI began to play an 
increasingly successful role in the struggle for land and services.  In 1996, several of 
these movements joined together to run a common slate of candidates for mayor and city 
council under the banner of the left-of-center PRD.  “We were convinced we wouldn’t 
win,” according to Hector Bautista, leader of the largest organization in the coalition.6
Yet, to their surprise, they did win, and it gave the Mexican left their first victory in a city 
of over a million inhabitants.7 The PRD, with the same coalition of social movements, 
would go on to consolidate its electoral strength with repeat victories in municipal 
elections in 1999 and 2002.   
Since then Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl has been the scene of an unusual process of 
turning a loose coalition of social movements into a governing party.  The results of this 
process have profoundly transformed relations between the inhabitants of the city and 
their municipal government, but not always in easy or predictable ways.  In some cases, 
the PRD governments have shown a penchant for promoting good governance, 
transparency, and citizen participation, old demands of the social movements that created 
the coalition.  However, in other cases, they have reinvented or fallen back on old 
strategies for clientelistic control reminiscent of previous PRI governments.  Overall, the 
stronger self-governance has somewhat strengthened downward accountability to citizens 
by removing layers of bureaucracy and political negotiation that kept municipal leaders 
focused primarily upwards on state and federal political leaders.  At the same time, 
 
6 Interview with Hector Bautista, Mexico City, March 4, 2005. 
7 The PRD would win Mexico City in 1997 and Acapulco in 1999, both which remain PRD bastions; 
similarly, they won several governorships after 1998, but Neza was the first major urban victory for the 
Mexican left.  The PRD had won Morelia, the capital of the state of Michoacán, in 1989 and Juchitán, 
Oaxaca in the 1980s, but the PRI recovered these smaller cities after the initial PRD victory. 
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competitive elections have provided citizens with some degree of control over their 
elected authorities.  However, the leaders of groups within the PRD have become the new 
centers of political power, at the top of a dense web of political factions.  The form of 
democratic governance that has emerged is partially accountable and occasionally 
responsive, but leaves little place for citizen deliberation. 
8.2 From Bedroom Community to Major City 
 
The area where Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl now stands was once Texcoco Lake in the 
State of Mexico, the country’s largest state, which surrounds Mexico City on both sides.8
In the mid-1850s the government began to dry the lake to prevent flooding, and by 1900 
it had become arable land suitable for settlement.  The first post-Revolutionary 
government of Venustiano Carranza declared the lands in the bed of the former lake 
national property in 1917 and in 1919 began to sell parcels to settlers.   
In the 1940s, the federal government promoted the creation of committees for 
“moral, civic, and material improvement” to help mediate between residents and the 
government in the installation of basic services.  By 1949, the city had approximately 
perhaps 2,000 inhabitants, which increased dramatically to 40,000 by 1954.  In 1953, the 
state government created the Committee of Urban Neighborhoods of the District of 
Texcoco to serve as an umbrella organization for the thirteen neighborhoods in the area 
 
8 Mexico City was once part of the State of Mexico, but it became a federal district shortly after 
independence in 1824.  The State of Mexico remains the largest state in the country, however, with 
13,096,686 inhabitants, almost double the second largest state, Veracruz with 6,908,975 inhabitants, and 
considerably more than the federal district with 8,605,239 (XII Censo General de Población 2000, 
Aguascalientes: INEGI, 2001). 
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(which grew to 33 by 1959 and 39 by 1960).  By 1960 the neighborhood association had 
requested that the area, which now had a population of 73,915, become a separate 
municipality, a demand that was granted in April 1963.9
Figure 8.2: Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl in the 1970s 
Source: Official website of the city, www.neza.gob.mx
The 1960s and 1970s saw an enormous expansion of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl 
along with the expansion of the entire Mexico City metropolitan area.  Neza became a 
bedroom community for those who could not afford housing in the capital itself—recent 
migrants from other states and children of low-income families in the capital.  The 
population grew almost nine times in the 1960s and then more than doubled again in the 
1970s (see Figure 8.3).  In the early 1970s, according to one account, the city had only a 
handful of phone lines, two post offices, one book store, two banks, one firehouse, one 
Red Cross hospital, and three gas stations.  There were no libraries, parks, hotels, 
 
9 The history of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl from the 1850s to 1963 is based on la summary provided for the 
city in the Enciclopedia de los Municipios de México.This volume is  published by the Instituto Nacional 
para el Federalismo y el Desarrollo Municipal (INAFED) and available at www.e-local.gob.mx. Consulted 
August 2004.  
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theaters, newspapers, or cemetery.10 The city became a symbol in Mexico of the worst 
effects of urbanization. 
 
















Population 73,915 649,620 1,393,116 1,267,839 1,225,972
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Sources: XXII Censo General de Población 2000 and Margarita García Luna and Pedro Gutiérrez Arzaluz, 
Nezahualcóyotl: monografía municipal, Toluca: Gobierno del Estado de México, 1999, p. 29 (with 
population statistics based on previous census calculations). 
 
Figure 8.4: Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl Today 
Source: Official website of the city, www.neza.gob.mx. 
 
10 De la Rosa, Netzahualcóyotl, p. 4. 
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However, in the 1980s and 1990s the characteristics of the city changed 
dramatically.  Educational levels increased, as second and third generation inhabitants 
were able to take advantage of opportunities for study in the metropolitan area, and 
economic fortunes rose noticeably.  As Figures 8.5 and 8.6 indicate, key educational 
indicators improved dramatically and young people in Neza, ages 25-29, were more 
likely to go to college than elsewhere in the state or the country.  Nezahualcóyotl had 
been the poor bedroom community to the capital in the 1970s, but by the 1990s its 
proximity to the ever-expanding capital meant that it was prime real estate and those who 
could not afford housing had to move to municipalities even further away from Mexico 
City.   As a result, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl began losing population in the 1980s and 
1990s, at least according to official figures.11 There was nowhere left to build in what 
had become the most densely populated city in the metropolitan area and greater 
affluence brought lower birth rates and smaller households. 
 
11 There may, in fact, be more people living in the city than official figures indicate.  Voter registration 
rates suggest a higher population than census figures do.  The voter rolls show 900,754 registered voters in 
2003.  This is a full 73.5% of the official population (for 2000), while the census suggests that only 65.48% 
of the population is 18 or older.  This difference could be due to a high level of mobility on the part of 
registered voters (with many having left the municipality since registering); however, this possibility does 
not seem to be born out by the evidence: only 7.7% of the population in 2000 had lived outside the 
municipality in 1995, somewhat lower than the average for the state as a whole (10.5%), suggesting a fairly 
stable population in the city.  Moreover, voting rates in Neza for the 2003 congressional elections (37.8%) 
are very close to the average for the rest of the state (36.5%) and to the other major cities in the state 
(Ecatepec 35.0%, Naucalpan 37.6%, Tlanepantla 40.7%, Toluca 41.8%, Chimahualcán 32.3%, and Chalco 
33.0%), which suggests that a large pool of absent voters probably does not exist.  This scenario is different 
scenario than that of Tijuana, where there is also an unusually high number of registered voters compared 
to the population figures but turnout in the 2003 elections was extremely low (28.31% of registered voters), 
suggesting that the possibility that some registered voters who have moved away, a conclusion that is 
strengthened by the relatively high number of inhabitants in Tijuana in the 2000 census (16.9%) who 
reported having lived in another state five years earlier.  The population and migrant population are 
calculated based on the 2000 Census (XXII Censo de Población) and statistics on registered voters and 
voting participation. See “La participación ciudadana en la elecciones de 2003,” the Federal Electoral 
Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral, available at www.ife.org.mx).  Census statistics on migrant condition 
(percentage of inhabitants who lived outside the municipality five years earlier) are reported for all 
inhabitants five years and older. 
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Children not attending school
Have not completed primary
school
Note: “Illiteracy” and “Have not completed primary school” are a percent of all inhabitants over 15 years 
old; Children not attending school” is a percentage of all children 6-14 years old. 
Sources: XXII Censo General de Población 2000 and Emilio Duhau and Marta Schteingart, “El primer 
gobierno perredista de Nezahualcóyotl,” in Schteingart and Duhau, eds., Transición política y democracia 
municipal en México y Colombia, Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrúa, 2001, pp. 180-81. 
 
Figure 8.6: Higher Education Compared: Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, Mexico State, and National, 2000 











Source: INEGI, XXII Censo General de Población 2000. 
Despite significant improvements, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, nonetheless, 
continued to be predominantly a poor and working class town that depends heavily on 
Mexico City and other cities in the region for employment.  Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl had 
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half the national average of people making minimum wage or less, but over half of the 
working population reports making less than three minimum wages, the rough equivalent 
of US$4,140 per year in 2000, still a very low wage for the metropolitan area of Mexico 
City, where living standards are unusually high (Figure 8.7).  Few inhabitants make over 
ten minimum wages (roughly US$13,800), even a smaller proportion than the state and 
country as a whole, suggesting that there is a limited middle class in the city.  
Nonetheless, the income structure in Neza did show significant gains in the 1990s, which 
suggests a long-term upward trend.12 
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Source: 2000 Census (XII Censo General de Población 2000). Note: Income in Mexico is generally 
calculated in terms of multiples of the minimum wage, which was set at 1,137 pesos per month for the State 
of Mexico in 2000, approximately US$1,380 per year at the exchange rate of the time. 
 
Equally significant is the fact that, according to the federal government’s 
economic data only 18% of the economically active population of Ciudad 
Nezahualcóyotl actually works in the city.  While these statistics almost certainly 
 
12 Based on author’s comparison of data in the 1990 and 2000 census. 
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underestimate the number of people who work in the city, since they tend to undercount 
informal employment (which is prevalent in Neza), they still indicate that Neza has far 
less of an employment base for its residents than other major municipalities in the state or 
the state average as a whole (Figure 8.8).13 Despite the overall successes of the 
population of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl in raising living standards, gaining access to 
education, and improving infrastructure and basic services, the city still lags behind the 
rest of the region in developing its own businesses.  As we will discuss later in this 
chapter, the lack of a strong base of local businesses imposes significant limitations on 
Neza’s developing a strong municipal tax base and, therefore, reduces the ability of the 
city to progress in addressing the remaining needs of the population. 
Figure 8.8: Percentage of Working Residents Employed within Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl compared to 
the State of Mexico as a Whole and Other Major Cities in the State, 1999 














Note: Unemployment oscillates between 2-4% in the State of Mexico, depending on year and means of 
measurement. The EAP includes employed and unemployed persons. 
Source: All data from INEGI: Economically Active Population based on the 2000 Census (XII Censo 
General de Población 2000); Number of employment positions within each city from the Economic 
Census of 1999 (published by INEGI as Imágenes económicos del Estado de México, 2001).   
 
13 Based on the Economic Census of 1999, the last one for which data is available.  The Municipal 
Development Plan of the city for 1997-2000 indicates that 43% of the population works in the municipality, 
41% in Mexico City, and 13% in the State of Mexico (Ayuntamiento, Plan Municipal de Desarrollo 1997-
2000).  However, I have not been able to ascertain the basis for this calculation, and it  
clearly conflicts with the official federal government statistics.   
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8.3 Political Control, Political Change 
 
PRI Hegemony and Struggles for Land (1963-88) 
 
The PRI dominated politics in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl from the city’s birth in 
1963 until the victory of the PRD in 1996, and almost completely in the period from 1963 
to 1988.  Every mayor was a member of the PRI and, until 1982, every member of the 
city council.  Even after changes in state electoral rules began to assign seats to 
opposition parties in 1982, the PRI dominated the city council and handily won every 
municipal election, never controlling less than 70% of the seats (see Table 8.1). The PRI 
maintained this dominance through an unusually strong relationship between the city and 
state governments, a solid party base of social organizations, and close ties to the most 
important economic actors in the city after independence, the fraccionadores. 
 The fraccionadores were the real estate developers who had bought property in 
Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl at bargain rates to resell it to individuals and families that needed 
land.  In some cases, these were undoubtedly legitimate purchases; in many cases, 
however, they were behind-the-scenes deals through which wealthy individuals, 
politicians, and real estate companies won the right to resell land that they had purchased 
through bribes or favors to state government officials.  In many cases, the fraccionadores 
obtained titles to land that poor families already occupied and then resold it to them at 
higher rates than many could afford.  With the city’s population explosion in the 1960s, 
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the fraccionadores were a potent economic force.14 Several reports confirm that the first 
administrations of Neza were particularly close to the fraccionadores and that they 
played an important role in the constituting of the city itself.15 The fraccionadores 
constituted one of the most potent bases of support for municipal leaders throughout the 
1960s, but their star waned in the 1970s as the state government stepped in to buy out the 
fraccionadores and sell land directly to residents (as is discussed below). 
 The PRI maintained a tight control of state politics in the State of Mexico until the 
1980s, winning every municipal and state election.16 Given the weak finances of 
municipalities and their dependence on agreements with the state and federal 
governments to obtain funds for investment in infrastructure,. the state government 
maintained tight control of municipal governments everywhere in the state throughout the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.  In the case of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, this need was 
significantly accentuated by the two priority needs of the city: land titles and basic 
infrastructure (electricity, water, and sewage).  The state government is exclusively 
 
14 Fraccionadores is a term used in Mexico for an individual or company who sells land in parcels.  
Fraccionadores are often legitimate companies, but evidence from several sources indicates that in Ciudad 
Nezahualcóyotl few of the fraccionadores had followed legal processes to obtain land titles—and there was 
little or no transparency in the land titling system in the State of Mexico in this period.  See de la Rosa, 
Netzahualcóyotl. 
15 Duhau and Schteingart, “El primer gobierno perredista,” p. 166; de la Rosa, Netzahualcóyotl, pp. 11-12; 
Ferras, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, p. 15.  The Asociación General de Colonos (General Association of 
Settlers), a community organization created with government support in 1957 to represent the area that 
became Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, included a state government representative, four representatives of the 
fraccionadores, and four representatives of the population at large, although two of the four at-large 
representatives were active PRI members close to the state government.  This group was the official body 
that channeled demands for autonomy.  It was disbanded when the first city government was elected.  
However, the fraccionadores managed to ensure the election of mayors close to their interests throughout 
the 1960s (María Eugencia de Alba Muñiz, “Control política de los migrantes urbanos: un caso de estudio, 
ciudad Nezahualcóyotl,” M.A. thesis, Center for International Studies, El Colegio de México, September 
1976, pp. 78-89). 
16 A single, relatively cohesive political group, known as the Grupo Atlocomulco, dominated the state PRI 
almost continuously from 1945 on.  This group continues to dominate state politics, though disputes within 
this group and within the PRI itself have become more noticeable since the 1990s. The PAN had a minimal 
presence in some municipalities and presented its first candidate in gubernatorial elections in 1975 
(winning 12.5%, the party’s best showing until 1993, when it would win 16.5%). See Duhau and 
Shteingart, “El primer gobierno perredista,” pp. 176-77.    
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responsible for land titling, as well as water and sewage.  Electricity is the responsibility 
of the federal government, but the state government often plays a mediating role in 
getting the Federal Electricity Commission to install service in new areas.  The state 
government thus played a very direct role in municipal affairs in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl 
as long as the primary needs of the city were focused on land and services.  For much of 
the 1970s, a state-created trust for regularizing land titles (discussed below) even became 
an alternate political power in the city, far more influential than the city government 
itself, and its president would use it as a trampoline to become governor of the state.17 
Since the city lived to a large extent under state tutelage, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl 
was also used by the state PRI to distribute patronage to politicians from outside the city.  
Elected representatives and city officials, including mayors and many local and federal 
congressmen, were often not even residents of the city.  For example, between 1963 and 
1990, only five of the nine mayors were residents of the city.18 In the one federal 
election, 1988, only two of the ten candidates for congress from districts in Neza were 
residents of the city.19 During the time when the PRI enjoyed almost complete hegemony 
in most states, it was not unheard of for outsiders to run for office in Mexican 
municipalities; however, the frequency with which this happened in Neza is quite unusual 
and speaks to the relative weakness of the local politicians to negotiate their interests vis-
 
17 In interviews, two social leaders active in the 1970s commented that the state government was far more 
important in meeting citizens’ demands than the city government.  Inteviews with Odón Madariaga, May 
21, 2005, and Martín de la Rosa Medellín, May 3, 2005. 
18 Moises Raúl López Laines, Nezahualcóyotl: Perfil Político, Anaylisis y Alternativas, Ciudad 
Nezahualcóyotl: Imprenta San Diego, 1989, pp. 85-86.  López Laines is a noted PRIista politician and 
former congressman from the city who carried extensive research on the PRI’s internal practices and 
citizens’ views of the party in 1988-89. 
19 Emilio Alvarado Guevara, Yolhueyliztli: Historia de Nezahualcóyotl, Mexico, D.F.: Editorial ARIES, 
1996, p. 181. Alvarado Guevara is another PRI politician (and former alternate congressman) who 
published a book a detailed history of the PRI governments in Neza. Note: There were ten federal electoral 
districts in Neza at the time; however, there are currently only five electoral districts, as the number of 
members of congress elected directly has been reduced significantly through federal constitutional changes. 
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à-vis the state government and party structure.  The recent creation of the city meant that 
there were few local political leaders who had much stature in the state or national party 
despite the city’s size.  The sense that the city was largely an appendage of the state 
government certainly contributed to its political weakness as well. 
 The local PRI in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl depended on a well-structured network 
of occupationally and territorially based organizations that allowed the party to mediate 
and, to some extent, control demands between citizens and government authorities.  Of 
the three traditional sectors of the party in Mexico (labor, peasant, and popular sectors), 
the labor and peasant sectors were relatively weak.  The National Peasant Confederation 
(CNC) would gain some influence in the 1970s by supporting a revolt against the 
fraccionadores, but the absence of industry meant that the labor sector was largely 
irrelevant.  The popular sector, known as the National Council of Popular Organizations 
(CNOP), brought together associations of owners and workers in the city’s many 
markets, the teachers’ union, the chamber of commerce, and the General Association of 
Residents (Asociación General de Colonos), an umbrella organization for neighborhood 
groups. Together these groups were the backbone of the party.  At the same time, the PRI 
had committees in each section of the city (there are generally several “sections” in each 
federal electoral district), which gave the party a geographical base at election time and 
ensured a party presence in each neighborhood of the city.20 The party provided 
numerous services to local residents through the CNOP affiliated organizations and the 
section committees, including legal and financial advice, employment listings, and 
support for a range of social demands for licenses, land titles, services, and other needs 
 
20 This description of the PRI is taken from Duhau and Schteingart, “El primer gobierno perredista,” pp.  
183-86, and confirmed in conversations with leading members of the PRI in the city. 
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that only the government could resolve.  The CNOP organizations thus formed the crucial 
link between citizens and public authorities under the PRI governments.  According to 
Duhau and Schteingart, “These organizations linked the daily life of the population in its 
social, economic, and urban aspects, but they also constituted the channels of support to 
leaders who occupied the mayor’s office, city council seats, and other important positions 
in the municipality, for many decades.”21 
The PRI, however, was hardly a democratic organization in its internal operation.  
Though it provided services through its constituent organizations as an intermediary 
between citizens and public authorities, this was done in return for loyalty, votes, and the 
support of particular leaders who could claim the ability to resolve problems.  The PRI, 
and the governments it created, operated in Neza as elsewhere in Mexico by providing a 
paternalistic form of intermediation to its loyal members but refusing to deal with those 
who chose to go outside the system.  When groups tried to break off from the party, the 
authorities would either try to co-opt them back into the party structure or threaten to 
write them off.22 In Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, the local PRI hierarchy usually proposed the 
candidacies for election, though negotiation among key leaders, to the state PRI, which 
made the final decision.  On only one occasion, in 1978, did the local PRI try to elect 
candidates by allowing members to vote in a primary election.  However, the results 
created so much bitterness among the losing groups that party leaders stepped in to name 
 
21 “El primer gobierno perredista,” p.  186.  I was a witness to the CNOP’s continued ability to operate as 
mediator during two afternoons I spent at the CNOP office in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl.  During this time, 
members of various CNOP organizations arrived to get help with such things as contested bills for services 
and petitions for neighborhood improvements.  In one dramatic case, a woman asked for help because the 
administrator of the city’s public hospital, whose services are supposed to be free, had refused to release 
her sister from the hospital without payment of a substantial sum of money.  The CNOP leaders led a 
march on the hospital to get her sister released. 
22 Alba Muñiz, “Control político de los migrantes,” covers this process in some detail with specific cases.  
See especially pp. 2-3. 
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the candidates in the end.23 A few figures dominated the PRI’s candidacies for office, 
and the leadership of the party organizations for years on end.24 One internal study of the 
PRI noted that candidacies repeatedly went to the same politicians and that a quarter of 
all party positions in 1988 were held by only eight people. The PRI in Neza created a 
vertically integrated system of interest intermediation dominated by individual leaders, 
caciques, who could resolve problems for ordinary citizens in return for loyalty to those 
leaders. 
The lack of horizontal links in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl during its first 25 years 
also contributed to the PRI’s success in controlling dissent and eliminating challenges to 
its hegemony.  Martín de la Rosa, a Jesuit priest, who tried in the early 1970s to organize 
an autonomous popular movement for change, wrote that “Horizontal communication is 
minimal: the city is infinitely atomized; each person or each group fights as hard as 
possible against daily problems of subsistence, problems that are really common.”25 The 
atomization of social struggles was compounded by the lack of public spaces, including 
parks, city newspapers, community radio stations, or local television programs, that could 
have facilitated deliberation among citizens. In addition, citizens’ information often came 
from Mexico City news sources, and they spent much of their day in jobs in the City as 
well.  Most of the remaining collective spaces within neighborhoods, markets, and a 
handful of local businesses were successfully co-opted by the only political party of any 
strength. 
 However, despite the PRI’s seeming monopoly on social and political 
organization, significant chinks in this control existed.  Struggles for land and services 
 
23 Alvarado Guevara recounts this episode in Yolhueyliztli, pp. 62-65. 
24 Duhau and Schteingart, “El primer gobierno perredista,” p. 156. 
25 De la Rosa, Netzahualcóyotl, p. 4. 
282
developed at the margins of the party, and though these social movements were often co-
opted or controlled, their activities laid the groundwork for later cleavages in local 
politics and the emergence of new political alternatives in the city.  The most striking 
challenge to politics as usual came in the form of a mass struggle against the 
fraccionadores in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  In 1953 a group of inhabitants in what 
would become Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl formed the Frente Mexicano pro-Derechos 
Humanos (Mexican Front for Human Rights) and threatened to stop paying the 
fraccionadores for their land titles.26 This group was suppressed, but in the mid-1960s 
several neighborhood leaders began reviving this idea.  Though the initial attempt to 
constitute an alliance that could declare a payment strike failed in the period 1964-67, a 
larger movement emerged around 1969 under the name of the Movimiento Restaurador 
de Colonos (Residents’ Restoration Movement), known by its initials MRC.27 The MRC 
declared a wholesale payment strike, asking residents of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl to stop 
paying the fraccionadores their monthly quotas for the land titles, since most 
fraccionadores had obtained the titles illegally, and called on the state government to take 
control of the land and sell it to the residents at reasonable prices.   
The MRC’s payment strike spread like wildfire; by 1971, a reported 70,000 city 
residents were active in 28 MRC subcommittees.28 The state government had 
immediately recognized the need to negotiate with them.  The state was in the middle of 
 
26 See Ramón Rivera Espinosa, “Planificación Urbana Municipal y gestión popular en Ciudad 
Nezahualcóyotl,” M.A. thesis in urban planning, Escuela Superior de Ingeniería y Arquitectura, Instituto 
Politécnico Nacional, June 2002, pp. 105-6. 
27 On the MRC, see Rivera, “Planificación Urbana Municipal,” pp. 107-112; Ferras, Ciudad 
Nezahualcóyotl, pp. 16-19; Alba Muñiz, “Control político de los migrantes,” pp. 91-130; Alvarado 
Guevera, Yolhueyliztli, 145-58; and de la Rosa, Netzahualcóyotl, pp. 12-15.  This discussion is 
supplemented with information obtained from an interview with MRC leader Odón Madariaga, May 21, 
2005. 
28 De la Rosa, Netzahualcóyotl, pp. 12-13. 
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an election in 1969, and the PRI’s gubernatorial candidate, Carlos Hank González, sent a 
representative, Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza, to try to contain and, if possible, co-opt the 
movement.  By 1971, the MRC’s key leaders had joined the National Peasant 
Confederation (CNC) of the PRI and, although they accepted the legitimacy of the party, 
they were allowed to have a separate base from which to maintain the movement.  As 
several leaders grew closer to the PRI, the movement split, in 1972, and leaders chose 
different political strategies.  The movement’s original leader, Artemio Mora Lozada, 
joined the city council, supported by the PRI’s popular sector (CNOP), and was largely 
ostracized from the MRC. In contrast, the majority of members followed Odón 
Madariaga and maintained a slightly more combative participation in the party through 
the CNC.29 
In 1972 the MRC finally won its principal demand: the state government, now led 
by Hank González,30 approved a state trust, FINEZA (Fideicomiso por Nezahualcoyótl), 
to buy out the fraccionadores at market value, resell the land to residents at subsidized 
cost, and install services.  Capitalized with 600 million pesos, FINEZA purchased 49,263 
lots from the fraccionadores and then resold them to residents.31 In comparison to the 
municipality, which had, by one account,32 a budget of around ten million pesos per year 
 
29 However, the MRC under Odón Madariaga managed to help the governor impose a candidate for mayor 
of mutual convenience to both in the 1972 elections over the objections of the local PRI.  The candidate 
had been the governor’s most recent representative in the successful negotiations with the MRC.  The MRC 
thus both won spaces for a key political ally and maintained a margin of autonomy from the local PRI.  On 
this point, see Alvarado Guevara, Yolhueyliztli, pp. 150-51. 
30 The son of Carlos Hank González, Jorge Hank Rhon, would eventually become mayor of Tijuana in 
December 2004. 
31 Alvarado Guevara, Yolhueyliztli, pp. 154-55.  There were 142,747 legal lots in Neza in 1986, according 
to statistics in the Mayor’s annual report.  A rough calculation, therefore, suggests that over a third of the 
land titles sold up to that point came through FINEZA in the 1970s.  (Many other lots had already been 
purchased in the 1960s or were purchased after FINEZA ceased operation.)  The number of lots is cited in 
Arzaluz, “Participación ciudadana,” pp. 294-95. Did FINEZA sell the lots a lower prices than the 
fraccionadores would have? 
32 De la Rosa, Netzahualcóyotl, p. 12.  Figure is for 1972, the same year FINEZA was created. 
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and no ability to solve the land problem, FINEZA became, for much of the 1970s, a 
significant figure of public authority in the municipality, rivaling the municipality. 
Pichardo, who had been the first negotiator sent by Hank González, became the president 
of FINEZA, and the trust’s technical committee included three representatives of MRC 
(including Odón Madariaga), one of the fraccionadores, as well as representatives of 
different levels of government and other stakeholders.   
The MRC was by far the largest movement that took place outside the PRI and, in 
the end, it successfully negotiated its members’ demands in return for loyalty to the party 
(and eventually positions for its leaders, who became city council members, local 
legislators, and members of congress later in the 1970s and 1980s).  The price of success 
on a major scale was playing the game according to the rules of the dominant party.  
Timing and strategy had worked in the favor of the MRC.  Following the tumultuous 
1960s, President Luis Echeverría and the state’s Governor were trying to reconstruct 
relations with social organizations that were willing to negotiate with (and ultimately 
support) the PRI.   
There were several movements in the 1970s and early 1980s, however, which 
refused to play by the rules of the game.  As a result, they operated on the margins of the 
PRI, at a much smaller scale, but they also laid the groundwork for changes that would 
take place in the late 1980s and 1990s.  The center-right PAN, for example, maintained 
an independent base, largely in the less destitute north of the city and was able to gain 
adherents among a few economically successful residents.  A few political parties of the 
left also operated on a smaller scale, including the Communist Party (PCM) and the 
trotskyist Workers’ Party (PMT), as well as the much smaller Revolutionary Workers’ 
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Party (PRT) and the Socialist Workers’ Party (PST).   
Similarly, several social organizations engaged in independent action on a small 
scale.  Although their margin for maneuver was always limited and they left no 
institutional legacy, they sowed the seeds for changes that were yet to come in the city.  
One group of Jesuit priests, for example, led by Martín de la Rosa started the 
organization Servicios Populares, A.C. (Popular Services, SEPAC) in 1969 to train 
leaders of popular struggles.  Influenced by liberation theology and the work of the 
Brazilian educator Paolo Freire, who stressed that people should take development into 
their own hands rather than be the objects of other peoples’ actions, SEPAC eventually 
lost the support of the more conservative clergy in Ciudad Nezahualcóytol and separated 
from the Catholic Church.  During the 1970s, SEPAC started a monthly bulletin, El 
Despertar del Pueblo (“the awakening of the people”), a popular film series, food 
cooperatives, and the city’s first popular school.  SEPAC spawned an organization, the 
Unión de Colonias de Nezahualcóyotl (UNICON), dedicated to fighting for land titles 
and public services.  Most of the leaders of current social organizations in Neza 
interviewed for this project cited SEPAC as a significant influence in the formation of 
independent social organizations in Neza.33 
Another organization, which years before had split from the PRI, the Unión 
General de Obreros y Campesinos del Estado de México (General Union of Workers and 
Peasants of the State of Mexico, UGOCM), began a strategy, parallel to the MRC, of 
forcing the state to intervene against the fraccionadores. The UGOCM  argued that the 
area that the city now occupied had been declared communal lands by Mexco’s liberal 
 
33 On SEPAC, see Rivera, “Planificación Urbana Municipal,” pp. 122-25 and de la Rosa, Netzahualcoyótl.  
Martín de la Rosa, no longer a Jesuit, would go on to teach at a university in Tijuana and eventually 
become the chief architect of the COPLADEM described in Chapter 7.   
286
President Benito Juárez in 1862 and that this decree had been reaffirmed by President 
Plutarco Elias Calles after the Revolution.  As such, the fraccionadores could not 
rightfully have purchased the land.  Through targeted lawsuits and payment strikes, 
UGOCM succeeded in getting a few neighborhoods in the city declared property of the 
state and resold to residents at a lower price.34 The UGOCM, though independent from 
the PRI, succeeded largely because it kept its actions small and operated with the support 
of the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), a small party that was separate from but close to 
the PRI and used by political leaders to create the impression of political pluralism.  The 
UGOCM would lose momentum towards the end of the 1970s, but it would reemerge as 
an important force in the 1990s when its new leader became the first PRD mayor of 
Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl. 
A group of students influenced by the 1960s student movement started a Maoist 
organization, the Frente Popular Independiente (Independent Popular Front, FIPI) in 
1974.35 FIPI developed in the eastern parts of Mexico City, as well as Neza, where it 
focused on fighting for land titles and services and against the rise in transportation 
prices.  The group divided in 1979 over whether to participate in the elections (and 
following the death by torture of the organization’s leader) but reemerged in 1980, 
joining forces with a local popular school in the Villada neighborhood of Neza.  The FIPI 
and the Jesuit-inspired UNICON, were part of the burgeoning Urban Popular Movement 
in Mexico that brought together urban social organizations from cities throughout Mexico 
 
34 Rivera, “Planificación Urbana Municipal,” pp. 113-115, and interview with UGOCM leader Valentín 
González Bautista, October 4, 2005. 
35 I base the  description of the FIPI and its successor organizations (UCP-MRP and UPREZ) on an 
interview with Felilpe Rodríguez, local congressman and historical leader of the UPREZ nationally and in 
Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, May 20, 2005; Rivera, “Planificación Urbana Municipal,” pp. 118-19; and the 
pamphlet printed by UPREZ “Los siete aspectos que debes saber de la UPREZ” (“seven things you should 
know about UPREZ”). 
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(including Tijuana’s CUCUTAC, see chapter 7).  By 1987, the organization had 
metamorphosed once again, acquiring its current name and identity, Unión Popular 
Revolucionario Emiliano Zapata (Emiliano Zapata Popular Revolutionary Union, 
UPREZ).  The UPREZ would go on to play a decisive role in the 1996 PRD victory and 
subsequent leftist governments in the city. 
 Many of these independent groups played only small roles in the struggle for 
social change in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl in the 1970s and early 1980s.  Their possibilities 
for action were severely reduced by the almost complete dominance of the PRI and the 
unwillingness of this party to deal with any organization that did not accept a degree of 
loyalty to it.  In 1981, however, a state constitutional change allowed for representatives 
of minority parties to have seats in the city council.  This led to the PAN winning both 
minority party seats in 1982 (chart 8.1).  In 1985, when another constitutional change had 
expanded to three the minority seats, the PAN repeated in one, the PARM (a small party 
close to the PRI) took another, and a coalition of left-wing parties -- the Mexican 
Socialist Party (PMS) -- won the third one.  The small but hegemony-breaking presence 
of the PAN and the Mexican left in the council presaged even bigger changes just around 
the corner (Figure 8.9).  
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Table 8.1: Mayors and City Council in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, 1964-1996 
Term No. Mayor  
PRI 




1964-1966 1 Jorge Sánez Knoth 1 síndico       (4 total) 
3 regidores    
0
1967-1969 2 Francisco González Romero 1 síndico       (6 total) 
5 regidores    
0
1970-1972 3 Gonzalo Barquín Díaz 1 síndico       (6 total) 
5 regidores    
0
1973-1975 4 Oscar Loya Ramírez 1 síndico       (6 total) 
5 regidores    
0
1976-1978 5 Eleazar García Rodríguez 1 síndico       (6 total) 
5 regidores    
0
1979-1981 6 José Luis García García 2 síndicos      (9 total) 
7 regidores    
0
1982-1984 7 Juan Alvarado Jacco 2 síndicos      (9 total) 
7 regidores 
2 PAN    (2 total) 
1985-1987 8 José Lucio Ramírez Ornelas 2 síndicos    (11 total) 
9 regidores   
1 PAN    (3 total) 
1 PSUM 
1 PARM 
1988-1990 9 José Salinas Navarro 2 síndicos 
9 regidores 
1 PAN   (3 total) 
1 PMS/PSUM 
1 PDM 
1991-1993 10 Juan Gerardo Vizcaíno Covián 2 síndicos 
11 regidores 
5 total  
1994-1996 11 Carlos Viña Paredes No data No data 
Sources: Moises Raúl López Laines, Nezahualcóyotl: Perfil Político, Anailisis y Alternativas, Ciudad  
Nezahualcóyotl: Imprenta San Diego, 1989; Emilio Alvarado Guerara, Yolhueyliztli: Historia de 
Nezahualcóyotl, Mexico, D.F.: Editorial ARIES, 1996. 
 







PRI 72.2% 88.0% 70.0% 66.9%
PAN 19.4% 7.7% 15.8% 17.1%
Other parties 8.4% 4.3% 14.2% 16.0%
1978 1981 1984 1987
Note: Percentage for parties is of valid votes.  Invalid votes were often quite high (23.8% in 1978, 15.6% in 
1981, 7.9% in 1984, and 5.8% in 1987, which may suggest a silent protest against the electoral rules). 
Voter participation is calculated based on total votes against registered voters. 
Source: Adapted from Tosoni García, “Acerca de cómo participan los excluídos,” Appendix, Table no. 16 
(no page number), based on statistics available at the Centro de Estadística y Documentación Electoral of 
the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana 
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Political Opening (1988-1996) 
 
An outside observer of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl in 1987 would probably have seen 
little change in the ongoing dominance of the PRI and the traditional clientelistic forms of 
politics.  However, the multiple struggles that had taken place around the margins of the 
dominant party, including both the MRC and the autonomous social and political 
organizations, had created political fissures that were being exacerbated by the severe 
economic crisis Mexico had been suffering since 1982.  When Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas 
bolted from the PRI in 1988 and ran a left-of-center candidacy for president, his 
campaign brought together many of the disparate movements at the margins of the PRI 
and exposed the fissures.  Odón Madariaga, erstwhile leader of the MRC, who had since 
served in Congress and the City Council but now found himself marginalized from the 
PRI, organized the Cárdenas campaign in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl and ran for Congress 
himself on the ticket of one of the parties supporting Cárdenas.  The UPREZ, UGOCM, 
and the PMT, which had developed a small but dedicated following, all joined the 
campaign as well.  To everyone’s surprise, Cárdenas won handily in Ciudad 
Nezahualcóyotl, defeating PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari by 56.1% to 23.4% 
(with a respectable 11.1% for the PAN’s Manuel Clouthier; see Figure 8.10).  Madariaga 













Manuel Clouthier (PAN) 11.1%
Percent of the Vote
Source: Adapted fromTosoni García, “Acerca de cómo participan los excluídos,” Appendix, Table no. 16 
(no page number), based on statistics available at the Centro de Estadística y Documentación Electoral of 
the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana 
The PRI’s first loss in Ciudad Nezahualcoyótl—and by a sizeable margin—
caused significant reflection within the local PRI.  The party conducted an extensive 
survey to gauge citizens’ attitudes toward the party and underwent self examination with 
respect to  its internal rules for selecting candidates.36 The analysis revealed that 
undemocratic practices within the party, the dominance of a few leaders, and the failure 
to reflect new citizen demands had all contributed to the party’s loss of credibility.  
Nonetheless, several PRIistas interviewed observed that the party failed to correct these 
problems after 1988.  Indeed, the same issues would contribute to the party’s definitive 
loss in municipal elections eight years later.37 
However, if the PRI had trouble learning the right lessons from the election and 
 
36 The results are published as López Laínes, Nezahualcóyotl. 
37 Interviews, Hector Pedroza, Arcadio López, and Luis Pérez, all April 23, 2005.  See also Duhau and 
Schteingart, “El primer gobierno perredista,” p. 190-91. 
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changing course, the left had even more trouble maintaining its loose coalition.  Many of 
the principal leaders who had supported Cárdenas came together in 1989 to found the 
Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD); however, the leaders of some of the parties that 
had supported his candidacy refused to join.  The new party, with few resources and still 
weak institutional structure, failed to make major gains in Mexico in its first few years.38 
Similarly, in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, the PRD struggled over the next two elections to 
maintain a fraction of its votes from 1988 (winning only 15.8% and 13.7% in 1990 and 
1993 respectively).  The coalition that had supported Cárdenas’ presidential bid split up 
and most of the social organizations returned to their primary tasks of community 
organizing.  Other key leaders from the 1988 coalition, including Odón Madariaga, soon 
left the PRD or never joined at all.39 The PRI won the next two municipal elections, each 
time by a large margin (see Figure 8.8).  








PRI 44.3% 54.1% 27.7%
PRD 13.9% 13.0% 32.6%
PAN 12.7% 12.0% 22.6%
1990 1993 1996
Note: Percentage of total vote.  In 1990, many Cárdenas supporters cast blank ballots as a protest. 
Source: Compiled from statistics of the Instituto Electoral del Estado de México, election results for 
various years available at www.iiem.org.mx.   
 
38 See Kathleen Brun, Taking on Goliath, op. cit. 
39 Madariaga joined the PRD and ran for mayor in 1990, but after losing left the party and largely retired 
from politics.  Interviews, Odón Madariaga and Hector Bautista. 
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Despite the failure of the left to capitalize on the 1988 victory, these elections and 
their aftermath proved a turning point for many of the social organizations that had 
participated.  These elections forced the state and federal government to change electoral 
laws to include more representation of minority parties as a means of ensuring legitimacy 
in the eyes of public opinion.  One of the organizations that took advantage of the new 
political climate was the Movimiento Vida Digna (Movement for a Dignified Life), born 
out of the socialist PMT in the early 1980s with the realization that political struggle 
needed to be “accompanied by the necessity of the stomach.”40 The group had begun in 
the Aguilas neighborhood, where they joined the fight for land titles and services.  
MOVIDIG, originally under a different name, had eventually become involved in 
distributing coupons throughout the city for subsidized food, supplied water to 
communities left without services during the 1985 earthquake, and later worked to obtain 
subsidized homes for people who lacked their own property.  The leaders of the 
organization participated in the 1988 campaign for Cárdenas, but soon returned to their 
community organizing work, although with a new commitment to electoral involvement.   
When the government cancelled the coupons for subsidized food (known as 
tortibonos) after the elections, MOVIDIG switched strategy and began food cooperatives 
throughout Neza, pooling resources to buy food in bulk and distributing it at low prices to 
their members.  The membership grew until the organization was in every neighborhood 
of the city.  With the success of its cooperative, MOVIDIG ran candidates for and in 
1987, 1990, and 1993 won city council seats under the minority representation rule.  The 
 
40 This account of MOVIDIG is based on interviews with two of the organizations’ historical leaders 
Hector Bautista, now a member of Congress and secretary of organization of the PRD, and Cirilo Revilla, 
director of Administration in the municipality.  The quote is from Revilla, interview, May 19, 2005. 
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presence of MOVIDIG members on the city council marked an important turning point.  
With the salary of the council member, Hector Bautista (later mayor of Neza) and the 
support he was able to negotiate from the city government, MOVIDIG was able to invest 
in trucks to carry goods for the cooperative and strengthen their institutional 
infrastructure.  Their second city council member defected from the movement (and the 
PRD), but with their third council member, Cirilo Revilla (now a municipal official), they 
were able to continue to strengthen MOVIDIG. 
Other movements blossomed at the same time, inspired by the new climate of 
openness, political pluralism, and the experience of the 1988 elections.  The UPREZ, 
described earlier, started its first “popular school” in 1987 to make up for the lack of 
official schools in one of the neighborhoods.41 This innovation marked a switch away 
from their traditional struggle for services and housing.  The UPREZ also joined 
Cárdenas’ coalition in 1988 and joined the PRD the following year.  Of more recent 
creation, the Movimiento de Liberación Nezahualcoyotlense (Neza Liberation 
Movement, MLN), was born in 1990 in the aftermath of the Cárdenas campaign.  
Even while the PRD languished in the aftermath of the 1988 elections, several of 
the principal movements that had supported Cardenas’ campaign were hard at work 
consolidating their social and political base in the new climate of openness and electoral 
competition.  Independent movements could rarely make their demands heard to 
authorities in the 1970s and early 1980s if they did not accept a degree of loyalty to the 
PRI; the PRI as a near monopoly party saw no reason to deal with those who would not 
 
41 Interview with Felipe Rodríguez, local congressman and historical leader of the UPREZ in Ciudad 
Nezahualcóyotl.  See also Rivera, “Planeación Urbana Municipal,” pp. 173-75, and Shteingart and Duhau, 
“El primer gobierno perredista,” pp. 187-88.  By 2005 UPREZ had opened 57 popular schools in 10 
municipalities, with a significant number in Neza, according to Rodríguez. 
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accept their “rules of the game.”  In contrast, in the 1990s, when political competition 
was a reality (if still unequal), PRI governments were willing to deal with opposition-
supported organizations to keep them within reach of their control and, if possible, co-opt 
them.  As Hector Bautista of the MOVIDIG noted, the communities “where MOVIDIG 
mobilized were urbanized more quickly…that is why the social organizations grew, 
because the PRI gave something [to us]...”42 
In 1996, the principal social organizations, MOVIDIG, UPREZ, MLN, and 
UGOCM, decided to launch a joint candidacy in the municipal elections.  None of the 
organizations thought they could win, so they proposed Valentín González Bautista, 
leader of the UGOCM, to run for mayor, and divided up the city council candidacies 
among the major organizations. 43 The UGOCM had been one of the leading semi-
independent organizations in the 1970s,44 but by 1996 it had a minimal presence in the 
city. The MOVIDIG made an alliance with the UGOCM to promote González’s 
candidacy, but it appears to have met with little opposition (even though González was 
not even a PRD member at the time).  In the previous elections, the PRD had waged a 
lackluster campaign with little unity among the social organizations; this time, they 
banded together and González turned out to be a surprisingly effective candidate.  
Perhaps most importantly, the PRD-affiliated organizations had grown in strength and 
stature while the PRI had continued to lose credibility with the society in general.45 At 
 
42 Hector Bautista, interview. 
43 Hector Bautista, interview. See also the descriptions by Duhau and Schteingart, “El primer gobierno 
perredista,” 188-89; and Arzaluz, “Participación Ciudadana,” pp. 301 and 301f. 
44 It had been active in pursuing land grants through the legal system.  Though linked to the semi-official 
Popular Socialist Party (PPS), in Neza the UGOCM had been seen as fairly independent from the PRI. 
45 One account written by a PRIista shortly before the 1996 election notes that the 1993-96 PRI 
administration in Neza was seen as particularly corrupt and unresponsive to social demands.  Several PRI 
members interviewed noted that the party had continued to put forward the same candidates—or their 
relatives—over and over again, thereby creating frustration among many PRIistas who saw no chance to 
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the same time, in 1996 Cuautémoc Cárdenas, the erstwhile presidential candidate of the 
left, had launched his bid to become the first elected mayor of Mexico City.  Although 
the Mexico City election, in which Cárdenas won, took place several months after the 
election in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, the simultaneous campaigns in both cities helped 
raise the profile of the PRD in voters’ minds.46 The election produced a surprise result: 
the PRD won over a third of the votes with the PRI and PAN close behind.  Under the 
State of Mexico’s electoral rules, this meant that the PRD was entitled to the mayor’s 
office and a majority of city council seats.  For the first time in the city’s history, a party 
other than the PRI would govern.  This change would also coincide with the push in 
Mexico to strengthen municipal governments.  What would these changes mean for 
democratic governance in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl?  
 
8.4 How Much Decentralization (1996-2005)? 
 
The story of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl since 1996 has been one of increasing 
political pluralism and steadily strengthened municipal structure and finances.  The PRD 
would win municipal elections again in 2000 and 2003, garnering an outright majority of 
votes in 2003.  Neza had truly become a PRD bastion—just at the time that municipal 
finances and functions expanded dramatically.   
 
break into leadership roles in the party.  Alvarado Guevara, Yolhueyliztli. This view was echoed by several 
PRI leaders interviewed: Hector Pedroza, Arcadio López, and Luis Pérez, April 23, 2005 
46 Interview, Odón Madariaga. 
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Authority and Autonomy  
 
The municipality of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl has always struggled to raise 
revenue.  Since there is little industry and most inhabitants work outside the city, the 
municipality has few options for leveraging local revenues compared to other cities of its 
size.   Indeed, from 1989 to 1996, total municipal revenue remained almost completely 
static in real terms (Figure 8.12).  Corruption under PRI-affiliated administrations 
appears to have played a major part in this poor performance.  Before 1997, the 
municipal slaughterhouse, stadium, and zoo produced no income for the municipal 
government, and it appears that revenue generated from these sources entered the official 
party’s coffers directly.47 The PRD-affiliated administrations that governed after 1997 
succeeded in increasing locally generated revenue by a third between 1997 and 2002 (see 
Figure 8.13).   
Figure 8.12: Real Municipal Revenue by Source in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, 1989-2002 












1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Transfers Local Revenue Debt Other
Source: Calculations based on data from INEGI, Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos. 
 
47 Duhau and Schteingart, “El primer gobierno perredista,” p. 201. 
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Source: INEGI, Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos. 
 
The increase was particularly noticeable in the first three years when the 
slaughterhouse, stadium, and zoo began to produce revenue.  The municipality also, like 
many of its Mexican and Latin American counterparts, has struggled to collect property 
taxes; fully 42% of residents did not pay any taxes on their property in 2003.48 As a 
result, the boom in municipal finances that began in 1997 was largely the result of 
municipal transfers, especially Ramo 33, which had come to constitute over 40% of 
municipal revenue by 2002 (Figure 8.14).49 Given this influx of new transfers, the city’s 
finances more than tripled in real terms between 1997 and 2002 (Figure 8.12, above).50 
48 Plan de Desarrollo Municipal 2003-2006, pp. 151-52. 
49 Ramo 33 has constituted over 40% of municipal revenue since 1999 (it was 35% in 1998).  It has 
oscillated between 41% to 46% since 1999.  Author’s calculations based on the graphs presented. 
50 In absolute terms the increase in the municipal budget was almost five times, from 217 million to one 
billion pesos from 1997 to 2002.  Author’s calculations based on figures in INEGI, Sistema Municipal de 
Base de Datos. 
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FORTAMUNDF 91 195 224 247 282 290 318
FAISM 30 45 57 68 54 57 61
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: INAFED, “Finanzas Públicas Locales,” available at www.inafed.gob.mx.
The influx of federal revenues has meant a rapid growth in the municipality’s 
ability to respond to pressing demands without negotiating ad hoc agreements with the 
state and federal governments.  This has been particularly important in a period of 
democratic change, where the party in power at the municipal level has few allies in the 
state or federal government.  A review of yearly reports by mayors of Neza in the 1990s 
reveals how much those governments depended on major investment funds granted by 
state and federal authorities in order to be able to achieve investments in infrastructure.51 
The formula-based federal transfers that went into effect after 1997 have allowed the city 
to operate with relative autonomy to set its own priorities.  Since over three-quarters of 
these funds have been part of the FORTAMUNDF, which is essentially discretionary and 
can be used for any municipal government needs, the city was able to pay off a major 
water debt inherited from the PRI governments and to have considerable flexibility in 
setting spending priorities since then.   
51 These annual reports include frequent expressions of gratitude to the federal and state governments for 
investments in roads, electricity, and water systems.  Author’s review of Informes Municipales. 
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As in other cities, however, federal transfers have two significant drawbacks.  The 
first is that although transfers are no longer discretional at the federal level, state 
governments get to set the formula through which they are distributed to the 
municipalities.  This means that discrepancies do exist in how the resources are 
distributed within states.  Nonetheless, the requirement that they be strictly formula-based 
means that they have become increasingly equitable, though not perfectly so.  Ciudad 
Nezahualcóyotl used to receive less than 40% of the state average for per capita federal 
transfers in 1989-1990; today it receives 82% of the state average and roughly around the 
same amount as most other large cities in the state (Figure 8.15).52 
Figure 8.15: Average Federal Transfers to Municipalities in the State of Mexico,  














State Average Ecatepec de Morelos Nezahualcóyotl
Naucalpan de Juárez Tlalnepantla de Baz Toluca
Source: All data from INEGI.  Federal Transfers from Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos.  Population 
figures for 1989-92 from XI Censo General de Población y Vivienda 1990. Population figures for 1993-97 
from Conteo de Población y Vivienda 1995. Population figures for 1998-2002 from XII Censo General de 
Población y Vivienda 2000. 
 
52 In the 1989-92 period, Neza received a quarter of the per capita transfers of Naucalpan and around a half 
of the per capita transfers to Toluca, the state capital.  There remain only minimal differences today.  The 
discrepancy started to change in 1998 with the creation of Ramo 33 and has improved significantly each 
year. 
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 The second drawback of transfers is that the state government can decide on the 
timing of the distribution of funds.  As in Tijuana (chapter 7), the state government has 
often delayed the transfer of funds, and city officials complain that this is often done to 
harass the municipal government and make it difficult for them to plan expenditures. In 
2005, according to city officials the state government delayed the transfer of a new 
program for public security to most of the PRD-affiliated municipalities,.53 
Nonetheless, the scorecard is still overwhelmingly positive for the municipal 
government of Neza in terms of autonomy and authority: they have increased their 
overall revenues by a significant amount and, despite the constrainst of the state 
forumulae and problems with timing,  federal transfers have decreased the degree of 
control that state and federal governments once exercised over transfers to municipalities, 
which has been especially important for a government run by an opposition party.  For a 
municipality that has few sources of local revenue, increased federal transfers have 
provided a new source of authority and the autonomy to make decisions. 
 
8.5 The Impact on Democratic Governance (1996-2005) 
 
System of Representation 
 
Competitive Elections 
Although the PRD has dominated politics in this period, elections have been 
 
53 Interview, Martín Rosales, chief of staff to Mayor Luis Sánchez., May 19, 2005  Mayor Sánchez led a 
several day-protest in the state capital over this. 
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highly competitive (Figure 8.16).  The PRD has won both remaining municipal elections 
(2000 and 2003) and most federal congressional seats; however, the PRI has maintained a 
strong base of support and continually threatens to return to power, while the PAN has 
shown surprising strength, even managing to win, on the coattails of Vicente Fox’s 
presidential campaign, two of the municipality’s five federal congressional seats in 2000.  
Indeed, since 2000, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl has been one of those unusual municipalities 
in Mexico where all three parties actually govern: the PRD in the municipal government, 
the PRI in the state government, and the PAN in the federal government.  This is a far cry 
from the pre-1996 period where the PRI won every municipal election by more than 30 
percentage points while controlling both the state and federal governments.  
 








PRD 32.6% 37.80% 50.70%
PRI 27.7% 26.30% 26.90%
PAN 22.6% 26.60% 15.00%
1996 2000 2003
Note: A change in electoral laws in the State of Mexico shifted the electoral calendar ahead by several 
months.  Instead of holding municipal elections in 1999 and 2002, as would have normally happened, the 
elections took place in 2000 and 2003.  This meant that the term of the mayor in 1997-2000 was lengthened 
by several months.  Note that the PRI went into the 2003 elections in a coalition with the Green Party 
(PVEM) and vote totals reflect the coalition’s total. 
Source: Compiled from statistics of the Instituto Electoral del Estado de México, election results for 
various years available at www.iiem.org.mx.   
 
Considerable doubts remain about the impartiality of the state electoral institute, 
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and shortly before the 2005 gubernatorial elections all of the institute’s counselors were 
forced to resign in the middle of a political scandal and the state congress chose new 
counselors.  Traditionally the PRI has been seen by the opposition as maintaining a tight 
grip over the institute54; however, the forced resignations seem to have met with the 
satisfaction of all the major parties.  Perhaps more importantly, regardless of any doubts 
that might be raised about the institute itself, all major parties (and quite a few smaller 
ones) have continued to win elections in the state.  No opposition politicians in Neza 
seemed to believe that they had lost through fraud.55 
The Mayor and Public Administration 
 The PRD carried out primary elections for its mayoral candidate in both the 2000 
and 2003 elections, a first for any major party in the city.  In 2000, this process involved 
an actual open primary for anyone with a voting card; in the second case, it involved a 
poll to determine the top two candidates followed by an actual election between those 
two candidates.56 The existence of the primary has served to select candidates with a 
strong base of support and give citizens a voice in selecting who governs.  As we will see 
below, the primaries also help determine who runs in the city council elections, which 
provides for greater citizen engagement in council elections than elsewhere in Mexico. 
 
54 Interview, Rodrigo Iván Cortés, congressman and member of the PAN State Council in the state of 
Mexico, March 4, 2005. 
55 Interviews with four city council members of the Carlos Alberto Pérez Cuevas (PAN), April 22, 2005; 
Hector Pedroza (PRI), April 23, 2005; Cesar Pedro López Gómez (PRI), April 23, 2005; and Francisco 
Antio Ruíz López (PRI), April 23, 2005. 
56In 1996, of course, there had been no primary since the PRD-affiliated organizations had little hope of 
winning.   In 2000, MOVIDIG’s leader, Hector Bautista, allied with the MLN, UGOCM, and smaller 
organizations, defeated UPREZ’s leader, Felipe Rodríguez.  In 2003, MOVIDIG was challenged by 
UPREZ, UGOCM, and the MLN in the first round.  In the second round, MOVIDIG built a winning 
coalition with smaller groups while UPREZ won the support of the MLN and UGOCM.  Interview, Felipe 
Rodríguez, May 20, 2005. 
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The first mayor of the PRD, Valentín González Bautista, had a very plural 
municipal administration.  His party lacked qualified candidates for municipal office, so 
he relied on technically trained party members, and some former PRI officials, many of 
them from Mexico City.  To create confidence, he named a comptroller from the PAN 
and a director of urban planning from the PRI.  This approach created considerable 
conflict with other groups in the PRD, especially UPREZ and MLN (but also 
MOVIDIG), which felt excluded from power.57 
The approach to filling government positions changed dramatically in the 
following two governments, which instead decided to consolidate a municipal 
administration made up primarily of PRD members. Hector Bautista, the leader of 
MOVIDIG and the second PRD mayor of Neza (2000-2003), complained that with 
González’s administration: 
 
I didn’t see any difference between a PRIista and a PRDista 
administration…when I arrived, it was important to give a different profile 
to the administration; the party members were going to be in the 
administration.58 
Key positions went to the PRD and especially to members of MOVIDIG.  This pattern 
repeated and intensified itself in the third PRD government of Luis Sánchez (2003-2006), 
in which almost all top-line positions went to members of MOVIDIG. Sánchez reserved 
only a few of the less strategic positions, such as ecology and public relations, for non-
members of MOVIDIG, while making sure to install members of his group in the most 
sensitive or powerful positions (including secretary of the municipality and the directors 
 
57 Duhau and Shteingart, “El primer gobierno perredista,” p. 197; Arzaluz, “Participación Ciudadana,” pp. 
302-04; confirmed in interviews with leaders of PRD-affiliated groups. 
58 Interview, Hector Baustista. 
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of government, finance, administration, and participation, among others).59 
The City Council 
 Electoral laws in the State of Mexico, as in all states, assign a majority of seats in 
the council to the winning party regardless of the vote total.  This has led a significant 
degree of overrepresentation of the PRD in many cases and an underrepresentation of the 
PRI (see Table 8.2).   Despite this, divisions within the PRD make for a complicated and 
occasionally competitive process of decision-making within the city council.  During the 
first administration, Mayor González often found himself at odds with UPREZ and MLN 
and even, for a time, MOVIDIG, after he fired a member of MOVIDIG from his cabinet 
in 1999.  In the last two administrations, there has been less obvious division among the 
PRD council members, but differences among groups are constantly being negotiated.60 
According to former Mayor Hector Bautista, “Up to now, the PRD does not exist [as] a 
militancy, a structure…they [sic] are the movements.”61 The party that has benefited 
most from this state of affairs is the PAN, which has established itself as an erstwhile ally 
of the mayor on key policy matters.  This was true during the first PRD administration 
and continues to be so today.62 The PRI has had a more difficult relationship with the 
PRD, and a much more marginal impact on policy.  According to one PRI council 
 
59 Interview with Cirilo Revilla, director of administration and a historical leader of MOVIDIG.  Confirmed 
in interviews with other municipal officials and current and former city council members.  The one notable 
exception was public security, however, where a director was named from a political group within the 
national PRD (who did not live in Neza or participate in any of the internal groups in the party within the 
city). 
60 Based on interviews with seven current and former members of the city council of all three parties: Alliet 
Bautista (PRD), April 22, 2005; Antonio Zanabría (PRD), April 22, 2005; Felipe Rodríguez (PRD), May 
20, 2005; Carlos Alberto Pérez Cuevas (PAN), April 22, 2005; 
Hector Pedroza (PRI), April 23, 2005; Cesar Pedro López Gómez (PRI), April 23, 2005; and Francisco 
Antonio Ruíz López (PRI), April 23, 2005. 
61 Interview with Hector Baustista. 
62 Interview with Carlos Pérez Cuevas, coordinador of the PAN in the city council (2003-2006), and Duhau 
and Schteingart, “El primer gobierno perredista,” pp. 190-91. 
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member, “We have been able to have influence, but very little.”63 Nonetheless, the PRI 
has often has been willing to negotiate support of major PRD initiatives in return for 
economic support of initiatives that benefit its base.   Moreover, the PRI has been able to 
use its linkages to the state government, still in control of the PRI, to negotiate resources 
for projects that benefit its base.64 
Table 8.2: Overrepresentation in the City Council of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, 1996-2005 
Election 
Year 






1996 Valentín González  PRD 27.7% 13 59.1% +31.4% 
PRI 32.6% 4 18.2% -14.4% 
PAN 22.6% 4 18.2% -4.4% 
2000 Hector Bautista PRD 37.8% 13 59.1% +21.3% 
PRI 26.3% 4 18.2% -8.1% 
PAN 26.6% 4 18.2% -8.4% 
2003 Luis Sánchez PRD 50.7% 13 59.1% +8.4% 
PRI/PVEM 26.9% 6 27.3% +0.4% 
PAN 15.0% 3 13.6% -1.4% 
Note: We have included both síndicos and regidores in this number, but not the mayor.  Though an 
argument could be made that the mayor is technically the “first among equals” in the council, the reality of 
municipal organization suggests otherwise.  There was also a Green Party (PVEM) member in each  period 
1996-2000 and 2000-2003. 
Source: Instituto Electoral del Estado de México, www.ieem.org.mx.
The PRD has used its open primary system, in part, to assign council seats among 
its key factions: MOVIDIG, UPREZ, UGOCM, and MLN.  According to the results of 
the primaries, the various factions negotiate the number of positions each receives within 
the party’s slate for the city council.  65 In some cases, the major factions in the PRD 
have used the quotas they have negotiated in the party list to give spaces to small 
affiliated factions.66 In some cases, the local factions have had to cede spaces to major 
 
63 Interviews with members of the city council. 
64 Interviews with members of the city council. 
65 However, the system is entirely discretional.  For example, the UPREZ, which finished second in the 
2003 primary, ended up without seats in the council.  Interview, Felipe Rodríguez. 
66 This practice is particularly true of MOVIDIG, which gave four seats to small factions in 2003, and to 
UPREZ, which gave two of its four seats to smaller factions in 2000. 
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groups in the national PRD, as well, as part of broader political negotiations.  Since the 
major PRD-affiliated groups that originated in Neza have also become the most important 
political groups within the PRD in the State of Mexico, negotiations for spaces in the 
council often reflect alliances at the state and national level.  As a result, the effect of the 
primaries on the composition of the city council has become increasingly diluted by 
multiple levels of political negotiation among party factions.  Whatever effect primaries 
might have on making the party list system more representative is thus largely lost. 
The operation of the city council is also far less effective than even its fragmented 
composition would suggest.  The council primarily performs the function of bringing 
citizen demands to the municipal administration, the real decision maker, and that only in 
a highly sectarian way.  The council is not a venue for rational scrutiny of proposals and 
forging an agreement on policy. Although commissions exist to cover most of the major 
responsibilities of the council, they rarely, if ever, meet and commission leadership seems 
to be largely used to obtain specific benefits for particular a social group or sector of a 
party.67 There was significant activity at the outset of the first PRD government, when 
the council debated and created regulations and even drafted and passed their own 
internal council regulations68 However, activity has slowed considerably since that time, 
despite occasional issues that generate debate (such as the approval during the second 
administration of a land grant to a private university to set up installations in the city).   
 Perhaps most telling is how the mayor and municipal administration see the city 
council and how the council members see themselves.  In the 2003 elections, MOVIDIG 
 
67 Commissions in theory consist of a president, a secretary, and two to four other members.  This 
paragraph is based on interviews with the current and former council members cited earlier except where 
noted. 
68 Apparently suggested by a councilmember of the PAN and based on the council regulation of Tijuana 
(Arzaluz, “Participación Ciudadana, p. 356 and 356f). 
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chose not to run a single candidate for the council and ceded all of the seats they had 
negotiated to other small groups close to them.  At the same time, they retained almost all 
of the leading administrative leadership positions for themselves.  MOVIDIG’s leaders 
consider the administrative positions far more significant than the council.  According to 
one historic leader of MOVIDIG who serves in the administration, “The city council sets 
a general outline of what to do (lineamientos generales), but it is not involved in 
operations.”69 One PRI council member noted that “By tradition, the city council seats 
have been centers for receiving demands (centros de gestión).”  The PAN’s council 
coordinator observed that “People see us just as people to bring concrete demands to, not 
as the government” (“la gente nos ve como meros gestores, no como gobierno”).  Several 
PRD council members recognized that they primarily responded to citizen concerns, but 
that these were almost always concrete needs brought to them by neighborhood leaders 
affiliated with their own group within the party.  Major policy issues, they admitted, were 
usually negotiated among the leaders of the factions before they were brought to the 
council.  In sum, the council served primarily as a way for PRD factions and opposition 
parties to maintain a quota of influence within the government and to transmit specific 




Since 1996, the quality of municipal information made public has increased in 
both quality and quantity.  However, there have been ups and downs in this process, and 
 
69 Interview, Cirilo Revilla. 
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citizens still have limited access to knowing how decisions are made by their elected 
authorities.  The city’s three-year development plans have become good sources of data 
on city finances and priorities, especially the 2000-2003 municipal development plan, 
which stands out of the extent of information included.  The mayor’s annual report varies 
in terms of completeness, but this too has become a useful reference point with 
considerable data.  From 1997 to 2000, the municipality produced a bulletin called 
Agenda 33 which published extensive data on the use of Ramo 33 funds (see next 
section).  However, by 2000 the city had also stopped publishing the Agenda 33, and 
these figures have not since appeared in public municipal documents.70 
In 2004, a maverick council member from the PRD and the council’s PAN leader 
succeeded in passing legislation to create a municipal transparency law.71 They used the 
fact that transparency was receiving a great deal of attention in the national press to press 
the issue in the council.  Since citizens in Neza receive most of their information from the 
national press, based in neighboring Mexico City, they had a great deal of exposure to the 
debates about transparency taking place at the time.  These two council members 
included a requirement in the legislation to force the municipality to reveal not only 
salaries but also bonuses and other forms of remuneration that high and mid-level public 
officials receive.  Since mayors often use bonuses to reward supporters, buy off 
opposition votes, and hide funds for political campaigns, this requirement could represent 
a significant change in the practices of governance in the city.72 At the time of this 
writing, the municipality had just implemented the law, and it is too early to know what 
 
70 As far as this author could determine at least.  They are not in the annual municipal report or on the 
webpage and no city council member had seen these figures published either. 
71 Interviews with Council Members Alliett Bautista (PRD) and Carlos Alberto Pérez Cuevas (PAN). 
72 Interview, Pérez Cuevas (PAN)/ 
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impact it will have on governance.  However, it is worth noting that the municipality now 
publishes on its website all salary and bonus information for high and mid-level officials; 
all major legislation and regulations; and an inventory of the documents in each 
municipal office that can be requested by citizens.  One of the council members who had 
proposed the legislation noted that the municipality had done a far more complete job of 
implementing the law than she ever expected.73 With this transparency law, Ciudad 
Nezahualcóyotl has become one of the few municipalities to have its own local 
transparency law and it is the only one of the major cities in the state that has such 
extensive information available on its website.74 However, the law had just gone into 
effect as of this writing and it is as yet too early to evaluate its effectiveness in practice. 
The municipality performs less well in terms of making its ongoing actions 
transparent.  Despite the requirement that city council meetings be public and held at 
least once a week, they appear to be held sporadically.  They are neither announced ahead 
of time nor truly public. As one councilmember noted, “the meetings are public, but the 
meeting room is small and only a few people close to the council members come.”75 The 
city has several small papers that report on the outcome of councils meetings, but rarely 
are reporters inside to cover the debates in council meetings themselves. 
 
73 Bautista, re-interview, September 3, 2005. 
74 Based on a review of the websites of the other major cities in the state in August 2005: Naucalpan, 
Tlanepantla, Ecatepec, and Toluca. 
75 Interview, Alliett Bautista, Council Member (PRD). 
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Opportunities for Participation 
 
The Municipal Development Council (CODEMUN) 
 One of the innovations of the first PRD administration was to activate the 
Community Development Council, known as CODEMUN (Consejo para el Desarrollo 
Municipal), a body that would oversee the funds supplied by Ramo 33 through the 
Municipal Social Infrastructure Fund (FISM).  The CODEMUN is a structure similar to 
the COPLADEM (discussed in chapter 7 for Tijuana), which has as its central function to 
give citizens a voice in deciding how to use funds supplied by FISM and monitor 
implementation.   Under federal law, every municipality is required to have a 
CODEMUN or COPLADEM to receive FISM; however, in most cases, they are fictional 
creatures, stacked with beneficiaries of programs or friends of the mayor to ensure strict 
government control.76 In the case of Neza, however, the first PRD administration 
decided to hold open elections in public assemblies for twenty-five Neighborhood Social 
Development Councils (five in each of the five federal electoral districts).  Each 
neighborhood council would then send a representative to the CODEMUN, which would 
also include a representative of the city council, the director of social development, as 
technical secretary, and the mayor as president. 
 It is unclear how democratic the election of the first CODEMUN was; however, 
the result was an intense, public, and often participatory process that lasted throughout 
the first PRD administration, often to the frustration of other elected authorities.  The 
election of neighborhood counselors took place with little previous notice, which ensured 
that the PRD won 22 of the 25 councils and the PAN the remaining three, leaving the PRI 
 
76 See chapters 5 and 6.  
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out entirely.77 Each of the PRD counselors had previous organizational experience and 
belonged to one of the PRD’s main political factions (see Table 8.3).   
However, this body proved in some cases to be more independent than even the 
city council and far more visible in its public profile.  The CODEMUN asserted its right 
to decide on which infrastructure projects would get FISM funds from the municipality 
and, although the city council had legal authority in this matter, the CODEMUN 
succeeded in establishing de facto decision-making authority to do so.  The body met 
once a week in highly public sessions, that were frequently well-attended by social 
organizations that had an interest in the outcome of infrastructure decisions. Equally 
significantly, the CODEMUN began publishing its own bulletin, Agenda 33, which 
reported on infrastructure investments with detailed information about decisions, 
expenditures, and completion dates. According to one prominent political leader, the 
CODEMUN “was the “communications system” between the city government and the 
citizens.”78 Nonetheless, like the City Council, the CODEMUN also made decisions 
based on bargaining among factions within the PRD.79 It was far more public than the 
council, but its decision-making process was not terribly different.  Nonetheless, it served 
the purpose of making decisions on community investments a highly public exercise that 
citizens could follow closely. 
 The experiment was not without detractors.  Many political leaders felt that the 
CODEMUN was usurping the authority of the city council.  Although the same 
 
77 This is noted by Arzaluz, “Participación Ciudadana,” p. 346, and confirmed by an interview with a 
former member of the CODEMUN.  The rest of the paragraph is based on Arzaluz, “Participación 
Ciudadana,” pp. 345-71, except as noted. 
78 The original quote is: “Era el correo entre el ayuntamiento y los ciudadanos.” Interview with Felipe 
Rodríguez, historical leader of UPREZ and city council member (2000-2003). 
79 Interviews, Martín Becerra, March 4, 2005, and Arelio Acero, November 18, 2005.  
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CODEMUN remained in functions, officially, through the second PRD administration, it 
quickly lost authority under the government of Hector Bautista.  According to Bautista, 
the CODEMUN and the Citizen Participation Councils (described below) “became an 
opposition…it was very hard to work with them…I went around them; I went to the City 
Council.”  By 2002, the CODEMUN had stopped meeting, but it had lost authority long 
before that.    
In August 2004, the administration of Mayor Luis Sánchez decided to revive the 
CODEMUN, but they took care to keep it firmly under their control and to share the 
benefits widely enough that every political faction and party would be happy.  In a late 
night meeting, the mayor gave each faction a quota of seats to fill in the new CODEMUN 
(see Table 8.3).80 The factions were happy to oblige and named their representatives.  
The PRI took seats related to areas where they felt they were weak and had no other 
representation.  UPREZ was excluded, but the other major PRD factions joined, as did 
the PAN.  In a few cases, sham elections were held to which only those whose faction 
was slated to win showed up; in other cases, no assemblies were held and attendance lists 
were fabricated.  The sharing of the wealth meant that every party and faction could 
guarantee public works projects for their members and clients. A few of the city council 
members were embarrassed by the lack of transparency, but all recognized that it was a 
solution that kept everyone happy.  
 
80 This information is based on interviews with four city council members and several administration 
officials.   
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Table 8.3: Party and Group Affiliation of Members of the CODEMUN, 1998-2004 
Party PRI PAN PRD 
1998-2002 0 3 22 
2004- 6 4 11 
Note: The CODEMUN had 25 members in the first period and only 21 in the second.  In the first period, 
MOVIDIG had 4 seats, UPREZ 5, MLN 4, UGOCM 5, and other groups 5. 
Source: Arzaluz, “Participación Ciudadana,” p. 351, for 1998-2002; for 2004 period, interviews with 
current and former city council members and administration officials.  
The Citizen Participation Councils (Copacis) 
Another ambitious experiment in citizen participation that was started under the 
first PRD government also would turn out to be less participatory than its name might 
suggest, yet still would open up significant spaces that citizens used to organize 
themselves, bring their needs to the city government, and create new channels of 
influence at the margin of old political leaderships.  The Citizen Participation Councils, 
known as Copacis (Consejos de Participación Ciudadana), have existed for well over a 
decade and are required to exist under the state constitution. Under PRI governments, the 
presidents of the Copacis were selected by the PRI’s neighborhood organizations 
(seccionales) or party leaders and were charged with providing intermediation between 
neighborhood concerns and the municipality.81 
In April 1997, however, the new PRD government held open elections in 96 small 
districts for Citizen Participation Councils, made up of five members, including a 
president, secretary, and three counselors, elected on a single list.  In many cases, the 
PRD tried to reproduce the alliance of factions that had brought it to power a few months 
earlier and negotiated lists that included several factions.  In other cases, the PRD divided 
with several factions competing for seats.  In most cases, the PRI and, occasionally, the 
 
81 Based on interviews with three neighborhood leaders who participated in Copacis before 1997. 
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PAN also jumped into the elections.82 Only a fraction of registered voters participated: 
approximately 25,000 voters or 8% of the 312,724 citizens who had voted in the mayoral 
elections a few months before; however, this was still a significant number for a first-
time vote for neighborhood authorities that had few clear functions (see Table 8.4).   
Table 8.4: Citizen Participation Council Elections, 1997 and 2003 
 Total vote 1 list 2 lists 3 lists 4 lists 5 lists 6 lists  7 lists N.D. 
1997 25,000 
(estimate) 





















11% 30% 41% 7% 4% 4% 4% N/A 
Source: Source: Salazar, “La Participación Ciudadana Organizada” and Salazar, “Diagnóstico de los 
Consejos Electos 2003-2006; and internal municipal documents.  Vote total for 2003 cited in Plan 
Municipal de Desarrollo 2003-2006, p. 132.  2000 estimate based on the assertion in the Plan that the 2003 
election represented a 98% increase in voting.  All other figures are estimates based on a sample of Citizen 
Participation Councils (73 of 96 for 1997 and 27 of 79 for 2003), drawn from internal documents of the 
municipality.   
 
Although parties were officially not allowed to get involved in what was supposed 
to be an election for non-partisan citizen counselors, only a handful of lists won that were 
not backed by a faction or candidate affiliated with one of the parties.  In the end, the 
PRD won 64% and the PRI 27% of the councils for which data were available (see Table 
8.5).  The 2000 Copacis elections showed only a slight increase in participation, but the 
2003 elections drew over 66,000 voters, roughly 22% of those who had voted in the 
mayoral election, with significant competition in most districts (which had now been 
reduced to 79; see Table 8.4).  In 2003, the PRD would win 57% of the councils, 
compared to 39% for the PRI (Table 8.5).83 As in the city council and the CODEMUN, 
 
82 Almost three quarters of the districts (73%) surveyed in one internal municipal study revealed 
competition among two or more lists, and almost half (48%) had more than two lists competing.Author’s 
calculations, based on data on the 1997 Copaci election is drawn from Gerardo Salazar, “La Participación 
Ciudadana Organizada,” unpublished manuscript.  Salazar, an anthropologist, would become the municipal 
government’s Coordinator of Citizen Participation shortly after the elections in 1997.   
83 However, a split in one of the PRI’s factions would lead four of the councils to switch from the PRI to 
the PRD a few months after the election.  Interview, Gerardo Salazar, deputy coordinator of  the municipal 
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disputes among the factions within the PRD dominated the Copaci elections as well 
(Table 8.6). 
Table 8.5: Citizen Participation Council Elections, 1997 and 2003, Winning Lists by Party 
 Sample  PRD PRI PAN Independent No Data 
1997 73 (76%) 47 (64%) 19 (26%) 0 (0%) 5 (7%) 2 (3%) 
2003 79 100%) 45 (57%) 31 (39%) 2 (3%) 1 (1%) 0 (0%) 
Note:  Of these, 12 correspond to councils organized by PRI mayoral candidate Antonio Cabello, a former 
member of MOVIDIG. Soon after the election, four of them split from the PRI after one of Cabello’s lead 
organizers formed a new PRD-affiliated group, MAS, and took four of the Copacis with him to the PRD. 
Source: Salazar, “La Participación Ciudadana Organizada” and Salazar, “Diagnóstico de los Consejos 
Electos 2003-2006.  I could not obtain data for the 2000 Copaci elections. 
 
Table 8.6: Citizen Participation Council Elections, 1997 and 2003, Winning PRD Lists by Faction 
 MOVIDIG UPREZ MLN UGOCM  Others Independent
1997 13 (28%) 8 (17%) 2 (4%) 6 (13%) 7 (15%)*  11 (23%) 
2003 11 (24%) 4 (9%) 3 (7%) 7 (16%) 9 (20%)** 11 (24%) 
* Councils close to particular political leaders who had separated from the major groups. 
** Includes smaller groups, such as MOPAVI, UBADEZ, M4, MAX, UGOCM Histórico, and Gente en 
Movimiento. 
Source: Salazar, “La Participación Ciudadana Organizada” and Salazar, “Diagnóstico de los Consejos 
Electos 2003-2006.” Both are unpublished documents cited with the author’s permission. 
Extensive interviews with fourteen neighborhood leaders, including eleven 
Copaci presidents (see Table 8.7), along with interviews with key municipal officials and 
council members and a review of unpublished internal documents of the municipality 
about these organizations, confirm that the Copacis are largely partisan organizations, 
despite the legal framework that forbids parties from getting involved in Copaci 
elections.  Indeed, slates in Copacis elections are usually put together in complex 
negotiations among the key political factions in the PRD and PRI or used by smaller 
factions to show their strength to the large organizations.  One leader of a small faction in 
the PRD noted, for example, that having a Copaci “reaffirms the political space that I 
have” and allows him to negotiate other demands with the municipality.  A PRI Copaci 
leader noted that serving on a Copaci is a “platform to a political career.”  Another 
 
office of Citizen Participation. 
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Copaci leader stated that “The councils are tied to political parties, they work with them, 
through them.” Yet another stated that “here one cannot talk really about a Copaci made 
up of citizens—all are politicians.”84 
Table 8.7: Neighborhood Interviews Conducted, 2005 








Benito Juarez Center 3 1 1 3 
Metropolitana Center 3 0 0 3 
Sol Center 1 1 1 1 
Juárez Pantitlan Center 1 0 1 0 
Virgincitas Center 1 0 0 1 
Maravillas Center 0 1 1 0 
Amplicación 
Revolución 
Center 1 0 1 0 
Reforma Center 1 0 0 1 
Perla South 1 0 1 0 
Campestre 
Guadalupana 
North 1 0 1 0 
Total  11 3 7 9 
Note: All neighborhoods have roughly comparable socio-economic levels and have received land titles 
since the 1980s or before.  The three neighborhood leaders who did not belong to Copacis served in other 
positions in PRD and PRI-affiliated organizations. 
 
This view is echoed by municipal officials who see the Copacis primarily as 
political organizations where they measure the strength of different factions with the 
parties.  Municipal documents about the Copacis invariably refer to them by their party 
affiliation and the specific faction they belong to within the party.  Hector Bautista, the 
former mayor, observed that the Copacis “come out of political agreements; in many 
cases, they do not represent citizens…they are spaces of [political] projection.”85 The 
municipal director of public security stated that he saw little reason to work 
systematically with the councils because they were “a type of political expression…in 
many cases they have a political tilt.”86 MOVIDIG leader and municipal official Cirilo 
Revilla similarly commented that “we do that Copaci thing because it is a legal 
 
84 Interviews, four Copaci leaders, see Table 8.7. 
85 Inteview, Hector Bautista, congressman and former mayor (2000-2003). 
86 Interview, Jorge Amador, director of public security. 
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requirement…the real leaderships are different.”87 
This would seem to be damning evidence that the Copacis are mere 
manifestations of political competition without a role in linking citizens deliberatively to 
each other or to the government.  However, the Copacis do actually appear to play an 
important role as official intermediaries between neighborhood concerns and local 
leaders.  The kinds of demands Copacis deal with are the bread and butter ones of 
neighborhood affairs: broken water pipes, flooding, insecurity, permits for vendors and 
for festivals, broken street lights, and the paving of roads.  They are the everyday issues 
that affect people’s quality of life.  Without an exception—and regardless of party 
affiliation—every neighborhood leader interviewed saw the Copacis as an important 
avenue for resolving community concerns by enabling people to get their demands across 
to those who make the decisions.  They recognized that these organizations existed 
alongside traditional forms of mediation within the different factions of the PRD and the 
PRI. 
Copaci leaders recognized that municipal officials had little interest in the fate of 
the citizen participation councils.  However, they also noted that the Copacis were elected 
community authorities and, therefore, possessed some democratic legitimacy.  One PRI 
Copaci president stated, after noting the city government’s lack of interest in the Copacis, 
“I am the government.”  He noted that even though municipal officials often did not want 
to pay attention to the Copacis, they had to.  As he and others observed, the Copacis have 
official stationery with the seal of the municipality, which they can use to present 
demands to the corresponding agency of the municipal government, and the agencies are 
required by law to give them a response.  This particular leader said that 80% of the 
 
87 Interview, Cirilo Revilla, municipal director of administration. 
318
demands he presented had been met.  Other Copaci leaders of both PRI and PRD 
concurred with this interpretation.  They felt that they were elected neighborhood 
authorities and municipal officials were obliged to respond to listen to them. Another PRI 
council president noted that the council’s development “depends on how innovative a 
person is,” though she added “the government plays with groups of councilors that are of 
their party.” Based on the interviews, it became clear that the government tended to listen 
more to PRD-affiliated Copacis, and these were generally effective because they could 
leverage support from leaders of their party faction in the council or in the administration, 
However, even the PRI councilors felt that they were effective and able to get a hearing 
on most issues.   
 Several neighborhood leaders noted that the Copacis had been more active in the 
first period of PRD government, under Valentín González Bautista (1997-2001), when 
municipal officials met frequently with the councils and conducted a series of health 
campaigns with them.  During this period, there was also a director of citizen 
participation in the municipal government who reported directly to the mayor.  Former 
Mayor González Bautista, now a member of Congress, noted that “participation was the 
basis of everything we did.”88 His commitment to participation may have come in part 
out of his conviction as a social leader.  However, it also seemed to be the result of his 
tenuous position in the mayor’s office; González Bautista was elected mayor by a narrow 
margin from a small faction in the PRD and needed to construct a support base by 
mobilizing citizens. Much as early Tijuana mayors of the PAN felt they needed to 
mobilize citizens through participatory channels to gain legitimacy and establish a 
support base, the first PRD mayor in Neza knew he needed to reach out to citizens in 
 
88 Interview, Valentín González Bautista, October 4, 2005. 
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creative ways if he were to be successful.  After the next two PRD mayors won election 
by larger margins, however, they gradually abandoned the emphasis on the Copacis.  The 
citizen participation director began to report to the municipal secretary (the number two 
official) instead of directly to the mayor and the municipality stopped meeting regularly 
with the Copacis.  These citizen participation councils survived because the law afforded 
them a degree of legitimacy and many of the leaders were tenacious in making sure the 
government listened to them.   
Despite the success of the Copacis in establishing themselves as official 
interlocutors between citizens and the government, they were by no means alone in this 
role.  Indeed, as the interviews with city leaders indicate, the most significant grassroots 
leaderships were those tied directly to the factions within the PRD and the PRI.  Leaders 
of MOVIDIG and UPREZ, in the PRD, and the CNOP (popular sector) of the PRI 
indicated in interviews that they maintained important representatives in each 
neighborhood who were charged with providing links between citizen concerns and the 
faction leaders, who in turn would bring these concerns to the attention of the 
government.89 In many cases, the factions actually have offices within neighborhoods 
where they attend to the demands of citizens; in other cases, the designated faction 
leaders attend to citizens in their place of business or their home (which usually has a 
sign noting the party faction they represent).  On balance, the predominant channels for 
intermediation between citizens and the government remained the informal structures of 
these party factions, tied each to a historical leader of a social movement in the city.  
However, the Copacis have gained a small foothold as an institutionalized channel for 
 
89 Interview with Felipe Rodríguez (UPREZ/PRD); Hector Bautista and Cirilo Revilla (MOVIDIG/PRD); 
and Hector Pedroza and  Luis Pérez Maldonado (CNOP/PRI). 
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intermediation as well.   
For the most part, little public deliberation appears to take place within these 
participatory channels.  However, looks may be deceiving in some cases.  The PRD 
factions in particular emerged out of histories of social struggle by autonomous 
organizations.  Although historical leaders seem to maintain tight control over these 
organizations, there are also legitimate processes of debate and negotiation that go on at 
the neighborhood level among average citizens who belong to these organizations.  
Leaders of the factions appear to maintain highly centralized control over their groups, 
but they also can do so because they listen to demands from the grassroots within their 
factions.  It is possible that some neighborhoods with a history of collective action have 
local deliberative processes and this possibility merits further research.  However, even if 
neighborhood-level processes are, in some cases, deliberative, they have to make 
demands through a political structure that requires bargaining through intermediaries 
within political factions.  Indeed, the line between community deliberation, on one hand, 
and the strategic bargaining of leaders within a competitive political system, on the other 
hand, may at times be hard to draw.  Copaci leaders and local leaders of factions may at 
times represent positions that emerge from processes of collective debate within their 
neighborhoods, but to have any influence on public decisions they have to act within a 
system that requires them to bargain through channels filled with complex processes of 
interest intermediation.  Deliberation and negotiation are by no means exclusive 
possibilities.  What is clear, however, is that the political system itself does not encourage 
broad public deliberation of public matters.  Any deliberation that takes places is within 
neighborhoods or smaller groups and can only be projected into the political terrain 
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The victory of the PRD in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl coincided with a significant 
growth in the city’s authority and autonomy and also contributed to this change.  The 
advent of significant federal transfers multiplied the income of a municipality that had 
subsisted on debt and infusions of resources from the state government.  After 1997, the 
PRD administrations were able to pay off their inherited debt and embark on ambitious 
initiatives to invest in the city’s development.  Moreover, by closing gaps in the 
municipal treasury, where previous administrations had siphoned off city funds for 
partisan purposes, they increased the municipality’s locally generated revenue.  However, 
these achievements also faced serious limitations.  With most of its residents working 
outside the city limits or in informal jobs within the city, the municipality lacked a tax 
base of its own that it could tap.  Therefore, while the municipal government grew 
significantly, it still remained far below other large cities in Mexico in the level of 
municipal expenditure per capita.
As decentralization took roots in Neza, the city was embarking on an ambitious 
experiment in democratic governance.  For the first time in the history of Mexico, a 
coalition of social movements was taking over a large city government and it was 
committed to creating a new model of participatory democracy.  Some of these efforts 
were—at least initially—a clear break with the past.  The city council rose in importance 
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as disputes among factions created real strategic debates in the council for the first time.  
The municipality released a quality of public information far superior to any published 
before.  And the government empowered the municipal development council, an elected 
citizens’ organization, to make decisions on the use of some investment funds and 
charged dozens of Citizen Participation Councils (Copacis) to serve as the official 
conduit for citizen demands to the municipality.  
 The reality of these changes was far less ambitious than it seemed at first, 
however.  The city council soon receded from view as the different factions within the 
PRD reached elite pacts on how to govern together; party leaders negotiated a backroom 
deal to appoint their followers to the Municipal Development Council in lieu of an open 
election; and information that had once been published openly on municipal investments 
soon disappeared from public view.  Real decision-making power came to be held by the 
leaders of the party factions within the PRD, who negotiated strategically most major 
issues before they ever reached the city council or the development council.  The local 
leaders of the PRI and the PAN maintained a quota of influence by deploying their 
relationships with the state and federal governments, respectively, which were in the 
hands of their parties.  The Copacis, which had been an ambitious experiment in citizen 
participation, soon lost their visibility and had to compete with informal power brokers of 
the different party factions who reclaimed their role as the principal intermediaries 
between citizens and the municipality.  Given the significant deficits in public services 
and the uneven access to the legal system, political brokers played a vital role in helping 
citizens make their rights effective.  Few if any autonomous organizations existed and 
almost all collective efforts in the city were tied, in one way or another, to a faction 
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within one of the parties.  By 2005, the landscape of Neza was one of inter-organizational 
bargaining among the three main political parties and among factions within them.   
 Although this style of minimalist democratic governance fell far short of the 
democratic ideal espoused in 1997, it was far ahead of the authoritarian, top-down 
politics that had dominated the city before the PRD’s arrival.  Citizens had highly 
competitive elections and a market of political intermediaries.  They had recourse to 
Copaci leaders, council members, neighborhood representatives of the different PRD 
factions, section presidents in the PRI’s grassroots structure, and dozens of other 
intermediaries who all made some claim on political influence and provided ways in 
which interests and demands got articulated and processed.  Citizens had few institutional 
channels for influencing public decisions, no autonomous spaces outside the parties, and 
few opportunities for deliberating collectively, but they were not hostage to a single 
group or set of groups with exclusive control over political power.  And while the leaders 
of the party factions had final say in most policy decisions, they had to take into account 
their own members as well as the range of other actors who legitimately represented 
voices in the city—smaller PRD-affiliated organizations, PRI-affiliated organizations, the 
PAN, and even the Copacis.  A dense web of social and political interactions, mediated 
by hundreds of community brokers representing different parties and party factions, tied 
leaders and constituents together in a sort of complicity of governance.  It hardly met the 
criteria for good and deep democratic governance laid out in the strong normative ideal of 
this project, but it was a significant advance, nonetheless.  Indeed, the links that social 
organizations maintained to the different political parties helped preserve their influence 
in the political process and gave citizens an ongoing voice in public decision-making, 
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In June 2005, the State of Mexico held gubernatorial elections.  The PRI won 
almost half the votes in the state and more than double the votes of the PRD’s candidate 
for governor, a little known businesswoman name Yeidkol Polevnsky.  The PRD won 
only one municipality in the entire state and did so by a large margin: Ciudad 
Nezahualcóyotl.  The PRD’s method of governance might not be deeply democratic, but 
it appeared to have won the sympathy of the voters nonetheless—at least for the time 
being. And there was still that sense of pride in Neza too—the pride that was still 
associated with having thrown out the once all-powerful PRI.  The voters were not about 









The Paradox of Local Empowerment 
 
9.1 Findings: The Paradox of Local Empowerment 
 
Mexican municipalities have increasingly assumed new functions, powers, and 
resources, and gained a decision-making margin to use these.  Decentralization reforms 
have not been as ambitious in Mexico as in several other countries in Latin America, but 
there is no question that they have empowered municipalities in ways that were almost 
unimaginable two decades ago.  Municipalities have passed from being mere stepping 
stones for political advancement to important government entities with both policy scope 
and political influence.   
Nonetheless, the form of democratic governance that has emerged in these newly 
empowered municipalities is often permeated by authoritarian institutions and practices 
that have carried over from the period of one party-dominant rule.  Although 
municipalities now have competitive elections, elections alone have proved unable to 
produce local governance that makes public authorities responsive and accountable to 
citizens or enables citizens to become engaged in public affairs.  Indeed, because of the 
way local representative systems are structured, elected municipal officials remain 
primarily responsive and accountable to party leaders rather than to citizens, and they 
have few incentives to pursue initiatives that would make public decisions more 
transparent or to create institutional channels for citizen participation.    
Moreover, the clientelistic practices that were once the basis of Mexico’s political 
system remain a powerful legacy that shape political practices today.  These practices 
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create a form of “indirect citizenship” in which individuals can enforce their rights or be 
heard by public authorities only by using political intermediaries.  This phenomenon is 
not merely a case of authoritarian leaders surviving at local levels after they are thrust out 
of power nationally, but rather the permeation of authoritarian practices among the range 
of political actors, old and new, that contest power in Mexico, within the context of a 
political system that creates few incentives for responsiveness and accountability.  The 
fragmentation of civil society and the weak enforcement of citizenship rights conspire to 
sustain these authoritarian practices even with the advent of political competition.  The 
paradox of local empowerment is that simply empowering local governments does not 
necessarily empower citizens locally.  In other words, bringing the government closer to 
citizens does not necessarily bring citizens closer to government. 
 Nonetheless, the three cases explored in this study show that decentralization also 
produces different effects in different contexts of state-society relations.  Where social 
organizations are weak and largely controlled by a single political party, decentralization 
tends to reinforce existing power structures.  Where strong social organizations exist 
prior to decentralization, local empowerment has a greater chance of producing better 
forms of democratic governance.  However, given the party-centric nature of Mexican 
municipalities and the limited degree of integration among social organizations, it 
appears that social organizations with ties to political parties actually may perform better 
at linking citizens to public decision-making than loose organizations with few ties to 






Decentralization to municipal governments is proceeding gradually but 
continuously.  In just over two decades municipalities have gone from being mere 
political appendages of higher levels of government to having their own significant areas 
of authority and autonomy.  They have come a long way since the early 1990s when 
Tijuana launched the first municipal lawsuit against the federal government over 
jurisdictional issues.  Since then, a constitutional change has determined that 
municipalities have their own functions and powers that cannot be revoked or overruled 
by other levels of government.  Moreover, municipal expenditures have risen from 
around one percent of total public expenditures in 1982 to over seven percent today.   
This percentage is far below the participation of municipalities in public expenditures in 
several other countries in Latin America, including Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, and 
Guatemala, but it is significantly higher than only a few years earlier in Mexico and 
roughly comparable to a few other countries, such as Chile and Argentina.1
However, significant challenges remain.  The ability of state governments to 
overrule municipal decisions, although it is prohibited by the constitution, remains a 
ongoing point of contention.  Although federal transfers to municipalities must be based 
on formulas, state governments get to decide which formulas to use.  As a result, state 
governments end up having a great deal of discretion over the formulas used and the 
timing of transfers.  In both the cases of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl and Tijuana, for 
 
1 See Selee, “Introduction,” in Tulchin and Selee, Decentralization and Democratic Governance in Latin 
America. 
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example, state governments have used their discretion over transfers to control or punish 
the municipal government.  The state government withheld resources from Neza, for 
example, because of political differences with the city government.  In contrast, in 
Tijuana both state and municipal governments are of the same party but political 
differences among public officials have led to the withholding of resources.   In the case 
of Chilpancingo, the state government has used its control over resources to influence 
spending priorities of the municipal government.2
At the same time, most municipalities in Mexico have few ways of raising 
significant revenue on their own.  Large cities with significant industry and commerce, 
like Tijuana, have successfully innovated in creating their own sources of revenue.  But 
smaller and medium-sized municipalities, like Chilpancingo, and large municipalities 
with little local industry or commerce, like Neza, have come to depend overwhelmingly 
on federal largesse.   Indeed, municipalities under 100,000 inhabitants receive over 80% 
of their revenue, on average, from federal transfers.  Medium-sized cities (100-500,000 
inhabitants) receive 63% of their revenue, on average, from federal transfers, while even 
large cities (over 100,000) receive a slight majority of their revenue, on average, from 
these transfers.3 Federal transfers have played an important role in equalizing municipal 
revenues across municipalities of different sizes.  However, given the degree of 
arbitrariness in how states assign (and channel) these transfers, the dependency on 
transfers has also limited the autonomy of municipal governments.  The alternative of 
requiring greater autonomy in revenue-generation would be likely to increase inequality 
 
2 These problems are similar to those of Argentinean municipalities, where state governments have even 
greater discretion over transfers.  However, other countries in the region, including Bolivia and Brazil, have 
developed ways of avoiding this problem by transferring a set percentage of tax revenues from the national 
government to the municipalities without passing through intermediate levels of government. 
3 Data from Figure 5.14. 
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among municipalities sharply.  
Chart 9.1 summarizes the state of decentralization—the independent variable in 
this study—according to the indicators set out in Chapter 3. 
 
Chart 9.1: Findings on Decentralization 
Variables Indicators  Findings 
Authority The change in functions that municipal 
governments perform. 
Whether municipal governments have 
exclusive or overlapping responsibility 
for new functions. 
The change in powers municipalities 
have for determining regulations and 
other policies within their jurisdiction.  
Whether new functions and powers are 
mandated by constitutional changes, 
new laws, or just administrative 
decrees. 
Whether municipalities have sufficient 
resources to carry out their functions 
and powers. 
Significantly increased functions; most 
municipalities are assuming responsibility for 
key core functions, planning, and occasionally 
additional functions once reserved to the state. 
Most functions are exclusive for municipalities. 
Municipalities have increasing powers to set 
regulations; recent court case bars states from 
overruling, but it is too early to gauge the impact 
of the ruling. 
Most changes in federal and state constitutions; 
few state constitutions go beyond the federal 
minimum set of functions and powers, however. 
Municipalities have increasing resources but it is 
still less than the needs overall. 
Autonomy The percentage of revenue that is locally 
raised and not subject to control by 
other levels of government. 
The percentage of transfers that are non-
discretional and unconditional (set in 
formulas with clear timing for 
transfers). 
The degree of borrowing authority that 
municipal governments have. 
Whether municipalities have broad 
policymaking discretion for deciding 
their expenditures. 
Whether local authorities can be removed 
by higher level authorities or their 
decisions reversed. 
Percentage of local revenue is limited, except for 
largest municipalities 
Transfers are increasingly set by formula, but they 
still leave discretion to the states for altering 
formulas, timing;  situation is much better for 
municipalities than in mid-1990s 
Municipalities are gaining increased borrowing 
authority, with approval of state legislatures; 
however, only a very few large or wealthy 
medium-sized cities can take advantage of 
private borrowing. 
Most municipalities now have powers to decide 
their own expenditures without outside review; 
more reporting requirements on Ramo 33 might 
actually be appropriate for accountability. 
It is increasingly difficult for state authorities to 
remove mayors/councils as was common before. 
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Democratic Governance 
Proponents of decentralization have argued that it might enhance representation 
by empowering elected authorities who are closer to citizens, more likely to know their 
preferences, and more likely to be held to account by citizens at election time.  Moreover, 
government would be more transparent since citizens would be able to monitor the 
actions of their elected authorities more easily in local spaces.  In addition, increased 
local decision-making would facilitate citizens’ participation in public affairs, especially 
their ability to engage with each other and with authorities in public deliberation and 
decision-making.  Skeptics have worried that decentralization would, on the contrary, 
open government to capture by elite factions or create governments that were too 
institutionally weak to be effective. 
I find evidence that neither the promise nor the perils of decentralization are being 
realized.  Local governments mostly do have competitive elections, publish some 
information on their decisions, and have channels for citizens to make their views known.  
However, these systems rarely work as well as they could and ultimately produce 
governance that limits responsiveness and accountability and excludes citizens’ active 
participation in public affairs. 
 
Systems of Representation 
Representation in Mexican municipalities is far stronger than it was previously. 
Competition is pervasive and over three-quarters of municipalities, where 85% of 
Mexicans live, has seen at least one change in political party.  Even 70%  of small rural 
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municipalities (with under 15,000 inhabitants) and 88.8% of those between 15,000 and 
100,000 inhabitants have had at least one change of political party in power since 1983.  
This finding appears to contradict the idea that municipalities are redoubts of the old one-
party system in an otherwise plural democracy.  Despite fears that local governments are 
given to dominance by single leaders or groups, most Mexican municipalities appear to 
be experiencing considerable competition among several political parties.  In the three 
cases explored here—all medium to large municipalities—at least two parties compete 
actively at all times and each party has competition among distinct groups within it.  
These cities all appear to have multiple and overlapping cleavages that are expressed 
through political competition.  I would leave open the possibility that small 
municipalities might be more given to dominance by a single leader or faction (i.e., elite 
capture), but the evidence on competition suggests that this is not the case even in a 
majority of smaller municipalities. 
Despite advances in competition, all municipalities, regardless of the party in 
power, suffer from the legacy of authoritarianism.  Rules of the old order remain in 
effect: supermajorities for the winning party, party lists, no independent candidacies, and 
no reelection.  During the period where one party, the PRI, was hegemonic, these rules 
served to ensure local politicians’ loyalty to the party hierarchy and to higher level 
officials in the state and federal government.  However, today these same rules sharply 
limit the democratic potential of municipalities.  They keep council members subservient 
to the mayor or to the party; ensure mayor’s subservience to party or to higher level 
authorities with influence in his party; and keep citizens from knowing (or caring) who 
their council members are.   
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Even though most municipalities (62.2%) do not have a majority party, one party 
always controls the municipal government, and the second party is almost always heavily 
underrepresented in the council.  Minority parties are thus forced to rely on two- or three-
level games to have a voice in council proceedings, using their influence with members 
of their party in the state congress or national government. Despite the strength of the 
PRD in Chilpancingo and the PRI in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, for example, their real 
influence has come from appealing to their party’s strength at the state level.  The PAN in 
both cities, though a smaller party, has been effective at becoming a channel to federal 
authorities, who belong to the same party and control key resources for the municipality.  
In Tijuana, where the PAN controlled both the city and state government in the period of 
study, the PRI relied on divisions within the PAN during some years to leverage 
influence by blocking legislation.   
In all municipalities, the winning party governs with a slate of city council 
members who are selected by party leaders or the mayoral candidate and thus have no 
personal political base or direct connection to citizens.  Even in cases, such as Tijuana, 
where the governing party (PAN) decided to allow primaries for council member slates, 
this provision only allowed only slightly more than one percent of the electorate, who 
were members of this party, to participate in selecting the slate.  Moreover, the 
prohibition on independent candidacies gives the parties a monopoly over political 
power.  In a system where entry to these parties is seriously restricted, party leaderships 
preserve tight control over political power and citizens’ options for political participation 
are restricted.  The combination of closed, hierarchical parties and rules that grant a 
monopoly of control over candidacies to these parties leads to a system that is only 
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weakly responsive and accountable.  The prohibition on reelection compounds these 
weaknesses by making politicians more concerned with appealing to party leaders (or 
party notables), who determine a politician’s next opportunity, rather than to voters who 
could reward or punish them for their performance in their current office.4
Decentralization may well improve the quality of representation, by reducing the 
distance between citizens and their elected authorities, but only if electoral rules create 
the right incentives for these authorities to listen to their constituents and the means for 
voters to reward or punish them at the ballot box.  Ironically, both federal and all state 
congressional elections in Mexico follow rules that mix single-member districts with 
proportional representation.5 These systems perform far better than the municipal party 
lists because they ensure both the direct election of representatives and a composition of 
the legislature that reflects the relative strength of the various political parties.  The 
federal and state elections also suffer from serious design flaws that undermine 
responsiveness and accountability, including prohibitions on reelection and independent 
candidacies.  Nonetheless, they are far more effective than municipal elections at 
providing effective representation. 
 
Transparency 
The quantity and quality of information that municipalities report to citizens have 
 
4 Party list systems are very common in Latin America—and in other recent democracies, including several 
in Africa.  In a few cases, however, the worst effects of party lists are somewhat mitigated by having low 
barriers to entry into parties (e.g. Uruguay).  In these cases, elections are through party lists but party 
hierarchies have little control over who is a candidate.  Colombia recently abandoned party list voting 
altogether in municipal elections with seemingly positive effects for democratic governance.  
Municipalities have become vibrant centers of democratic innovation, often driven by independent 
candidates who have won local elections in cities such as Bogotá and Medellín.   
5 These mixed elections systems are similar to the electoral systems for national elections in Germany and 
New Zealand. 
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increased noticeably in recent years.  In the three cities explored here, the quality of 
annual municipal reports has increased dramatically, often providing valuable 
information on local government finances and decisions.  Moreover, all three 
municipalities have dramatically improved the quality of information available on their 
websites, including basic information on municipal salaries and public works projects.  
Tijuana is notable for including a detailed list of public contracts on the city’s official 
website. 
Another important, though very recent, advance has been the approval of state 
“access to information” laws that allow citizens to access state and municipal documents 
on demand.  As of this writing, 25 of the country’s 32 states (including Mexico City) had 
passed such laws.  Most of these laws are of recent passage, however, and in many cases 
have not yet been fully implemented.  Therefore, it is difficult to know what impact they 
might have on citizens’ access to information about what their municipal governments’ 
do.  Of the three municipalities studied here, none, as of yet, has a functioning state law.  
Both the State of Mexico and, as of September 2005, Guerrero, have passed laws, but 
they have not yet taken effect.  The access to information law in Baja California remains 
a bill in the state legislature, and the governor firmly opposed.   
An important, but very recent, addition to this debate has been the passage of 
municipal access to information laws in both Tijuana and Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, as well 
as in a small number of other cities across the country.  The law in Neza seems to be 
particularly well-crafted, in that it provides a public listing of all municipal documents 
available to citizens in each municipal government department.  It also requires that the 
municipality publish all payments that government officials receive, including those that 
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fall outside their usual salary.  Publishing full payment information is significant since 
mayors in Mexico often use unreported “bonuses” as a way of buying support from 
council members or getting subordinates to make hefty campaign donations.  However, 
we need further research to determine how well this law is functioning in practice, since 
its implementation appears to rest on a commission named by the mayor.6
Although these are all very positive steps towards encouraging municipal 
transparency, citizens still have trouble knowing what their elected authorities are doing 
on their behalf.  Access to information laws, where they exist, help give citizens 
information after the fact on what their authorities have decided, but they give citizens 
little information on how decisions are made.  Despite requirements in all three cities 
studied here that council be meetings be open to the public, councils almost always meet 
behind closed doors.  In Tijuana council meetings are taped and put on the municipal 
website, but this provision is a long way from allowing citizens to be present in the 
hearings (and still allows for the council to edit the broadcast if they so choose).  In none 
of the cities are council meetings announced ahead of time or specific votes reported 
afterwards.  Since municipal corruption often involves favoritism in the awarding of 
contracts, allowing full access to hearings and a recording of decisions made by councils 
would help in detecting corruption as well as allow citizens to make more informed 
judgments about their elected authorities. 
Moreover, most municipalities still do not publish detailed financial data in a 
timely fashion.  Neza stands out for disclosing full information on salaries and bonuses, 
but few (if any) other municipalities do this.  Municipal budgets published often leave out 
 
6 The law was implemented after the end of my period of investigation so I do not have trustworthy 
evidence of how well it is functioning.   
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key financial data.  The budgets published in Chilpancingo have often left out municipal 
debt; in Neza published budgets have failed to note a large amount of federal transfers 
that are left unspent at the end of several fiscal years.   
 Given their physical closeness to citizens, municipalities should be more 
transparent than state or national governments.  However, the weaknesses in institutional 
design often make them less transparent than other levels of government.  Ironically, the 
federal government already has an extensive access to information law with an 
autonomous body that provides oversight.  Although not all hearings are public, decisions 
of the full Congress are published regularly and in a timely manner.  Municipal 
governments may be closer to citizens, but their institutional design has worked against 
them becoming more transparent than higher levels of government. 
 
Opportunities for Participation 
One kind of opportunity for participation is for citizens to have clear institutional 
channels to make demands to public authorities.  Many municipalities have created 
regulations to govern the role of neighborhood committees and require them to be elected 
in public assemblies or at the ballot box, as in all three cases in this project.  Despite this 
practice, these committees can generally only get their demands heard if they belong to 
clientelistic networks, “trade favors” with politicians, or belong to political groups within 
one of the parties.  In the three case studies, these practices range from a dense system of 
political engagement in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, where committees use membership in 
party factions to have influence; to Chilpancingo, where local committees generally 
belong to clientelistic networks; to Tijuana, where direct clientelism has been reduced but 
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replaced by a system in which citizens have little voice in public affairs.  In none of these 
cases do political leaders seem to place much emphasis on these committees except at 
election time, and these committees have few links among themselves that would allow 
them to scale up their engagement or function as arenas for deliberation on broader public 
issues.  In Neza, however, the committees have been perhaps more successful at getting 
their concerns heard, in large part because of their direct links to the political parties and 
the leaders of the major party factions. 
In addition to getting demands heard, a second way in which citizens might 
participate is in taking part in public discussion, deliberation, and decision making. In all 
three cases studied, mayors implemented systems of participatory planning and structured 
public deliberation.  These systems were generally set up to give citizens a role in 
decisions on investments in public infrastructure, although in Tijuana the municipality 
also created committees to address a number of cross-cutting concerns such as the 
environment, migration, and disability.  In one case, Chilpancingo, the participatory 
planning system existed in name only, since officials restricted the Municipal Planning 
Council meetings to those who had already benefited from municipal projects.  In Tijuana 
and Neza, in contrast, mayors implemented real systems of participatory planning with 
initially positive results.  In Neza, the Municipal Development Council became quite 
influential in infrastructure decisions during the first period of PRD government, but the 
next two mayors reduced its influence.  By the third period the mayor had succeeded in 
dividing the Council among political parties and party factions and thus eliminated it as a 
space for citizen engagement.  In Tijuana, the second and third PAN mayors 
implemented a wide-ranging system of elected citizen representatives to decide on 
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investments within several districts of the city, along with committees of government 
authorities and citizen organizations around key issue areas.  These bodies all met 
periodically in a citywide council that allowed citizens to have a voice in setting broad 
policy directions for the municipality.  However, by the fourth and fifth PAN 
administrations, the mayors had ensured that candidates favorable to the government 
would win most elections and thus eliminated these bodies as a space for real 
participation in deciding public priorities.   
The experiences of Tijuana and Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl suggest that local 
governments can serve as a vibrant arena for citizen engagement and public deliberation.  
However, the failure of these participatory systems indicates that local governments do 
not automatically play this role absent favorable conditions to do so.  Indeed, traditional 
political practices appear to have won out over new styles of participatory governance in 
all three municipalities. 
Chart 9.2 summarizes the findings with regards to democratic governance 
according to the indicators set forth in Chapter 3. 
 
Chart 9.2: Findings on Democratic Governance 




Representation All citizens have equal rights to vote or 
be voted for public office, as well as 
express opinions and organize 
autonomous organizations 
Elections are free and fair. 
An independent, respected electoral 
institution oversees the elections. 
Voting preferences are translated into 
In most places, the rights to organize, express 
opinions, and vote are respected; in some high-
violence areas these rights are still precarious 
The right to be voted is restricted to those who are 
members of a political party; independent 
candidacies are barred in all local elections 
Electoral institutions and tribunals are generally 
credible, although concerns remain 
Municipal parties receive supermajorities in all 
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representative bodies in roughly 
proportional amounts. 
Elected officials have incentives to be 
responsive to citizen demands. 
municipalities; second party usually is 
underrepresented 
Party list system and ban on reelection undermine 
council members’ sense of accountability to 
citizens and creates “upward accountability” to 
party leaders and other political authorities of 
their party 
Transparency There a legal framework that gives 
citizens access to municipal documents 
on demand. 
Municipal documents are published and 
made available regularly, especially 
city council resolutions, municipal 
development plans, annual budgets, 
infrastructure investment expenditures, 
contracted debt amounts, the salaries of 
high level municipal officials, and 
contracts with private parties. 
Municipal council meetings are generally 
open and their decisions are public 
record. 
Twenty-two states have access to information 
laws, but these are uneven in their scope and 
application; many states have resisted this 
innovation and few municipalities have separate 
laws on information access 
Information published by municipalities is very 
uneven—both among municipalities and within 
them from year to year—and what needs to be 
published is almost entirely at the discretion of the 
mayor; there is little consistent way for citizens to 
know what the municipality does unless the mayor 
chooses to inform on this 
Few municipal council meetings are open, even 
when rules require them to be. 
Participation Neighborhood councils serve as 
meaningful conduits for citizen 
concerns. 
Citizens have clear institutional channels 
for presenting demands to public 
authorities and for commenting on 
municipal initiatives. These channels 
are the real channels of participation 
and influence rather than informal 
networks based on personal relations 
and patronage. 
Participatory planning/participatory 
budgeting processes exist which 
involve a broad cross-section of 
citizens and have a real impact on 
deciding and monitoring investment 
decisions. 
Many municipalities appear to have regulations 
establishing official neighborhood committees, 
but rarely do these committees have clear 
institutional channels for engaging with public 
authorities unless they are willing to engage in 
political tradeoffs. 
The primary way that citizens get things done is 
through personal relationships with political 
leaders.  Official channels serve only as a 
formality.  Patronage and intra-party 
relationships remain paramount to influence in 
policy. 
Participatory planning exists in theory in many 
municipalities, but it rarely functions well unless 
the mayor is personally committed to it.  
Existing participatory planning systems tend to 
be used to legitimize decisions made by the 
mayor and (occasionally) council rather than to 
engage citizens in municipal affairs. 
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9.2 Interpretation: Understanding the Paradox 
 
The paradox of local empowerment is that empowering local governments does 
not necessarily empower citizens within those localities.  If local governments are closer 
to citizens, why do they fail in the cases explored here to generate substantially better 
democratic governance that could empower citizens as deliberators on public issues and 
the ultimate arbiters of public power?   
I argue that, at least in these three cases, the weight of the past overpowers the 
promise of the present; that is, the legacy of institutions and practices left over from an 
authoritarian period pervade the structure of municipalities and the behavior of key 
actors.  These legacies undermine the potential to generate better representation, greater 
transparency, and deeper citizen participation.  However, the different texture of state-
society relations in each of the three municipalities produces a somewhat different 
outcome for democratic governance in the process of decentralization.  Although none of 
the three municipalities produces the kind of vibrant democratic governance that 
proponents of decentralization might predict, each municipality produces a different kind 
of governance, some which augur far better for future democratic development than 
others.  Understanding the variations among the three municipal experiences turns out to 
be as important as understanding the commonalities among them.  In this section, I look 
first at the findings that are shared across the three cases and then examine the reasons for 




The Limits of Local Democratic Governance 
 
Why do elements of the old authoritarian order survive even in a period of 
democratic opening?  The answer does not appear to confirm the worst fears of the 
skeptics that municipalities would fall prey to weak institutions and the power of local 
elites.  Municipal governments suffer from significant weaknesses in institutional 
capacity, but their democratic failures are not principally a result of these.  Although elite 
capture may present a problem for the smallest municipalities, it does not seem to be part 
of the problem for most Mexican municipalities which have significant competition 
among two or more political parties.   
Rather, the old order survives, in large part, because political leaders have few 
incentives to change a system that is functional for their purposes, and social actors have 
too little influence to demand change.  The system of representation prevalent in Mexican 
municipalities—with no re-election, closed party lists, guaranteed majorities, and no 
independent candidacies—creates little downward accountability and, therefore, few 
reasons to pursue reforms that would democratize municipalities themselves.7 This lack 
of downward accountability means that municipal authorities have little sustainable 
interest in pursuing strategies for transparency and citizen participation.  Individual 
leaders may see a political benefit in measures designed to encourage a closer 
relationship between citizens and the municipality, particularly if they need to build a 
 
7 Municipal elections are set by state constitutions, not municipal law, so any changes would have to be 
made at the state level.  However, it is notable that municipal elected officials have displayed no interest in 
this topic. 
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new coalition for their party or their policies, as happened when opposition parties won 
for the first time in both Tijuana and Neza.  However, the lack of downward 
accountability greatly undermines the long-term incentive to sustain these measures once 
a party has built a strong electoral coalition.  The absence of a strong representative 
system that generates downward accountability thus undermines the possibilities for 
creating greater transparency and opportunities for citizen participation.  In much of the 
literature on participatory democracy, this is treated as a separate category from 
representative democracy or a better and deeper form of democratic practice.  These 
results indicate that neither participatory practices nor transparency measures are likely to 
emerge if representative democracy is not robust.  Participation and transparency are not 
alternatives to representation, but rather necessary 
Municipal democracy received a great deal of attention in 1980s and 1990s from 
opposition parties (primarily the PAN and PRD), because they saw the opening of 
competition as a way of prying open a closed political system.  However, no party has 
shown particular interest in changing the formal rules that govern municipal governance 
because these rules serve their interests.  The absence of reelection, the existence of party 
lists, and the prohibition on independent candidacies all ensure that local leaders are loyal 
to party and to more senior elected official of the party.  Moreover, having a 
supermajority in municipal council has proved beneficial to each party.  The PRI has 
fixed its sights on controlling the largest number of municipalities in the country; the 
PAN on controlling the largest municipalities.  The PRD has largely ignored 
municipalities in recent years as a strategy of achieving power (focusing instead on 
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control of Mexico City and a good showing in national elections).8 For the PRI and the 
PAN, supermajorities allow them to govern unfettered in their municipalities of 
influence.  Ceding majority control would mean they have less control over the 
municipalities that are most important to them. 
 Moreover, each party has a particular style of relating to citizens that is influenced 
by the legacy of the single party-dominant system that prevailed in Mexico for several 
decades.  The PRI has been and continues to be a mass-based party built on mobilizing 
citizens within the party framework through corporatist organizations and clientelistic 
networks.  The party operates through a network of intermediaries who resolve issues for 
citizens at community (or workplace) level and who, in turn, respond to higher level 
intermediaries within the party hierarchy.  Although this system is increasingly less 
effective than it once was, as more people fall outside these channels of mediation, it still 
works sufficiently well to win elections, especially when turnout is low or other parties 
fail to present strong alternatives.  
The PRD has been formed largely out of two currents: the traditional left, which 
built itself around mobilizing citizens in social movements outside the then hegemonic 
PRI; and excisions from the PRI, which have brought political leaders into the left who 
replicate their old party’s practices.  As the experience of Neza shows, the traditional left 
had to learn how to compete with the PRI by constructing its own networks of 
intermediaries who provided concrete benefits to its members.  Once in power, the PRD 
leaders in many ways have replicated the practices that they once fought against: they 
provide concrete public benefits to those associated with their own networks at the 
 
8 There was, a period in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the PRD focused extensively on 
municipalities; however, the party has since focused more on national elections. 
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expense of the larger public. The left has long employed a discourse of inclusive social 
participation, and has been responsible over the years for many of the most creative 
attempts at generating participatory institutional channels, but this discourse contrasts 
with the PRD’s de facto structure, which is based on layers of intermediaries.  Ironically, 
the clientelism of the PRI led to a clientelism of the left.  In some cases these practices 
within the PRD are a result of PRI leaders migrating to the PRD and bringing with them 
their ways of conducting politics.  However, frequently, as in Neza, the left generated its 
own clientelistic and personalistic networks as a means of counteracting the clientelism 
of the PRI.  In some cases, as in Neza, it is very likely that the PRD’s systems of 
intermediaries are less hierarchically structured than the PRI’s systems and, as a result, 
more open to citizen demands.  While the PRI’s intermediaries are often vertically 
integrated within a corporatist hierarchy, the PRD’s intermediaries appear to be 
horizontally distributed and in constant competition with each other.  Citizens thus have 
more options about which intermediaries to use for their purposes.9
The PAN has followed a different path.  In response to the PRI’s ability to 
penetrate society, including most opposition organizations, the PAN constituted itself as a 
small party with closed membership.  At election time it reached out to unaffiliated 
voters, but it kept its actual membership small and protected.  The PAN made it 
especially difficult for people to join the party, relying instead on small cadres of long-
standing members to be candidates and organizers.  The party’s liberal orientation has 
 
9 In both cases, these are tendencies: the PRI has some competition among intermediaries within 
neighborhoods and labor fields, for example among organizations that represent street vendors in Neza; 
however, it is more common for the PRI to have only one set of intermediaries in each neighborhood, as in 
Chilpancingo and Neza.  In contrast, the PRD may have multiple intermediaries in any given neighborhood 
or labor field, and there is no central leadership capable of settling the disputes over “clients” among these 
intermediaries. 
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given its members a strong belief in citizens’ right to engage in public affairs as 
individuals, unmediated by corporatist or clientelistic networks.  As a result, elected PAN 
officials, as was the case in Tijuana, have often been inclined to find institutional ways of 
involving unaffiliated citizens in governance once the party wins municipal governments.  
However, the PAN has not been willing, to this day, to open itself significantly to new 
members.  Despite winning the presidential election in 2000, the PAN continues to have 
only 221,599 full members nationally out of almost 65 million registered voters.10 The 
two models live in permanent tension for PAN governments.  On one hand, a small party 
elite sees itself as responsible for directing public affairs; on the other hand, party leaders 
want to engage individual citizens in public affairs through institutional channels.  In the 
case of Tijuana, the vision of a participatory democracy lost out over time to the practice 
of an efficient government directed by the party faithful.  Not surprisingly, this pattern 
has been replicated in other cities governed by the PAN, such as Ciudad Juárez and León, 
where vibrant participatory experiences gradually lost their impact within municipal 
governance. 
Citizens, faced with governments that allow no public channels for ongoing 
citizen voice and deliberative input into public affairs, resort to the only means they have 
for political influence, short of rebellion: personalistic and clientelistic networks that give 
them some means of access to elected authorities on decisions that affect their lives.  This 
dependency is augmented by the arbitrary enforcement of the law and vast economic 
 
10 Official data of the PAN, published on the party’s website: www.pan.org.mx/padronAN/index.aspx,
accessed October 16, 2005.  There are another 876,802 registered “sympathizers,” who have fewer rights 
and obligations within the party structure.  There were 64.71 million voters registered nationally in the 
2003 elections.  Data on registered voters from Instituto Federal Electoral, “Comparativo de Participación 
Ciudadana a Nivel Nacional: Estadística de las Elecciones Federales de 1991-2003,” available at 
www.ife.gob.mx, accessed January 8, 2006. 
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disparities, which make personal connections to people in high places a form of insurance 
policy against disaster, especially for the poor.  Dependency on personal political ties, in 
turn, undercuts citizens’ ability to make demands for greater transparency, better electoral 
rules, or institutional channels of participation.  It replicates a long-standing history in 
Mexico of indirect citizenship, where citizens must rely on intermediaries to make their 
voices heard or enforce their basic rights. 
As a result, civil society in Mexico has also been affected by the legacies of 
authoritarianism.  During the period of one party dominant rule, social organizations had 
to operate at the margins of the political party system, negotiating their demands in return 
for supporting the party in power.  During this period, many social organizations, such as 
the Inhabitants Restoration Movement (MRC) in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, ended up co-
opted by the PRI.  Others, such as Cucutac in Tijuana, found refuge and support in parties 
of the left as a bulwark against co-optation.  Few were able to maintain a margin of 
independence from political parties.  In the three cases studied, Chilpancingo presents a 
model where most social organizations, with some independent mobilization at the 
margins, have been incorporated within the governing PRI.  Chilpancingo continues to 
present patterns of political incorporation of social organizations within a single party 
similar to most Mexican municipalities fifteen or twenty years earlier.  Tijuana is a case 
of thin social organization, due in large part to the demographic and economic mobility 
of the city.  A few autonomous non-governmental organizations, largely geared to social 
assistance, operate in the city, but there are few strong community-based organizations.  
Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, in contrast, is a densely organized city, with dozens of social 
organizations with strong community bases.  These groups are almost always affiliated 
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with either the PRD or PRI and with specific political groups within these parties.   Neza 
has few truly independent civil society organizations, though it does have a dense texture 
of organization within the political parties.   In none of the three cities do we find strong 
independent social organizations capable of challenging the government in power. 
 The media, which might offer another venue for citizen participation, are 
similarly weak in most localities in Mexico. At a national level, the media have played an 
important role in monitoring public officials, pushing for transparency laws, and giving 
citizens a voice on major demands for political changes.  However, most local media in 
Mexico remain dependent on the goodwill of a few key political or government leaders 
for their advertising revenue.  Major national media can diversify among different levels 
of government (often run by different political parties), numerous public agencies 
(including several autonomous ones), and a mixture of public and private sector 
companies.  In contrast, local media often depend almost entirely on the business of a few 
state government departments, the dominant political parties, and major urban 
municipalities.  This dependency reduces their margin of autonomy to monitor and 
critique state and municipal governments.   
 The paradox of local empowerment is thus maintained by a combination of old 
institutions that create upward accountability, political parties with few incentives to 
change the status quo, and civil society and media organizations unable to create a 
demand for change from the outside.  In this context, institutions and practices developed 
during authoritarian times persist in a period of political competition.  This perseverance 
of the old order in the new, in turn, limits the ability of decentralization to produce better 
democratic governance.  It also limits the consolidation of Mexico’s democracy by 
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preserving old patterns of state-society relations even as the political system becomes 
increasingly open and competitive. 
These findings also suggest an important theoretical insight.  The potential for 
stronger and deeper forms of democratic practice—those that allow for greater citizen 
voice and monitoring between elections—depends in large measure on the quality of 
representative democracy.  In much of the literature, participatory democracy is seen as 
an alternative to representation or as a corrective for its inability to give citizens a greater 
role in the political process.  In contrast, these findings suggest that a democratic system 
that lacks strong and effective institutions for representation is unlikely to develop 
sustainable opportunities for citizen participation or mechanisms for transparency.  Only 
public authorities who are responsive and accountable primarily to citizens are likely to 
innovate in strategies for giving citizens greater voice and allowing them to monitor 
public decisions.  In Mexico, a substantial part of the problem for both participation and 
transparency appears to be derived from the lack of strong systems of representation in 
municipalities.  This problem is then compounded by legacies of the past, the preferences 
of political parties for a closed political system and the weaknesses of civil society and 
the media to serve as a counterweight.   
 
The Variations in Democratic Governance 
 
Despite limitations in each of the three cases explored, the cities each display 
somewhat different effects of decentralization on democratic governance.  I argue that 
these differences result from distinct patterns of state-society relations—in particular, the 
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way citizens are linked to the political process—in each municipality prior to 
decentralization.  In particular, municipalities where social organizations independent 
from the government existed prior to decentralization – these municipalities appear to 
develop more democratic practices of governance after decentralization.  However, the 
way these organizations are linked to the political process is also quite important. 
 In the case of Chilpancingo, few social organizations outside the PRI existed prior 
to decentralization.  During the 1980s and early 1990s, several community groups did 
come together to form a larger urban popular movement; however, this movement was 
never as strong in Chilpancingo as in other cities in Mexico and faded during the course 
of the 1990s.  By the time the municipality gained greater authority and autonomy those 
social organizations that still existed outside the PRI were small and atomized.  Similarly, 
most media in the city maintained a close relationship with the PRI since the only sources 
of advertising were the state and city governments, both in the hands of that party.  In this 
environment, the PRI has succeeded in maintaining its electoral edge, and PRI-affiliated 
governments have made little attempt to implement initiatives to make government more 
transparent or to engage citizens as participants or deliberators in public affairs.  The 
party itself is changing, allowing new sectors of society to gain influence within the PRI; 
however, this has not affected the nature of governance as yet.  Figure 9.1 shows, in a 
simplified schematic way, the nature of state-society relations in Chilpancingo.  Although 
the nature of political groups and intermediaries change, most of the channels of 
influence remain vertically integrated within the PRI. 
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Figure 9.1: Schematic Representation of State-Society Relations in Chilpancingo 
 
Note: The stars represent citizens; the lines channels for negotiation between key social and political actors 
with the dotted lines representing weak relationships and the solid lines strong relationships.  This 
schematic diagram necessarily oversimplifies the relationships but it is intended to show a general 
framework for the dominant forms of interactions between state and society. 
 
In contrast, the PAN came to power in Tijuana slightly before the push for 
decentralization took place in Mexico, and PAN-affiliated governments helped push this 
process further by experimenting with debt financing, the first lawsuit over municipal 
jurisdiction, and the creation of a national mayors’ association.  Tijuana had never had a 
strong network of PRI social organizations similar to that in most other Mexican cities, 
and the left similarly failed to develop a strong base of social organizations.  Although 
Tijuana had had an important urban popular movement in the early 1980s, in response to 
the city’s rapid urbanization, this movement lost strength in the late 1980s as the state and 
city governments expanded their land titling program.   The city has had numerous small 
non-governmental organizations and neighborhood-based associations, but these have 
rarely achieved any significant scale.  Rapid migration to the city and a relatively high 
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degree of economic mobility reduced the incentives for the city’s inhabitants to form or 
join social organizations either in or outside of political parties.  In some ways, this city 
of independent citizens seemed highly suited to a PAN administration that sought to 
create participatory mechanisms for citizens to become engaged in policy outside of 
corporatist and clientelistic channels.    
Indeed, the experiences under the second and third PAN governments in Tijuana 
showed some of the best design elements for good democratic governance: expanding 
representation in the council; increased transparency; and a well-designed structure for 
citizen participation.  In particular, the attempt to create a structure for citizen 
participation served to give citizens a direct voice in policy decisions that affected them 
and built arenas for public deliberation among citizens in different communities and with 
public authorities.  However, this effort failed to create a strong base of stakeholders who 
could carry the process forward when later PAN mayors failed to support the process.  
This city filled with unorganized, independent citizens was ideally suited to a 
participatory approach to governance that would bypass traditional political 
intermediaries; but it was poorly suited to maintaining these practices when political 
leaders lost interest.  The fact that most social organizations had few ties to the political 
parties allowed for a deeper form of citizen participation while the participatory 
mechanisms lasted.  However, since the social organizations also had few ties among 
themselves, they were unable to defend the process against the vagaries of politics. Over 
time the innovations in transparency and representation also lost steam in the face of a 
lack of organized social pressure – a pressure that could have driven them forward when 
political leaders lost interest and commitment to democratic change.  Figure 9.2 presents 
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a rough schematic representation of state-society relations in Tijuana, showing that the 
only strong state-society relationship is between the PAN and the municipal government, 
while most other citizens and committees are only weakly or indirectly linked to the 
municipality. 
 
Figure 9.2: Schematic Representation of State-Society Relations in Tijuana 
Note: The stars represent citizens; the lines channels for negotiation between key social and political actors 
with the dotted lines representing weak relationships and the solid lines strong relationships.  This 
schematic diagram necessarily oversimplifies the relationships but it is intended to show a general 
framework for the dominant forms of interactions between state and society. 
 
Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, on the other hand, has long had a dense set of social 
organizations.   The PRI formed its own social organizations within the party, and several 
independently created social organizations, such as the MRC, affiliated with the party as 
a strategy for pursuing their demands.  At the same time, the pressure of an expanding 








affiliated with the left.  These left movements would eventually join together to create the 
PRD in Neza and launch a successful candidacy for mayor in 1996 at the same time that 
decentralization began to empower the municipal government with newfound autonomy 
and authority.  Most social organizations remain within these two parties and are 
represented by intermediaries who serve as a bridge between average citizens and 
government authorities.  To a large extent, the participatory mechanisms that have been 
attempted in Neza have empowered these intermediaries, who compete in elections for 
the Participation Councils, serve in the Municipal Development Council, and aspire to 
join the Municipal Council or the administration.  Politics in Neza is carried out as a 
series of negotiations among leaders of political groups, who in turn depend on these 
intermediaries to mobilize support at election time.  The intermediaries, in return, 
communicate citizens’ concerns to the leaders who have the power to resolve problems. 
 In Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, decentralization has not produced vibrant democratic 
governance that engages individual citizens but rather a competitive market of 
intermediaries who represent citizens.  The existing participatory arenas involve strategic 
bargaining among these intermediaries and between intermediaries and public authorities.  
On the face of it, this competitive market of intermediaries would seem to be far inferior 
to Tijuana’s once participatory approach that engaged individual citizens in deliberation 
about public affairs.  However, whereas Tijuana experienced the decay of its 
participatory mechanisms, leaving citizens without a means to have their voices heard, 
Neza continues to have a complex array of intermediaries who compete among each 
other to represent citizens’ voices.  This approach to democratic governance through 
competing intermediaries is far inferior in promise to the notion of individually engaged 
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citizens, but it turns out to be far more sustainable.  Even when public authorities have 
wanted to eliminate the participation councils, for example, they have been unable to do 
so because they create strong incentives for organized groups to defend them.  The 
continued persistence of strong social organizations tied to the political parties in Neza 
undermines the emergence of more direct and deliberative forms of citizen participation, 
but it also helps sustain what spaces for citizen voice currently exist against the 
ambivalence of political leaders.  Figure 9.3 shows a rough schematic representation of 
state-society relations in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl showing the multiple and overlapping 
relationships between the government and social actors. 
 
Figure 9.3: Schematic Representation of State-Society Relations in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl 
N
ote: The stars represent citizens; the lines channels for negotiation between key social and political actors 
with the dotted lines representing weak relationships and the solid lines strong relationships.  This 
schematic diagram necessarily oversimplifies the relationships but it is intended to show a general 
framework for the dominant forms of interactions between state and society. 
In a political system that is as party-centric as that of Mexican municipalities, the 
existence of strong social organizations tied to the parties may be the best means citizens 










does little to promote deliberation.  When these organizations are tied only to one 
dominant party, as in the case of Chilpancingo, they are unlikely to serve as motors of 
change.  However, when they exist in competing parties, it is possible that they may 
generate a market of competing intermediaries, as in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, and this 
process, in turn, gives citizens options for getting their voice heard.  This arrangement is 
far from ideal; citizens still depend on intermediaries to put forth demands, but they get to 
choose who they entrust with their demands, both between parties and within parties, 
which sets up a degree of competition by these intermediaries to represent citizens.  In 
some cases, real deliberation may take place in neighborhoods and social groups, which 
are then represented strategically through intermediaries; however, this subject needs 
further research.  Nonetheless, the system itself does nothing to encourage deliberation 
among groups or communities or between these and public authorities.  The existence of 
an independent, unorganized citizenry, as in Tijuana, may be suitable for deeper forms of 
democratic engagement and public deliberation, but activating this potential depends on 
political will or on linking citizens together through larger, more complex forms of social 
organization than currently exist.  For the reasons put forth above, we should be skeptical 
that any party can long maintain political will to innovate in favor of better democratic 
governance under the existing institutional rules of Mexican municipalities.11 
These findings suggest that there may at times be a tradeoff between channels that 
provide effective citizen input into public decisions and those that generate deliberative 
modes of citizen engagement.  The Tijuana model generated a more deliberative 
 
11 For a complementary argument about why participatory budgeting in Brazil works better in some 
municipalities than others, based on the configurations of state-society relations, see Leonardo Avritzer, 
“Presupuesto Participativo en Tres Contextos,” presentation at the seminar on Decentralización, Iniciativas 
Locales y Ciudadanía organized by the Woodrow Wilson Center and Fundación Pent in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, December 17, 2005. 
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approach but ultimately proved of limited use in providing citizen voice in the political 
process.  The model in Neza is far less deliberative (or even internally democratic); 
however, it has proven fairly resilient in providing an ongoing channel for citizen voice.  
Given the choice, most citizens would probably prefer an effective channel for input to 
one that is ideally deliberative.  It remains to be seen, however, if effective, but 
nondeliberative models of citizen participation, such as that in Neza, might transition 
over time into more deliberative arenas for citizen engagement and under what conditions 
this might be possible. 
 
9.3 Recommendations: Getting Beyond the Paradox 
Political competition, even among political elites and party intermediaries, is still 
far better than virtual one party rule; however, it is a far cry from the kind of democratic 
energies that decentralization is supposed to release by allowing citizens to participate 
actively in public affairs, know what their leaders are doing, and get them to respond to 
their concerns and be accountable to them.  The existing state of affairs of local 
democracy in Mexico remains quite distant from the normative understanding of 
democracy as a system of institutionalized public deliberation. 
This research points to the importance of knowing the context of prevailing 
electoral institutions and political practices in order to understand the impact of 
decentralization on democratic governance.  As a result, its findings also point toward a 
set of policy recommendations that may address some of the particular concerns raised 
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about local democratic governance in Mexico and may be the basis for improving the 
democratic impact of decentralization.  None of these are easy to achieve, but given the 
right combination of circumstances—inspired leadership, strategic coalitions, or public 
pressure—these recommendations might find opportunities for advancement.   Despite 
the incentives against change, reforms in one state are likely to create a demonstration 
effect that may lead to change in other states.  Reforms that strengthen social 
organizations may particularly generate virtuous cycles that strengthen democratic 
governance over time.  It is important to emphasize, however, that democratic change is 
cannot be reduced to a question of institutional engineering; rather, it requires 
simultaneous attention to institutions and to the configuration of state-society relations. 
Reforming Electoral Institutions: Four aspects of the current system undercut 
responsive and accountable representation and would benefit from change: party list 
systems with party leaders’ control over candidacies; provisions granting automatic 
majorities to winning parties; the prohibition on reelection; and the prohibition on 
independent candidacies.  Allowing reelection would give policymakers incentives to pay 
attention to constituents’ concerns and citizens a chance to reward or punish their elected 
officials.  If this change were coupled with a mixed electoral system that combines 
district and at-large elections for municipal council, it would be far easier for citizens to 
hold their council members accountable.  Although this newfound accountability would 
most directly affect the district council members, it would also increase citizen awareness 
of the council members and their role overall.  Eliminating supermajorities for the 
winning party would further force politicians to listen to voters and build coalitions if 
they could not obtain a majority.  Losing parties would have a meaningful role in the 
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council and winning parties could not take the opposition for granted.  Finally, 
introducing independent candidacies in local elections would allow people to run citizen 
slates if they could not work through the parties.  Given the degree of closed entry into 
the parties, this would go a long way toward ensuring that all citizens can “vote and be 
voted.”12 
Improving Access to Information: Several efforts could be undertaken to ensure 
that citizens have greater access to information about what their municipal officials do 
and decide.  The existence of access to information laws that apply to municipal 
governments is a good first step, especially if these include guarantees of privacy to the 
person who requests information, covers all documents produced by the municipalities, 
and is overseen by an autonomous council with sufficient resources to comply with their 
mandate.  In addition to this, municipalities would benefit from efforts to create laws and 
regulations (either at the state or municipal level) that govern public access to municipal 
council meetings and minimum standards of reporting on municipal finances, salaries, 
and council decisions.  Since many citizens have limited access to the internet and cannot 
make trips to the state capital, municipal transparency laws that prove systems for 
obtaining documents directly from the municipality would be especially helpful. 
Improving Participatory Models:  The models for citizen participation developed 
 
12 Guatemala has a system of independent candidacies, called civic committees, where local organizations 
can register their own list for municipal elections.  These have never governed in more than 8% of all 
municipalities at the same time (and usually fewer), but the experiences to date appear to be quite positive 
and they have forced the political parties to improve their practices.  See Jesus Puente Alcaraz and Luis 
Felipe Linares López, “A General View of the Institutional State of Decentralization in Guatemala,” in 
Joseph S. Tulchin and Andrew Selee, eds., Decentralization and Democratic Governance in Latin America, 
Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2004, especially pp.  256-57. Similarly, Colombia allows 
independent candidacies in local elections.  This provision has been credited with producing more dynamic 
governments at a local level and unleashing a process of municipal innovation.  See Gabriel Murillo and 
Victoria Gómez, eds., Redefinición del espacio público: eslabonamiento conceptual y seguimiento de las 
políticas públicas en Colombia, Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 2005. 
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in Tijuana and Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl provide an excellent guide to what is possible if 
authorities want to implement a serious program of citizen engagement.  The Tijuana 
model, as initially implemented, provides several design elements that make it a 
particularly appealing approach.  It included thirteen citizen councilors from each district 
of the city who were elected as individuals, rather than on a slate of candidates, thus 
reducing partisan interference and making it more possible for individuals not associated 
with parties to win seats.  It also included a parallel set of sectoral committees that dealt 
with substantive, cross-cutting issues, such as the environment, migration, disability, and 
public security.  In a context where many urban issues affect different populations, these 
sectoral committees provided an opportunity to build cross-class dialogue on major 
policy issues, while the district committees dealt with investment decisions in specific 
zones.  The model also allowed for frequent meeting among all of the various 
committees, which engaged citizens in deliberation over major, city-wide priorities rather 
than just their own community and sectoral concerns.  Finally, the Tijuana model made 
all policy issues pass through the participatory planning structure for discussion but with 
final decision-making authority left to the elected city council, whose members chair the 
various committees.  With a mayor who gave serious attention to the system, it both gave 
citizens an influential voice in almost every aspect of public policy and gave them direct 
access to elected officials, but also preserved the ultimate authority of the elected 
representatives. 
The Tijuana model, however, lacked two important elements. First, it included no 
formal mechanism for the government and citizen councilors to report back to citizens at 
large within their neighborhoods.  This reporting mechanism is an important element 
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built into many participatory budgeting processes in Brazil.  Secondly, this model did 
little to resolve non-infrastructure related issues within each of the districts.  Here the 
model employed in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl to create elected citizen participation councils 
with their office in the municipality and with official stationery is particularly appealing.  
Even with scant attention from the municipality, the participation councils have a legal 
mandate to speak on a range of issues affecting their districts.  With a real commitment 
from municipal authorities, this model could provide a potent link between citizens and 
the government and institutionalize a range of demands that now have to be channeled 
through informal contacts and clientelistic networks. 
Strengthen Civic Organizations and Independent Media: Perhaps the most 
important set of reforms deal with how to strengthen civic organizations and independent 
media.  As argued above, the existence of strong social organizations linked to political 
parties appears to be the single best determinant of sustaining a political process that 
empowers citizens’ voices.  Strengthening the voice of citizens through organized groups 
inside and outside of political parties and in independent media would go a long way to 
motivating political leaders to innovate in favor of better democratic governance and to 
sustain these innovations over time.  However, for organizations outside of parties to be 
effective they need to have sufficient ties among themselves so as to have an impact on 
the political system.  Where autonomous organizations exist with few links among 
themselves, as in Tijuana, they tend to become irrelevant to political decision-makers.  In 
the much vaunted experience of Porto Alegre in Brazil, for example, the presence of 
strong social organizations outside of the governing Workers’ Party (PT) forced PT 
governments to implement and maintain participatory budgeting as a means of 
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channeling the multiple voices of civil society that otherwise might have proved a 
challenge to their continuance in office.13 The absence of strong civic and media 
organizations in Mexican municipalities means that they have little external pressure for 
change or to sustain innovation when it does occur. 
None of these reforms alone would change state-society relations automatically or 
magically transform democratic governance in Mexico’s municipalities.  However, each 
would make a step in the right direction; taken together they would be a powerful force 
for change.  The institutional changes in representation would certainly improve the 
responsiveness and accountability of elected officials.  Laws and regulations on access to 
information would give citizens more direct knowledge of what decisions public 
authorities make.  Serious attempts at participatory planning would create a powerful 
engagement of citizens in the political process and institutional mechanisms for citizen 
voice and deliberation that could, eventually, replace the informal processes for 
conducting politics through clientelism and particularism.  Most importantly, 
strengthening civic organizations and independent media could both help stimulate 
change and provide a means to sustain it over time.   
 
9.4 Broader Lessons: Deepening Democracy in Latin America 
The findings of this study shed light on why decentralization has not gone further 
in improving democratic governance in Mexico and also how the effect of 
decentralization varies among municipalities depending on the nature of state-society 
 
13 Marcus Melo, “Democratizing Budgetary Decisions and Execution in Brazil.” 
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relations.  The lessons of this study, however, go far beyond understanding the impact of 
decentralization; they also shed light on some of the broader challenges of democracy, 
especially in Latin America. 
Democracy in Latin America is in a crisis.  Opinion polls have consistently shown 
moderately declining public support for democracy in most countries in the region and a 
growing dissatisfaction with the way actual democracies work.14 In part, the public’s 
confidence in democracy has to do with the “output” side of these democracies: most 
countries in Latin America, including Mexico, have gone through democratic transitions 
at the same time that they have faced economic crises, increasing inequality, and an 
overall slowdown in growth.15 For the most part, this result appears not to reflect failures 
of democracy, per se, but of simultaneous processes of democratization and economic 
stagnation.  Indeed, in many countries, economic crises forced authoritarian regimes to 
open the political system, as in Mexico, but democracies have been unable to revive the 
economy sufficiently to win full public confidence.  
However, some of the citizens’ loss of faith in democracy also reflects “input” 
factors that have to do with the way these democracies operate.  Citizens often do not 
find that their democracies produce governments that are accountable and responsive or 
create opportunities for their involvement in public decision-making.  Democracies face 
declining public confidence, in part, because they are insufficiently democratic. This 
 
14 See “The Latinobarometro Polls: Democracy’s Low-Level Equilibrium,” The Economist, August 12, 
2004.  In particular, the time series of the question “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of 
government” is telling: it shows a decline in recent years in almost every country in the region, including 
Mexico.  See also Informe Latinobarómetro 1995-2005, Santiago, Chile: Corporación Latinobarómetro, 
2005, especially p. 52; and Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens Democracy, New York: 
United Nations Development Program, 2004.   
15 Kurt Weyland, “The Input and Output Sides of Democracy,” unpublished paper presented at the seminar 
on “the Study of New Democracies in Latin American and Elsewhere: Reflections on the 25th Anniversary 
of the ‘Transitions Project’” held at the Woodrow Wilson Center on Friday, October 1, 2004. 
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study points to several of the key elements in this failure, at least for Mexico; however, I 
suspect that many of the results analyzed here are likely to have a broader resonance in 
other countries of the region.  Systems of representation create perverse incentives that 
keep elected authorities from being responsive and accountable to citizens; as a result, 
public authorities have few incentives to pursue transparency measures or to create 
opportunities for citizen participation outside of preexisting channels based on informal 
exchanges through political intermediaries.  Old practices of clientelism and 
particularism thus persist and remain the primary way that citizens are linked to the 
political process.  As a result, citizenship remains indirect for most people—that is, they 
have to appeal to political intermediaries to have their concerns heard by public 
authorities and, in many cases, to enforce their rights.  The weak enforcement of 
citizenship rights further enforces the persistence of indirect citizenship.  Since rule of 
law is weak and citizens have few hopes of obtaining state benefits without political 
connections, they depend on these intermediaries as an alternative to enforceable rights.   
However, the quality of democracy also shows substantial variation across 
localities within each country.  The findings here suggest that the way institutions 
develop and political and social actors interact help shape this varied texture.  In the case 
of Mexico, the institutional structure of politics differs little from place to place.  
However, the nature of state-society relationship does vary considerably.  Where civil 
society organizations are strong and linked effectively to the political system, there 
appears to be greater possibility that the political process will reflect citizens’ views.  
Where independent media have the ability to monitor and critique public authorities, 
there is more likelihood of transparency.  While further research is needed to determine 
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the exact configurations of state-society relations that produce the most effective forms of 
democratic governance, it is clear that new democracies in Latin America are likely to 
show great variations in the quality of governance across different municipalities.  These 
differences will become increasingly important as municipalities increase their authority 
and autonomy within the state.  These differences will matter a great deal for the way 
citizens experience democracy and how they evaluate its worth over time.  
 
